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Introducing Vigilant Audiences
Daniel Trottier, Rashid Gabdulhakov and  
Qian Huang
In nearly any context, people are attentive and judgemental when it 
comes to the affairs of others. Vigilant audiences entail a range of 
phenomena, span geographic areas and vary in their motivations as 
well as their affiliations. This watching can escalate to vigilantism if 
audiences witness something that demands a response. We understand 
digitally mediated vigilantism to include practices where citizens (or 
digital media users more generally) are offended by other citizen actions, 
and retaliate through practices and repertoires that include mobile 
devices and social platforms (Trottier, 2017). As a global development, 
digital media audiences denounce and bear witness to criminal and 
moral offences. They consume footage of these events, but also take a 
collective role in scrutinising and seeking retribution against targets. 
Two examples illustrate some of the concerns explored in this edited 
volume.
First, consider the global response to the Charlottesville ‘Unite the 
Right’ rally in 2017 (covered in Milbrandt’s chapter in this volume). In 
response to images of torch-bearing crowds chanting racist and anti-
Semitic slogans, it is not difficult to imagine why witnesses denounced 
these participants, and sought to hold them accountable by any available 
means. Here, digital media audiences felt compelled to bear witness to 
racial hatred, in order to prevent future rallies and comparable incidents. 
As we shall see in later chapters, audiences were asked to share 
information about the participants, as well as to join in denouncing 
them. Yet even consuming these images appears to carry social 
importance, as it involves recognising political developments for what 
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they are, and recognising white nationalists for who they are, in order to 
assert that they will not be accepted in society. The backlash against 
these images can be understood as positive developments as they call 
out — or openly denounce — troubling instances of racial hatred that 
could otherwise be normalised and accepted.
We can contrast this case to a second instance of mediated 
denunciation. Roughly six months before Charlottesville, a sixty-eight-
year-old woman in the Netherlands was caught on camera pocketing 
someone else’s wallet. Camera footage of the incident circulated on a 
regional crime-fighting programme, and the woman turned herself in 
to the police. The footage continued to circulate, and ended up on a 
local video hosting site where it garnered an additional half-a-million 
views (Baard, 2017; Trottier, 2018). The website includes a comments 
section where the audience published vitriolic and malicious comments. 
Shortly afterwards, the woman took her own life. Mediated scrutiny 
and denunciation led to an outcome that defies any sense of justice or 
proportionality. Even relatively minor forms of ridicule and shaming 
can culminate in insurmountable harm, especially for those who may 
be marginalised or otherwise vulnerable. Shaming in particular is a 
collective assault on a target’s social standing and self-worth. Much 
like the Charlottesville backlash, audiences varied in the extent of 
their engagement with mediated coverage. Yet simply having watched 
the video contributes to its metrics on the Internet, and contributes 
to an imagined audience-cum-jury of peers. In both cases, people are 
consuming images and responding to them in a way that may seem 
just or at least minimally harmful at the level of any single person’s 
actions. Cumulatively, they serve a powerful and pivotal role in terms of 
scrutinising the worth of a fellow citizen.
While these incidents emerged in response to particular events, 
ranging from shoplifting to white-nationalist rallies, vigilantism may 
persist through pre-existing groups. Despite the seemingly ‘disruptive’ 
nature of digital technologies, those who experience the greatest harm 
may be those who have historically faced social disadvantages and 
vulnerabilities. Consider the plight of Kyrgyz migrant workers in Russia, 
notably the scrutiny and violence leveraged against women by their 
families and peers (Gabdulhakov, 2019). Local communities back home 
consume footage of the abuse of female migrants abroad in response 
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to accusations that they were seen interacting with non-Kyrgyz men. 
While digital media technologies allow this harmful and denunciatory 
content to circulate globally, they also mobilise communities that are 
locally entrenched. Other examples of such vulnerabilities include the 
case of sexual minorities who fall target to vigilantes amid a broader 
social stigma. In Russia, non-heterosexual relations are interpreted as 
perversion, generating a ‘ripe’ atmosphere ‘for opportunistic uses’ when 
it comes to ‘moral entrepreneurship’ in vigilante practices (Favarel-
Garrigues, 2019, pp. 4, 6). 
Longstanding forms of moral scrutiny and justice-seeking are linked 
up with a connected and pervasive media landscape. It is possible to 
focus on emerging developments, including large-scale decentralised 
social coordination among digital media users, as well as the reach of 
wearable and otherwise socially embedded technologies. These novelties 
may lead us to believe that users are uniquely empowered through 
new media practices. Yet we are also witnessing the reproduction and 
furthering of existing relations and behaviours. Vigilant audiences 
are an extension of public and pre-digital gatherings like Russia’s 
comrades’ courts (Gabdulhakov, 2018) and China’s village pact or 
‘pidou’ during the Cultural Revolution (Huang et al., 2020), but also 
other contemporary mediated publics assembled by crime-based reality 
television (Schlesinger & Tumber, 1993), and a denunciatory tabloid 
press (Johansson, 2007). We need to consider how these inform and 
shape citizen-led scrutiny and denunciation through digital media, 
especially when formal media actors like newspapers and broadcast 
media also increasingly maintain an audience base on platforms like 
Twitter and Facebook (Chadwick, 2017).
Digital vigilantes seek job losses and embodied interventions 
against their targets, and typically express their disapproval through 
denunciation, shaming and doxing (sourcing and circulating any 
available information about them, see Douglas’ chapter in this volume). 
In using the term vigilantism to describe these digitally mediated 
practices, we draw upon scholarly perspectives that conceptualise an 
otherwise value-laden label. Moncada points to five core dimensions 
when speaking about vigilantism, including ‘social organisation, target, 
repertoire, justification and motivation’ (2017, p. 407). Each of these 
raises complexities that we will briefly address.
4 Introducing Vigilant Audiences
First, vigilantes may be either individually or collectively organised, 
and as a collective can be formalised or relatively informal (ibid.). 
Although earlier definitions treated spontaneous forms of self-defence 
as distinct from vigilantism, the kinds of connectivity afforded to digital 
media users (van Dijck & Poell, 2013) complicate this distinction. For 
example, an individual can spontaneously upload footage of racial 
abuse to their Twitter account, without much forethought about desired 
audiences or intended outcomes. Yet intended outcomes may be 
determined later on by an assembly of users who coalesce around this 
incident. When it comes to gathering an audience around an actionable 
event, we can consider instances where an audience is pre-assembled 
in relation to a media franchise (as Driessen does in her contribution 
to this book), as well as cases like the Charlottesville rally where an 
audience is brought together afterwards.
Second, (digital) vigilantism is centred on a target, who is deemed 
to have violated a certain social order. As Moncada (2017) points out, 
this may involve criminal acts as well as actions and utterances that are 
morally offensive. It bears noting that the ease with which offending 
images and videos can circulate online means that these manifestations 
occur largely outside any single jurisdiction. Moreover, moral 
denunciations can be an opportunity to seek legal and institutional 
reform, as has been the case in the #metoo movement (North, 2019). 
When it comes to selecting a target of denunciation, it is not just the 
specific individual who may come under scrutiny. Rather, this can 
spread to a broader category of target. This is once again evident in light 
of #metoo, where the denunciatory focus includes not only the alleged 
predator, but also norms and beliefs that serve to tolerate sexual abuse. 
Yet vigilante acts against members of vulnerable and marginalised 
communities more broadly can also serve to increase the scrutiny and 
repression conducted by the community at large.
Third, vigilantes make use of repertoires that ‘range from lethal to 
non-lethal’ (ibid.). While embodied vigilantism primarily involves 
physical forms of violence, digitally mediated cases may touch upon 
cultural or institutional forms of violence (Galtung, 1990) that may 
severely compromise subsequent life chances for the target as well as 
those affiliated with them. Here we can consider job loss as a central part 
of the digital vigilante’s repertoire, which aims to place the target and 
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their dependents in an economically and socially precarious position. 
Fourth, vigilantes and their supporters invoke justifications for their 
activities in order to seek broader legitimation. As they are able to attract 
a geographically and ideologically dispersed audience, digital vigilantes 
in particular may fail in convincing these audiences with their 
justifications, and may in turn trigger counter-denunciations against 
themselves and their actions. In considering cultural polarisation in the 
Anglo-American context and elsewhere, certain denunciations and calls 
for action may be rebuked on ideological grounds, with a sizeable 
audience turning to the initiators’ Twitter feed in order to call attention 
to (for instance) ‘problematic’ content. Here too we can consider how 
categorical affiliations such as gender and ethnicity may enable or 
constrain attempts to justify vigilantism to a broader audience.
Finally, vigilantes are compelled by motivations that ‘cannot be 
assumed to align neatly’ with stated justifications (Moncada, 2017, p. 
408). These may include closely held values linked to criminal justice, 
but participants may also seek financial gain (through merchandise 
sales or ad revenue on their social media accounts). Likewise, one of the 
key tensions that informs this book lies in the motivations of the wider 
audiences that participate in vigilant denunciations. We may consider 
whether there are connections between a desire to seek retribution, and 
a desire to consume entertaining footage. Put simply, vigilant audiences 
are characterised by a confluence of entertainment and criminal justice.
We should therefore consider the notion of the audience, especially 
when highlighting the shift from embodied to digitally mediated 
practices. We can begin by considering how the audience is understood 
in contemporary media and cultural studies literature, notably how they 
may endorse, resist or negotiate with vigilant discourses (Hall, 2001). 
As stated above, audiences may be ideologically aligned with an attempt 
to seek (social or criminal) justice, but such events are just as likely 
to attract bystanders that either reinterpret the meaning or deny the 
legitimacy of these events. Prior studies on television audiences stress 
the active role viewers take in ascribing meaning to content (Ang, 2013). 
In principle, such abilities have only been enhanced by the emergence 
and popularisation of social media platforms that solicit input and 
engagement from their users. Not only are digital media users more 
engaged in domains such as political campaigns (Vitak et al., 2011) and 
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journalism (Braun & Gillespie, 2011), but it has arguably never been 
easier for users to watch over and express their opinions about their 
peers (Andrejevic, 2004). Such scrutiny occurs in real time, for instance 
when a livestream triggers both supportive and critical comments 
(see Tanner et al.’s contribution to this volume), but also through the 
retrospective scrutiny of user-generated content that may span years 
and transcend any individual context (Trottier, 2012).
Peer-to-peer scrutiny may be manifest in the form of harassment and 
stalking, but must also be recognised in more innocuous and acceptable 
forms of listening, lurking (Crawford, 2011) and even orbiting (Stauffer, 
2018) that may serve to normalise asymmetrical relations of visibility. In 
other words, we should be attentive to the range of contexts where 
digital media users are compelled to make themselves publicly visible 
(either for intrinsic reasons, such as self-expression, or more tangible 
goals such as gainful employment), if only because of the kinds of 
audiences and scrutiny that may emerge in consequence. A personal 
Twitter account can end up harming its owner if opponents use it to 
locate and republish discrediting statements. Likewise, review platforms 
like Yelp or Tripadvisor may be weaponised to denounce and harm the 
public standing of individuals (Finley, 2015). Digitally mediated 
scrutiny and denunciation necessarily involve an assemblage of human 
and non-human actors (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000; Trottier, 2018). While 
users may temporarily coalesce around an offensive event, we must 
acknowledge that specific media platforms frequently serve as hubs to 
coordinate and host such coalescence. Platforms like 4chan and 8chan, 
specific sub-communities like the Reddit Bureau of Investigation (Myles 
et al., 2020) and culturally specific news sites like GeenStijl in the 
Netherlands are closely linked to open denunciations. Although these 
groups evoke a ‘viral’ reaction among a greater public, they also rely on 
a core of more closely affiliated users who may invest more time and be 
more explicitly ideologically aligned.
Contributions to this edited collection address contemporary digital 
media practices involving users both consuming and participating in 
the denunciation of other individuals. These engage with a range of 
(cross-)disciplinary perspectives, including but not limited to sociology, 
criminology, philosophy, legal, cultural and media studies. While 
drawing upon cases in the Anglo-American context, this collection also 
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endeavours to consider developments in regions that have received less 
coverage in English-language scholarship. These cases often transcend 
the boundary between policing and entertainment, and one of our goals 
is to call attention to the confluence between these practices in dispersed 
contexts. Remaining attentive to social harms that may arise, we seek to 
privilege the particular contexts when exploring cases. As the opening 
examples clearly show, what may be considered appropriate or ethical 
in one context would be inconceivable in another.
In particular, we seek to make theoretical and empirical contributions 
by considering how particular cases and more general practices are 
made meaningful. This includes taking into account how digital media 
users develop denunciatory and shaming practices as well as how the 
press and other public figures may support or contest them. Because 
the incidents themselves are by definition mediated, it is important 
to consider the distinction between providing coverage of a vigilante 
campaign, and contributing to its ends by invoking a greater audience. 
We are also concerned with the role that digital vigilantism can play 
in either contesting or reinforcing categorical forms of discrimination 
and violence, and how such possibilities are shaped by local cultural 
contexts. Finally, we consider how vigilante audiences either challenge 
or further support criminal justice practices such as police investigations.
Exploring Local/Global Tensions in Class-Based 
Scrutiny and Denunciations
When looking broadly at cases of justice-seeking through digital media, 
this book is especially concerned with the relations between global 
developments and local conditions. On the one hand, we are witnessing 
the use of similar digital practices across cultural contexts. Not only do 
these practices make use of the same platforms (such as Facebook or 
Twitter), but they also mobilise comparable discourses or repertoires, 
including linking instances of sexual violence across countries and 
industries with the #metoo hashtag (Mendes et al., 2018), as well as 
connecting accusations that political opponents are funded by George 
Soros (Weaver & Hopkins, 2018). Paradoxically, despite seemingly 
greater cultural polarisation, fragmentation and a more inward-looking 
Internet, recent mediated expressions of nationalism and nationhood 
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seem in some ways interchangeable. As one example, national identities 
online draw upon a globalised repertoire when repurposing image 
macros (memes) across national or ideological lines.
Fig. 1.1  Local Adaptations of a Global Meme (unknown creators, unknown dates 
of creation, published under fair use)
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The cases this book considers are also shaped by local circumstances, 
and are best understood with at least some consideration of local 
governments, local press and local values. While having to account for 
emerging technologies and practices, states may still assert some degree 
of sovereignty over global information flows. This is partly to make 
Silicon Valley platforms accountable to local (tax) laws, but also to have 
some control over those information flows. Recent examples include 
Russia’s Internet-governing laws, such as the ‘Yarovaya law package’ 
that expanded anti-extremism legislation to the digital domain; the law 
on ‘fake news’ that made online criticism of the state a legal offence (The 
Moscow Times, 2018; 2019); as well as tje ‘Great Firewall of China’ that 
restricts access to American platforms (Xiao, 2019). Governments also 
shape what is considered legally and morally acceptable, for instance 
when the UK sought to address ‘social harms’ associated with digital 
media (Volpicelli, 2019). And while platforms like Orkut and Instagram 
have steadily been acquired by tech giants like Google and Facebook, 
in Russia, VKontakte (a social network comparable to Facebook) and 
Yandex (a search engine comparable to Google) have not only resisted 
such takeovers, but also appear to flourish (Yegorov, 2019) under what 
we may consider a kind of digital nationalism. Although domestic 
platforms in Russia are more appealing to users due to simplicity and 
content diversity (ibid.), they are also closely collaborating with Russia’s 
security forces in compliance with the above-mentioned legislation. 
Even global forms of justice-seeking may be interpreted differently 
in local contexts. The call to denounce sexual abuse of children is 
near universal, yet Russia’s Occupy Paedophilia has mobilised under 
this banner to assault sexual minorities. And while developments in 
one context can resemble or provide insights for digitally mediated 
denunciations elsewhere, vigilant audiences are necessarily shaped by 
local circumstances.
As an example of this, consider the discursive notion of the ‘nice 
car’ (typically a late-model and high-end foreign vehicle). Drawing 
from a comparative study that the editors of this book have recently 
carried out (Huang et al., 2020), nice cars are manifest as an abstract 
trope that can in turn be spotted and even photographed or filmed in 
one’s neighbourhood. If that footage is publicly shared, it can serve as 
an opportunity to denounce the owner, but also a broader category 
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of individual such as ‘the wealthy’. This may become an opportunity 
to address misdeeds such as bad parking or aggressive driving, and 
we might expect that it also becomes a moment to air more general 
concerns such as growing wealth disparities and abuses of economic 
privilege. Looking at comparable incidents in Russia, China and Anglo-
American countries, we see comparable denunciations shaped both by 
the affordances of digital media tools, but also by regional factors such 
as the press and civil society, which may or may not be willing to further 
mobilise denunciations against drivers of luxury vehicles. 
In Russia, mediated scrutiny, shaming and exposure of citizens by 
fellow citizens are deeply rooted in the country’s history (Gabdulhakov, 
2018). In the 1970s and 1980s, amid severe production shortfalls, Soviet 
society developed a privileged stratum of citizens who could access 
goods and services through the system of blat  —  a web of strategic 
connections and mutually beneficial favours (Ledeneva, 1999). Through 
social connections of blat socialist citizens could even acquire a foreign-
brand (‘inomarka’) vehicle. Such privileges of the select few served as 
irritants for the greater masses, deepening socio-economic tensions in a 
state that grounded its credo on principles of egalitarianism.
In contemporary Russia, inequality on the roads remains a pressing 
issue, though it is possible to distinguish unique features of post-Soviet 
vigilante justice, characterised by mediated visibility afforded by social 
media, distrust in police and the prevalence of moral crusades (Favarel-
Garrigues & Shukan, 2020, p. 6). In 2010 Russia’s pro-Kremlin youth 
commissars from the nation-wide Nashi [Ours] youth movement 
founded several vigilante projects, including StopXam [Stop a 
Douchebag].1 StopXam launched its fight against “traffic violations and 
arrogance on the road” (stopadouchebag.org, n.d.) and quickly gained 
popularity across the country and in other former Soviet states. 
Participants approach perceived traffic violators and place stickers on 
their windshields, reading “I spit on everyone, I drive where I want”; 
the process of retaliation is filmed, edited and uploaded on the group’s 
YouTube channels (Gabdulhakov, 2020). StopXam claims to be 
indiscriminate in who they approach with retaliation; however, 
1  Pronounced as ‘Stop Kham’. Orthography and translation used by the groups is 
preserved. 
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participants often feature the ‘rich and famous’, ensuring the popularity 
of the episodes. 
Confrontations between participants and the drivers escalate to 
verbal and physical altercations, generating added entertainment for the 
audience. The message that participants send through their practices is 
that unlike Russia’s police, they are not afraid to approach people who 
otherwise feel immune on the roads. When marking luxurious vehicles 
with stickers, participants engage in a performance of class-struggle in 
which the fearless youth bring to justice those who are used to getting 
away with misdeeds. Picking up on the cases, traditional media outlets 
engage in framing of StopXam, law enforcement and other relevant 
actors, while further exposing the targets (Gabdulhakov, 2020). 
Additionally, when addressing such phenomena as citizen-led justice 
movements that instrumentalise social media, platforms such as 
YouTube enable the circulation of denunciatory videos, making them 
continuously available to wider audiences. Audience members 
perpetuate the circulation by sharing content and otherwise reacting to 
it (comments, emojis, ‘dis/likes’). While StopXam’s retaliatory repertoire 
is intensified and amplified through (edited) exposure of targets online, 
YouTube episodes can be monetised to generate an income. Additional 
funds can be generated through merchandise sales and via state 
subsidies. StopXam and other vigilante groups in Russia have turned 
into brands with their own online stores; they have been endorsed by 
the state through presidential grants in support of their activities 
(Gabdulhakov, 2018, p. 326). The relationship between vigilante 
formations and the state, however, should not be perceived as 
monotonous. Here we can differentiate between state-loyal participants 
(former Nashi members), state-targeting participants (investigations 
exposing corrupt officials, etc.) and openly criminal participants (moral 
police targeting women, migrants and sexual and other minorities). 
Each cluster varies in their application of legal frameworks; yet even the 
relationship between StopXam and the state has not been entirely 
smooth. Over the years of their operation, the framing of StopXam 
participants by state media evolved from “heroes” to “hooligans” 
(Gabdulhakov, 2020). The negotiation of trust, support and interests 
between state authorities and vigilantes are temporally dynamic. 
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In contrast, the meaning that ‘nice cars’ bear in contemporary China 
reflects a different context. Before the Opening and Reform, it was 
considered a ‘bourgeois lifestyle’ to own a private car and only top 
government officials were equipped with passenger cars (Barme, 2002). 
Therefore, the word ‘gongche’, which means ‘public service car’, had a 
connotation of governmental privilege and political power that lingered 
in Chinese society during the following decade. In addition, to own a 
private car signifies a better economic status because it requires resources 
beyond the reach of most citizens (Zhang, 2017). Despite recent 
economic growth coupled with a growing domestic car market (Wu, 
Zhao & Ou, 2014), foreign brands such as Audi and Mercedes-Benz are 
still regarded as privileged commodities. Meanwhile, growing economic 
disparity also furthers conflicts between social strata in China (Anagnost, 
2008). 
Such social conflicts are manifest through cases where a vigilant 
audience scrutinises individuals with ‘nice cars’. Offences typically stem 
from traffic conflicts, among which cases involving ‘nice cars’ usually 
solicit a larger degree of attention and denunciation. Such scrutiny is 
often picked up by mass media and reported with titles that feature a 
typical pattern: A woman/man (of a certain social identity) + who 
drives + a ‘nice car’ brand + scratched/hit/injured/beat/ran over/killed 
+ a socially disadvantaged individual. Such titles serve to frame these 
incidents into conflicts between social strata (Huang et al., 2020). 
Audiences are also offended when people publicly show off their 
luxurious cars, even though the target might not have broken any law. 
Potentially, questions about the legality of their achieved wealth will be 
raised and crowdsourced investigation will follow. Thirdly (and 
relatedly), corruption and government-related privilege are linked to 
‘nice cars’ due to the enduring connotations evoked by public service 
cars. The third type of incident has decreased dramatically since Xi 
Jinping took power, due to the reformation of the public-service car 
system (Xinhua News Agency, 2014) and the party’s internal anti-
corruption campaign. 
In these cases, one struggles to distinguish between participants and 
audience, due to the lack of formal organisation coupled with the 
interchangeability between these roles when an audience shifts from 
lurking to reposting and vice versa. As a result, the Chinese mass media 
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normally refer to the participants/audience as ‘netizens’, or as a faceless 
mass who are ‘concerned’ or ‘angry’. The media often spotlight the 
identity of the targets and the social group they belong to, which shapes 
the public discussion of such incidents. The scrutiny of people who 
drive nice cars can help expose, punish and deter individuals who either 
transgress traffic laws or are compromised through corruption, alongside 
other social injustices in China. However, it can also harm people if the 
accusation is unsubstantiated, or when a disproportionate punishment 
results from the incident being framed as class conflict. Interestingly, in 
recent years, audiences in China have raised questions about mass-
media framing when such incidents happen (Ji, 2019).
In Anglo-American countries, class awareness has recently 
manifested through critical discourses about billionaires and the 
so-called “1%” in the context of the Occupy movement (Breau, 2014). 
While roadside offences like bad parking are captured and discussed in 
localised Facebook groups, there is a curious absence of concern for the 
political and economic conditions that shape ownership of ‘nice cars’. 
Upmarket and foreign brands of vehicles are often acknowledged in these 
groups, and it may be inferred that their owners perceive themselves 
as above the law. Yet in comparison to China and Russia, there is no 
broader class-based mobilisation. Discourse on these groups remains 
localised to specific neighbourhoods, and denunciations against nice 
cars pertain more to brand preference, rather than social strata. Beyond 
references to neighbourhoods, vigilant audiences are not mobilised 
based on perceived economic disparities. Likewise, press coverage 
of so-called ‘crap parking’ groups focuses more on the novelty of the 
groups themselves, rather than embracing the class-based framing of 
their activities as seen in China.
Through these cases we can begin to ascertain a seemingly global 
pattern of scrutiny and denunciation of the wealthy, by way of their 
vehicles. These different instances reflect a common desire to express 
frustration with the owners of luxury vehicles when they breach traffic 
laws. They also reflect the manner in which public roadways can be 
contested and politicised spaces (Nikiforov, forthcoming). Yet, in each 
country, we see socio-political circumstances shaping digitally mediated 
cultural practices. In Russia and China, user-led denunciations and 
targeted visibility can escalate into a more cohesive and culturally 
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significant event, and receive greater public support as well as attention 
from the press. In countries like the United Kingdom and the United 
States, similar offences receive negligible attention from a national 
digital media audience, and typically fail to culminate in something 
more collectively significant. They may simply be manifest as a series of 
badly parked luxury vehicles, rather than mobilise a more enduring 
campaign or attempt at social reform.
Section and Chapter Overview
The following chapters consider cases that appear to involve both 
justice-seeking and entertainment-seeking. Indeed, the confluence 
between these desires is a troubling development in citizen use of digital 
media. Yet it is possible to identify cases where there is a deliberate 
foregrounding of entertainment as an intended outcome of scrutiny, as 
well as vigilant audiences that may have already converged around a 
television programme or movie franchise. In the next chapter, Driessen 
addresses fandoms as ‘pre-existing collectives’ that hold actors and 
authors accountable for offences that take place both within and beyond 
the screen. Such communities are centred around a set of beliefs that may 
concern casting decisions and issues of representation on screen, but also 
call attention to the conduct of actors in their private lives. Thus, vigilant 
scrutiny among audiences spills over from on-screen to off-screen, but 
also spreads from public figures to less prominent members of the 
public including critics who may challenge these beliefs. The following 
chapter by Linton picks up on these themes in considering offence-taking 
and mobilisation in the context of comedic performances. While all of 
the cases covered in this book consider offence-taking to some degree, 
comedy-based forms of entertainment are unique in the sense that they 
are typically seeking to transgress or at least unsettle moral boundaries. 
Here, too, scrutiny and denunciation can transcend the boundary between 
fiction and real life, and, in so doing, reach a broader audience who is not 
acquainted with the original context of the comedic work. 
Culture and class stratifications are reproduced through content that 
circulates on digital platforms, and these platforms may be compelled to 
undergo transformations as a result of their association with this content. 
Jiaxi Hou’s chapter considers the prominence and scrutiny of an 
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underclass subculture in China, and how its visibility led to denunciations 
by other communities. Here, the mediated visibility brought about by 
social media platforms serves both to affirm a community of supporters 
as well as to incite scrutiny and rebuke from a broader audience. In 
considering the role of the state and platform in the context of broader 
socio-cultural circumstances, this chapter presents vigilant audiences as 
shaped by a multiplicity of actors. Even a denunciatory label like 
‘vulgarity’ can be unpacked to refer to a range of offences, targeting not 
just individual artists but a broader social underclass in the name of 
collective morality.
A second set of chapters considers how citizenship and broader 
notions of national identity are produced and expressed through 
mediated denunciation. National identities are often expressed through 
exclusionary rhetoric and practices, where outsiders and critical voices 
are met with retaliation. Likewise, we find instances where shared 
morality is defended among an online audience that largely corresponds 
to a national population. Tanner et al.’s chapter considers far-right 
vigilantism as a transnational manifestation with an emphasis on the 
tenuous and contested process of technical mediation. By looking at a 
Canadian alt-right figure’s vigilante activities in Europe, they provide 
a detailed account of the technical and mediated conditions through 
which an audience is produced. Audiences are assembled through a 
range of readily available technologies and practices, yet this process of 
assembling is tenuous and contested. Even an incendiary media artefact 
such as a so-called “Molotov JPEG” (Hawley, 2017) is tentative, and 
may provoke unanticipated outcomes. 
Incidents that reinforce commonly held values may be contentious in 
their execution, provoking controversies and even counter-denunciations. 
Favarel-Garrigues’ chapter considers how the Russian group Lev Protiv 
asserts a social order in public spaces, and in turn becomes subject to 
public scrutiny and controversy. While patrolling and confronting those 
consuming drugs or alcohol in public spaces, Lev Protiv members bring 
these offences to a wider public. As such, conventional vigilantism is 
positioned “in front of a permanent audience” (Favarel-Garrigues, this 
volume, p. 125), that enhances the scope of the group but also appears to 
generate a critical backlash. Such controversies appear to fuel the group’s 
prominence, a striking development even within the post-Soviet context. 
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Chalfaouat’s chapter addresses digital vigilantism as citizen-led justice-
seeking in the Moroccan context. In spite of the potential for mob justice, 
he considers how citizens can be empowered as a result of recording 
and denouncing misconduct. In the case of an assault of a teacher by a 
student, the viral circulation of the footage is both shaped by and acts as 
a catalyst in struggles between educators, citizens and the government. 
Local and online media venues also play a pivotal role in circulating and 
facilitating outrage as well as conflicting accounts of the offence under 
scrutiny. Of particular interest in this study is the degree to which citizens 
are compelled to co-produce security as a result of emerging technological 
affordances, but also through relations with state authorities.
While vigilant audiences may often be associated with social harms 
and regressive politics, recent examples including the backlash to the 
white supremacist rally in Charlottesville appear to support more 
progressive causes. The next set of chapters considers scrutiny and 
denunciation of hate speech and populism by vigilant audiences. In 
doing so, these works address an ambivalence whereby otherwise 
troubling forms of citizen-led justice may be considered acceptable by 
a wider public. These contributions consider recent cases in order to 
work towards an understanding of the potential acceptability of these 
practices in various contexts and circumstances. 
Plesničar and Šarf’s chapter considers the backlash to hate speech 
occurring on social media in the Slovenian context. When seemingly 
public content on Facebook was republished on a denunciatory Tumblr 
page, it was re-contextualised, and its authors came under greater public 
scrutiny. Yet when physical posters of the denunciations appeared in the 
nation’s capital, a counter-denunciation arose against the anonymous 
authors of the Tumblr page, and a broader debate emerged about the 
appropriateness of these tactics. This chapter draws upon a range of data 
to consider the socio-cultural as well as legal contexts of republishing as 
weaponised visibility. Not only does this case raise the issue of who is 
entitled to denounce, but also how the notion of ‘the public’ itself may 
be context-specific and contested. 
Many prominent cases of hate speech are manifest as collective 
and largely anonymous incidents. Denunciations of events like 
Charlottesville appropriate images of these events, not only to 
deanonymise participants, but also to deny the legitimacy of racist and 
nationalist discourses in public life. Milbrandt unpacks the call for action 
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put forth by Twitter account @yesyoureracist, as well as the audience that 
emerges in consequence of that call. Her analysis evokes asymmetrical 
relations of visibility that appear to be normalised in Anglo-American 
contexts, among others. The notion that it is “merely a matter of time 
before anonymous faces are rendered identifiable” (Milbrandt, this 
volume, p. 234) suggests a surveillant imaginary (Lyon, 2018) about not 
only what can be achieved by vigilant audiences, but also the conditions 
in which this may be permissible. 
Douglas’ chapter further explores these conditions in relation to the 
possibility of Hine’s (1998) understanding of non-violent vigilantism. 
Deanonymisation of hate speech through doxing is presented as a viable 
practice, notably when coupled with de-radicalisation programmes and 
other forms of the potential reintegration of the target. Vigilantism is 
always context-specific, and even progressive forms of engagement 
may raise unanticipated outcomes. Yet the arguments considered in this 
section are especially helpful in beginning to decouple acceptable from 
unacceptable forms of denunciation.
Finally, vigilant audiences may complicate or otherwise impact police 
work. Dekker and Meijer provide an account of how European law-
enforcement professionals negotiate the boundaries between accepted and 
unsanctioned online engagements among digital media audiences. These 
developments are largely made meaningful by notions of community 
policing, in which local context and collaboration with the authorities are 
pivotal factors. Established principles of police work are troubled by what 
is easily available to digital media users. By raising questions of legality 
and acceptability, these practices reopen debates about the role of citizens 
in policing, as well as the demands for police accountability that underpin 
vigilant engagements (Johnston, 1996). Police may generally consider 
vigilant citizens as an added burden, yet they may also engage in mediated 
practices that inform and encourage audiences’ sense of criminal justice. 
Young’s chapter in this section considers mugshot websites in the United 
States, and in particular the apparent contradictions between shaming 
arrestees for crime-prevention purposes, and shaming for amusement. 
Although such initiatives may be state-funded, by making mugshots 
digitally accessible they facilitate unanticipated and unwanted actions by 
citizens and other private actors. As such, Young’s focus on new policing 
initiatives brings us back full circle to entertainment as a mobilising force 
in citizen justice and shaming, even among formal agencies.
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Ethical Concerns of Researchers Studying  
Mediated Visibility
The contributors and editors of this collection share concerns over 
mediated visibility and related social harms. This is a tangible issue for 
those who experience unwanted scrutiny, and is linked to troubling 
practices such as harassment, stalking, discrimination and unjust 
punishment. In studying and directing attention to these practices, we 
hope for a better understanding of their emergence in order to begin to 
alleviate related harms. Yet as researchers we also have to be aware of 
and acknowledge our potential role in producing and reproducing such 
harms. This involves being mindful of our research data, including how 
it is gathered and retained, but also how such data can be repurposed. 
As an outcome of this collection, we hope to draw attention to 
asymmetrical relations of visibility between social actors. In some cases, 
these efforts will involve making under-studied practices, actors, 
negotiations and decisions more visible to our readership. Yet this is not 
a one-size-fits-all approach, and some aspects of social life are obscured 
for a reason. As we seek to understand how these cases are publicly 
manifest, it seems appropriate to direct our attention to press reports 
and other seemingly ‘official’ channels, but also social media posts and 
other content that may be publicly available, at least for a limited period 
of time.
When interpreting such social media data one of the first observations 
a researcher will make is its volatility. Text, image and video content may 
circulate widely one day, only to be removed from all public sources 
shortly thereafter. This is due to various reasons, including targets of 
harassment requesting the data is removed, social media platforms 
removing it for violation of terms of service, vigilantes themselves 
not wanting to attract any further attention, or simply because the 
hosting website has been neglected. In many cases it would appear 
that actionable and stigmatising content — and the denunciations that 
surround them — are invoked and then revoked in a strategic manner. 
In response to such volatility, it may be tempting for researchers to 
purposively and aggressively seek out and retain this data. Indeed, 
this is a practice that has gained cultural traction through the use of the 
term ‘receipts’, whereby digital media users take screenshots of others’ 
 19Introducing Vigilant Audiences
offences, and retain them for subsequent judgements (Waldman, 2016). 
Whether researcher or concerned citizen, it is understandable why we 
may wish to capture and retain evidence of criminal or moral offences, 
as well as the public outrage that may follow. Yet in (re)publishing this 
data, we risk bringing further unwanted visibility to those who have 
already suffered excessively in this regard. While we may otherwise see 
no trouble in collecting data that are considered public or open source, 
Young’s chapter on mugshot photography covers one of many examples 
of supposedly public data being repurposed for troubling ends (see also 
Zimmer, 2010).
As such, we must consider the possibility of unwanted or otherwise 
harmful forms of visibility against the targets of, and participants in, 
digital vigilantism. The term ‘target’ here should be understood in 
broad terms: not just those originally denounced, but also those who 
may experience categorical discrimination as a result of the open 
circulation of these cases. In order to prevent further unwanted scrutiny 
of private citizens, at times we chose not to include names or other 
personal information in our reporting, even if this already appeared in 
the press or elsewhere. This amounts to deciding not to republish names 
and identities that may otherwise remain searchable. However, this 
approach is called into question when considering the status of public 
and quasi-public figures. Both Favarel-Garrigues and Linton’s chapters 
include the names of members of civil society and comedians who can 
clearly be understood as public figures. Such decisions are not always 
straightforward, as even public figures can be subject to unwanted 
forms of visibility, for example, when details of their private lives are 
leaked to the public. Moreover, if we treat a YouTube celebrity with one 
hundred million subscribers as a public figure, how should we approach 
an aspiring star with a more modest following?
As a result of our concerns with mediated harm, we aim to be 
careful about what we make visible in this collection. In taking a global 
approach, we are necessarily calling attention to cases and targets that 
were previously unknown to at least a part of our readership. Yet in 
reflecting on these concerns and guidelines, we do not intend to develop 
an approach that collapses the moral implications of the cases considered 
in the following chapters. To be clear, there is no moral equivalence 
between doxing Nazis, and Nazis doxing.
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Over the past few years, various movie prequels, sequels and reboots 
have occupied cinemas. Most of these, like Star Wars and Ghostbusters, 
continued their original storylines in new, innovative ways. Although 
this led to praise from fans and movie critics, it also prompted critique. 
Take for example the debates that followed the releases of the Star Wars 
instalments The Force Awakens (2015) and The Last Jedi (2017). Both 
received a lot of criticism about their storylines and casting choices, 
particularly from a vocal minority of fans who were upset about the 
movies’ casting decisions. The protagonist of the saga, Rey (portrayed 
by Daisy Ridley) was female, which did not fit the typical ‘male-hero’ 
trope of the previous movies. Furthermore, adventurous companion 
Rose (portrayed by Asian-American actress Kelly Marie Tran) did not 
have the typical looks or body type of a Hollywood actress. Both Ridley 
and Tran (Rey and Rose) took their Instagram profiles offline due to 
criticisms and comments received by alleged Star Wars fans who heartily 
disagreed with their roles in the franchise.
These actresses going offline due to online harassment was not a 
stand-alone incident and seems to fit a trend of bullying celebrities on 
social media (cf. Condis, 2018 and Massanari, 2017). The harassment 
of Ghostbusters actress Leslie Jones in 2016 is another example: Jones 
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decided to (temporarily) remove her Twitter profile after she was 
repeatedly pestered by conservative writer and professional troll Milo 
Yiannopoulos and his followers. Twitter decided to ban Yiannopoulos 
from the platform, but the damage had already been done (see Proctor, 
2017; Johnson, 2018; Blodgett & Salter, 2018 for detailed discussions 
of the Ghostbusters case). These diverse cases illustrate so-called toxic 
fandom (cf. Hills, 2018): harmful practices driven by fans’ feelings of 
entitlement, possessiveness or superiority, which enable them to make 
claims about their favourite franchise. 
The growth of this phenomenon, perpetuated by an allegedly small 
group of fans who feel entitled to make these harmful claims, seems to 
align with a current trend in Western media, namely that of reboots, 
prequels, sequels or re-releases of formerly popular cultural products. 
Star Wars originated in the seventies, Ghostbusters in the eighties. The 
fans seemed to be split between either clinging to past portrayals or 
demanding for more faithful representations of today’s world. In other 
words, the fans seemed to hijack the narratives surrounding these 
franchises; for example, by publicly criticising casting choices and the 
film’s writer and director, or by objecting to the development of the 
film’s or a character’s storyline. Consequently, the group of unhappy 
fans has become (more) vigilant towards the story and character 
development of the franchise they enjoy. This vigilance leads to opposing 
viewpoints within these fandoms, which is predominantly visible 
online, where audiences express their love or hate for the franchise’s 
new developments on various social media platforms (Johnson, 2018). 
These strong differences within the pre-existing community of a fandom 
is a topic that has thus far gained little academic attention, whilst rivalry 
between different fandoms — particularly present in sports (Gushwan, 
2012) — has received greater coverage.
This study aims to better understand this phenomenon of vigilance 
in fandoms by examining the interplay between fans, celebrities 
and producers. It will do so by exploring the different practices fans 
employ to ‘hijack’ franchise narratives using digital vigilantism (DV). 
DV is defined by Trottier (2017, p. 55) as the process whereby citizens 
collectively take action, in the online realm, against other citizens they 
feel offended by or who have opposing views about an issue. This 
resonates with Scott’s notion of toxic fan subcultures, which tend to 
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be “…instances of coordinated harassment on social media platforms 
against content creators, celebrities, and other fans” (2018, p. 144). Social 
media platforms are key to this phenomenon, as in practice they enable 
access to other fans, celebrities and content creators. Scott’s (2018) 
toxic fan subcultures can publicly express oppositional and otherwise 
hostile sentiment and are further legitimised by these content creators’ 
and celebrities’ direct responses (e.g. J.K. Rowling’s responses to fans 
via Twitter). In this way, fandoms and producers alike use (unwanted) 
exposure as an overt strategy. Visibility becomes a “weapon in the 
struggles they wage in their day-to-day lives” (Thompson, 2005, p. 31). 
More particularly, visibility plays the most significant role in those cases 
in which celebrities and their private lives are scrutinised, and when 
these fandoms engage in the practice of mediated shaming: a “user-led 
surveillance practice to render other social actors visible in a punitive 
and denunciatory light” (Trottier, 2018, p. 171). 
Purpose
To examine how DV plays a role in pre-existing communities, the 
purpose of this study is twofold: First, it aims to bring vigilantism 
and fan studies together by offering an understanding of online fan 
practices through the lens of digital vigilantism. Secondly, it provides an 
exploration of how DV is empirically manifest in pop-culture fandom, 
by providing examples from the fandom of the Harry Potter spin-off 
movie series Fantastic Beasts and Where to Find Them (2016–current). 
The different ways in which the fans hijacked narratives (e.g. related 
to character or story development) are discussed. First, I highlight how 
fans denounced the involvement of actor Johnny Depp and campaigned 
for him to be removed from the film. Second, the fans criticised film 
producer David Yates and author J.K. Rowling for not taking a stand 
against Depp’s involvement. Third, following Rowling’s continued lack 
of opposition to Depp’s inclusion, fans continued to hijack the franchise 
narrative by shaming Rowling. Fourth, this chapter exposes how these 
escalating situations surrounding the franchise challenged the norms 
and values of the fandom. Although this particular case is selected 
here, the phenomenon of vigilant fandoms reaches beyond new or old 
franchises, or movie fandoms solely, as mentioned in the introduction.
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This chapter brings together two different fields that have a strong 
focus on active, resistant audiences. First, fan studies considers fans as 
active, participatory audiences that have a high affective investment 
in an object (cf. Jenkins, 1992). Second, digital vigilantism studies (cf. 
Trottier, 2017) considers how collectives turn to mediated tools to take 
action against something or someone. Digital vigilantism has its roots 
in the broad field of surveillance studies, which interprets ‘surveillance’ 
as a mode of organisation and behaviour, e.g. how to conduct oneself 
relative to the norms of society or online (cf. Lyon, 2017; Andrejevic, 
2007). What makes this work different in comparison to other studies 
on vigilantes, which often tackle political or legal issues, is that fandoms 
form a pre-existing collective. Vigilant audiences are commonly theorised 
as spontaneous yet coordinated groups taking action (Trottier, 2017). 
Fandoms are a pre-existing group (though comparable to religious or 
political groups) of which a small cluster has become vigilant due to new 
developments surrounding their object of affection. Additionally, this 
sheds new light on the policing of ‘good vs. bad’ fans; a topic scarcely 
discussed in fan studies (notable exceptions are, for example, Twilight 
fans not being proper Comic-Con geeks, see Busse, 2013; or Twilight fans 
being interlopers in the Muse fandom, see Williams, 2013).
What follows is an overview of how studies on fans and DV offer 
a theoretical framework to understand resistant, active audiences. 
Then, a description of different online fan practices resonating with 
vigilantism is offered. Next, I examine the different ways in which fans 
hijacked narratives surrounding Fantastic Beasts by analysing online 
material (articles and tweets) and thus revealing instances of unwanted 
exposure, mediated shaming, denunciation, online campaigning and 
calling people out within pre-existing communities, like a fandom. 
The conclusion considers this study’s implications with suggestions for 
future work.
Understanding Fan Practices as Modes of Vigilantism 
Fandom and vigilantism are united by the fact that both groups are 
participatory audiences. In his seminal work on fans, Henry Jenkins 
(1992) defined them as textual poachers: appropriating those bits 
of a storyline that are interesting to them, or re-creating the story by 
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building on poached elements, retelling the story with their own 
emphasis or adjustments. This implies that fans (although not all) have 
a tendency to go against dominant readings of certain narratives, or at 
least to negotiate their interpretation of a media text (e.g. a film, book 
or TV show). This also implies that fans have grown accustomed to 
re-appropriating or running afoul of the traditional canon of a story: 
they can add their own twist to it. But this is also a way to offer criticism 
of the original text, particularly if the fans consider it unsatisfactory. 
Jenkins’ work fits the so-called “’fandom is beautiful’ phase” (Gray et 
al., 2007, p. 3), a categorisation of early studies on fan cultures that often 
focus on how fan audiences are indeed resistant and creative. While 
fandom is an important aspect of popular culture, there is still a need to 
consider notions of resistance and creativity with nuance, particularly 
when looking at recent toxic fan practices (Proctor, 2017; Hills, 2018; 
Scott, 2018). 
Nowadays, via social media particularly, fans can poach material 
and render visible their re-appropriations more easily, which suggests 
that fans are also potentially more easily confronted with other 
interpretations of the original text. According to Barnes (2018), the 
emotions that these adaptations elicit might invite fans to comment on 
the adaptations. Besides, because of social media, fans’ objects of fandom 
are more accessible and visible than before (cf. Thompson, 2005), which 
also makes it easier to critique them. Barnes (2018) argues that this 
‘commenting culture’ (fans’ expressions of (dis)like or (dis)agreement) 
is grounded in affective investment. That might also explain why fans 
respond so strongly to each other when a commenter is vicious or angry, 
as this inspires a feedback loop (cf. Barnes, 2018) of similar comments. 
Challenged Doxas and Fan Policing
To understand this group of vocal fans, the so-called toxic fans, Hills 
(2018) takes a Bourdieusian position in defining them by drawing on 
field theory. He argues “what has been journalistically and academically 
identified as ‘toxic’ online behaviour emerges precisely when a field’s 
previously stable doxa has been disrupted and called into question 
by heterodox forces” (Hills, 2018, p. 107). For example, if new fans 
enter a pre-existing fandom like Star Wars then the older group’s doxa 
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(the composition of the collective that has been taken for granted) is 
challenged (i.e. ‘these newbies cannot become as knowledgeable as the 
older fans’). Or, if a movie previously featuring an all-male cast (like 
Ghostbusters) is remade with a female cast, a doxa (the belief about 
who is best at portraying the story) is challenged. Hills continues by 
explaining that not all fandoms are toxic, but he does suggest that 
fandoms are always “doxic in specific ways that tend to exclude certain 
kinds of fans” (2018, p. 111). These conceptions of exclusion, policing 
or protecting one’s doxas resonate with the behaviour and practices of 
digital vigilantes (cf. Andrejevic, 2007; Trottier, 2018). 
Notions of exclusion and belonging have often played a role in 
fan studies (cf. Sandvoss, 2005). Busse, for example, examined how 
fans practice an “internal fannish dismissal” (2013, p. 73) of new fans 
entering a fandom. When the popular teen series Twilight became part 
of the Comic-Con (CC) convention, the CC fans dismissed the Twilight 
teens attending the event. The CC fans felt that they were higher up 
the ladder of cultural hierarchies (a legitimate, longstanding convention 
versus a mainstream, fleeting, ‘smut’ success). By policing who is a 
‘rightful’ attendee of Comic-Con, the CC fans aimed to protect their 
own sense of community (Busse, 2013). Peculiar to this instance of 
policing is its revelation of a gender bias: the largely female fan base of 
Twilight attending a male-dominated space such as Comic-Con did not 
fit the doxa of the conference’s regular “geek hierarchy” (Busse, 2013). 
Similarly, Stanfill (2013) examined how fans of the series Xena: Warrior 
Princess stereotype each other by denoting their activities as peculiar, 
stigmatised or simply a bit too much (e.g. a fan getting a back-piece 
tattoo of a particular scene from Xena). These previous works expose 
how fans have a tendency to create their own boundaries around the fan 
community and who can join it, as well as what constitutes the doxa of 
a ‘good’ fan (behaviour).
The doxic character of fandom confirms that exclusion, creating 
a hierarchy and policing are not new to fandom. Furthermore, fans 
themselves appear to be vigilant about who enters or is part of their 
community. Yet this denunciation of other fans or the franchise’s 
producers (e.g. Ghostbusters’ strategy of employing a diverse cast instead 
of creating a nostalgic reboot of the old product) seems to have become 
more visible due to social media. Some have even gone as far as shaming 
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other fans or celebrities involved in the franchises they care about, 
including the cases of Rey and Rose mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter. The fans seem to watch and control who holds the right views, 
thus the right doxas. That turns this type of surveillance amongst these 
groups into a cultural practice (Monahan, 2011). Surveillance according 
to Monahan involves “exercises of power and the performance of power 
relationships” (2011, p. 495), which is present in these previous examples. 
As Monahan interprets Lyon (2001): “different forms of surveillance 
could be positioned along a spectrum from ‘care’ to ‘control’” (2011, 
p. 497). In other words, fans can go from watching over each other for 
protection to enforcing particular behaviour.
Fans seem to have grown more vocal and concerned about changing 
doxas (see Proctor, 2017; Scott, 2018; Barnes, 2018). Moreover, publicly 
expressing such comments online makes their criticism and concern 
visible to all. This in turn can lead to other fans joining in this practice 
of expressing their (dis)agreements and might potentially result in 
demands from the disgruntled fans that the doxas should continue 
unchanged. I thus propose that we can also consider them as (digital) 
vigilantes (Trottier, 2017): a loose, yet organised collective that takes 
deliberate action against an offence. Nowadays, the changing doxas of 
fandoms are rendered visible through online communication via various 
social media platforms (Thompson, 2005; Barnes, 2018). However, this 
development also needs to be nuanced. It is questionable if these people 
are fans at all, or whether they are just social actors that use fandom to 
pester others (Proctor, 2017; Hills, 2018). Likewise, those involved in 
practices like DV might also temporarily come together as a loose and 
spontaneous network of people (Trottier, 2018) who leave the discussion 
after the hype is over.
Bringing surveillance and fan studies together, by approaching fans’ 
online practices as modes of vigilantism, helps to explore how shared 
values and norms are debated. According to Trottier, DV campaigns 
express a form of collective identity based on, for instance, “national, 
religious or ethnic forms of solidarity” (2017, p. 57). The campaigns in 
fandoms against producers or franchise developments might express 
a form of affective solidarity building on a (former) mutual love and 
understanding for the media text and fandom that is now challenged 
and negotiated. The fandom and their beloved celebrities (and the 
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private lives of these celebrities) are placed under public scrutiny, and 
discussions are intense and enduring (Thompson, 2005; Trottier, 2017). 
This suggests that these franchise audiences also become more polarised, 
which is an interesting aspect to explore at a time when fandom can be 
considered a proven aspect of contemporary politics (Dean, 2017).
Trolling
In today’s world, due to the increase of social media platforms, it is 
possible for fans, stars and producers to (parasocially) interact. As 
Proctor states: “[f]an quarrels and conflicts are not a new phenomenon 
either, but the migration from the (analogue) margins into the (digital) 
mainstream has exposed the various operations of fan cultures to the 
larger online public…” (2017, p. 1124). That is, fans now have the (digital) 
tools to go beyond mere poaching, the typical way to re-appropriate 
or express criticism of the original media text. Now, the fans can reach 
out to producers, and express their criticism more visibly, thus more 
publicly than before.
The vocal criticism expressed by some of the fans within a fandom 
can be defined as trolling, a now polarised term often used in the public 
sphere for anything related to having fun at the distress of others. To 
clarify, I draw on Phillips’ (2015) definition, which conceptualises 
trolling as a form of amusement that one might have at someone else’s 
expense.1 Unlike demanding change for affective reasons, trolling is often 
purposefully harmful or intended to upset media creators or other fans 
rather than elicit a sincere response. Yet, to troll, one needs to possess 
a certain amount of knowledge to make fun of that person, or to know 
when trolling becomes amusing for a wider audience. The humour of 
these trolls therefore leads to in-or exclusion: those in on the joke and 
those who are not. My use of the term then avows the idea that this 
group of fans who trolls also needs to have knowledge of their ‘target’. 
When Gamergate happened, the trolls were keen to release personal 
information (doxing) and chose their subjects based on their close 
involvement and (known) positions in the gaming subculture (Condis, 
1  Phillips, in Phillips & Milner (2017) indicates that the use of ‘trolling’ is ever-
changing, and that the 2015 definition might already be outdated. Yet the overall 
sentiment that trolling is a practice that requires one to offend or be humorous at 
somebody else’s expense remains. 
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2018; Barnes, 2018). Phillips (2015) argues that trolling can amplify 
certain issues or challenges at stake in society. Trolls are metaphorically 
starting a fire and walking away from it. The actual fire is not the ‘lulz’ 
(the fun or laughter at someone else’s expense), but the build-up to the 
action.
In asserting how trolling connects to fan studies, Scott clarifies why 
and when fans or producers can be labelled trolls: 
When […] they have become too aggressive in their affective claims to textual 
ownership, manifested in actively attempting to sway or collectively criticize 
particular representational choices. Producers are situated as trolls when 
they, for either industrial or personal reasons, insert themselves into fan 
communities of practices or actively attempt to contain particular forms of 
fannish reading (2018, p. 146, emphasis added).
So, trolling fans are perhaps not so much in it for the ‘lulz’ as argued 
by Phillips (2015), but rather are too passionate or too concerned about 
changes happening to their beloved object of fandom. Therewith 
they exclude or are vigilant of those who do not follow their ‘textual 
ownership’, or who do not accept or agree with their doxa. Scott (2018) 
clarifies her assertion of trolling by using the case of headmaster Albus 
Dumbledore’s unspecified sexuality in the Harry Potter franchise. 
Although J.K. Rowling has stated she envisions Dumbledore as gay, 
he is not (explicitly) portrayed as such in the existing movies or in the 
Fantastic Beasts and Where to Find Them spin-off. The fans however, ever 
since learning about Dumbledore’s sexuality, were also left divided: some 
fans objected to the idea, while other fans have regularly attempted via 
Twitter and various social media campaigns to make this more explicit. 
Yet neither the movie producers nor J.K. Rowling considered this an 
element that should be explicitly mentioned. That fans organised such 
actions does not per se mean that they are trolling (nor does it imply 
that movie producer David Yates does),2 yet there are resemblances 
with the vigilante mindset: fans organise themselves actively as a 
collective against a particular person or happening they were offended 
by (either Yates not willing to make Dumbledore’s sexuality explicit, or 
the thought of Dumbledore as gay).
2  See the full article here: https://edition.cnn.com/2018/02/01/entertainment/
jk-rowl ing-dumbledore-gay/index.html
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Totemic Nostalgia
On the other hand, if the filmmakers were to portray Dumbledore as 
homosexual, some fans might genuinely feel hurt by this change made 
by the adaptation. Proctor (2017), in his study of the Ghostbusters 
fandom who reacted toxically to the all-female reboot, describes this 
genuine pain as “totemic nostalgia […] a fan protectionism, which is 
not toxic, centred on an affective relationship with a fan object, usually 
forged in childhood” (Proctor, 2017, p. 1122) and which should be 
read as “innocuous rather than explicitly toxic” (ibid, p. 1129). In other 
words, Proctor makes an argument that we should not refer to all fan 
behaviour as toxic. 
The media often cherry-pick the worst cases of toxic fan behaviour, 
thus amplifying them. Yet some of the fans that denounced the casting 
of the all-female Ghostbusters reboot because of childhood nostalgia 
might also be those who engaged in the bullying of actress Leslie Jones. 
This leads us to question what the dominant doxa of a fandom is, and 
who determines this doxa.
Still, not all fans participate in these practices of trolling, totemic 
nostalgia or other ways of expressing their criticism. Yet these can be 
examined because fans, as Proctor (2017) argues, now quarrel online. 
Fan practices have gained more visibility (cf. Thompson, 2005; 2011), 
and are amplified more easily through the online reach of social media 
platforms. Moreover, they are no longer confined to fan-only spaces 
(e.g. secluded fora or fan conventions).
Case Study: Controversies Surrounding Fantastic Beasts 
This chapter offers an empirical snapshot of vigilantism in an Anglo-
American pop culture fandom, namely that of Fantastic Beasts and Where 
to Find Them (Fantastic Beasts or FB from hereon). These fans are not 
drawn together because of an event that happened; they were already 
formed as a collective. Yet they have been divided by new developments 
in the fandom and franchise they care so much about.
Fantastic Beasts is a spin-off series of the Harry Potter franchise. The 
series is created and written by author J.K. Rowling, and produced by 
Warner Brothers. FB was first mentioned in the Harry Potter series as a 
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popular book that the wizards read to learn about fantastic beasts, written 
by Newt Scamander, who is the main protagonist of the movies. Due 
to the enormous popularity of the Harry Potter franchise, the Fantastic 
Beasts mentioned in the original books turned into an actual published 
book of its own. A movie based on the adventures of Newt Scamander 
followed in 2016 (directed by David Yates, who had previously been 
involved in the Potter franchise as director of several of its films).
A second FB film was released in 2018, as part of a planned total of 
five. The Crimes of Grindelwald (shortened to Grindelwald), has stirred 
up commotion in the fandom because of its casting choices. Particularly 
controversial were the casting of Johnny Depp as Grindelwald, a 
powerful, dark wizard, and the involvement of South Korean actress 
Claudia Kim as Nagini, a woman/snake-like creature who later turns 
into the dark wizard Voldemort’s pet and horcrux (an object that 
stores part of Voldemort’s soul so he can return to power). Fans also 
condemned the lack of emphasis on Dumbledore’s sexuality. As a result 
of these controversies, several issues were highlighted in traditional 
media. Venues like The Guardian, USA Today and Vice criticised the 
lack of diverse ethnic voices shaping the wizarding world of Fantastic 
Beasts. According to these media, decisions about casting or (what is 
not included in) the narratives of the movies were made because J.K. 
Rowling and Warner Brothers sought to keep the movies accessible to 
all age groups, and did not want them to be rated PG (a more restrictive 
rating than the child-friendly U).
For this study, I looked at the controversies surrounding Fantastic 
Beasts. These controversies have their roots in fans’ tweets, but got 
picked up by members of the news and entertainment media. To analyse 
these controversies, a snapshot sample of fifteen articles was selected.3 
The articles offered a more opinionated perspective on the franchise 
and contained tweets (N=56) from fans about the franchise. Although 
I will not refer to specific Twitter handles, the tweets can still be traced 
back to their origins (cf. Zimmer, 2010). I considered it a prerequisite 
that the tweets discussed in this chapter appeared online as part of a 
3  In total, searching for all news related to Johnny Depp’s involvement in Fantastic 
Beasts in the Nexis database yielded 263 articles between January 2016 and 
December 2018. Articles on Claudia Kim’s casting as Nagini over the same time 
period offered 369 results. 
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news or entertainment media article, which implies that they have been 
taken from a public(ly accessible) account. However, this also might 
bring about a bias in the data: these media outlets might have selected 
cases they found most interesting (cf. Proctor, 2017). The tweets have, 
through this pre-selection, gained visibility, prominence and endurance 
by being part of a publication. However, I aim to overcome this bias by 
contextualising and analysing them in connection to each other, and not 
as sole expressions of criticism or dissatisfaction. 
The articles selected all covered one of the controversial topics 
surrounding FB, with a particular focus on the casting of Johnny Depp 
as Grindelwald and the decision to cast South Korean actress Claudia 
Kim as Nagini. Articles included are from the online platforms of news 
and entertainment outlets NME, Buzzfeed, Slate, Floor 8, ELLE (Dutch 
version), Yahoo (Lifestyle) and Vice and the websites of British media 
BBC, The Independent and The Guardian. All were published between 
2016 and 2018. These outlets (and articles) were chosen because of their 
accessibility and fit with the (adult) target audience of Fantastic Beasts.
To uncover these empirical manifestations related to the various 
controversies surrounding the FB movies, I conducted a thematic 
analysis (see Braun & Clarke, 2006). That means I aimed to identify 
patterns by assigning codes to the material, followed by grouping these 
codes together into overarching themes that summarise these patterns. 
Although these materials only form a snapshot of the vast amount of 
articles on these different controversies, they are by no means cherry-
picked (cf. Proctor, 2017), nor do these practices only happen in popular 
culture fandoms. Sports fandoms thrive by cultivating rivalries, yet are 
considered a different type of fandom to study in comparison to pop-
culture fandoms (cf. Gushwan, 2012).
Results
This section presents four patterns related to digital vigilantism in the 
fandom of Fantastic Beasts. The different steps discussed show how 
different narratives surrounding Fantastic Beasts (e.g. casting choices, 
story development) are hijacked by its fans, who engage in practices 
like denunciation, calling out and shaming actors and producers. These 
practices reveal how grievances escalated within the fandom (and in 
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the media) surrounding the development of the movie. First, I briefly 
discuss the unwanted exposure of the lead actor in Grindelwald, namely 
the fandom denouncing Johnny Depp as an abuser; second, following 
this casting choice the fans organised a campaign to remove Depp from 
the film and fans called out and shamed  —  meaning they publicly 
denounced and stigmatised (cf. Trottier, 2018)—the movie’s director, 
Yates, for casting him; third, the shaming of Rowling by fans, both for 
Depp’s involvement and for casting Kim as Nagini; finally, I illustrate 
how the fan doxas are challenged by changes in the franchise. 
Unwanted Exposure 
The first step in the ‘hijacking’ of Fantastic Beasts came after the alleged 
accusations, influenced by the #MeToo movement, against lead actor 
Johnny Depp. Fans started petitioning to remove him from the movie, 
condemning his involvement. Depp has a notorious reputation (accused 
by ex-partner Amber Heard of domestic abuse, see Rao, 2020) and was 
seen as a poor fit for the child-friendly and inclusive franchise. This 
generated unwanted exposure (Thompson, 2005; 2011) for the movie, 
but also for Depp. Comments like this one made by a Twitter user cited 
by NME “it really isn’t too late to replace Johnny Depp, guys” (NME, 
2017) are exemplary. Another person expressed their excitement about 
the main character, Newt Scamander, but states “then I remember 
we’ll see more of johnny depp [sic]” (Independent). When the trailer 
appeared online, comments like this materialised again; one fan said 
“I legitimately love everything about this. Except the fact that Johnny 
Depp is still Grindelwald” (ELLE, 2017). In sum, they all contain 
phrases that denounce Depp, with the result that his involvement was 
heavily criticised. Madianou has described how such unwanted and 
unexpected exposure often reveals the “power asymmetries of shame” 
(2011, p. 5). Both Depp and the franchise itself were unable to control 
this sudden backlash. According to an article in People (‘Johnny Depp 
Sues UK Tabloid for Defamation over Story Slamming Him and J.K. 
Rowling’ by Ale Russian, published in June 2018), Depp even sued a 
British tabloid for libel over a story in which the actor was denounced 
as a “wife-beater”.
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Rowling defended Depp’s casting, trying to make the fans see why 
keeping him in the movie was justified after he and Heard settled in 
court. She is cited in an interview with Variety (Clarke, 2017) stating that 
she accepts that some fans will not be satisfied “however, conscience isn’t 
governable by committee. Within the fictional world and outside it, we 
all have to do what we believe to be the right thing”. By expressing her 
opinion publicly, Rowling might attempt to “contribute to the audience’s 
sense of acceptable social norms and thus, to the awareness of other’s 
regard” (Madianou, 2011, p. 6) and try to influence the outlook the fans 
have on the casting. To put it bluntly, she seems to argue that the case is 
settled and that it is not up to her or the fans to make judgements, and 
therewith commands the fandom to move on.
Online Campaigns
The second moment of escalation in which the fans were involved, and 
the second trend identified, is related to the continuing vigilantism of 
the fandom in the Depp case. They made an active comparison and 
initiated an online campaign (Trottier, 2017) for director David Yates 
to follow the example of Ridley Scott, who fired Kevin Spacey from All 
the Money in the World after several sexual assault allegations were made 
against the actor.4 Ridley decided to cease working with Spacey and 
even reshot the movie with another performer in the role, completely 
erasing Spacey from the project. Tweets like the following demonstrate 
how fans considered this situation as exemplary for Depp’s position 
and future in the franchise: “If Ridley Scott fire Kevin Spacey after 
filming an entire movie with him and voluntary reshooting it a month 
before release, then y’all can do the same thing w Johnny Depp bc 
you still have a year to go [sic]” (NME, 2017). Likewise, another fan 
remarks,
If Kevin spacey can get ditched last minute from a movie they can 
recast johnny depp in fantastic beasts, his character canonically already 
changed his face so how about perhaps recasting with someone who’s 
not an abuser maybe [sic] (ELLE, 2017).
4  See this article in The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2017/
nov/09/kevin-spacey-cut-out-of-film-and-replaced-by-christopher-plummer
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This fan also mentions how the story of Fantastic Beasts would lend itself 
for a recasting, more so than the situation Ridley Scott had to deal with 
for his movie.
The choice to keep Depp in the movie led to the calling out and 
shaming of Yates as producer, but also to the denunciation of Rowling 
as writer: jokingly, one fan commented that “David Yates’ justification 
for having Johnny Depp in Fantastic Beasts 2 is every bit as weak as Ron 
Weasley’s magic skills” (Independent, 2017). Another fan states more 
seriously: “[…] there’s Johnny Depp in it and I promised myself I would 
boycott all of his films. I just don’t get why someone as vocal as J.K. Rowling 
accepted that he play in the film [sic]” (NME, 2017, emphasis added). 
Similarly, another fan tweeted: “The only thing I really need to know is 
how @jk_rowling is so vocal on feminism and women’s issues, yet is willing 
to turn a blind eye to actual domestic abuser Jonny Depp starring in 
one of her book adaptions?”(ELLE, 2017, emphasis added). Rowling is 
denounced by these fans who shame her by pointing out the hypocrisy 
of her own behaviour — also a signal of totemic nostalgia, commenting 
on how Rowling ‘used to be’ (cf. Proctor, 2017; Barnes, 2018). Drawing 
on that past image of Rowling, as someone who usually advocates for 
women’s issues, was intended to highlight the apparent contradiction of 
her decision not to take action against an alleged abuser who was part 
of her own project.
Shaming and Denouncing Rowling
The situation escalated further thanks to fans’ continued shaming of 
Rowling, which intensified when the casting of South Korean actress 
Claudia Kim as Nagini was announced. Nagini never received much of 
a backstory in the original Harry Potter books, but was mostly known 
as Voldemort’s pet. Therefore, the reveal of Nagini as a woman of 
Asian heritage was remarkable. One fan denounced Rowling as follows 
“Apparently JK Rowling decided that Nagini (volemort’s pet snake) 
is a Korean woman and I am so sad that so much of my childhood 
was wasted on such an unsurprisingly racist white woman [sic]” 
(Yahoo, 2018). Another phrases their denunciation even more strongly: 
“JK Rowling is trash […] If you don’t see anything racist about an 
Asian woman being the pet of a white man — who is basically magic 
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hitler, I don’t know what to say [sic]” (Floor8, 2018). Or as another 
commenter indicated “listen Joanne, we get it, you didn’t include 
enough representation when you wrote the books. But suddenly 
making Nagini into a Korean woman is garbage. Representation as 
an afterthought for more woke points is not good representation” 
(BBC, 2018). Another fan puts the discussion in relation to the Harry 
Potter movies, where another Asian actress/character (Cho Chang) 
was portrayed stereotypically: “I just want to say I’m impressed with 
JK Rowling. It takes a LOT of confidence to go 2/2 on racist Asian 
stereotypes. Cho Chang being the demure ‘gentle flower’ and #Nagini 
being the sexually attractive dragon lady” (Yahoo, 2018). 
Rowling reacted with an explanation of why the character Nagini 
in the film is Asian: allegedly, the snake-like creature has its roots 
in Indonesian mythology. Journalist Hanna Flint, in her articles for 
The Guardian (2018b) and Yahoo News (2018a) marks this “constant 
rejigging of the original narrative furniture” as “retcon”, meaning 
retroactive continuity. This is a strategy or phenomenon that might 
(help to) overcome totemic nostalgia, as it enables new developments 
by creating a timeline that is already a part of the story, yet this might 
lead to dissatisfaction for some fans. As with the Depp controversy, the 
Nagini episode again exposed how fans “police” the norms and values 
of their fandom, and the franchise and its creators (cf. Busse, 2013; 
Scott, 2018). As is also illustrated in articles by author Nicole Clark 
(2018) for online platform Vice, Rowling has always been admired 
for her vocal attitude against inequality and injustice with regard to 
certain issues, for example, homosexuality, yet she was now (in the 
cases of the Depp and Nagini controversies) criticised for apparently 
not living up to these values, and she was consequently shamed for 
this change in behaviour and mindset. Nicole Clark (2018) illustrates 
this by bringing in Dumbledore’s alleged sexuality, noting that “there 
were no solid markers to confirm a lived experience of homosexuality” 
and “no representation that might suggest to young, gay readers that 
they too could grow up to be the world’s most powerful wizard”. She 
concluded that “[t]o claim that kind of power in retrospect is not only 
goofy, but deeply disrespectful”. Reporting on the case by Vice (Clark, 
2018) further amplified the visibility of the dispute and seemed to 
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support the practices of shaming and calling out that fans engaged in 
via social media. 
Likewise, Terry Nguyen (published in Vice, 2018) argued that 
Rowling glosses over the racist and colonialist histories that inspired 
the backstories for some other characters in Fantastic Beasts. He stated: 
“[t]hat ignorance effectively destroys Rowling’s progressive mirage and 
the significance of her characters of color […]”. Here too, the practices 
of fans are amplified through, or resonate with, the arguments of the 
journalist. The denunciation of Rowling suggests that fans do not always 
agree with her. Moreover, the fans render Rowling’s conflicting opinions 
and decisions more visible by calling attention to and shaming these 
instances online.
The Challenged Doxa
The fourth pattern identified in fans’ reactions is illustrative of the 
challenged and changing doxas (cf. Hills, 2018) of the fandom. In the 
Depp controversy, this relates closely to the topic of abuse, a topic 
brought up in 2017 by journalist Alanna Bennett from Buzzfeed, whose 
article generated another wave of condemnation towards Depp and his 
involvement in the film. She argued that abuse has always been a central 
theme in the franchise itself: “That was a big part of what made Harry’s 
escape into the wizarding world feel impactful — he was finally granted 
a reprieve from life with his abusers”. Abuse thus became the central 
theme these vigilant fans focused on in their online campaign against 
Depp. As one fan explained: “The Harry Potter universe is all about 
being against the abuse of power and yet you cast a known abuser?” 
(Buzzfeed, 2017). Similarly, another fan remarked: “What really gets me, 
is how many victims of abuse have used the Harry Potter franchise as 
a means to heal. How must they feel now?” (Buzzfeed, 2017). This also 
gives an insight into why the fans were surprised that Rowling did not 
challenge the casting of Depp. As one fan put it: “[…] the danger in 
looking the other way bc the truth is inconvenient. Jk rowling saying she 
doesn’t believe amber heard and is happy to keep a wife beater employed 
is disgusting. F*ck her [sic]” (Buzzfeed, 2017). Fans are making visible 
(cf. Thompson, 2005) and commenting (cf. Barnes, 2018) on what is 
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wrong with the path the franchise took, and particularly with this not 
having been challenged by its creators. 
What these different modes (shaming, denunciation etc.) and the 
examples regarding Fantastic Beasts illustrate is that, when considering 
these fan practices, it is necessary to look at the different power relations 
at stake. Again, this highlights how the doxa of fandom is challenged, 
and what being a “good” fan (a contested notion: see Busse, 2013; Hills, 
2018) entails: is it the fan defending Depp’s casting because J.K. Rowling 
approves, or the fan seeking social justice because Depp is an alleged 
domestic abuser? 
The Nagini controversy is encapsulated by tweets like the following: 
“How did nobody involved in Fantastic Beasts 2 look at this Nagini 
situation and think, ‘huh, this sounds problematic…’?” (USA Today, 
2018). However, some fans suggested that this clinging to the past 
by some fans is limiting for the franchise and fandom at large. For 
example, this comment illustrates such a sentiment: “So…Jk Rowling 
is racist now for casting a POC as a villain? What has this world gone 
to… People need to stop attacking their own allies for no reason [sic]” 
(BBC, 2018). Or this one: “jk rowling is not a racist by making Asian 
woman as nagini’s true form. I believe it’s just an act of bringing up 
some race diversity to the movie [sic]” (Yahoo, 2018), which then 
continues with “nagini is not a ‘white man’s pet’, she so precious to 
Voldemort he turned her into his closes horcrux [sic]”. Although these 
two comments resemble claims about the diversity of the franchise, 
they could likewise be interpreted as trolling other fans: they suggest 
that those fans concerned about Nagini’s casting should not be so 
easily offended by these “retcon developments”. Twitter comments 
mostly do not offer much context or space to further clarify these 
opinions. However, this fan provides some background as to why she 
has a particular opinion on Nagini’s casting “as an Asian woman I’m 
not particularly offended about Claudia being nagini […] people are 
just so easily offended these days, you can’t enjoy anything without it 
having some sort of racist deeper meaning [sic]” (Yahoo, 2018). She 
also criticises the fans who are offended for over-analysing or being 
judgmental about the meaning behind this casting choice.
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Conclusion and Recommendations
This chapter illustrates how a combination of fan and surveillance 
studies offers tools to understand vigilant, sometimes toxic practices that 
fans engage in. It has done so through looking at the fandom of Fantastic 
Beasts and various controversies surrounding the franchise that led to 
the hijacking and escalation of its narratives, as well as disagreements 
within this pre-existing community.
For the Fantastic Beasts fans, it might be argued that the fans gave 
greater visibility to the stories about Johnny Depp as an (alleged) 
domestic abuser, generating unwanted exposure for him and the 
franchise. They continued to amplify this allegation by campaigning for 
his removal from the film, and calling out David Yates and J.K. Rowling 
for not taking action. The fans organised themselves collectively against 
this casting decision, yet to no avail. Consequently, this episode spilled 
over into anger about the other controversy, and the two fuelled 
each other, with Rowling becoming the target of the Nagini casting 
controversy and being denounced as racist, and as an author who sought 
to pay lip service to diversity without properly engaging with what 
diverse representation in her books and films would involve. Again, this 
escalation illustrated the affective ownership of fans, but also indicated 
how these fans found it unacceptable to retro-con Nagini’s identity as 
an Asian woman prior to her transformation into a snake. The Depp 
and Nagini controversies are examples of how the fandom hijacked the 
franchise’s narrative, while also exposing fans’ reactions to changes in 
the doxa of the fandom and the franchise. The fans were asked to include 
and embrace these characters, but some fans considered the way these 
characters were introduced to be wrongful, and this led to conflicting 
views within the fandom.
This chapter demonstrates how the framework of vigilantism is 
applicable to and is present in fan studies. The ‘policing’ behaviour 
of fans, be it out of affection or totemic nostalgia, might influence 
surveillance studies to consider further the affective dimension of 
vigilant practices, in addition to looking at surveillance as a cultural 
practice (Madianou, 2011). Moreover, albeit on a micro level, the 
challenged doxas offer strong indications of how using visibility as 
a weapon (cf. Thompson, 2005; Trottier, 2017) might result in the 
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inclusion or exclusion of individuals in such strong pre-existing entities 
as fandoms. These vigilant practices can move beyond the practice of 
trolling (cf. Scott, 2018) or policing good or bad fans. We must examine 
these practices by looking at the role affection plays in these doxas of 
communities, and what might be the consequences when these doxas 
change. Small shifts in the doxa can lead to significant (perhaps not 
always intended) implications that might be challenging for groups 
known for coherence and belonging (Barnes, 2018). Moreover, 
these challenged doxas also inform us about the cultural norms and 
values that those involved with these groups are so passionate about. 
Understanding these challenges on a micro level might help us to 
understand them on a macro or societal level.
The case examined here is a brief exploration of vigilantism in 
pop-culture fandoms (also present in the fandoms of Ghostbusters, and 
Star Wars mentioned previously). Yet, the schisms within a fandom 
illustrated on this micro level — between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ fans, and 
the involvement of ‘toxic’ or ‘vigilant’ fans  —  might be a helpful 
framework in understanding the polarisation of contemporary politics 
(Dean, 2017), or the so-called ‘culture wars’. Future work could look 
at political groups, and the practices they engage in to campaign for 
or against someone. Yet to better understand this phenomenon, such 
research would also need to consider these vigilant-fan practices 
globally, as this analysis offers an Anglo-American perspective. The 
current discourse of labelling these audiences as toxic or trolls needs 
to be carefully (re-)examined: what makes one toxic, totemically 
nostalgic, too affective or a troll? And would these fans consider 
themselves vigilant or rather affective fans? Due to the scope of this 
study, the different terminologies have been briefly characterised, yet 
it would be valuable to explore this further (see also Proctor et al., 
2018).
To conclude, much like vigilantes, fans form communities defending 
what they stand for. This interdisciplinary framework of fandom and 
vigilantism then offers a point of departure to understand other socio-
cultural challenges.
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Contesting the Vulgar Hanmai 
Performance from Kuaishou: 
Online Vigilantism toward 




In November 2017, Chinese cyberspace was outraged after a group of 
middle-class parents alleged that their children were forced to strip 
naked and jabbed with needles in a Beijing kindergarten. Since 2010, 
more than sixty similar cases of child abuse have been reported in news 
media and Internet sites, not including other incidents concerning 
children’s well-being, such as food or vaccine safety issues.1 This 
outrage was prevalent on various social media platforms, including the 
dominant Sina Weibo2 and WeChat3 and other platforms more popular 
1  English reports of the news can be found at: https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/11/24/world/asia/beijing-kindergarten-abuse.html, or https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-42105443
2  Though with significant differences in user behaviors (Gao et al., 2012), Sina Weibo 
and Twitter are two comparable micro-blogging platforms, where public discussions 
occur. The monthly active users of Sina Weibo reached 462 million by the end of 
2018. The data can be retrieved from its business report at https://tech.sina.com.
cn/i/2019-03-05/doc-ihsxncvh0033063.shtml
3  WeChat is a mobile application with multiple functions: instant messaging, voice 
and video call, social networking, gaming and mobile commerce. 86.9% of China’s 
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with the middle class, such as Zhihu and Douban.4 In the widespread 
agitation against the suspected teacher and the related institutions, an 
underclass5 hanmai [shouting with a microphone] performer, Tianyou, 
also expressed his anger in a short music video that he produced. Yet 
comments about Tianyou’s work were extremely polarised compared 
to the contributions of other participants in the general outrage. On 
Kuaishou, the video-clip-sharing platform where the hanmai video 
was initially circulated, Tianyou was greeted with applause. However, 
when the video was shared on other social media platforms, their 
comment sections were filled with insults and rebukes, such as: “you 
should graduate from primary school first before you dare to say 
anything” or “do not show off your disgusting vulgarity in front of 
the public”.6
Why were opinions so divided on different social media platforms? 
Why was Tianyou treated as unqualified to participate in online public 
discussions through hanmai videos and why did people transform him 
into an object of denunciation? These were the first empirical questions 
of the study. Firstly, it is necessary to have a basic understanding about 
what hanmai is, its connection with the platform Kuaishou and its place 
in contemporary Chinese digital culture. A vocal performance with 
802 million Internet users used Pengyouquan [Moments], the social networking 
function of WeChat, while the Subscription Accounts function allows individuals, 
media institutions, enterprises and the government to establish their own official 
account. The data can be retrieved from the 42nd China Statistical Report on Internet 
Development by China Internet Network Information Centre in July 2018 from 
http://www.cnnic.cn/hlwfzyj/hlwxzbg/
4  From a Western perspective, Zhihu looks like a Chinese version of Quora and 
Douban shares some similarities with IMDb. Though official user data is lacking, 
the two platforms are perceived as attractive to urban middle-class users, especially 
those who have received a high level of education. Descriptions and individual 
analysis about the characteristics of users of Zhihu or Douban can be found in 
online discussion posts such as https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/51561339, or blogs 
https://news.newseed.cn/p/1336055
5  The term underclass in this study includes various social groups, from peasants 
to rural migrant workers and from laid-off workers in small towns to youth with 
limited educational resources. In general, it refers to the disadvantaged social 
groups in transitional China. Rather than referring to a social group of restricted 
scale, the term underclass might cover over half the general population of China (Li 
2005).
6  These comments were posted when Tianyou’s video was shared on Bilibili.com, 
another large video sharing social media platform in China. These comments are no 
longer available online now because the video was deleted, but they were recorded 
in the fieldnotes of the researcher on February 14, 2018. 
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musical accompaniment, hanmai is usually circulated through online 
video clips. The characteristics of hanmai, including the emphasis on the 
rhyming lyrics, the rhythmic background music and frequent use of MC 
as the title of the performers, might remind an unfamiliar spectator of 
the style of rapping in African-American hip-hop culture, though both 
the hanmai community and the Chinese hip-hop community refuse to 
admit the similarities. Hanmai was first generated and mainly circulated 
on Kuaishou, one of the largest social media platforms in China with 
over 700 million registered users, characterised by a video sharing 
function. Because of the large user base of the video-centric platform, 
the user-generated visual artefacts on Kuaishou are highly diversified. 
Nonetheless, hanmai is the only genre that co-evolved with the platform 
since its launch in 2014; it is barely tolerated on other social media 
platforms because of its ‘vulgarity’.
This study attempts to examine not only what is expressed in hanmai 
videos by the young Chinese underclass today, but also why and 
how hanmai was collectively resisted as vulgar by vigilant audiences 
from other social groups. Through empirical exploration, it tries to 
explain how vigilant practices, including denunciating, shaming and 
humiliating, can be utilised to exercise disciplinary force and contribute 
to the class-stratifying process. The study should be understood in the 
contemporary Chinese context, where not only was consensus around 
values and principles absent from a society undergoing drastic change, 
but digital technologies, especially social media platforms, were deeply 
embedded in these dynamic social changes. The study identifies different 
forms of online denunciations in the class-stratified public dialogue: 
underclass youths utilised affective and rhetorical denunciations of the 
upper social classes to construct their social identities; and the middle-
class condemned the aesthetic and moral inferiority indicated by the 
‘vulgar’ hanmai videos. The visibility of hanmai had once empowered 
the previously silent underclass group, but it was also utilised by the 
middle-class audience as a weapon in user-led vigilantism, triggering 
cooperation between the government and private corporations to 
formulate a new form of visibility for underclass youths to replace the 
‘vulgar’ hanmai culture.
The study uses digital ethnographic methods to track the 
developments of the hanmai culture on Kuaishou, from its emergence 
52 Introducing Vigilant Audiences
as the collective self-representation of the young Chinese underclass, 
to the explosive denunciations it received and eventually its gradual 
disappearance under the cooperative surveillance of the state, the 
platform and society as a whole. I obtained the data for this research 
during a two-year observation period from December 2016 to 
December 2018, from four primary sources around the assemblage 
of Kuaishou and hanmai. This intentional integration of varied or 
even conflicting sources of data followed the principles suggested by 
multimodal ethnography, in order to provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of how meanings are constructed in the multimedia 
world (Dicks et al., 2006). The first component of the data was 
collected through a repetitive “walkthrough” of Kuaishou, in order to 
identify the application (app)’s relatively closed technical system and 
how users interact on it (Light et al., 2018).7 Secondly, I collected forty-
eight videos of hanmai works with their lyrics transcribed, in order 
to find out how the underclass youth actually expressed themselves 
using hanmai videos and what they said. Thirdly, I sought out different 
forms of online discussions related to hanmai, especially those 
containing denunciative discourses, including blogs and posts on Sina 
Weibo, WeChat, Zhihu and Douban. These data did not just reflect the 
realities of digital denunciation; they could also help to capture the 
imbrication between the technologically mediated and the physical 
worlds (Murthy, 2008). Fourth, I conducted semi-structured interviews 
with sixteen individuals from related groups who participated in this 
hanmai culture and the online vigilantism that targeted it, including 
the performers and spectators of hanmai, hip-hop followers, users of 
the other social media platforms who posted comments about hanmai 
and programmers from the Kuaishou company.8
7  “The walkthrough method is a way of engaging directly with an app’s interface 
to examine its technological mechanisms and embedded cultural references to 
understand how it guides users and shapes their experiences. The core of this 
method involves the step-by-step observation and documentation of an app’s 
screens, features and flows of activity — slowing down the mundane actions and 
interactions that form part of normal app use in order to make them salient and 
therefore available for critical analysis” (Light, Burgess, & Duguay, 2018, p. 882).
8  In the following sections, thirteen of the interviewees allowed me to translate their 
Chinese Internet pseudonym into English; the other three preferred a completely 
new pseudonym.
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The Social and Cultural Context of the Underclass 
Hanmai Culture
First, it is essential to clarify the position and social significance of hanmai 
culture in the contemporary Chinese context. For both their lovers and 
their haters, hanmai videos were the first prevalent format for the self-
representation of the young Chinese underclass. During the last decade 
(as of June 2018) Chinese mobile Internet users have increased to 98.3% 
of the overall 802 million people who are able to access the Internet,9 
thanks to the availability of low-end smartphones with cameras and the 
gradually decreasing telecommunication tariffs. Access to the Internet is 
no longer the privilege of college students, or the middle class who live 
in the metropolis. Technological progress has provided the basis for the 
visibility of disadvantaged social groups that were previously silent in 
Chinese cyberspace. 
What identifies the underclass is not a straightforward question 
that can be easily answered with census statistics of the population’s 
income, ethnicities, occupations, educational backgrounds or origins; it 
is much more complicated than that. One finds discrepancies between 
realities and imaginations, between a person’s own sense of their 
(multiple) identities and how they are perceived by others. Moreover, 
the situation may be further complicated as China is still a drastically 
transitioning society, where there is hardly any consensus about either 
the standards of social class stratification or the norms of each specific 
social group. One possible solution might be to differentiate the two 
terms about class most commonly used in the Chinese language. One 
is jieji, which evokes particular concepts such as peasants, workers and 
capitalists within the Chinese Communist Party’s Marxist-Leninist 
ideology (Goodman, 2014). The other is jieceng, which denotes stratum 
or strata and has been adopted in the twenty-first century to describe 
social stratification after the recent economic reforms (Lu, 2002). 
Though the latter is more resonant today, the historical legacies of jieji 
must not be overlooked, the most significant being the strictly enforced 
house registration system  —  to give it its Chinese term, hukou. From 
1955 until today, the hukou system segregates the general population 
9  The data can also be accessed at http://www.cnnic.cn/hlwfzyj/hlwxzbg/
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into two groups of residents, the rural and the urban, according to their 
birth places and family locations. The rural/urban division in the hukou 
system still plays an important role, not only in contributing to general 
income inequalities (Xie & Zhou, 2014), but also in framing people’s 
identities and perceptions within the class system (Afridi et al., 2015).
Mobility used to occur mostly within each of the two groups before 
the 1980s. The forty-year economic reform transformed the geographical 
and temporal migration between the countryside and city with great 
ease. However, it is still difficult to change the attribute of one’s hukou 
within the strict binary of the rural/urban system. In general, rural 
populations might have enjoyed reputational prestige during the 
communist experiment, but they were inferior in economic and material 
aspects compared to the urban citizens (Li, 2004a). As a result, while the 
rural residents (and especially the peasants) might nominally rank high 
in the jieji system, the forty-year economic reforms saw them decline to 
the level of the underclass under the concept of jieceng. Until the end of 
2018, over 288 million people with rural hukou were working in cities.10 
These elites from the rural region not only faced exclusion from the 
primary labour market, the welfare system and the social networks of 
the cities, but they also lived in a precarious rift between the two 
reconstructed social stratification systems because they were perceived 
as an underclass in their new surroundings (Li, 2004a).
Nonetheless, although they are an essential aspect of the Chinese 
underclass, rural migrant workers are not the only component. Much 
more diversified social groups are closely connected to the Chinese 
underclass, thanks to the enlarging inequalities in contemporary 
Chinese society (Sun, 2003). For example, rapid urbanisation has 
uprooted numerous rural residents and transplanted them to newly 
constructed towns and cities by directly issuing them with the urban 
hukou.11 These passive immigrants are often unable to adjust immediately 
10  The data can be retrieved from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, http://
www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201902/t20190228_1651265.html
11  To better facilitate economic development, the Chinese government has been 
working to replace hundreds of millions of small rural homes with newly 
constructed high-rises in towns and cities so as to improve the general population’s 
living standards and also enlarge the consuming class of city dwellers. Related 
reports can be accessed from https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/world/asia/
chinas-great-uprooting-moving-250-million-into-cities.html 
Contesting the Vulgar Hanmai Performance from Kuaishou  55
to their new urban surroundings and find it difficult to establish 
themselves, even with the financial compensation from the government 
(Li, 2004a). 
Secondly, the drastic economic reform among state-owned enterprises 
since the 1990s has created over ten million unemployed workers, who 
form part of the impoverished urban population. Being laid off from 
the state-owned factories and businesses does not simply mean losing 
a stable job, but also the sudden loss of access to the welfare system, 
ranging from healthcare to a child’s education. Thirdly, the forty-year-
long economic reform has anchored part of the class stratification in 
Chinese transitional society (Li, 2004b) and therefore this period has 
witnessed inherited poverty and marginalisation among the younger 
generation. For example, the migrant workers’ temporary working 
status has divided millions of rural families, as most of the children are 
left in the village alone or with their grandparents while their parents 
work thousands of miles away, providing only financial support during 
their childhood. These children eventually come to face their own life 
choice: whether or not to join a new generation of rural migrant workers.
These different groups used to be regarded as unrelated categories 
within the larger framework of the underclass (Lu, 2002) or subordinate 
class (Goodman, 2014). Though these different groups shared 
commonalities in economic status such as monthly income, they 
hardly constructed a collective class consciousness (Solinger, 2012). In 
the media, they are usually depicted distinctly, with a different focus 
depending on the context. For example, the rural migrant workers, the 
most central group within the underclass, are usually presented as the 
laughable ‘other’ in urban cinemas, avoiding any discussion about the 
structural inequalities, in order not only to pursue commercial success 
among the urban audience, but also to accord with the state’s media 
policy to represent a harmonious society (Sun, 2014). On the other 
hand, the laid-off workers are depicted more as the pathetic ‘others,’ 
as their suffering is perceived as a direct consequence of the structural 
social transitions (Liu, 2016).
The prevalent access to social media platforms such as Kuaishou 
emerged in this social context, when the younger members of the 
underclass could, for the first time, take out their mobile phones, 
record themselves and publicise their own videos online. This process 
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also contributed to the emergence of collective identities that were no 
longer shaped by the boundaries among different groups within the 
underclass. Contradicting the stereotypes in traditional media, the 
young underclass concentrated on themselves, their social realities and 
recorded their dreams and ambitions in the hanmai videos. At its peak, 
tens of thousands of hanmai videos were created and shared on Kuaishou, 
while many more spectators were viewing, liking, commenting and 
tipping12 each other within the community. As the superstar of hanmai, 
MC Tianyou used to have over forty million followers on Kuaishou, who 
called themselves soldiers in his army. However, the explosive visibility 
of this subculture among the young underclass also attracted attention 
and opprobrium from other social groups, especially urban, middle-
class Internet users.
Reconstructing the Underclass on Social  
Media Platforms 
Though the technological foundations for the visibility of the underclass 
can hardly be neglected, the current study assumes that the Internet 
technology and social media in particular, is created, configured 
and used by human beings in specific social contexts (Fuchs, 2014). 
Meanwhile, the process of supporting daily activities online is so 
complicated that these things should be interpreted as mediators rather 
than intermediaries (Latour, 2005), which profoundly contribute to 
affecting our imagined perception of the differences between the online 
and offline world. In other words, the main theoretical concern of this 
study is to investigate how the Internet, with its platform characteristics 
and the Chinese class-based society are mutually shaping and shaped 
by each other within an intricate network, using the empirical case of 
hanmai videos on the Kuaishou social media platform and the vigilante 
12  Tipping, or dashang in Chinese, refers to viewers buying virtual gifts to reward 
the creators. The specific affordance and behaviour on Chinese social media 
platforms not only largely affects the social interactions between the viewers and 
creators (Lee et al., 2018), but also contributes to changed business models, as 
the donations form a large proportion of the revenues of social media companies. 
Related reports can be found at https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-02-17/inside-
chinas-lucrative-livestreaming-industry/10810788 and https://view.inews.qq.com/
a/20170706A06C2200 (in Chinese).
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practices that followed. Refusing the platform’s claim to be a neutral, 
objective and reliable “mirror of the authentic world” (Zhang & Zhou, 
2017), I interpreted this claim as a strategic metaphor that aimed not 
only to circumvent any obligations to answer to regulatory demands, 
but also to justify their services in negotiation with different types of 
users and government departments: in other words, to suggest that, as a 
platform, Kuaishou simply facilitated users’ online expressions without 
intervention. 
The paradigm that neutral social media platforms reflect social 
realties fails to capture the dialectical relationship between technology 
and society. Moreover, it is especially contested in the case of Kuaishou 
and its use in a transitional Chinese society that is characterised by 
economic as well as ideological cleavages (Sun, 2003). By regarding 
Internet technology as socially constructed, the current study assumes 
different social media platforms with various technological affordances 
(Bucher & Helmond, 2018) are gaining implicit power in assembling 
different online communities and facilitating cultural activities. 
Therefore, different platforms attract users with different backgrounds, 
with the result that various values and principles are cultivated in the 
vigilant practices targeting hanmai.
On the other hand, the study also refuses to regard the identities of 
the underclass as reflections of objective social positions, but assumes 
that such identities are conferred on subjects (Lawler, 2004). Some 
literature addresses the engagement of the Chinese underclass with 
digital technology by concentrating on how disadvantaged social 
groups might be empowered by the Internet. For example, as a result of 
the annual commute among rural migrant workers between cities and 
villages, mobile devices are brought back to the villages. These not only 
construct new social ties among the rural residents but also provide 
benefits by connecting them with the resource-rich urban areas (Oreglia, 
2013). Besides these material advances, previously disadvantaged 
rural workers can also use the mobile phones to “see the world” and 
gain an imagined sense of mobility by being online with some level of 
autonomy (Wallis, 2013, p. 3). However, my study is not restricted to 
the specific underclass group of rural migrant workers but is framed 
by the notion that the identities of the underclass are reconstructed in 
the dynamic negotiations between themselves, others and technological 
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platforms. It relies on the Bourdieu’s theoretical basis that classifying 
operations are dynamically classifiable practices rather than objective 
actions (Bourdieu, 1984). Expanding from Bourdieu’s analysis in fields 
such as education, lifestyles and cultural tastes, the integrated concepts 
of capital, field and habitus could be applied in the realm of online space 
(Ignatow & Robinson, 2017).
This research regards the members of the hanmai community as taking 
part in a dynamic process of self-construction, being recognised, in 
particular by middle-class Internet users, as having emerging collective 
identities as underclass youths. Such a process is not only made visible 
in the production and circulation of hanmai videos, but also through the 
online denunciations targeting them. The precarious situation that the 
young Chinese underclass are facing is significant, both in itself and as 
an insightful empirical context to understand how digital technology 
contributes powerfully to class stratification (Sterne, 2003). Moreover, 
this study also examines Kuaishou and other social media platforms 
as a digitally mediated field with implicit values, norms and rules 
embedded in its technological affordances. Habitus, in this study, refers 
not only to our ways of being in the world (Bourdieu, 1984); it also takes 
humans’ perceptions of technology into consideration. Visual materials 
have always been important to understand how habitus affects people, 
because elements that are hard to verbalise or articulate are contained 
there (Sweetman, 2009). Thus, the platform of Kuaishou concentrating 
on the creation and spread of videos can serve as a good field for us 
to understand the nuances and complexities of habitus in the Chinese 
class-stratifying process.
More specifically, this chapter departs from previous literature 
in its attention to the practices of vigilantism in the process of class 
stratification. The theoretical basis of digital vigilantism in this study 
is consistent with the definition that it is an ongoing process, in which 
people are collectively offended by others and respond by collaborative 
revenge, with certain patterns of actions afforded by digital technology 
(Trottier, 2017). In this case, the vigilant audiences, mostly composed 
of middle-class Internet users, were offended by the visibility and 
‘vulgarity’ of the underclass youths in the virtual space. Therefore, 
practices of shaming, denunciations and humiliations were widely 
utilised in the dialogue among the different social groups, in order to 
exercise disciplinary force and social control (Kasra, 2017). In particular, 
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the sudden visibility of an underclass with their own agency did not 
necessarily serve to empower a previously disadvantaged social group, 
but might also lead to misrepresentation, denunciation and regulation 
(in the Foucauldian sense of surveillance) of the original visual 
expressions due to the dynamic power structure (Brighenti, 2007). 
Moreover, the underclass youth (rather than any specific individuals) 
were the collective target of the online vigilantism in this case, which 
differs from other studies (cf. Cheong & Gong, 2010). When the targets 
of collective denunciations shift from specific individuals to categorised 
social groups, the mechanisms of the vigilant practices and the power 
negotiations behind them also change.
The Affective and Rhetorical Denunciations in Hanmai
Although it is widely recognised as a result of social media platforms, 
in the eyes of many hanmai followers, hanmai is consistent with various 
cultural practices from the pre-digital age. The essential characteristic 
of online hanmai videos is the reading or recitation of improvised 
rhymed lyrics with musical accompaniment. Not all hanmai performers 
necessarily shout into their microphone according to the term’s literal 
meaning; nonetheless, the term ‘shouting’ underscores that the lyrics are 
of greater importance than the other musical or visual elements in hanmai 
videos. Concentrating on this feature, some hanmai followers, such as Jia 
(2017) and Zhong, interpret current hanmai culture as an adaptation of 
traditional Chinese oral storytelling performance, especially the form 
that arose from the folk cultures popular in North China. Comprising 
a wide variety of speaking and singing arts, Chinese oral narrative 
entertainment has not only survived for more than a millennium, 
but possesses specific features in local dialects from various regions 
(Boerdahl, 2013). In particular, the frequent use of playful doggerel 
in hanmai lyrics shares significant commonalities with errenzhuan [the 
rotation of two people], the ancient telling and singing art form that 
still plays an important role in the entertainment of Northeast rural 
residents (Ma, 2019). 
Others, such as Tang (2017), propose that online hanmai performance 
actually evolved from its offline origins in the 1990s, when nightclubs 
gained popularity among the younger generations. Unlike the nightlife 
hotspots intended for the benefit of overseas tourists and investors in 
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metropolises such as Beijing and Shanghai (Farrer, 2008), the nightlife 
spaces in small cities and rural regions were characterised by a hybridity 
of karaoke, dancing and DIY (Do-It-Yourself) elements (Chew, 2010), so 
that it was necessary for microphone controllers, or MCs, to excite the 
crowd with improvised and playful rhymed words in the gaps between 
different songs. Despite the divergences in exploring the origins of 
hanmai culture, the fact that its offline basis is closely connected to the 
social and cultural atmosphere of rural and small city residents from 
the north cannot be neglected, even though digital technologies have 
largely enhanced its range of circulation and might also have altered its 
elements, notably from the perspective of hanmai followers.
Either the traditional errenzhuan art form or the nightlife in rural 
regions have embedded hanmai performance in underclass culture, and 
such connections are also articulated by both hanmai creators and its 
audience. At the beginning of many hanmai videos, or in the comments 
at the bottom of these videos, it is repeatedly mentioned that only 
laobaixing [people with hundreds of surnames] can understand the real 
meanings of the hanmai lyrics. According to the Modern Chinese 
Dictionary, laobaixing refers to ordinary people who are not soldiers or 
government officials, but the hanmai community reclaimed this term for 
themselves. MC Changjiang described himself as a laobaixing because he 
quit school at the age of twelve and used to work twenty-one hours a 
day as a construction worker and a dishwasher in order to survive. MC 
Yushao characterised the laobaixing using the true story of one of his 
followers who had to break up with his fiancée because he could not 
offer 500 thousand Chinese yuan as the betrothal gift. However, 
laobaixing is not used only by the hanmai community. Diverse social 
groups can use this term self-referentially, or they can be described as 
laobaixing by actors in the media landscape, ranging from the 
cosmopolitan middle class, to rural migrant workers and to Chinese 
emigrants living overseas. The significance of how the hanmai community 
interprets the word is that they add a sense of relatively lower economic 
and reputational status to the original meaning, to emphasise themselves 
being powerless in contemporary Chinese society. Nonetheless, even 
within the hanmai community there are differences in understanding 
about exactly what constitutes the underclass from the perspective of 
employment, the economy or respectability.
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Identifying themselves as a collective group of laobaixing, hanmai 
creators usually incorporate denunciations toward other social groups 
in their lyrics. Particularly the upper social class, composed of 
government officials, the rich and some morally degraded intellectuals, 
are constructed as the imagined objects deserving censure. In MC 
Tianyou’s hanmai video, “Laobaixing Has A Word to Say”, which triggered 
the middle-class denunciations in the Beijing kindergarten case 
described in the introduction, he severely condemned the suspect 
teacher in his lyrics:
You were the hope for our national rejuvenation
These young flowers once sang for you
But now you abuse them, assault them and torture them
Without any hesitation
[…]
I am not a good person, but I am human
Your hypocrisy has made you lose your soul13
A clear distinction has been drawn between laobaixing and the stigmatised 
upper class. Consistent with how pop music may affect the identities of 
young people in the other social contexts (Frith, 1996), the emphasis on 
social class in hanmai lyrics reproduces differences in identities. Röttger-
Rössler et al. (2019) argued in their study that visual artefacts were 
particularly effective at representing young people’s affective 
relationships and emotional feelings, especially when the youths felt 
that it was difficult to verbalise these experiences. Similarly, participating 
in hanmai culture by either performing or viewing these videos 
constructed the collective consciousness of the underclass on the basis 
of affection rather than rationality. The young underclass expressed 
hardly any clear expectations for structural reform, or practical strategies 
for social change, in order to defend their own rights, topics that were 
relatively prevalent in young middle-class Chinese online discussions 
(Fu, 2019). The young underclass chose to underline their intensified 
emotional feelings, such as anger, yearning and desperation, in their 
hanmai culture, and never talked about how their situation could be 
improved. 
13  The original video is no longer available online. However, thanks to YouTube user 
Bee at Kwai’s efforts in making an archive of hanmai videos, we can still see the 
reposted video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SryWoHxqpH8&
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Moreover, as a user-generated genre, participation in hanmai culture 
is not limited to viewing the videos, but also includes the interactions 
within the community and a flexible shift between being a creator and 
a spectator, as barriers to participation have broken down. This active 
participation contributes to the sense of belonging inherent in this new 
identity, which renders the group distinct from those they criticise in 
their lyrics. Regarding hanmai as a vernacular creation embedded in 
their real-life experiences, the community weighs social class as the more 
significant distinguisher to construct their identity, rather than gender or 
sexuality (Whiteley, 2013) or ethnicity (Grgurić & Janković-Paus, 2018), 
which dominate in other global contexts.
The difference of identities between the powerful and the powerless is 
sometimes conveyed rhetorically. Authority is usually portrayed using 
iconic symbols such as the Buddha or an emperor, fictional or distant 
figures in traditional Chinese culture, rather than current government 
officials or the rich. To symbolise themselves, the community idolise 
Monkey King as the representative of laobaixing. The main character in 
the sixteenth-century Chinese classical novel Journey to the West, Monkey 
King has always been an important rebel figure because his experiences 
in challenging the Buddha and the Jade Emperor and pursuing personal 
freedom have been retold many times in popular adaptations in film, 
anime or TV series. The importance of Monkey King is so significant in 
hanmai culture that there is even one specific Monkey-King voice within 
the vocal styles of hanmai; a beastial, hoarse and sharp voice in a 
particularly high tone. In MC Qixing’s work, “Buddha Says”, this vocal 
style was utilised organically together with the lyrics to express the anger 
and confusion of Monkey King, a protector and also a spokesperson of 
laobaixing, when he tried to challenge the authority of the Buddha.
Buddha, open your eyes and see these ugly faces
The evil are waiting for reward but the good are begging for 
forgiveness
Buddha, I believe in you but where on earth are you
I have walked for hundreds of thousands of miles
You tell me you are in my heart
Buddha says turning back and I can see the shore
I go back but I don’t have a home anymore14
14  Again, the original video is no longer available but the reposted version can be 
accessed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6cyOdouZ48o
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Through the affective and rhetorical criticisms of the upper class, 
the imagined adversary of laobaixing, underclass youths’ anger and 
confusion were expressed in the lyrics and cherished by the online 
audience. The audience understood that these lyrics spoke out the 
innermost feelings of Monkey King, whereas in the original work, 
it is well known that Monkey King was gradually disciplined by his 
master during the arduous journey from China to India to search for 
the truth of Buddhism. The comment section of hanmai videos on 
Kuaishou was usually suffused with praise, acknowledgement and 
support. The most frequent remark is either 666, a popular Internet 
slang term on Kuaishou that means ‘awesome’, or laotie [buddies], 
an intra-community appellation indicating the intimate relationships 
among the users. Even though some MCs mark their videos as 
‘original’ if they write the lyrics by themselves, they always encourage 
other competing MCs or the viewers to perform the song freely 
themselves or to paraphrase the lyrics. The distinction between the 
upper class, depicted as the blameable ‘others’ in the lyrics of hanmai, 
and the laobaixing themselves, are further reinforced by the affective 
interactions within the community.
Besides the Monkey-King voice, other popular vocal styles indicate 
the different categories of the content and also different ideologies 
behind the lyrics. For example, the ‘emperor’ voice is usually used in a 
hanmai work when the ambition of social mobility is underlined, while 
the ‘alcohol and tobacco’ voice usually emphasises the sufferings 
from intimate relationships caused by class boundaries. Creating, 
performing and viewing hanmai videos have transformed their 
exploration of the emerging underclass identity into a constantly 
changing process of performativity. Moreover, the lack of dialogue 
between the hanmai community and an imagined upper class has 
deflated the denunciative discourses in hanmai lyrics, and at the 
same time, positions hanmai as self-referential, and as something that 
entertains its own group. However, the rapidly increasing visibility of 
both hanmai and Kuaishou has evoked antagonism among other social 
groups, which means that the previously non-vigilante denunciations 
in hanmai lyrics have transformed the hanmai community into the 
subjects of large-scale online vigilantism led by middle-class Internet 
users.
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Hanmai Being Denunciated: from Ignorance to 
Multifaceted Vulgarity
The similarities between hanmai performances and rapping in African 
American hip-hop culture boosted the former’s visibility. Neglecting the 
hanmai community’s identity as a local culture rooted in underclass lives 
in rural regions of North China, some hip-hop lovers identified hanmai as 
a localised Chinese hip-hop culture. For example, one hip-hop fan, Xiao, 
compared MC Tianyou with a popular Chinese rapper, GAI, arguing 
that both of them have depicted the street life of the young underclass 
based on their real experiences.15 A music critic and producer, Liang 
(2017), also argued that hanmai might be closer to the initial spirit of 
authenticity in African American hip-hop culture, compared to Chinese 
hip-hop, because hanmai was actually generated by the underclass, 
while contemporary hip-hop culture was more attractive to urban 
middle-class youths as it resonated with their cosmopolitan lifestyles 
(Kloet, 2010). The identification of the similarities between hanmai and 
hip-hop rapping, rather than the denunciations in the lyrics of hanmai, 
infuriated the Chinese hip-hop community. Xiao’s personal page on 
Douban was soon inundated with comments stating “Hanmai Is Not 
Hip-hop” together with insults towards Xiao, MC Tianyou and the 
whole hanmai community. Similar offensive discourses toward hanmai 
arose on platforms like Sina Weibo, Zhihu and Douban.
The hip-hop community originally began to denounce hanmai 
performers because of the lack of originality in their music, the simplicity 
of their ‘flow’,16 and their ignorance of intellectual property protection. A 
hip-hop group, Xinjiekou, accused the whole hanmai community of 
plagiarising flows from Chinese hip-hop musicians. They created a rap 
song entiteld “Fuck Hanmai”, on Sina Weibo in order to provoke collective 
resistance against hanmai. By denouncing the supposed offences carried 
out by the hanmai community (which included not only plagiarism, but 
also their rural backgrounds and their rustic tastes) the previously 
15 Xiao shared the experience with the researcher in an interview held on February 2, 
2018.
16  Though rappers seldom define the term, ‘flow’ is an important element for the 
audience to judge the qualities of hip-hop music. It usually describes the rhythm of 
the music and the rhymes of the lyrics and how well the two elements interact. 
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unknown hip-hop group gained popularity and reaffirmed the class 
differences between hanmai and rapping. Ironically, when the fact that 
Xinjiekou itself had also been involved in dozens of copyright disputes 
was disclosed by hip-hop fans, the hip-hop community was not collectively 
mobilised to reach a consensus in resisting hanmai using vigilante rap, as 
Xinjiekou had expected. Xinjiekou is not an exclusive case, as hip-hop 
culture has evoked legal and intellectual property controversies from its 
very beginning due to its sampling practices (Self, 2001). Nonetheless, 
ignorance of copyright was the initial cause of the hip-hop community’s 
denunciations of hanmai culture. Vigilant practices have served as one of 
the key distinctions with which the middle-class hip-hop community 
differentiate themselves from the underclass hanmai.
This denunciation of hanmai attracted wider public attention 
from more diverse middle-class Internet users. Unlike the hip-hop 
community’s anxiety to differentiate themselves from the hanmai 
community, the wider middle-class public was astonished by the extent 
of vulgarity in hanmai videos. On Zhihu, thousands of questions and 
answers were posted to discuss why hanmai was so vulgar and what 
consequences would emerge if these vulgar works continued to be 
popular among the younger generations, in order to provoke collective 
resistance to hanmai. Interestingly, the content of hanmai actually 
contained much less profanity or vulgarity compared to American 
hip-hop culture (Taylor & Taylor, 2007). We may ask what ‘vulgarity’ 
means when the word is prevalently used in the public denunciations 
targeting hanmai culture and community. This study identifies three 
layers of meaning intended by different users of the term ‘vulgarity’: the 
aesthetic, the moral and the technological.
Aesthetic Vulgarity
The immature vocal style, the monotonous rhythm, the substandard 
recording facilities and the garish filters together constituted the reasons 
that middle-class Internet users’ denounced hanmai. One of the most 
unacceptable features was therefore its low quality from an aesthetic 
perspective, especially when compared with global hip-hop culture. 
Preference for the latter indicated a modern and cosmopolitan cultural 
taste that could always keep up with the global trends (Kloet, 2010), 
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while being a hanmai follower was denounced using terms like ‘rustic’ 
and ‘vulgar’. Such comparisons between hanmai and hip-hop could 
be particularly popular in shaming and humiliating discourses. For 
example, to answer the question what is the difference between hanmai 
and rapping, answers such as “hip-hop is like the food you eat for dinner 
but hanmai is like the shit you try to get rid of after you eat” or “hip-hop 
is a genre of modern music but hanmai is what the ancient homeless 
say when begging” received hundreds or even thousands of likes and 
supportive comments. Denunciations of hanmai in the name of vulgarity 
could be interpreted as a class-stratifying practice in Bourdieu’s sense of 
the distinction through cultural tastes (Bourdieu, 1984).
However, from the perspective of a hanmai lover, it was the simplicity 
of hanmai that attracted laobaixing to participate in this online culture, 
because all it required was to write what they wanted to say, organise 
the words using rhymes and recite them before a webcam with a 
musical accompaniment. For those who did not want to write their 
own lyrics, all the lyrics written by acknowledged MCs were ready-
made and openly shared within the community for everyone to use. 
The hanmai community did not even feel the aesthetic humiliations as 
the middle-class vigilant audience expected. When asked about how he 
felt about being compared to a beggar, MC Tianyou answered from a 
different perspective: “[Beggars] work hard to create the rhymes, get 
some praise and also receive some money from the audience. What 
is wrong with being a beggar?” The aesthetic denunciations seemed 
to miss their destination, as the hanmai community perceived their 
vernacular creations as closely connected to the traditional Chinese folk 
culture within their own context. Nonetheless, the denunciations not 
only further reinforced the boundary between different social classes 
with different cultural tastes, but also increased the visibility of hanmai 
culture in public discussions.
Moral Vulgarity
The visibility of hanmai, escalated by increasingly widespread public 
denunciations, triggered more attention from a middle-class, vigilant 
audience, who later regarded these videos as proof of the moral 
degradation among the underclass youths and worried about their 
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social influence. Although hanmai videos lacked straightforward 
profanity or offensive language, they were still perceived as vulgar for 
being a potential threat to existing moral values and public interests. 
Rather than directly condemning the aesthetic inferiority of hanmai, 
denunciatory discourses about the moral aspects of hanmai’s vulgarity 
were combined with disgust, but also sympathy. For example, a 
freelance columnist with the pseudonym Crocodile argued that the 
vulgarity of hanmai was socially constructed, as a reaction to the fact 
that upward mobility was highly restricted for the underclass youths: 
“[y]ou will feel helpless when you watch these hanmai videos, you 
know? You can do nothing, and they can do nothing either, because 
they don’t have any hope in their life. You can just feel it from their 
vulgar lyrics”.17
Denunciations also indicate conflicting expectations and values 
about how the underclass youths should behave among the middle-
class vigilant audiences themselves. For example, Liu, a Sina Weibo 
user, argued that current hanmai works indicated the loss of traditional 
values such as diligence and endurance, which were cherished among 
the older generation of rural migrant workers, because the underclass 
youth now spend too much time dreaming about defeating fictional 
emperors and replacing them. Elsewhere Tong expressed her particular 
dislike of the intense yearning for upward social mobility expressed by 
the young underclass using symbols of traditional Chinese culture on 
WeChat. The appropriation of symbols and languages from traditional 
Chinese culture was either considered as disrespectful and ignorant 
towards the orthodoxy of traditional culture, or as a refusal of modern 
values. These different or even contradictory perspectives contributed 
to the multi-layered meanings of vulgarity in condemning the whole 
hanmai culture, as the term might have different meanings for different 
members of the vigilant audience. The lack of proper moral values was 
the significant charge in this case of public vigilantism against hanmai 
culture. This echoes with certain characteristics of contemporary 
Chinese society (Sun, 2003), in which no single value system, either 
traditional Chinese, socialist, or neoliberal, is dominant among the 
public.
17  From the researcher’s interview with Crocodile on 2018, June 27. 
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Technological Vulgarity
Moreover, the aesthetic and moral denunciations were always 
intertwined with technological concern, especially referring to the 
recommendation algorithm that characterised the Kuaishou platform. 
The use of recommendation algorithms to provide customised content 
had been the underlying principle of Kuaishou from its launch. Users 
were assumed to restrict their behaviours to simply scrolling through and 
watching videos without performing additional actions. This naturalised 
process was constructed through the combination of the concise user 
interface, particular strategies in content distribution and the refining 
algorithm. Kuaishou also established a particular strategy to exclude 
videos generated by celebrities or top users from being distributed 
in the recommendation system. The technological affordances of the 
platform had attracted new Internet users and empowered previously 
silent groups by augmenting their visibility. However, these affordances 
also contributed to public denunciations when the social impacts of the 
algorithm were repeatedly mentioned.
In particular, the unpredictability and intricacy of the recommendation 
system, as well as the traffic-centric logic used in designing its algorithm, 
provoked most criticism from the vigilant audience, which blamed 
Kuaishou alongside hanmai culture. For example, Yan strongly opposed 
Crocodile’s expression of the hopelessness of the underclass youths by 
arguing that:
The frightening thing is its recommendation system. If you see one 
vulgar video, like a teenage mother, the system will push you much 
more. But are there so many teenage mothers in real life? The system 
only cares about the traffic. This can exemplify social problems, but it 
will also harm the young people, especially teenagers, because they have 
not got the ability to correctly understand things.18
In arguing over who should take responsibility for spreading the 
vulgarity of hanmai culture — the algorithm, underclass youths or social 
structures —  the middle-class vigilante audience had not arrived at a 
consensus. Nonetheless, the middle-class, user-led vigilantism against 
the vulgarity of hanmai culture appropriated its visibility, which might 
18  Yan expressed this in an interview with the researcher on January 17, 2018. 
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once have empowered the previously silent young underclass. Finally, it 
succeeded in objectifying hanmai videos as a visual resource, triggering 
more powerful social sectors to surveil and regulate the young 
underclass. By condemning the vulgarity of hanmai, the middle class 
reinforced their perceived aesthetic and moral superiority compared to 
the underclass youths, as well as their ability to recognise the risks of 
new technological affordances. 
From User-led Vigilantism to Institutional Surveillance
The user-led vigilantism among middle-class Internet users did not 
develop into organised action against the underclass youths’ hanmai 
culture, though shaming, condemning and humiliating discourses 
were prevalent in public discussions. However, it triggered the state 
and the platform, two powerful social institutions, to rethink what 
kind of representations of underclass youth should be visible in the 
virtual world. In April 2018, Chinese Central Television, which served 
not only as a media organisation but also as a branch of state authority, 
criticised Kuaishou for providing vulgar and harmful information to 
younger generations. The State Administration of Radio and Television 
soon required Kuaishou to examine its existing online content and stop 
uploading new videos, and the app was forcibly removed from the 
Android app store.19 Besides these punishments, it was also disclosed 
that the authorities summoned Kuaishou’s administrators for a face-to-
face meeting, after which they were required to hire a larger censorship 
team of at least 3,000 new employees to manually review all the user-
generated videos before they were distributed automatically using the 
algorithm.20
At the same time, a new round of the Jingwang [Purifying the Internet] 
campaign was launched: several state-level institutions collaborated in 
order to crack down on vulgar and obscene content online. The national 
Jingwang campaign never claimed it was targeting either Kuaishou or 
19  The announcement was publicised through the State Administration of 
Radio’s WeChat account on April 4, 2018: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/
jnn-uMPl_uPaFbunaE4Kgg
20  The transcript report can still be accessed from the following URL, though the 
originals were deleted: https://36kr.com/p/5127645
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the hanmai culture;21 nevertheless, the state’s intervention in the name of 
protecting juveniles from vulgar online content had significant impacts 
on Kuaishou. For example, in the end of May, Kuaishou publicised an 
announcement indicating that they had removed nearly 700,000 video 
clips and blocked almost 200 accounts every day from early April in the 
name of combatting vulgarity.22 Under these conditions, hanmai videos 
gradually disappeared from the platform. It was transformed from a 
genre with tens of thousands of updates every day, to nothing; no one 
was performing any longer, no videos were being shared, and no more 
public discussions about it were raised.
On the other hand, Kuaishou actively cooperated with the state 
to create new sets of algorithms and surveillance rules to purify the 
online expressions of the young underclass. In the letter of apology 
posted by Kuaishou, Su Hua, its CEO, claimed that “the algorithm will 
be optimised with a healthy and positive value” that “strictly complies 
with the national regulations and common ethics and morals”.23 The 
changed algorithm not only excluded hanmai videos, but also gave 
more weight to underclass videos with so-called “healthy and positive 
values”, such as the magnificent Chinese farmland or the happily 
singing rural migrant workers on construction sites. The underclass 
youths’ anger and confusion was erased together with hanmai; the 
ambitions they once articulated were no longer visible, and neither 
were the formerly enthusiastic public denunciations about the 
vulgarity of hanmai, especially those discourses that interpreted this 
vulgarity as the result of powerlessness and social inequalities that 
the underclass youths encountered. Few participants in the online 
denunciations were willing or able to share their opinions any longer, 
21  The Jingwang campaign was initiated after the establishment of the Cyberspace 
Administration of China in 2014, led by Chinese president Xi Jinping, which was to 
pay special attention to the regulation and management of online information. 
Jingwang campaigns were co-organised by the National Office against Pornographic 
and Illegal Publications, the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology and the Ministry of Public Security.
22  The announcement was publicised through Kuaishou’s WeChat account on May 27, 
2018: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/UzX0vwI01MJo9olu27K4MA
23  This is taken from the letter of apology that was publicised in the form of banner 
on Kuaishou in April 2018. There is no available link since it is shared only within 
Kuaishou app. The researcher kept the snapshot of the letter in her fieldnotes on 
April 8, 2018. 
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except to support effective acts of the state. While new technology 
can be utilised by civil participants, either to improve a previously 
disadvantaged social group’s visibility or provoke public discussions 
in the form of denunciations, it is also harnessed by the authorities, 
with cooperation from the platforms themselves, to scrutinise the 
mediated image of the underclass youths.
Conclusion
By tracing the evolution of hanmai culture and related online vigilante 
practices, this study examined how the use of social media platforms 
is a significant aspect of the Chinese class-stratifying process. Hanmai 
videos, on the one hand, were utilised to express not only the emerging 
collective identity of the underclass youths, but also their social visibility 
in the digital public sphere. However, they also served to reinforce 
middle-class identity when vigilant middle-class audiences denounced 
the aesthetic and moral vulgarity of hanmai, using technological 
concerns as a weapon. The technologically mediated visibility of 
Chinese underclass youths in the form of hanmai videos transformed 
from a force that empowered social recognition to a trigger for various 
disciplinary forces, both from the middle-class audiences and from state 
power, in cooperation with social media platforms. 
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‘I don’t think that’s very funny’: 




Comedy evokes strong emotions, and though it is generally intended to 
create a positive response, jokes can sometimes cause offence or other 
harmful effects. This chapter will investigate the line between what is 
tasteful and what is not — and, of course, who has the right to decide this. 
Due to the subjective nature of comedy, it is possible to create distasteful 
comedy without it being intentionally harmful, but audiences may take 
issue with work in which they consider the lack of taste to be harmful 
or potentially harmful, either to themselves or to others. This chapter 
discusses examples of when audiences have acted as digital vigilantes 
towards comedy, particularly in online spaces, and it questions when 
it is appropriate for audiences to react in this way. The debate is not a 
new phenomenon, but with the rise of social media and the ease with 
which information and vitriol can be shared and de-contextualised, it 
is now becoming an even more important topic to address. Audiences 
can easily take to the Internet and air their grievances about a snippet 
of comedy, and this can often spread faster than the initial text (for the 
purpose of this chapter, ‘text’ will refer to a performance, video, joke 
or event). This can then lead to audiences forming an opinion about it, 
and potentially feeling outrage towards it, having never experienced it 
first-hand. Due to the way that information is shared, digital audiences 
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are increasingly engaging in commentary on a subject to which they 
were not originally exposed. Audiences, and therefore digital vigilantes, 
can criticise something that did not originally concern them, or has been 
taken out of context, and this can be problematic for both audiences and 
comedians/creators.
The majority of cases discussed in this chapter focus on satire, 
attempted satire, or events that were framed as satire after the event. 
An early example relevant to this research is The Great Dictator (dir. 
Chaplin, 1940). The film was critically received but years after its 
release, Chaplin stated that “Had I known of the actual horrors of the 
German concentration camps, I could not have […] made fun of the 
homicidal insanity of the Nazis” (Chaplin, 1964, p. 392). Though there 
was no digital media at the time, Chaplin went through a similar type of 
self-reflection as that which will be discussed in many of the examples 
in this chapter. In modern times, practitioners cannot have this delayed 
response to their text, and as such often become engaged in discussions 
with fans, audiences and digital vigilantes directly following the release 
of the text, with no significant delay between the performance and the 
discussion. This limits the opportunity for self-reflection on the part of 
the practitioner. However, due to social media, and the opportunities 
created by the Internet more generally, practitioners now also have the 
ability, and responsibility, to be aware of the cultural significance and 
connotations of their work. To be able to engage in media, they must 
also be able to access and experience it, and therefore have an awareness 
of the implications of their work. This awareness of current events is 
often the basis of their comedy but can lead to a negative response 
from audiences when the practitioner appears under-researched or of 
improper agency to discuss the issue. If a reader of the text (e.g., an 
audience member) cannot see that the practitioner has direct experience 
of the issue they are discussing, the reader will be hesitant to engage 
with the discourse, and this can lead to audiences feeling uncomfortable, 
or offended, as will be outlined in this chapter. If the practitioner is 
considered to be more powerful than the subject of the joke, they lack 
the agency to make certain jokes as audiences are likely to object if they 
feel that the comedian is ‘punching down’ rather than ‘punching up’.1
1  The concept of ‘punching down/up’, although idiomatic, is a comedic term 
regarding the perceived power dynamics between the individual making the joke 
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Digital vigilantism (DV) “is a process where citizens are collectively 
offended by other citizen activity, and respond through coordinated 
retaliation on digital media” (Trottier, 2017, p.  55). This chapter 
discusses how comedy practitioners, in particular those who publish 
their work online, are viewed as citizens, and therefore can be subject 
to digital vigilantism towards their work. When considering comedy, 
“factors which can influence humour appreciation are such things as 
religious beliefs, political convictions, and sexual orientation” (Lockyer 
& Pickering, 2009, p. 128), and this raises issues of agency, ethics and 
morality, when writing and producing comedy.
In this chapter it is important to consider the cultural capital of 
comedy. “The tastes actually realized depend on the state of the system 
of goods offered” (Bourdieu, 1984, p.  228): the issue of taste, and 
reactions to it, are dependent on the state of capital of the good. Bourdieu 
argued that the bourgeois theatre is a respectable and enjoyable place 
to visit “because it only asks questions which ‘everyone asks himself’, 
from which ‘the only escape’ is ‘humour and incurable optimism’” 
(Bourdieu, 1984. p. 267). He then described how, although the theatre 
and its comedy is relatively accessible to those with the means, the next 
stratum — visiting the opera, galas, etc. — expressed an accordance with 
being part of high society (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 269). Visitors to a comedy 
show would generally be of lower capital “culturally or economically” 
(Bourdieu, 1984, p. 283), and this lowers the capital of entertainment 
such as the theatre, and, when applied to more modern entertainment, 
comedy. Comedy has never been considered to have a high cultural 
capital, and as such has, so far, been given leeway to discuss human 
experiences that may be considered inappropriate for other genres. It 
is worth noting that this chapter is written from an Anglo-American 
perspective, and that in different cultures and countries opinions of 
comedy and comedy laws can differ.
In fictional comedy, the audience is generally separated from 
potentially offensive jokes as they understand that the narrative is 
imagined. However, fictional comedy based on real-world events can be 
more problematic. Producer Amy Poehler faced backlash for the show 
and the subject matter of the joke. It is generally agreed by practitioners that it is 
appropriate to ‘punch up’ by making jokes about those in higher power, but not to 
‘punch down’ on those who are in a lower position.
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Difficult People (dir. Klausner, 2015–2017) when audiences considered a 
joke made by a character to be a step too far. A character within the show 
tweeted “I can’t wait for Blue Ivy to be 18-year-old so R Kelly can piss on 
her”, causing uproar on real-world Twitter. Here viewers expressed 
their disdain with tweets like: “A joke about R. Kelly assaulting Blue Ivy 
is not a joke targeting him. It’s making light of what he did and punching 
down at his victims” (Twitter, 2015). This tweet was written by a verified 
account and received a high number of likes and retweets, with 
comments that reinforced the opinion given. The character in Difficult 
People faced a similar backlash as the writers, and so the overarching 
purpose of the fictional storyline appears to have been misunderstood: 
the purpose of the joke was to cause controversy for the character, and 
therefore the character had to deal with the repercussions of their 
actions, ultimately deciding to remove the tweet. The real-world writers 
faced a similar response and found themselves in the same scenario they 
had written for their character. However, the events of the show could 
not be reversed as easily as deleting a tweet, and by persecuting the 
writers, the real-world digital vigilantes appear to have underscored the 
social commentary written into the episode by behaving in the same 
way as their fictional counterparts. The character who was persecuted 
wrote the tweet to ‘punch up’ at R Kelly and received a negative response 
from her followers. This in turn led to the creators of the show receiving 
the same negative response in real life. The creators of the show not only 
wrote the tweet but also the fictional backlash which followed, and thus 
were already aware of the implications of the tweet, having condemned 
it themselves.
Comedy has been widely researched, though perhaps not as widely 
as other genres that are considered of a higher cultural capital, such 
as drama or blockbuster films that are accessible to a wider audience, 
and as such are under more pressure to be enjoyable for everyone. 
That being said, due to the discourse around comedy it still remains 
a relevant subject for discussion. Its relevance stems from the fact that 
“comedy plays an absolutely pivotal role in the construction of a cultural 
identity” (Medhurst, 2007, p. 1) and therefore helps to shape society 
and the people within it. The reason that comedy has not been as widely 
studied as the other genres is that “comedy has also been perceived as 
ephemeral or lacking in intellectual weight” (Stott, 2005, p. 18), because 
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it is generally something that must be taken at face value. Here we should 
recall the perceived responsibility of texts of a higher cultural capital to 
tackle weightier issues. Based on Bourdieu’s analysis, comedy should 
hold a low intellectual weight. However, with the development of Web 
2.0 and social media, comedy can be shared widely, changing both its 
delivery and reception, which provides audiences an opportunity to 
express both enjoyment and offence.
The examples featured in this chapter include cases where discourse 
has strayed from fan response to social commentary, and developed 
into, or displayed elements of, digital vigilantism. Many of the examples 
began with audiences engaging in discussion, who were then joined 
by individuals who had never experienced the source text first hand. 
These responses then led to tensions between practitioners and their 
employers, which resulted in the enforcement of the actions and opinions 
of the digital vigilantes, or of the individuals showcasing vigilante-like 
behaviour. Though this discourse may not have been intentional, it 
directly affected the practitioners and as such the scale and implications 
of the response online developed into acts of digital vigilantism.
The next section of this chapter discusses the methodological approach 
taken to research this topic, explaining why the cases studies were 
chosen and how they are relevant to the research. The section ‘Subscribe 
to Digital Vigilantism’ examines vigilant audiences of YouTube, with a 
specific focus on the channel of Felix Kjellberg, known as PewDiePie, 
which has received both support and condemnation from vigilant 
audiences. Kjellberg has been accused of being racist and anti-Semitic, 
and so he lost contracts with big businesses including Disney. Yet he has 
also received support from audiences when at risk of losing his title as 
the most subscribed channel on YouTube. This section also discusses 
the case of Mark Meechan, a YouTuber whose comedy video resulted in 
him being prosecuted for a hate crime, despite him maintaining that the 
content of the video was not intended to cause offence. Both cases cover 
the way in which content, later described as satire, has been condemned 
by audiences. One of the key issues of both cases was the lack of clarity 
surrounding the satirical intention of the uploads, and the retrospective 
definition assigned by their creators. Kjellberg and Meechan, in their 
roles as YouTube content creators, lacked the credibility that would have 
been conferred by their having established careers as comedians, and 
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the role of YouTube personality blurs the lines between reality star and 
fictional character.
The next section, ‘Dapper Laughed’ focuses on the work of Dapper 
Laughs, whose real name is Daniel O’Reilly. O’Reilly originally made 
short videos on the platform Vine, using shock tactics and offensive 
topics to attract viewers, but later moved from the platform to television. 
However, his offensive comedy, though originally what attracted his 
audience, eventually resulted in the cancellation of his series with 
ITV. The section also examines the comedian Frankie Boyle, who has 
been accused of producing racist and callous work both on television 
and on Twitter, but who successfully sued the newspaper, The Mirror, 
for defamation after they published such claims. Unlike Boyle, an 
established comedian, O’Reilly faced similar issues to Kjellberg and 
Meechan, in that his character Dapper Laughs was confused with his 
real self. However, O’Reilly played on this confusion following the 
response to his television work. The cases examined in this section 
discuss how vigilant audiences can follow targets from digital spaces 
into television and the wider community. Certain content appears to 
be deemed acceptable in digital spaces due to the space having a lower 
cultural value, but when moving onto television broadcast it is held to a 
higher level of scrutiny.
The third section is titled ‘Your Fey is Problematic’ and examines 
television comedy, and the issues faced when audiences conflate writer 
with character with actor. This section focuses on the works of Tina Fey 
and Ricky Gervais, who each have different approaches to dealing with 
vigilant audiences. It discusses issues of agency, and how individuals 
with different backgrounds or experiences can discuss and comment 
on topics that others may be unable to tackle. The concept of agency, or 
perceived agency (or lack thereof), affects the way in which audiences 
respond to and interpret a text, and thus whether the audiences may 
then become vigilant to certain content. The section also touches on how 
both Fey and Gervais have taken different approaches to responding to 
vigilant audiences and the affect this has had on their work, and how the 
cultural capital of their work, being primarily television-based rather 
than online, has affected reactions to it. Following Gray, 
Debates about what is it permissible to mock tend to be predicated 
upon assumptions about the target; whether an individual or a group is 
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vulnerable or too powerful, whether a joke serves to change or aggravate 
a situation. Narrative comedy complicates the mix further: its targets 
are fictional and in theory, one cannot hurt a fiction; but we are aware 
that things are not quite so simple. All arguments, however, that explore 
laughter’s relationship to powerful emotions assume clear boundaries 
between joker, audience and target; the joker acts, the target suffers, the 
audience laughs (or not) (Gray, 2005, p. 146).
Methodology
The topic of comedy, audiences and digital vigilantism is ever changing, 
and as such this research was conducted with grounded theory, as its 
methods “consist of systematic, yet flexible guidelines for collecting and 
analysing qualitative data” (Charmaz, 2014, p. 2). As social trends and 
audience reactions develop, the subject of the research was continually 
developing, especially in the case of Kjellberg in the next section, and 
therefore the research approach had to be adaptable to new information 
and events.
This research also had an ethnographic approach, as I observed 
audiences engaging with texts — and each other — on Twitter and other 
digital spaces. Ethnography is appropriate as it “is the study of culture and 
ethnographic descriptions are creative endeavors that allow researchers 
a window to the world of a particular culture” (Schembri & Boyle, 2013, 
p. 1252), with digital vigilantes forming the particular culture in this 
instance. This research examined the way that audiences and businesses 
have responded to comedy practitioners and their content, as “typically 
ethnography begins in observation, proceeds analytically to deconstruct 
culture and social meaning, and then uses words to reconstruct reality 
as verbal description” (Margolis, 2002, p. 373). Data was collected by 
following popular events that appeared in the news, and searching for 
key terms on Twitter, such as #subscribetopewdiepie. I then examined 
the most popular tweets in terms of likes and retweets, which signified 
agreement from other users of the site. It was also important to follow 
the practitioners themselves, to witness the discourse they chose to 
engage with on the platform. Users of Twitter often engage in digital 
vigilantism based on the posts of other users, rather than responding to 
a specific original tweet. This meant that it was important to search for 
discussion that was validated by other users.
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One of the major difficulties faced in this research is that comedy is 
inherently subjective. Every individual will experience comedy 
differently and, though this is integral to the efficacy of any joke or 
comedy piece, it can pose difficulties in terms of researcher bias. For this 
reason, I have refrained from presenting a judgement as to whether the 
cases cited are offensive, but rather provided a discussion on the reaction 
of audiences and digital vigilantes regarding each case. Another issue 
came from the ever-changing digital space. The discussion of Kjellberg 
could run on indefinitely due to his continued activity and discourse 
online. 
Across the board, new examples of difficult comedy become apparent 
almost daily. For the purpose of this chapter, research was focussed 
primarily on Twitter, and avoided detailed discussions on personal 
blogs, Instagram and other social media. O’Reilly’s videos as Dapper 
Laughs were made on Vine, a now defunct social media platform, so 
these videos are accessed today through YouTube.
The majority of cases discussed in this chapter feature white males, 
based in the United Kingdom. The profile of these individuals puts them 
in a majority, holding a position of cultural power, and as such they are 
at much greater risk of punching down rather than the more socially 
acceptable act of punching up. This makes their work inherently more 
problematic as they lack the agency to make fun of those in a minority. 
The first example discussed is Felix Kjellberg’s YouTube channel. This 
was chosen because, at the beginning of this research, it was the most 
subscribed-to channel on the platform. Though online comedy may 
possess low cultural capital, Kjellberg’s reach is so wide that his work 
may be regarded as having higher capital than he may have intended 
or expected. This means that, as a practitioner, he may have a greater 
responsibility to his audience to make his intentions explicit. This 
research examines responses to his YouTube videos, and his since 
deleted Twitter account, as well as discourse on Twitter surrounding the 
Subscribe to PewDiePie campaign.
The case of Mark Meechan is an appropriate comparison as he works 
in the same sphere, but with a much lower subscriber count and arguably 
possesses lower capital and responsibility. Despite his smaller audience, 
Meechan’s joke led to prosecution, and therefore showcases the power 
of digital vigilantes. Dapper Laughs similarly, had lower responsibility 
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due to the lower cultural capital of Vine, but this responsibility increased 
when given a television show with higher cultural capital. These three 
examples were selected as they feature individuals whose work relies 
on the confusion between character and reality, and all experienced 
changes in their employment or contracts due to the impact of digital 
vigilantes.
The Internet is a rapidly changing sphere and YouTube is ever-
growing, with more than 2 billion active users as of November 2019. 
This, combined with the fact that 79% of Internet users claim to have a 
YouTube account, implies that the cultural capital of digital media, and 
in this case comedy, is changing faster than content creators can keep 
up with (Mohsin, 2019). Furthermore, Twitter has 145 million users 
daily (Lin, 2019), which means that there is massive scope for users to 
see and be drawn into digital vigilantism targeting content they may 
not have experienced first-hand, leading to further misinterpretation of 
what the creators may have originally intended. The scope of digital 
platforms is incredibly wide-ranging, with the potential to encapsulate 
target audiences of content creators, which makes YouTube and 
Twitter personalities excellent examples to show the impact of digital 
vigilantism.
The other examples discussed in this chapter are all comedians, 
or comedy writers, with more established careers that are not based 
primarily on YouTube or social media. These individuals are included 
as they have generated discourse online, in particular on Twitter. 
Interestingly, of the four practitioners, Boyle, Fey, Gervais and Poehler, 
the two female Americans, Fey and Poehler, have refrained from 
engaging in discussions on Twitter directly, putting them slightly out 
of the remit of this chapter, though still being subject to elements of 
digital vigilantism regarding their work. Boyle and Gervais however, 
continually engage in feedback from audiences via social media, making 
them more of a target for digital vigilantes. Poehler and Fey are relevant 
to this chapter however, as they discuss the issues they have faced from 
vigilant audiences through situational comedies, rather than responding 
directly to individuals. Boyle and Gervais are relevant examples as they 
faced similar responses to their work as the aforementioned YouTube 
and Vine personalities, however, they both were established in their field 
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prior to the instances of vigilantism, leading to different experiences and 
outcomes.
There are many more individuals who could be examined, but 
these were chosen as they featured heavily in UK news at the height 
of their notoriety, and were discussed prominently online, particularly 
on Twitter where the discussions were trending. The main criteria for 
selection was cases where actions from vigilant audiences interfered 
with, or were perceived to interfere, with the career of the practitioner 
targeted.
Subscribe to Digital Vigilantism: How Have Vigilant 
Audiences Both Condemned and Supported Content 
Creators on YouTube?
In no other area of life than comedy would it be socially acceptable to 
“lie to friends and cause them inconvenience, even pain” (Morreall, 
2009, p. 2) and yet in the context of comedy it is totally acceptable, as 
the pain results — theoretically — in laughter. In the realm of YouTube, 
viewers engage with content creators as though they were friends, 
with the ability to communicate directly by commenting on a video, 
or through other social media sites. This section examines the case of 
PewDiePie (real name Felix Kjellberg), who is well-known for being 
the most subscribed-to individual channel on YouTube. Over the past 
two years, Kjellberg has faced a severe backlash for his comedy videos, 
leading to real-world consequences for his work. Since then, however, 
he has regained support from his viewers because another channel, 
T-Series, came close to surpassing him in subscriber count. Lastly, this 
section looks at a case where an individual was taken to court due to the 
viewers’ reactions to a comedy video he uploaded online.
Kjellberg began his channel in 2010, originally focussing on game 
playthroughs. His comedic reactions while playing the games were a 
significant factor in his growing popularity on the platform. In 2017 
Kjellberg shifted from his original style of YouTube content, making 
more comedy vlogs and fewer video-game playthroughs. As part of 
these comedy videos, Kjellberg made a since deleted video where he 
ordered a selection of services from the website Fiverr. These services 
included paying a pair of men to dance while holding up a sign 
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which read “Death to all Jews”. Following on from this, other videos 
included paying a man dressed as Jesus to say ‘Hitler did absolutely 
nothing wrong’ (Winkler, Nicas, & Fritz, 2017). As a reaction to this, 
“in 2017 YouTube removed some advertisers from his channel… and 
Disney-owned Maker Studios cancelled a contract because some of his 
content appeared to be anti-Semitic” (Meyers, 2017). Several videos 
were removed by Kjellberg following the controversy. In defence of 
his content, Kjellberg also published a blog post on 12 February 2017, 
stating that “[he] was trying to show how crazy the modern world is, 
specifically some of the services available online” (Kjellberg, 2017).
If “comedy is the imitation of the ridiculous or unworthy aspects 
of human nature” (Stott, 2005, p. 19), then viewing Kjellberg’s work as 
problematic is… problematic. The satirical nature of his content was not 
explicit, and as such Kjellberg failed to emphasise the ridiculousness of 
the work to audiences, which would have shown them that Kjellberg 
was not agreeing with the sentiment of the jokes, but rather condemning 
it. However, confusion has arisen around the difference between 
PewDiePie the character, and Kjellberg the content creator, much like 
the tweet in Difficult People.. The complicated boundary between author 
and character will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
A major issue in this case is that much of the backlash developed 
following the publication of articles that condemned Kjellberg’s content, 
and vigilant audiences responded directly to the content of the articles, 
rather than referring back to the original video. In John Cleese’s live show 
John Cleese Live! !—The Alimony Tour (Cleese, 2011), Cleese discusses the 
concept of feeling anxiety as a result of comedy. He explains that when 
the film A Fish Called Wanda (dir. Crichton, 1988) was being viewed 
during its test screenings, the three most offensive moments of the film 
were also widely agreed to be the funniest. He then goes on to explain 
the reasoning behind this, stating that “when you get into taboo areas 
[…] there’s always a little bit of anxiety” (Cleese, 2011). For some, the 
anxiety Cleese refers to leads to a viewer becoming so tense that they 
feel that they are offended, but for the majority this is what creates the 
comedy. Cleese describes this as: “You get the normal laugh, and then 
you get the extra energy that comes from that little bit of anxiety being 
liberated” (ibid.). To experience comedy is to willingly put yourself into 
a position of anxiety. Whether this is anxiety that you are personally 
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subject to, or an anxiety that stems from witnessing another person 
experience anxiety —  thus gaining pleasure from witnessing them be 
subject to it — is not entirely relevant. Anxiety caused from a comedic 
set up must not be so overwhelming that it overpowers the comedic 
relief, but there will always be different levels of anxiety that viewers or 
readers can cope with. 
When Kjellberg’s videos were cut and clips taken out of context, the 
set-up and punchline were separated, leaving the anxiety unliberated, 
and audiences offended. When discussing the situation in his blog 
post, Kjellberg stated that although not intentional, he understood that 
the jokes were “ultimately offensive” (Kjellberg, 2017). This response 
echoes Chaplin’s delayed response to The Great Dictator but whether this 
came from personal reflection or purely to appease digital vigilantes 
may never be known.
However, recently audiences have rallied around Kjellberg, as 
another channel came close to surpassing his number of subscribers. 
T-Series is a channel dedicated to videos advertising and showcasing 
Bollywood films and music, and is “India’s largest Music Label & Movie 
Studio” (T-Series, 2018). Fans and subscribers of Kjellberg’s channel 
engaged in Twitter campaigns, using a variety of hashtags including 
#pewdiepievstseries to encourage others to subscribe to the PewDiePie 
channel. An individual known on Twitter as TheHackerGiraffe 
also claimed to have hacked thousands of computers to send out a 
message asking recipients to unsubscribe from T-Series and subscribe 
to PewDiePie. However, they also claimed that the reasoning behind 
their actions was actually to raise awareness of the dangers of having 
poor security, “Spread the word with your friends about printers and 
printer security! This is actually a scary matter. Will tweet everything 
about this entire #pewdiepie hack later to explain to everyone exactly 
what went down” (TheHackerGiraffe, 2018). The user also expressed 
an understanding of vigilant audiences who responded to their invasive 
actions by tweeting later “To all those who wanna dox me, you’ll never 
find out where I live!” (TheHackerGiraffe, 2018).
As the ‘Subscribe to PewDiePie’ meme spread however, it developed 
consequences outside the remit of the original light-hearted campaign. 
A self-proclaimed fan vandalised a World War Two memorial with 
the campaign slogan, causing Kjellberg to condemn the actions on 
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his YouTube channel, telling his viewers “don’t do anything illegal 
because obviously that would look bad on me” and that the vandalism 
is “obviously disgusting” and that he does not condone such actions 
(Kjellberg, 2019). A conflict developed between vigilantes acting for, 
and against, Kjellberg.
On 15 March 2019, there was an even greater shift in the campaign, 
as a terrorist who attacked a mosque in New Zealand used his online 
broadcast to record his final words: “Subscribe to PewDiePie”. Though 
this does not directly fit into the subject of digital vigilantism, it occurred 
as a response to popular media, and is it interesting to note Kjellberg’s 
response to the attack. Initially he only discussed the event on his 
Twitter account, stating that he was “absolutely sickened having my 
name uttered by this person” (Kjellberg, 2019), and continued to post 
videos pertaining to the meme/campaign. However, on 29 April 2019 
Kjellberg uploaded a short video to YouTube declaring that he wanted 
to end the meme, explaining that though he appreciated the support, 
he “didn’t want hateful acts to overpower all these amazing things that 
people are doing” (Kjellberg, 2019), stating that he should have ended 
the ‘Subscribe to PewDiePie’ campaign following the Christchurch 
shooting. Kjellberg, as a practitioner, lost control of his work as audiences 
engaged with and changed its meaning. Though Kjellberg attempted 
to regain control and enjoyed the support of a large group of digital 
vigilantes engaging in playful behaviour to boost his subscriber count, 
ultimately his actions were ineffective as the discourse developed by 
digital vigilantes and news reporters was too great.
DV is “a form of mediated and coordinated action” (Trottier, 
2017, p. 57), so although in this case the audience was not necessarily 
persecuting Kjellberg, they are showcasing similar actions and 
behaviours as digital vigilantes to maintain their perceived ideal social 
order. Though there was originally a highly tongue-in-cheek element to 
the campaign, its coordination and unremitting execution imitates the 
actions of digital vigilantes, though individuals engaged in actions that 
opposed Kjellberg’s original intention.
In 2016, a YouTuber, Count Dankula, whose real name is Mark 
Meechan, posted a video in which he had trained his girlfriend’s pug to 
respond to anti-Semitic language and perform the Nazi salute. The video 
was viewed over 3 million times before it was removed from YouTube 
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(BBC, 2018). Meechan claimed that the video was made solely to annoy 
his girlfriend, but as it was uploaded to an open platform, the video was 
available to the public to view, and subsequently Meechan was taken 
to court under the Communications Act of 2003, which “makes it an 
offence to use a public communications network to send certain types of 
messages including those that are grossly offensive or threatening” (‘PF 
v Mark Meechan — Judgments & Sentences — Judiciary of Scotland’, 
2018).
Other comedians took to defend Meechan, with Ricky Gervais 
tweeting “If you don’t believe in a person’s right to say things that you 
might find ‘grossly offensive’, then you don’t believe in Freedom of 
Speech” (Gervais, 2018). Returning to the discussion of cultural capital, 
different levels of comedy come with a different cultural capital. Digital 
comedy such as that on YouTube is relatively new, but is comparable to 
slapstick in that slapstick is often considered to be of the lowest cultural 
capital. Slapstick is said to be “popular, rather than literary, low physical 
comedy” (Dale, 2002, p. 1). In addition to this, in a paper originally 
written in 1987 discussing situational comedy, Paul Attallah states 
that “in the classic dichotomy between high art and low art, television 
definitely occupies the region of low art” (Attallah, 2010, p.  14). The 
paper was written before the advent of YouTube, and as such the platform 
is excluded from the analysis, but based on the placement of television 
as lower than film, books and plays, YouTube would arguably be classed 
as a lower artform than even television. From this we can infer that the 
more accessible, or popular, comedy is, the more it must be of interest 
to the lowest level of society, or at least carry the lowest cultural weight. 
YouTube is an entirely accessible source of entertainment, and therefore 
arguably on the lowest rung of the ladder of cultural capital. This then 
raises questions of whether comedy on this platform should be judged 
on the same level as other means of speech or comedy production, or 
whether the content creator should be more considerate of the potential 
reach of their work. Attallah also states that “There is a strong sense in 
which television and everything connected to it is seen as unworthy […] 
of critical evaluation” (ibid., p. 90), and this statement could also be 
applied to content on YouTube.
Though vigilant audiences highlighted the video and were the 
reason why Meechan was taken to court, audiences also raised nearly 
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£200,000 to cover Meechan’s legal fees, via a GoFundMe account he set 
up. Meechan posted several update videos in the year following the 
upload of the original video, M8 Yur dug’s a Naazi. In the first video he 
stated that “the public response to the video was kinda overwhelmingly 
positive [sic]”, however, he described how one of Meechan’s neighbours 
approached him in their street and told him “you Nazi bastard, you’re 
a Nazi bastard [sic]”. The neighbour’s vigilante actions, which were 
physical rather than digital, went on to include emptying a bin from 
the dog park on Meechan’s front door. Meechan explains in the video 
that they reported the neighbour for these actions, expecting a charge 
for damage to property. However, the neighbour was later arrested for a 
hate crime — not for their physical actions, but for accusing Meechan of 
being a Nazi (Meechan, 2016).
Meechan goes on to defend his video by saying “I’ve had Jewish 
people messaging me saying that they don’t agree with what I did but 
they say I shouldn’t have been arrested for that [sic]”, and that “[he] 
didn’t expect it to be on the front page of Reddit [sic]”. He also implies 
that he lost his job due to the high level of media coverage of the video, 
though his employer refused to provide a reason for the termination 
of his contract. Meechan also states that, if you watch his videos, he 
makes it very clear that he does not agree with discrimination of any 
kind, but that it is clear he is a fan of offensive comedy, such as the 
work of Frankie Boyle who is discussed later in this chapter. Meechan 
reiterated that “[he doesn’t] think we should bring harm to anyone for 
any reason”, however, Meechan also believed that with the backing of 
the English or Scottish Defence League, he would have been able engage 
in similar behaviour without facing any charges, and if he were part of 
an organisation, Meechan felt that his actions would be “recognised as 
free speech”, even though his actions as an individual were taken to 
court.
In Meechan’s third video, he briefly explains some of the details 
around his court case. In the video he mentions witnesses speaking at 
the trial and asks his audience “Do not […] contact them or harass them 
[sic]”, implying that digital vigilantes may have tried to defend Meechan 
by turning on those speaking against him in court. It is important to 
note that Meechan has a much lower subscriber count on YouTube than 
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Kjellberg and as such his video may have gone unnoticed by the courts 
had it not been for digital vigilantes sharing the video.
This section shows the ways in which audiences can both condemn 
and support content creators on YouTube and can carry those vigilante 
elements into real world spaces, through printer hacking, or court 
cases. The speed with which content can be uploaded and spread, often 
further than initially intended, allows audiences to engage with content 
quickly and form instant opinions and reactions to it. In the case of Felix 
Kjellberg, the Subscribe to PewDiePie campaign developed in ways 
apparently outside of his control. There are also plenty of incidents 
regarding Kjellberg, and other YouTube content creators, that could 
inform further research, such as a scandal in 2017 when Kjellberg used 
a racial slur during a live stream, and again in 2018, when Kjellberg 
promoted a channel that transpired to be pro-Nazi.
Dapper Laughed: How Have Vigilant Audiences Followed 
Independent Comedians from Online Spaces to the 
Mainstream?
This section examines how audiences have followed practitioners from 
online spaces as they moved to work in television and on stage. In 
particular, this section focuses on Dapper Laughs, also known as Daniel 
O’Reilly, who originally began creating content on Vine and was picked 
up by the channel ITV to develop a television series. The character of 
Dapper Laughs blurs the line between content creator and character, 
something that other comedy practitioners appear to try to differentiate 
between rather than actively confuse. O’Reilly’s offensive humour was 
considered relatively acceptable on the Vine platform, but in moving 
to television, a platform with higher levels of cultural capital, visibility 
and regulation, this humour was no longer acceptable. This is further 
discussed when looking at comedian Frankie Boyle, whose offensive 
humour, both on television and Twitter, led to claims that his comedy 
style caused him to step down from his role with the BBC.
Dapper Laughs garnered success on the mobile platform Vine for his 
short sketches discussing dating, sex, inconveniencing strangers and 
occasionally British politics. O’Reilly faced some backlash against his 
comedy, especially due to his inclusion of strangers who may not have 
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been aware of or willing to participate in his videos, as well as the sexist 
nature of some of his content. However, the fact that this backlash was 
only minor when his work was restricted to a social media platform is 
something that ties in with theories of cultural capital, as he represented 
himself as an individual; he did not represent a production company or 
channel. Due to the success of his Vine channel, Dapper Laughs was 
offered his own television programme with ITV2; Dapper Laughs On The 
Pull. ITV defended their choice of the controversial comedian, releasing 
a statement saying “We realise that all humour is subjective and accept 
that Dapper’s humour is more risqué but feel that his unique brand of 
banter and brash charm is neither sexist or degrading to women” (ITV, 
via huffingtonpost.co.uk, 2014). However, during a live show, O’Reilly 
discusses some of the press response to his television series, where it 
had been described as a “Rapist’s Almanac” (Kern, 2014). During the 
show, O’Reilly, performing as Dapper Laughs, made a comment directed 
at a female audience member saying that “she’s gagging for a rape” 
(O’Reilly, 2014). A change.org petition, a form of digital vigilantism, 
was created asking ITV to pull the show from the air and received 67,860 
supporters. ITV later released a statement to say that the show would 
not be continuing for a second series, after they had “given careful 
thought to the recent criticism of the character Dapper Laughs, which 
has focused on his activities outside of the ITV2 programme” (ITV, 
2014).
Due to the premise of his Vines and his subsequent show, Dapper 
Laughs was not seen to be an actor playing a character and so audiences 
felt that everything that was said was a genuine opinion and belief. 
In interviews following the incident, the man behind Dapper Laughs, 
Daniel O’Reilly, revealed that the character was nothing more than that; 
a character. He went on to explain that he has “never said [he condones] 
rape” (O’Reilly, via Independent.co.uk, 2015) but in the view of the 
audience this was not enough to undo the outcry at his comments, 
which was then reflected in the producers’ action.
In late 2014, O’Reilly appeared on BBC’s Newsnight (2014), and 
declared that Dapper Laughs was a character he had created and that the 
views of the character were absolutely not views of his own. He stated 
of the videos, “that’s not real, obviously I don’t think that”, and that in 
his work he was “taking the mic out of what [he] thought men think”. 
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Part of O’Reilly’s defence was that “[he] didn’t see it was [him] saying 
it, [he] was creating this character”, and that “[he] didn’t realise [he] 
was causing that much of a problem”. During the interview, O’Reilly 
declared that “[he did not] want to be seen to approve of it” and that 
“Dapper Laughs is gone”. O’Reilly also spoke of how he was going to 
work towards preventing the work being shared and that he would no 
longer be continuing with the character.
However, shortly after denouncing the Dapper Laughs character, 
O’Reilly released the Res-Erection show, which had a trailer featuring 
Dapper Laughs descending from heaven, and switching places with 
Daniel O’Reilly who was shown wearing the same outfit that he wore in 
the Newsnight interview. This raised concerns about whether the initial 
apology was genuine. Although O’Reilly never returned to ITV, he 
continued to profit from the Dapper Laughs character.
In early 2018, O’Reilly appeared on the UK version of Celebrity Big 
Brother (Channel 5, 2018) and in his introductory video he states “my 
name is Daniel O’Reilly, but unfortunately some of you may know me 
as Dapper Laughs” (Channel 5, 2018), making it apparent that he is 
still content to profit by his infamous character. This links back to the 
aforementioned issue faced by Dapper Laughs: his mistake was that he 
was not already rooted in people’s minds as a likeable person and as 
such they were only able to see him as the offensive character, meaning 
that the actor Daniel O’Reilly had no opportunity to truly justify himself, 
and therefore “he’s reinforcing the behaviour rather than knocking it” 
(Bennett, theindependent.co.uk, 2014). This left O’Reilly open to digital 
vigilantes who condemned his offensive actions.
A comedian who has seemingly had more success in walking the 
fine line between comedic, tongue-in-cheek offence, and harsher, more 
provocative offence, Frankie Boyle has written about the issues of taste, 
offence and censorship in comedy. One of Boyle’s most controversial 
tweets, which has since been removed, was “Jimmy Savile did an 
incredible amount of charity work towards the end of his life, just to 
be sure he could shag Madeleine McCann in heaven” (original Tweet 
removed from Google search under the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) right to be forgotten). Making light of missing child 
Madeleine McCann is considered distasteful as the girl has never been 
found, and her story was heavily covered by the media, in some ways 
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raising the cultural capital of the case. Boyle made the assumption that 
the girl is dead, and added a reference to the recent discovery that 
former children’s television presenter Jimmy Savile was a paedophile. 
This may bring so much distress to the reader, that the anxiety — as 
mentioned by Cleese earlier in this chapter  —  caused by discussing 
the topic cannot, for most people, be outweighed by the release. This 
attracted digital vigilantes who called attention to the poor taste of the 
joke. To explain his joke would be to remove the comedic elements to 
it, as most comedy comes from the relief or surprise generated by the 
punchline. In the case of this joke, the punchline may have been taken 
out of context, or audiences understood the context and still rejected it 
as content that offended them, suggesting that the anxiety generated by 
the joke was too much. This led to digital vigilantes condemning Boyle 
and his work. 
Frankie Boyle has also written about his opinions and experiences of 
audiences taking offence at something, without ever experiencing the 
original text. Following the Charlie Hebdo attacks in France in early 
2015, he took to his website to write a blog post about his experiences 
with offence and comedy, which has since been removed. Boyle explains 
that “we no longer need to hear the actual content of the thing we’re told 
to be offended by” (Boyle, 2015), and this is a very real problem in the 
interpretation of comedy. His post generally explains his frustrations 
with the media, stating that “comedians get attacked for making jokes” 
(ibid.) and as such audiences — or the media itself — seem to be 
struggling with the fact that offence, if present, is a part of the comedy, 
and not an insensitive or inadvertent side-effect of the humour. Frankie 
Boyle discusses the fact that comedy, in general, is a work of fiction, and 
that “even on a good day I only really half agree with myself” (ibid.) 
and thus even if he says something distasteful and offensive it does not 
equate to his actual beliefs. It is simply that if a joke is funny he will say 
it anyway, and he does not have any interest in the ensuing aftermath: “I 
don’t really give a fuck about […] someone who might find a group of 
words in the wrong order too much to bear” (ibid.). Boyle also discusses 
the idea of moral superiority, in that we now seem to associate being 
offended with being morally superior, and therefore more intelligent, 
which again, could be an application of cultural capital; if you are 
morally superior, then you are culturally superior. As discussed 
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previously, in the past comedy has avoided such interrogation due to its 
low cultural capital, but by reading comedy and taking offence to it, the 
audience has raised its cultural capital. This reading, however, may not 
always follow the intention of the author, as Boyle defended his comedy 
by stating that “we have given taking offence a social status it doesn’t 
deserve: it’s not much more than a way of avoiding difficult conversations” 
(ibid.). In an article on satirical literacy and social responsibility, Jessie 
LaFrance Dunbar discusses “the audience’s responsibility as consumers 
of sociopolitical comedy” (2017, p. 79), and the importance of reading 
comedy appropriately. This, however, depends on the audience’s 
understanding of the nature of the comedy, which is reliant on the 
comedian, or practitioner, framing it correctly, as either satire, 
observation, etc.
Vigilant audiences are not restricted to commenting on issues that 
exist in online spaces. Though the work of Daniel O’Reilly began on an 
online forum, when he moved to television and physical spaces, his 
work began to reach wider audiences who were less familiar with his 
work, attracting vigilant audiences. In the case of Frankie Boyle, though 
primarily based on television, he also made use of Twitter, and his 
comments there opened him up to retort from digital vigilantes. 
However, in contrast to O’Reilly, Boyle has since continued to work 
online, using his blog to communicate with vigilant audiences and to 
continue the discourse surrounding the difficulties of working in 
comedy.
Your Fey is Problematic: How Are Vigilant Audiences 
Conflating Character with Writer? 
This section focuses on the works of comedy writers and performers 
Tina Fey and Ricky Gervais, by examining the agency, or perceived 
agency, which they each have. They have both received responses from 
digital vigilantes based on their work, and have different approaches 
to responding to such comments. The issue of audiences conflating 
fictional character with writer has been present throughout this chapter, 
but with the previous examples, the individuals were working within a 
frame in which they were playing a version of themselves. Much of the 
vigilantism directed towards both Fey and Gervais discusses the actions 
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of the characters that they have written, rather than their personal 
comments or actions. Though some audiences may be taking issue with 
the content of the writing, others seem to misunderstand the difference 
between writer and character, especially when the writer and actor are 
one and the same. When it comes to digital vigilantism, audiences can 
spread information and opinions faster than the content created by the 
targets can be released, especially with regards to television broadcast, 
which takes longer to produce than online content such as Vines or 
YouTube videos. Television also holds greater cultural capital than 
online spaces, and this affects the esteem in which audiences hold the 
content that they view.
Comedians Amy Poehler and Tina Fey have generated discourse in 
their work as comedians, using their status to promote feminism on 
many occasions. Being women in an industry primarily dominated by 
men brings attention to their work, and they were praised for presenting 
the 2015 Golden Globes, where they used their comedy personalities 
to draw attention to much of the sexism that exists in Hollywood. One 
journalist said that the media coverage of the Golden Globes is “the 
exact spot where feminism all but dies in America” (Freeman, 2015), 
and she praised Poehler and Fey for their ability to overcome this in the 
humour as they presented the awards, describing the event as “a feminist 
awards show” (ibid.). As women, a category that could be considered 
a minority in Hollywood, they have the power to punch up, due to the 
repression they face. Freeman goes on to explain that their gender is 
not the only reason their performance was so successful: “while they 
are generally lauded as being the most likable people in show business, 
they aren’t always all that nice” (ibid.). Although what they say might 
be, to an extent, offensive, or distasteful, the fact that Poehler and Fey 
are so likeable means that they have the agency to say things that would 
otherwise be considered unlikeable.
Fey manages the issue of ‘punching down’ in The Unbreakable Kimmy 
Schmidt (dir. Carlock & Fey, 2015–2019), which follows the tale of Kimmy 
Schmidt as she adjusts to life after having spent fifteen years kidnapped 
by a religious zealot and imprisoned in a bunker. The character wears 
bright colours and is always smiling, upbeat despite her past, and it is 
easy to forget the trauma that she and her fellow cult members went 
through. Nevertheless, the show manages to acknowledge the horrible 
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situation while remaining funny and without punching down at the 
victims. This is primarily down to the optimistic protagonist Kimmy, 
and her resilience in the face of adversity. The shows punches in all 
directions, as it targets the poor unfortunate characters as well as the 
rich and successful ones. Even when Kimmy is the butt of the joke, she 
eventually succeeds, and each character in the show is the butt of a joke 
at some point or another. As such it provides its viewers with a level of 
equality: unfortunate things happen to each of the characters in turn, but 
with no individual character bearing the brunt of the misfortune. The 
series is successful in generating (potentially) offensive narratives for its 
characters without incurring a significant backlash, as it is indiscriminate 
in its assault but fundamentally on the side of its characters.
Fey has also used the series to discuss issues of agency and taste, most 
notably in the episode Kimmy Goes To A Play! (dir. Carlock & Fey, 2016, 
release date 15 April). A character named Titus performs a play based 
on his past life as a Geisha, and audiences within the show flock to watch 
his performance and shame him for cultural appropriation. The fictional 
audience is outraged at the idea of the play before seeing it, but change 
their opinion after watching the play and trusting Titus’ authenticity. 
This episode reads as a response to real-life cases when audiences have 
reacted negatively to a work before they have experienced it themselves, 
often discovering the work through digital vigilantes.
Fey has faced commentary from vigilant audiences, as an individual, 
as a writer and as a character. The website Your Fave is Problematic 
(yourfaveisproblematic.tumblr.com) is dedicated to pointing out and 
sharing problematic behaviour by a variety of popular individuals and 
celebrities, with the tagline “Problematic shit your favourite celebrities 
have done” (Tumblr, 2017). Though there is a definite vigilante element 
to the website, they do make a point of explaining that they are not 
trying to actively attack those that they deem problematic, instead 
asking visitors to the site to keep an eye on their favourite celebrities 
and “If they do something problematic, call them out on it” (ibid.). 
Rather than attacking celebrities, the site encourages visitors to educate 
and inform them. The website has generated discussion around Tina 
Fey and her work, as she was featured on the website, but other Tumblr 
users submitted rebuttals of the condemnation. One user points out 
that “Feminist Humour often employs stereotypes, not [as] a way of 
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reinforcing them but as a way of destabilising them [sic]” (Tumblr, 
2016). The user goes on to defend the work by explaining that “when 
the character […] does something terrible we are supposed to recognise 
it as terrible […] If you jump straight to an offensive reaction, you miss 
out on this tripartite response” (ibid.). This links back to the concept of 
cultural capital: if audiences consider comedy to be of low capital then 
they may only want to accept what they are shown at face value, rather 
than learning to consume and read the text as discussed previously. 
However, audiences online are discussing a deeper meaning, which 
changes their response to the text. In her article on satirical literacy, 
Dunbar states that “students are ill-equipped to discern, let alone 
communicate, which aspects of the text are meant to be humorous and 
which are meant to invite thoughtful consideration” (2017, p. 84), and 
this is likely to be the case for audiences, who have had no training in 
reading comedy. This lack of understanding in how to read a text can 
lead to audiences confusing writers with the fictional characters they 
have created, or missing the text’s intended message.
One major difference between Tina Fey and Ricky Gervais is their 
online presence. Fey tends to steer away from direct online contact with 
audiences, while Gervais has a Twitter account with over 13 million 
followers, and as already mentioned, has spoken out about issues of 
offensive comedy, such as the case of Mark Meechan. Gervais has also 
presented the Golden Globes, in the years prior to Poehler and Fey, 
and has said that hosting the show again “would have been the end 
of [his] career” (Gervais, 2018, via The Hollywood Reporter), due to the 
controversial nature of a lot of Gervais’ work.
Gervais uses his Twitter account not only to engage with his fans, but 
also those who take issue with his work, using the platform to explain 
his stance on problematic comedy, as exemplified by this tweet: 
Please stop saying ‘You can’t joke about anything anymore’. You can. You 
can joke about whatever the fuck you like. And some people won’t like it 
and they will tell you they don’t like it. And then it’s up to you whether 
you give a fuck or not. And so on. It’s a good system (Gervais, 2018).
By engaging directly with digital vigilantes, Gervais continues the 
discussion on his own terms.
Generally, once a piece of fiction has been written, the author can 
have no more say in it. This can apply to screenplays or television, but 
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also to social media, like Vine and Twitter. If a person says something as 
a fictitious character or personality then it cannot be rescinded as a joke 
after readers have been offended by it. A writer is, to most audiences, 
invisible, and therefore needs to be wary that what they put into their 
work cannot be misconstrued, and that is their responsibility. If a viewer 
is offended by something that writer has chosen to say then —  if the 
comedy is good —  they were probably meant to be offended. Yet if a 
viewer is offended by something the writer did not mean then that may 
be attributed to poor writing. “Once an author is removed, the claim to 
decipher a text becomes quite futile” (Barthes & Heath, 1977, p. 147) 
and so the writer is powerless. This ties back to ideas of high-culture 
and low-culture comedy. Audiences misunderstood the joke, so perhaps 
it was too high-brow, but to explain a joke is to remove the revelation of 
the punchline, and thus it ceases to be a joke, or piece of comedy. There 
are allegedly two ways to remove this issue of offence and censorship 
from comedy, the first being ‘to retain the claim that comedy expresses 
feelings of superiority’ but the second is to discard the first in favour of 
‘one in which laughter and humour are based in something that is not 
anti-social’ (Morreall, 2009, p. 8).
Conclusion
Comedians in digital spaces such as YouTube or Twitter are seen more 
as peers than celebrities, actors or writers playing characters. This leaves 
them open to criticism from digital vigilantes who disagree with the 
content of their work, even if the work was originally intended as satire 
or parody. This is further complicated by the current issue of fake news, 
though that is an area of research outside the remit of this chapter. In 
online spaces, social hierarchy is removed, and audiences can respond 
to practitioners in the same way as they may respond to a friend or 
colleague. This means that they may also hold comedy practitioners to 
the same standard as they would their real-world associates. In digital 
spaces, a joke can also become removed from author or context and 
misunderstood, leading to vigilante-like responses that may in fact align 
with the point of view of the practitioner to whom they are objecting.
Although “traditions […] have informed the ways in which comedy 
and entertainment programming have been shot, promoted and 
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understood” (Mills, 2007, p. 180), with development in media, and 
changes to the way television is viewed and received, these traditions 
need to move forward. Comedy needs to have an “unexpected turn or 
dénouement, the punch line” (Kuipers, 2006, p. 5). As we are exposed 
to more comedy, from different and sometimes unexpected sources, 
writers and comedians try harder to surprise their audiences. This can 
lead to viewers being subject to comedy that they find difficult or 
uncomfortable, and then sharing their feelings online. Sometimes, this 
can be justified, if the supposed joke causes genuine offense, such as on 
grounds of homophobia, racism, sexism, etc. But at other times, humour 
may raise these issues intentionally, to raise awareness, to parody 
difficult subjects, or to educate viewers on their own behaviour.
Both author and audience have a responsibility to understand 
whether a joke is a parody or offensive. As stated earlier, comedy, in 
general, must be taken at face value, and so for both parties to engage in 
the comedy there must be an agreement between author and audience. 
If the practitioner does not contextualise the joke, either by defining it as 
satire, or by offering an explanation, then the agreement has been 
broken, but likewise if the audience decontextualises the joke then they 
too have broken the agreement. Both the lack of clarity and 
decontextualisation can turn audiences or fans into digital vigilantes as 
they work to reinforce the worldview that they feel has been broken. It 
is also a way for audiences to distance themselves from a practitioner 
whom they no longer wish to be affiliated with. “Humour needs to be 
both understood and permitted in order to be a joke” (Lockyer & 
Pickering, 2005, p. 80, emphasis in original), and it is the responsibility 
of both the practitioner and audience to make clear, and understand, its 
intent. Despite the idea that comedy is of low cultural capital, its words 
are given weight, and if they are to be treated in this way then comedy 
in general should be considered of higher standing. However, if we 
begin to take comedy more seriously, we need to understand that this 
may change its very nature. Despite this consideration, “no single 
intellectual viewpoint can hope to account for the complexities of 
comedy” (Medhurst, 2007, p. 2), and as such the discussion may extend 
indefinitely.
Overall, this research has shown that there are three key circumstances 
in which audiences take offence to comedy. The first is when audiences 
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engage with comedic elements that are separated from context, which 
can occur intentionally to discredit a comic, or accidentally, if discussing 
a component piece of a wider comedy. When the offensive content is 
removed from its context, audiences miss the ‘release’ and are therefore 
left with the anxiety, and none of the humour. The second is when the 
audience fails to separate the actor or writer from the flawed character 
they are performing or writing. When this happens, audiences misdirect 
anger at an offensive comment or action towards the actor or writer, 
rather than experiencing the intended story of the flawed character 
engaging in offensive or problematic actions. The third circumstance 
occurs when the comedy is, or appears to be, incorrectly positioned in 
the joke/action, either due to the power dynamic of the practitioner in 
relation to the text, or the setting in which it is told. Audiences, whether 
actively aware or not, can differentiate between humour that punches 
up and that which punches down. This relates back to the release of 
humour, as audiences’ anxiety abates when they understand that the 
subject of the joke is in a position of power, but when they see the 
comedian laughing at an individual who cannot defend themselves, 
or who is in a low position socially and economically, they retain the 
anxiety and cannot find humour in the message. In online spaces, 
audiences can share their dissatisfaction with ease and find like-minded 
individuals. This coordination in online spaces can lead to their criticism 
developing into digital vigilantism, and subsequently creating issues for 
the comedy practitioners targeted.
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During the first half of the 2010s, vigilante groups have increasingly 
appeared in the streets and on the Internet in Russia. Acting in the name 
of civil society, the ‘activists’ (aktivisty) patrol the streets in order to 
find badly parked vehicles (StopXam), inspect shops to check whether 
they sell expired products (Khryushi Protiv), or hunt and trap alleged 
paedophiles (Occupy Pedophilia), amongst other things. In spite of the 
diversity of their targets, Russian vigilantes share a common modus 
operandi, intertwining physical and digital practices. They remind 
people of the law, fight with alleged offenders and call the police, but 
they also film everything they do in order to create content, which they 
then spread on the Internet (Favarel-Garrigues, 2018; Favarel-Garrigues 
& Shukan, 2020). They therefore expose and shame on social media the 
offenders they meet face to face (Trottier, 2017). Their digital activity 
is sometimes hectic: they manage their own YouTube channels and 
webpages and renew the content they offer at least on a weekly basis 
(Gabdulhakov, 2018). Many are able to edit their films professionally, 
and they select the most spectacular moments during raids and patrols 
in order to attract viewers to their channels. The most famous vigilante 
groups, including the one studied in this chapter with more than 1.7 
million subscribers to its YouTube channel, earn a regular income from 
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their initiatives. The existence of an audience therefore plays a crucial 
role in the activity of these groups. 
However, studying this audience from a sociological perspective is 
difficult for two reasons. Firstly, the literature on vigilantism does not 
address this issue. Scholars focus on the attitudes of vigilantes, of their 
victims and of law-enforcement agencies, but not on the audience in 
whose name laws and moral values are enforced. Secondly, in the 
specific case of online Russian vigilantes, the identities of the audience, 
mainly anonymous viewers and commentators, are hidden. Nonetheless, 
even though people often do not use their real names when commenting 
on the work of self-proclaimed law enforcers, they do judge it, often 
either agreeing or disagreeing strongly with the vigilantes’ activities 
and points of view. 
This chapter focuses on public debates about Russian vigilante 
groups and the controversial issues surrounding their activity. Who 
voices the public criticism and what exactly is being criticised? The 
discussions encompass issues such as the legality and morality of 
vigilantes’ acts, their retributions, their social usefulness and their 
efficiency. But do vigilantes care about these criticisms? How does 
criticism affect their activity? The theoretical framework of this chapter 
is influenced by pragmatic sociology, particularly the analysis of 
controversies, which emphasises the role of the audience in public 
disputes (Boltanski et al., 2007). Cyril Lemieux defines controversies as 
triadic structures involving “situations where a difference between two 
parties is brought before a public, which is in a third place and therefore 
in a position to judge”1 (Lemieux, 2007, p. 195; see also Smadja, 2012). 
What are the controversial issues that the audience is led to judge 
concerning Russian vigilantes’ activity? 
As a case study, this chapter focuses on a particular group named Lev 
Protiv (Leo Against) and embodied by its leader, Mikhail ‘Lev’ Lazutin, 
born in 1995. Founded in 2014 and based in Moscow, this vigilante group 
presents itself as a ‘social project’, whose mission is to patrol train and 
metro stations, commercial areas and public gardens, urging smokers, 
drinkers and partygoers to respect the law. Lazutin gathers a team to 
conduct these operations, or ‘raids’: between five and ten people patrol 
1 “des situations où un différend entre deux parties est mis en scène devant un public, 
tiers placé dès lors en position de juge.”
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with him, including sportsmen. They promote a healthy lifestyle and 
claim to act as role models, showing Russian youth the ravages of alcohol. 
Most of the time, the raids conclude with a fight. Like all vigilante groups, 
Lev Protiv justifies its involvement in law enforcement by denouncing the 
passivity of the police (Abrahams, 1998; Johnston, 1996; Pratten and Sen, 
2007; Favarel-Garrigues & Gayer, 2016). Alongside outcasts, homeless 
people and punks, indifferent and unprofessional policemen constitute 
one of the main targets of the group, which includes ‘civic monitoring’ of 
law enforcement agents in its missions. 
From a methodological point of view, I use the data I have gathered 
on Lev Protiv since 2015, particularly the 150 videos that I have archived 
(which have often been removed from the activists’ channel) and also 
the commentaries (which have also often been removed). I have created 
a database of the comments from 59 videos posted until 2018, allowing 
me to understand which words are used most frequently and which 
topics are the most controversial. I have also undertaken ethnographic 
observation of six of the raids by the group in 2017 and 2018, and 
interviewed people who have relationships with Lev Protiv (as victims, 
observers, detractors and fans), but I do not use these sources in the 
present paper, except when the observation helps to understand the 
group’s popularity. 
I first focus on the popularity of Lev Protiv and present the information 
available about the audience of this project. I then turn to the emergence 
and development of the criticism of the group, and show that the main 
controversial issues surround the group’s focus on economic, legal, social 
and ethical arguments. While it may not hold true for all groups, in the 
case of Lev Protiv, the use of the Internet, particularly YouTube, not only 
allows them to expose their targets but also enables their critics to exert 
pressure on them to be more accountable to the public they claim to 
protect.
A Popular Vigilante Show
Lev Protiv offers a regular vigilante show, an impressive spectacle 
uploaded on YouTube at least once a week. Counting the exact number 
of videos edited and posted by Lev Protiv since its creation is probably 
impossible for several reasons. The Moscow branch does not keep all 
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edited videos on its channel. Some of them disappear suddenly for legal 
or commercial reasons, for instance if an activist commits a punishable 
act or if the video is not as popular as expected. The main YouTube 
channel of the group is cleaned on a regular basis, as shown in archives 
available on the Internet.2 In 2015 and 2016, the title of each edited 
video included a number used to classify all the videos on the channel, 
but this classification system was given up after the 130th episode in 
October 2016. The opening of a second channel in 2015 has complicated 
the calculation further.3 Moreover ‘copycat movements’ have spread in 
Russian cities, taking over the brand of Lev Protiv and imitating the style 
of the Moscow activists (Gabowitsch, 2018). However, in January 2019, 
230 videos were accessible on both YouTube channels. It is reasonable 
to estimate that the Moscow group has produced more than 300 videos 
since its creation in 2014. 
Most of Lev Protiv’s videos correspond to a genre, the ‘raid show’, and 
generally follow a set scenario. In the beginning, some unproblematic 
interactions are shown, in which offenders willingly allow Lev Protiv to 
remind them of the law, and sometimes express support for the group. 
These sequences prove, according to Lazutin, that a norm is shared by 
most Russians and that those who do not comply are ‘abnormal’ and 
behave ‘inadequately’. Then follow interactions in which a discussion 
takes place without a fight: for example, the activists grab bottles of 
alcohol and empty them in front of their owners. However, the conflict at 
this point is limited to a tense and more or less cogent dialogue. Lazutin 
spends a significant amount of time justifying himself, explaining his 
motivations and goals in front of the alleged offenders and the audience. 
Lazutin calls the police when an offender is caught drinking twice or 
answering with obscene language (mat) in public, which is forbidden by 
the Code of the Russian Federation on Administrative Offenses (article 
20.1 on ‘petty hooliganism’). The video usually ends with a dispute 
provoking physical confrontation, with Lev Protiv members getting 
involved in brawls and sometimes using pepper spray. The need to 
resort to force is thus shown as a necessary alternative when other forms 
2  See, for instance, the Internet archive Wayback Machine (first capture of the front 
page of Lev Protiv’s YouTube channel in June 2014): https://web.archive.org/web/* 
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCUBoIo2p7GSRMt1YcSswDEw
3  See https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCjkqm5yS4HGjxPFEl1vc4Ew/videos
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of interaction have failed. This option is supposed to underline, on the 
one hand, the uncivilised nature of the offenders who are not willing 
to comply with the law, and, on the other hand, the consequences of 
an absent or indifferent police force. Together with images that show 
the ravages of alcohol, the fight scene is the principal marketing ploy 
prompting users to click on the video. The offenders are, however, 
neutralised and handed over to the police when they arrive on the 
scene. Some raids end up at the police station, where Lazutin finishes 
performing his duties by writing his deposition. 
Although Lazutin’s image is intimately tied to these raid shows in the 
public space, it is important to note that he also posts other content to his 
YouTube channel, in which he develops a saccharine and compassionate 
discourse, a far cry from the aggression we see in the raids. Like other 
vigilante groups,4 Lev Protiv likes to portray itself in its videos as 
a group of do-gooders. Disguised as Santa Claus, Lazutin hands out 
New Year’s gifts to children, offers to buy medicine for the elderly at a 
pharmacy,5 distributes hot drinks and food to the needy,6 and speaks 
out against animal cruelty. One of the most popular videos, seen more 
than six million times by September 2018, features a wounded cat found 
in the street and saved by Lazutin.7 Among the first videos posted in 
2019, along with new violent raids, Lazutin shows himself saving 
dogs and distributing gifts to children living with mental illness. The 
avenger is also a philanthropist. However, violent images are generally 
more attractive to viewers than compassionate ones. In January 2019, 
two videos were released almost at the same time: “We Save Dogs from 
Death”8 and “Brutal Raid”.9 After a week, the second one had been 
viewed twice as many times as the first one (230,000 views for the raid 
video, 117,000 views for the other one as of 7 February). 
Lev Protiv is popular in Russia and Lazutin is a well-known public 
figure, among young Russians at least. In comparison with other Russian 
4  Davidych is a good example. As a famous test-driver and street-racer, he began to 
‘hunt’ corrupt traffic police officers while organising charity runs by visiting 
orphanages. He was arrested in February 2016 and released in 2019.
5  Lev Protiv 64, Helping Pensioners (Pomosch pensioneram), 12 November, 2015.
6  Lev Protiv 72, Help the Needy (Pomogai nuzhdayushimsya), 19 December, 2015.
7  Lev Protiv, Saving a Kitten from Death (Spasenie kotenki ot smerti), 30 September 
2015.
8  Lev Protiv, Saving Dogs from Death (Spasaem sobak ot smerti), 27 January 2019.
9  Lev Protiv, Brutal Raid (Zhestkii reid), 30 January 2019. 
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vigilante groups (including local initiatives10 and forbidden groups),11 
Lev Protiv seems to be the most popular project in Russia after Stop-
Kham, which was created earlier and is devoted to stopping traffic 
violations.12 Both projects have a lot in common: they were initiated by 
pro-Putin youth organisations and received grants from governmental 
programs supporting the development of civic initiatives (Hemment, 
2012; Rukov & Chesnokov, 2015). In the beginning of Lev Protiv, Lazutin 
took part in several Stop-Kham raids. Stop-Kham raids in which he 
participated used to feature on Lev Protiv’s main channel.13 
As shown in Table 5.1, since the creation of the first channel in April 
2014, the audience has grown continuously and by 2019 one and a half 
million people had subscribed to the channel. Yet, the audience of the 
videos on this main channel is even bigger. In January 2020, the channel 
had attracted more than 280 million views. Each of the thirteen most 
popular videos had been watched by more than three million viewers. 
The most popular video had reached almost 10 million spectators in two 
months!14 In 2018, a video was typically seen more than 100,000 times 
after one day, 200,000 times after three days, and about 300,000 times 
after five to seven days (see Table 5.2). The most appreciated videos 
are still being viewed two or three years after they were posted on the 
Internet.
Table 5.1: Progression of the number of subscribers on Lev Protiv’s main 
YouTube channel.




10  See for instance the Chelyabinsk-based project Trezvye Dvory, which existed from 
2014 to 2018. 
11  See for instance the Occupy Pedophilia project, which was banned in 2014. For more 
about this group, see Favarel-Garrigues (2019). 
12  See https://www.youtube.com/user/stopxamlive/about; In February 2019, more 
than 1.5 million people had subscribed to the channel, which is comparable to Lev 
Protiv’s audience, but the total number of views was far greater (390 million for 
Stop-Kham against 214 million for Lev Protiv).
13  https://web.archive.org/web/20140612084540/http://www.youtube.com/
channel/UCUBoIo2p7GSRMt1YcSswDEw
14  Lev Protiv, Lev protiv skinhedov-natsistov (perepalka), 24 November 2018.





Source: Lev Protiv’s main YouTube channel.
Table 5.2: Progression of views, likes/dislikes and comments for a video 
posted on July 16, 2018.
Date Views Likes Dislikes Comments
17.07.2018 127,131 9700 486 273
18.07.2018 193,000 12,000 678 418
19.07.2018 222,000 13,000 828 479
24.07.2018 290,000 14,300 1040 712
31.01.2019 536,000 21,000 1800 1068
15.06.2020 591,000 23,000 1900 1080
Source: Lev Protiv, Udushayushchii (Asphyxiating), 16 July, 2018, https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=8WvZ6r-_qAU
Lev Protiv’s second channel, opened in 2015, started to become 
popular in 2016. Called “Lev Protiv Live” until 2018, it is now named 
“Lev Protiv 2nd Channel” (Lev Protiv 2 Kanal).15 Whereas Lazutin leads 
the operations in the videos on the main channel, other members of 
Lev Protiv post videos of raids they conducted by themselves on the 
second channel. Their videos are successful, even in the cases when 
Lazutin does not personally take part in the raid. More than 500,000 
people had subscribed to the second channel by January 2020. Videos 
had been watched more than 100 million times, which is more than 
a third of the total number of views for the main channel. Only four 
videos had been watched more than three million times, but one of 
them had reached 10 million views in two years.16 A third channel, 
called “Mikhail Lazutin”, was begun in 2016: in 2020, 218,000 people 
have subscribed to it and videos have been viewed more than 22 
million times.17 As we will see further on, these figures are significant 
enough to generate regular income. 
15  See https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCjkqm5yS4HGjxPFEl1vc4Ew
16  Lev Protiv, Pathetic Cockerels (Zhalkie drachuny), 2 November 2016.
17  https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCjkqm5yS4HGjxPFEl1vc4Ew
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As a showman on YouTube, Mikhail Lazutin is a popular public 
figure. Several interviews with him are available elsewhere on the 
Internet.18 Major newspapers have written articles about his project 
(Sher, 2015). In each raid I have personally observed, I have noticed the 
presence of fans, asking Lazutin for a selfie, shaking his hand, waving at 
him or expressing support for his initiative. Such positive opinions are, 
however, far from being universal. As we will see further on, criticism 
is widespread on the web and several investigations of Lev Protiv are 
easily available. The name ‘Lev Protiv’ also appears in the media each 
time a brawl gets out of hand and creates severe damage.19 
In Search of an Audience
All interactions shown in Lev Protiv videos are observed by a third 
party (the audience), who are supposed to support Lev Protiv’s civic 
stance. The inclusion of this third party is imposed by members of Lev 
Protiv on the people they confront, evident in the conspicuous presence 
of a camera, which has at least some relation to the hostility incurred by 
the group. What is it possible to know about the audience of Lev Protiv? 
The issue of the audience is a blind spot in the general literature about 
vigilantism. The comments sections of the group’s YouTube channels 
give little insight: most of the commentators use pseudonyms and 
almost none of them can be considered as constant contributors to the 
discussion. This means that there is no core group of identifiable followers. 
However, the language used in the comments confirms clearly that the 
audience is young and that male adolescents prevail among the viewers. 
The audience is at least national (many comments start with “Here in 
my city…”) and seems sometimes to include Russian-speaking people 
living abroad, notably in other post-Soviet states. It is interesting to note 
that Lazutin constantly marks himself as an “activist”, as distinguished 
from “those who are indifferent”, “passives who do nothing to improve 
18  See his interview by the blogger Kolhoznik at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=50RGJSC6C9U 
19  In Moscow, Lev Protiv activists beaten during an operation at Kiev Station (V 
moskve izbili aktivistov dvizhenia “Lev protiv” vo vremya aktsii na Kievskom vokzale), 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, 20 November 2016; Mass Brawl on Bolotnaya Square Started 
because of a Bottle of Water (Massovaya draka na Bolotnoi ploschadi nachalas’ iz-za 
butylki vody), MK, 9 September 2018. 
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the world in which they live”, “couch potatoes surfing the Internet” 
who constitute probably the biggest part of his audience. 
The comments sections also show that Lev Protiv videos are deeply 
controversial: they are sometimes disliked by a high proportion of 
viewers and always highly commented upon. The contents provoke 
discussions and clashes between viewers. Some fans not only support 
the initiative, but also express their willingness to join the group. In 
some cases, they provide help by searching and giving the name, or the 
VKontakte (VK) page,20 of the smokers or drinkers involved in fights 
with the Lev Protiv team: “For you, Lev, the links of these bastards”,21 
writes one of them in July 2018.22 But Lazutin also has vocal opponents, 
both on the spot during encounters and on the Internet. 
Reactions to Lev Protiv’s raids are sometimes violent. When vigilantes 
appear in Bolotnaya, a square where revellers gather once a week, they 
are met with insults. On a few occasions, young people targeted by 
the group at Bolotnaya have used violence against the activists; in one 
video they can be seen bearing down on the group menacingly chanting 
“Healthy lifestyle sucks!” (Zozh sosyot!).23 Sometimes the activists are 
taught a lesson by adversaries who are greater in number and better 
organised than expected. In October 2015 at Bolotnaya, one member 
received an injury to the head during a brawl.24 Lev Protiv appeared 
in headlines again in November 2016, when an altercation between 
youths and the activists degenerated into a brawl in front of a Moscow 
shopping centre.25 In September 2018, the Lev Protiv cameraman was 
doused in pepper spray during a raid. According to Lazutin, all these 
events reflect the aggression and dangerousness of a population that the 
police should manage. 
The number of available videos about Lev Protiv on social networks 
(especially VK) and on YouTube is also impressive. These videos 
20  VKontakte (VK) is the most popular Russian online social media and social 
networking service.
21  They have been recognised because in the video they name the rock band they play 
in together. 
22  Lev Protiv, Filthy Herd on Bolotnaya 1 (Merzkoe stado na Bolotnoi 1), 3 July 2018.
23  Lev Protiv, Lev Protiv is Brutally Attacked by a Drunken Crowd (Zhestokoe napadenie 
pianoi tolpy na Lev Protiv), 7 October 2015, 11’08.
24  Lev Protiv, Fight on Bolotnaya Square (Draka na Bolotnoi ploschadi), 6 October 2015.
25  Lev Protiv, Assault at Shopping Mall “European” (Napadenie u TS “Evropeiskii”), 18 
November 2016.
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help to identify controversies surrounding Lev Protiv’s activity. They 
voice the criticism of Lev Protiv, which forces Lazutin to answer and 
to justify himself. Three main groups of authors can be distinguished: 
individual victims, anonymous collective accusers and well-known 
YouTubers or bloggers. It should be noted that major Russian human 
rights organisations have not taken part in this criticism, except Public 
Verdict, which offers legal assistance to the victims of law enforcement 
bodies in Russia.26
Lev Protiv victims sometimes try individually to raise the awareness 
of the general public about the danger posed by the group. For example, 
they create webpages or VKontakte pages in order to inform others 
about the group and to collect testimonies. However, sometimes these 
individuals find it difficult to gain support. In June 2018, during a raid 
that I observed, a man fought against the activists, fell down, could not 
stand again and was taken by ambulance to a hospital. Two days later, 
he opened a page on Pikabu27 called “Lev Protiv Activists Broke My 
Leg”, which gained a huge audience.28 More than 1,600 comments were 
published in three weeks; however, most of them were critical towards 
the self-proclaimed ‘victim’, suspected to have broken the law and 
provoked the activists. Victims’ threats to sue Lazutin seem to have 
produced no effect so far. 
Anonymous accusers include observers filming Lev Protiv in action 
in order to prove that they commit offences during their raids. Several 
videos showing how Lev Protiv members behave during their raids are 
available on YouTube. These videos show the hidden means used by 
activists in order to put pressure on alleged offenders: the aggressive use 
of floodlights, the disciplining of aggressive members in the group by 
other group members and the occasionally intimidating aspect of some 
of the members. During one of the raids I observed, a photographer 
familiar with Lev Protiv activity was following the group in order to 
publish potential abuses and wrongdoings committed by the group 
26  See http://vigilant.myverdict.org/
27  Pikabu is a Russian social news aggregation website.
28  How My Leg Was Broken and What To Do Now (Kak mne slomali 
nogu i chto teper’ s etim delat), 29 June 2018, https://pikabu.ru/story/
kak_mne_slomali_nogu_i_chto_teper_s_yetim_delat_5998252.
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on social media. Anonymous accusers sometimes give legal advice to 
smokers and drinkers stopped by activists.29
More structured communities of opponents also exist on Russian 
social networks. The VK page “Boris For30” (Boris Za), with around 2,800 
subscribers in January 2019, gives “instructions for communicating with 
activists” and explains the rights of the activists and of their targets.31 
Recommendations include being polite to the activists, obeying their 
instructions if alcohol is indeed being consumed and filming them 
in order to prevent aggressive behaviour. Two other pages have been 
created to criticise and mobilise against Lev Protiv: “The Tiger For” on 
VK had nearly 2,500 subscribers in January 2019,32 and “Anti Project 
(Proekt) Lev Protiv”, gathered around 600 at the same date.33 However, 
as the figures of popularity show, none of these initiatives reach the 
scale of the audience for the vigilantes themselves. 
The most significant impact on Lev Protiv’s reputation comes from 
the videos devoted to the vigilantes posted by famous bloggers and 
YouTubers. Some bloggers treat this topic in a humorous way,34 but 
most of the time the tone is serious, even alarmed. Public figures of the 
Russian Internet began to worry about this subject in 2016, and have 
sought to reveal who these vigilantes are, how violent they can be and 
how their projects are funded. As we will see, they play a significant role 
in fueling controversies surrounding Lev Protiv. 
The first to post videos on the subject, a series of three, was Adam 
Timaev. Born to a Chechen family, the blogger lives in Moscow. Around 
74,000 people had subscribed to his YouTube channel and his videos 
had been viewed more than 6 million times by April 2019. Timaev 
shows himself to be an investigator able to reveal the hidden truth about 
institutions (including Sberbank and the army), as well as popular 
projects on the web. Lev Protiv is clearly one of his main targets. His first 
video on this issue appeared at the end of 2016 and had been viewed 
almost 1 million times two years later. In January 2019, Timaev released 
29  See, for example, the comments for one of the first articles on this subject: at http://
seofuck.ru/kak-obojti-zakon-o-kurenii-ili-lev-protiv
30  Boris stands for Boris Yeltsin and his alleged taste for alcohol consumption.
31  See http://vk.com/wall-98572404_766
32  See https://vk.com/tiger_za
33  See https://vk.com/public70622974
34  See https://vk.com/ugarhiki
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two videos in which he publicly offended Lazutin and suggested they 
fight. 
The Timaev initiative inspired one of the most popular Russian 
bloggers, Nikolai Sobolev. Born in 1993, Sobolev started his career on 
YouTube with pranks and “social experiments” (Rakamakafo), then 
turned to the analysis of trends on YouTube (“YouTube’s Life”), before 
starting a new channel under his own name.35 His critique has reached 
a far larger audience. Since 2015, the videos on his YouTube channel 
have been viewed 467 million times. With 4.6 million subscribers, he is a 
Russian YouTube star who is fond of youth culture. His videos deal with 
famous rappers and bloggers, reality shows, extrasensory perception 
and sects, sports issues and the regulation of the Internet, among other 
topics. He often posts follow-up videos on particular topics, most of 
the time because his target has responded publicly to his initial video. 
Sobolev started to edit videos about Lev Protiv in February 2017. Two 
years later, they had been watched more than three and a half million 
times. While this is not a considerable number for Sobolev (this video 
is not one of his thirty most popular), it does give a large audience to 
Lazutin’s activity. As in the case of Adam Timaev, Sobolev’s videos 
prompted video replies from Lazutin and ended in a tense meeting in 
the street, where the two YouTubers settled their scores in a non-violent 
fashion in the presence of a camera and witnesses, including Timaev.36 
This confrontation, which was widely commented upon when a video 
of it was posted on the web, shows on the one hand that denouncing Lev 
Protiv has become a noteworthy activity. On the other hand, Lazutin 
himself interacts with famous bloggers in order to benefit from their 
popularity. 
This was especially the case when the gamer Panda FX, renowned 
for his videos about football videogames, criticised Lev Protiv on his 
channel in September 2018. Lazutin reacted by filming a video where 
he approached Panda FX in the locker room of a football stadium and 
asked him to dress in order to settle their scores in the street. This video 
was widely discussed on the Russian web as a fight between two public 
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figures. Lazutin was criticised by his own fans for being a hooligan and 
for adopting a provocative attitude. He finally apologised for having 
been unable to repress his anger and removed the video from his 
channel. These repeated public confrontations with famous bloggers 
and YouTubers may help to explain the rapid increase of Lev Protiv’s 
audience during the second half of 2018. Whereas it took two years for 
the group to pass from 500,000 subscribers to a million (from April 
2016 to April 2018), it took only nine months to attract 500,000 more by 
February 2019. And whereas it took several years to reach 100 million 
views by April 2018, it took only seven months to reach 100 million more. 
Controversies Surrounding Lev Protiv
Lazutin’s popularity has put him under ever-growing scrutiny, and 
there have been many efforts to reveal the true methods and objectives 
of the Lev Protiv project. As a “social interaction likely to have an 
audience” (Lemieux, 2007, p. 195; Smadja, 2012, p. 2), controversy leads 
the public to judge the relevance of the arguments of the two parties. In 
the case of Lev Protiv, this judgement depends on the identity of the 
accusers, on the relevance of the accusations and on the robustness of 
self-justification by Lazutin. The four main controversial issues regarding 
the activists deal with their earnings, the legality of their methods, the 
efficiency of their activity and the strength of their reputation.
Through its connections with other pro-Putin aktivisty, Lev Protiv used 
to have access to a rare resource: funding granted by the Civic Chamber 
in support of the development of civil society in Russia (Daucé, 2014, 
p. 15). Lev Protiv is thus peculiar in that it used to be state-sponsored. 
In 2014, the Lev Protiv project received over five million rubles from 
the Civic Chamber via “The Nation’s Health League”. The funds were 
paid to a non-commercial organisation called “Multinational Country”, 
registered in the town of Lyubertsy.37 In describing itself, the project 
insisted upon the legitimacy of the work that these “social aktivisty” 
carry out “conjointly” with the police, in order to implement the ban 
on smoking in public places. In 2015, the project received 7 million 
rubles via the “Russian Union of Youth”, but the funds were paid to 
37  See https://grants.oprf.ru/grants2014-2/winners/rec2471/
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the organisation “Young Talent”, also based in Lyubertsy. The project 
proposal stated at that time that offenders would be reprimanded and 
handed over to the police.38 The grants stopped in 2016. Like Stop-Kham, 
Lev Protiv are not a group of reservists unconditionally devoted to the 
powers-that-be; they are young people who negotiate their potential 
support and who aim to preserve a certain degree of autonomy.
The first controversies that emerged around questions of money date 
back to 2015 and reveal that a lucrative business is hiding behind the 
group’s charitable acts. Are they zealous activists or mere crooks? One 
of the most common criticisms of Lev Protiv in 2016 dealt with the 
allocation of State subsidies in 2014 and 2015; “where are the 12 million?” 
was at that time an oft-repeated question on the lips of the group’s 
detractors.39 In response to this criticism, Lazutin often replied that he 
never even saw the money, and that he was the victim of an orchestrated 
swindling operation organised by corrupt ‘officials’. Be that as it may, 
the controversy puts emphasis on the question of the oversight of 
government funds granted to non-commercial organisations, at a time 
when cracks in this system are being reported (Transparency, 2016). 
What is more, it is thought that receiving government subsidies gives 
“ordinary kids who yesterday were still sitting in class” an “illusion of 
impunity” (Alexandrov, 2015). 
The denunciation of the profits realised by Lev Protiv also includes 
the financial rewards from Lev Protiv’s digital activity. Firstly, the 
group makes money through its YouTube channels. It is unfortunately 
impossible to know the exact amount, and websites devoted to estimates 
are hardly reliable, since they show large disparities in their estimates 
and vary on a daily basis. In January 2019, SocialBlade (a website that 
tracks statistics and analytics for social media sites) estimated Lev 
Protiv’s earnings from their main channel to be no less than 3,800 euros 
per month. Estimated earnings from the second channel reached no less 
than 778 euros per month. A minimum estimate of the profits reached 
about 4,500 euros per month in January 2019. In June 2020, however, 
this estimate was far lower (about 600 euros per month).40 Besides 
38  See https://grants.oprf.ru/grants2015-1/winners/rec4173/
39  Bloggers Timaev and Sobolev have contributed to the diffusion of this information.
40  This estimate includes three channels: Lev Protiv’s first and second channel, and 
also Mikhail Lazutin’s own channel. 
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earning money from the advertisements on YouTube, Lazutin often 
promotes a product in the beginning of the videos: for example, for a 
particular pizza delivery service or sports-betting organisation. These 
sources of profit help to explain a shift in the terms used by Lazutin to 
present the group’s activity: whereas it used to be a “social project”, 
now it is “work”.41 The commercial dimension of the project fuels the 
denunciation of the hypocrisy of the alleged do-gooders. This accusation 
has also been taken up by leaders of provincial copycat movements 
(Gabowitsch, 2012), disappointed in a leader who is not the slightest bit 
interested in their work at a local level, and who in their eyes “only cares 
about his YouTube channel”.42 
Another concern deals with the legal or illegal nature of the methods 
the group employs. In the videos, as well as during the observations I 
carried out, speeches about rights prevail in dialogues between activists, 
smokers, drinkers and onlookers. All parties claim that they are acting 
to protect their rights. The constant use of a camera is controversial and 
the focus of many objections on the part of targeted individuals. “You do 
not have the right to film me”: asking not to be filmed is a classic reaction 
of those who are targeted by the group. The activists respond with 
an irrefutable argument: according to the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation, they have the right to film an offence being committed. This 
is also how they justify using a powerful floodlight at night, blinding 
their targets and exposing them to harsh light. The legality of the other 
methods employed by the activists is also constantly questioned. In the 
beginning of the raids, Lev Protiv used to use a water spray in order to 
extinguish the cigarettes of those who were refusing to cease smoking 
in forbidden places. The spray was at that time the signature of the Lev 
Protiv brand. Facing accusations of spoiling others’ property, the group 
stopped acting in this way. However, seizing the open beer can of an 
offender raises a similar question. If it is right to remind someone that 
they are contravening the law against drinking in certain public places, 
is it right to stop the offence by confiscating alcoholic drinks? I have 
41  See for instance Lazutin’s interview at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=50RGJSC6C9U
42  For instance, this was the case in Krasnoyarsk. In March 2016, the leader of the 
local chapter declared that he had decided to stop his activities, disappointed 
by Lazutin’s search for glory and money. See http://www.prima-tv.ru/news/
society/41892-dvizhenie_lev_protiv_samoraspuskaetsya
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already mentioned the raid I observed in June 2018, during which a man 
fighting with the activists fell down and claimed to have had his leg 
broken. After having posted his story on Russian social networks and in 
front of critical comments, the victim had to justify himself. Not only did 
he show proof of his broken leg and say that he had offended Lazutin 
because of his anger, but he also insisted on his right to break the law 
as long as he is ready to assume the consequences — which in this case, 
would have been a fine. However, this argument has hardly convinced 
his video’s audience and many commentators have criticised his cynical 
vision of crime and punishment. Contrary to other complaints publicised 
by his victims, Lazutin did not even answer to this accusation in order 
to justify himself. 
A third concern over the actions of the vigilante group deals with 
the use of coercion. As discussed earlier, violence occurs in most of 
the raids. Do activists have the right to incapacitate offenders? In their 
videos, the activists take pains to show that they are not responsible 
for the escalation to violence, but that they use violence in response 
to aggressive behaviour. During one raid, I heard Lazutin, in front of 
the camera, warn a man just before the fight started: “according to the 
legislation on self-defence, I have the right to hit you if you hit me”. 
But the activists’ justification of the use of violence with the need to 
defend themselves does not convince those who argue that the activists 
frequently provoke drunk people in order to infuriate them, to push 
them to their limits in order to guarantee bankable images of a fight. 
As argued in a critical paper about Lev Protiv: should criminal offences 
committed by people fighting against administrative offences be 
tolerated (Alexandrov, 2015)?
The efficiency of the activists is also criticised. Many commentators 
note that Lev Protiv does not prevent people from continuing to meet 
up at Bolotnaya square or around train stations. According a typical 
comment, the group would be better advised to fight “against the 
causes, and not the consequences of the problem”. In response, Lazutin 
asserts that his goal is not to help the drunkards he meets because, 
according to him, they are already lost. They are “cattle” (bydlo), i.e. 
dehumanised. Therefore, the main objective of constant brawls with ‘the 
cattle’ is to show a good example to the youth watching the videos 
throughout the country. As Lazutin puts it during an exchange with one 
drunk individual: “You show a bad example, and I show a good one. 
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There is good and there is evil”.43 This self-presentation as a role model 
fuels another widespread criticism. By giving free reign to their violent 
impulses, Lazutin and his band are a far cry from being role models. Is 
it morally right and socially useful to justify the use of force to fight 
against tobacco and alcohol consumption? Is this permanent readiness 
to fight in order to enforce the law a good example for Russian youth? Is 
it right to provoke a fight in front of those children that the activists 
pretend to defend? Are they then law enforcers or hooligans? As put 
straightforwardly by one man taken to task by the youths: “Who are you 
guys precisely? Are you pigs (cops)? Because honestly the more I look 
at you the more you look like troublemakers”44 It is, moreover, surprising 
that Lazutin’s advertisements for gambling, hardly compatible with a 
role model for young people, are not more criticised. 
Another area that receives little criticism is Lev Protiv’s vision of 
political order. Controversies around the group deal more with its 
hidden financial goals and questionable methods of fighting than with 
the political meaning of the spontaneous involvement of men, including 
athletes, in law enforcement. Although rarely mentioned, the argument 
has nonetheless been made that Lev Protiv would be well able to join, 
if needed, the army of “Putinist red guards”, in reference to the group’s 
early ties to Nashi, and the creation of Anti-Maidan collectives, eager 
to come to blows to defend the regime against the risk of revolution 
in all its forms. This is apparent in some of the terminology used to 
describe the “aktivisty”, referred to as the former Communist Party 
Youth Organisation (“komsomols”), “timurovtsy”,45 and even the Chinese 
Red Guard (“khunveibini”). However, this argument is partially refuted 
by Lazutin’s critical stance towards the regime since 2016, i.e. after 
governmental grants ceased. Lazutin’s credo is order, and he judges 
politicians by this criterion: he always insists on the fact that his raids 
occur “near the walls of Kremlin” in order to show that ruling elites are 
43  Lev Protiv, Udushayushchii (Asphyxiating), July 16, 2018, https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=8WvZ6r-_qAU
44  Lev Protiv, Lev Protiv ne na tekh narvalis’ (Lev Protiv did not pick the right ones), 
YouTube, June 14, 2007, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ot6UW68DcZQ
45  Timurovtsy refers to early Soviets who undertook charitable acts; the term comes 
from a book by Arkadii Gaidar, Timur and His Crew (Timur i ego komanda), published 
in 1940, in which a group of young adolescents secretly helped the needy and fought 
petty criminals. In one of its most famous scenes, Timur and his friends prevent a 
gang from doing harm by exposing their activities to the villagers.
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powerless. He used to quote Vladimir Putin when he was financed by 
governmental funds (from 2014 to 2015), but this is less the case since 
2016. In an interview, Lazutin confessed his interest in Navalny’s anti-
corruption investigations, but disapproved of his calls to take part in 
unauthorised demonstrations, believing that he was encouraging the 
youth to wreak havoc.46 
What, then, is Lazutin’s ideology? Some critics describe the activists, 
not without a certain social disdain, as stupid brutes, and compare them 
to the ultra-nationalists that participate in the “Russian March” parade 
(Alexandrov, 2015). It is true that before starting his project against 
alcohol and tobacco consumption in public places, Lazutin, at that time 
aged seventeen to eighteen, was a fan of prominent neo-Nazi activist 
Tesak, organising his own “safaris” against alleged paedophiles and 
sharing the neo-Nazi beliefs of his idol (Favarel-Garrigues, 2019; see also 
Kasra, 2017). However, five years later, it would be wrong to associate 
Lev Protiv with Russian neo-Nazi activists for several reasons. Firstly, in 
2019, as a young father, he distances himself from the mistakes he made 
when he was younger. He develops the image of a responsible Christian, 
quoting Jesus Christ and calling for love.47 Secondly, many adversaries 
mock Lazutin’s patronym, Dzhemalovich, which is not ethnically 
Russian. Indeed, Lazutin’s father is half Kurdish, half Georgian.48 In one 
video, activists beat a man who had previously called Lazutin a khach 
(darky), an offensive and demeaning term used by ethnic Russians 
against Caucasus people. This terminology echoes offensive criticism 
that is regularly formulated on the web: Lazutin has no legitimacy to 
clean Russian society because he is even not ethnically Russian. In fact, 
white supremacists feature among the subcultures drinking in Bolotnaya 
park during Lev Protiv raids. Lazutin and his friends denounce the 
intolerance and the hatefulness of these nationalists. One of Lev Protiv’s 
most popular videos is named “Leo Against Skinheads and Neo-Nazis”.49 
But as Marlène Laruelle has shown, nationalist speech is plural in today’s 
46  Mikhail Lazutin, Answers to questions (Otvety na voprosy), 17 April 2019, https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=8hXTGfBVQXs 
47  Ibid.
48  Ibid. 
49  Lev Protiv, Leo Against Skinheads-Nazis (Brawl) (Lev Protiv skinkhedov-
natsistov (potasovka)), 24 November 2018, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=wJJaD8966Pc&t=65s This video had reached 10 million views after two 
months. 
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Russia (Laruelle, 2017). Besides a healthy lifestyle and strict obedience to 
the law, Lazutin promotes patriotism and a form of nationalism based on 
belonging to a multi-ethnic and multi-faith country. Such a post-Soviet 
vision of nationhood, which is for instance celebrated during Second 
World War commemorations, corresponds to government rhetoric in 
Russia, valuing all components of the Russian ethnic mosaic. 
Conclusion 
More than four years after its creation, criticism and controversy have 
had no detrimental effects on the popularity of Lev Protiv so far, unlike 
in the case of other vigilante initiatives such as “Occupy Pedophilia” or 
“Davidich on the hunt” (Davidych na okhote). On the contrary, they have 
fuelled the group’s success: Lev Protiv gained further subscribers when 
popular bloggers started to relay the various criticisms. In fact, as the 
producer of a vigilante show, Lazutin has included the management of 
criticism in his work. He spends a significant amount of time answering 
to his critics and justifying himself. He has perfectly interiorised the idea 
that accountability is a fundamental feature of the neoliberal grammar 
of ‘projects’ in the development of civil society (Daucé, 2014). 
This case study suggests the need to examine more generally how 
vigilante groups gain audiences and how they strive to be accountable, 
whatever the context. Firstly, in order to appreciate and explain the 
popularity of a group like Lev Protiv, it would be useful to watch new 
YouTube content from the group and from their critics, and to do so 
with the vigilante channel’s subscribers, to observe as well as discuss 
their reactions. Such a method would help to explore the audience’s 
expectations, disappointments and criticisms toward the group, and 
how these evolve over time. Secondly, we may inquire how vigilante 
groups build their accountability in reaction to criticisms and 
controversies. By resorting to violence in order to maintain order and/or 
to implement the law in the name of a community, vigilante groups are 
controversial by nature and always have to justify themselves. However, 
the use of the Internet, especially YouTube, to publicise their activity 
places contemporary vigilantes in front of a permanent audience that 
scrutinises them, points out controversial issues and puts pressure on 
them to react to criticism on time and be more accountable. This constant 
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pressure to keep viewers watching videos might constitute a specific 
feature of vigilante groups using digital media, compared to those using 
classic forms of vigilantism. 
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The ‘Alps Mission’ and Far-Right Activism
How do far-right activists, digital media platforms and audiences 
interplay in the production and diffusion of discriminatory and harmful 
speech? Hate speech, identity claims, anti-immigration rhetoric and calls 
to prevent refugees from entering certain territories are all expressions 
of a far-right populist discourse that has become increasingly visible 
in the public domain in Canada, Europe and the United States (Eisler 
2016; Marwick & Lewis, 2017; Perry & Scrivens, 2015). For example, 
the 21st April 2018, Generation Identity (Génération identitaire or GI, the 
youth wing of Les Identitaires), a French far-right movement, launched 
what they called the “Alps Mission” in the Hautes-Alpes, France.1 A 
few hundred people, arguing that they needed to protect the white 
Christian identity of the European people,2 put up a blockade to prevent 
1  The mission lasted until 29 June 2018, though only about ten people from GI 
patrolled the area from 22 April on.
2  Their slogan is “Us before others” (Les nôtres avant les autres). 
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migrants — mostly from the African continent — from entering French 
territory from Italy. Holding up gigantic “NO WAY” banners and orange 
security nets symbolising the physical barriers they created to prevent 
migrants from entering French territory, militants presented themselves 
as the defenders of Europe. Interestingly, the militants involved were 
not just from France but from different European countries as well as the 
United States and Canada, an ironic blurring of the “us” in their slogan. 
It was not the first time GI had been active: in June 2017, the group 
had chartered a vessel to prevent NGOs from rescuing migrants in the 
Mediterranean Sea between Italy and Libya, the beginning of a “summer 
of disturbances” (Warren, 2017) targeting NGO rescue missions. 
According to its website,3 GI uses tactics such as demagogic 
discourse and exploitation of resentments to mobilise the population 
against traditional and mainstream political parties and elites, who 
are portrayed as corrupt and uninterested in the population and its 
immediate troubles, as well as responsible for numerous social and 
political problems (e.g. illegal immigration, unemployment, the 
negative impact of globalisation on local areas). It contrasts a hard-
working population involved in everyday economic and social struggles 
with elites presented as profiteers (Laclau, 2005) and can therefore be 
considered a far-right populist group.
In this chapter, far-right populist activism is understood as a 
program of actions that promotes an ethnocentric understanding 
of people and national identity, as well as a rejection of immigration 
and traditional political adversaries. One of the defining features of 
populism is the claim by the activists involved that they are taking 
charge of or responsibility for a cause on behalf of a silent majority or 
a wider population. Populist societal vigilantism activities are often 
aimed at attracting a large audience, which provides both support and 
legitimacy. The audience — defined as that part of the public interested 
in a cause or a group  —  must therefore be taken into account when 
considering how vigilante groups use media. Their activism entails 
mobilising a wide range of actions in both the physical and the digital 
sphere. The digital media platforms involved are Web 2.0 Internet-based 
applications, which make it possible for people to create and exchange 
3  https://generationidentitaire.org/presentation/
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user-generated content, often selected to support their personal or 
political opinions (Van Dijck, 2013). The presence and anti-immigration 
actions of such groups have been documented in Bulgaria (France 24, 
2016), Canada (Rémillard, 2015; Tanner & Campana 2019), France 
(Gardenier & Monie, 2018), Germany (El Jabri, 2018), Italy (Segond, 
2018) and South Africa (Fourchard, 2016) and the phenomenon seems 
to be spreading, at least in the Western world. Given GI’s objectives 
of promoting collective security, maintaining an exclusivist version of 
identity and protecting its territory faced with what is seen as the failure 
of traditional authorities, as well as its insistence on self-governance 
(Mudde, 2017), it can be considered to be a vigilante group. 
Les Johnston defines vigilantism as involving six elements (Johnston, 
1996): 1. Planning, premeditation and organization — vigilantes engage in 
some form of preparatory activity, such as surveillance of an individual 
or group and/or observation of a particular location; 2. Private voluntary 
agency  —  vigilantism is undertaken by private agents (as opposed 
to public actors) who are not approved or endorsed by the state; 3. 
Autonomous citizenship  —  vigilantism is engaged in voluntarily by 
private citizens who are not supported by the state and is often used 
in reference to popular movements engaged in what they see as self-
protection; 4. Use, or threat of use, of force — violence, or the threat to use 
violence, is a common trait of vigilantism and a necessary dimension 
of vigilante actions, whether the violence is symbolic, such as calling 
for the expulsion of illegal migrants, or physical; 5. Reaction to crime 
and social deviance — vigilantism aimed at crime control is distinct from 
vigilantism intended to promote societal control or “the maintenance 
of communal, ethnic or sectarian order and values” (Johnston, 1996, p. 
228). Both types are related to a defence of some type of rules or norms, 
whether institutionalised or not, but the second type is concerned less 
with deviance and more with values, culture or political ideas. Finally, 
6. personal and collective security — vigilante action is usually a reaction 
by individuals who feel that their security is in jeopardy. Johnston’s 
definition supports our contention that GI can be considered a societal 
vigilante group. Its actions are planned and organised  —  the barrier 
and the banner were put up by autonomous, private citizens acting 
voluntarily, without help or contributions from the state or authorities. 
Although there is no documented use of force, activists called for 
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the expulsion of illegal migrants, an act of symbolic violence. Finally, 
taking control of the frontier between France and Italy was presented 
as necessary to ensure the collective security of the population and 
maintain its communal (French) and ethnic (white) order and values 
(Christian). 
Moving beyond efforts to define such groups, and following the 
approach proposed by Favarel-Garrigues and Gayer (2016), as well as 
Pratten and Sen (2007), in this chapter we focus on the practices and 
actions of societal vigilantes. More specifically, we analyse not only how 
far-right populist activists use YouTube to promote and diffuse vigilante 
discourse, but also how the audience affects this process. What influence 
does the combination of digital media platforms, vigilante groups and 
audience have on the diffusion and visibility of far-right populism? Our 
analysis focuses on the materiality of the digital platforms through which 
digital mediation takes place (Kinsley, 2014). Materiality refers to the 
principle that a system or object, including digital platforms, should be 
understood not only in terms of its structure (what it is) but also in terms 
of its effects (what it does) (Drucker, 2013). Far-right populist discourse 
and content are the result of interaction between digital platforms (e.g. 
YouTube) and users (e.g. far-right populist activists). Looking at this 
process from a Latourian and Actor-Network Theory (ANT) perspective 
(Akrich, 1992; Latour, 1994; 2005; Law & Hassard, 1999), GI’s far-right 
populist activism as expressed in the Alps Movement can be understood 
as technical mediation between humans (activists), objects (digital media 
platforms) and the audience. 
This study focuses on a specific YouTube channel, run by Lauren 
Southern, a Canadian far-right populist activist who took part in 
the April 2018 Alps Mission. After looking at the literature on the 
relation between activism and digital media, we present an alternative 
framework  —  technical mediation and ANT  —  and show how this 
perspective provides new insights. We then explain our methodological 
approach and present a case study of technical mediation between 
Lauren Southern, YouTube and the audience. Finally, we discuss our 
main contributions and suggest a tentative path for the prevention and 
regulation of far-right content and online societal vigilantism. 
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Far-Right Populist Activism and Digital Platforms
Research on the relation between media and social movements has 
produced much relevant literature (Foellmer et al., 2018; Gerbaudo, 2012, 
2018). Some researchers have focused on how digital media contribute 
to the visibility of social movements by making it possible to promote 
a particular cause (Wolfson, 2014). Others, adopting the “connectivity 
paradigm” or the ability of Web 2.0 — given its platforms are fuelled by 
user-generated content —  to foster online sociability and interactions, 
have looked at how these new capacities and their interpretation by 
users allow the mobilisation of social movements (Bennett et al., 2014; 
Kavada, 2015; Van Dijck, 2013). Platforms —  in conjunction with how 
people use them — not only contribute to shaping a sense of community 
among their users (Burgess & Green, 2008; Gillespie, 2010) but also 
supply “validation, momentum and legitimacy in shaping social groups’ 
preferences, thus fostering their mobilisation” (Ellinas, 2018, p. 1). In 
this sense, such platforms are “important organizational agents” in the 
structuring and programming of social movements (Bennett et al., 2014, 
p. 233). Digital platforms provide access to an agenda that encourages 
far-right populist activists to adopt a particular frame with regard to 
crucial issues “such as immigration and crime, helping legitimise a 
political space in which the radical right can thrive” (Ellinas, 2018, p. 
1; Mazzeloni et al., 2003) and making it possible for the phenomenon 
known as the “alt-right” to generate new perspectives. 
According to Marwick and Lewis (2017, p. 3), the “alt-right” can 
more accurately be described as “an amalgam of conspiracy theorists, 
techno-libertarians, white nationalists, Men’s Rights advocates, trolls, 
anti-feminists, anti-immigration activists and bored young people”. 
Although some individuals within the alt-right, such as Richard 
Spencer or Milo Yiannopoulos, have become more widely known, their 
popularity has had a limited shelf-life. Most scholars recognise that the 
movement has “no real organizational structure” (Wendling, 2018, p. 
5) and can “scarcely be called an organized movement” (Hawley, 2017, 
p. 11). However, its presence and visibility in the public sphere and in 
debates is large and growing. Its use of digital platforms such as Twitter, 
Gab, Discord and 4chan, just to name a few, has become a central 
topic for research. While the aim of alt-right activism is to promote 
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identitarian and white nationalist or white supremacist discourse, its 
actual output consists largely of trolling, shaping and propagating “fake 
news”, or making use of irony and (dark) humour directed at certain 
categories or topics in society, such as immigrants and feminism.4 These 
strategies are supported by the diffusion of memes or “digital items 
with common characteristics that are imitated and reiterated around 
the web” (Nissenbaum & Shifam, 2017, p. 483) and used to “capture 
lurkers’ attention and to win their hearts and minds” (Hawley, 2017, p. 
73). The idea of a “Molotov JPEG”, coined by Hawley (ibid.), captures 
this dynamic perfectly: memes can be used to ‘set fire’ to public opinion. 
Alt-right activists look for provocations in the public domain that 
they can use to attract attention to their message of white nationalism. 
Contrary to traditional online activity by far-right groups, most of 
which is confined to confidential Internet sites such as stormfront.org, 
alt-right digital practices have spread beyond cryptic and confidential 
platforms to penetrate public discourse. Alt-right discourse that appears 
on specialised channels such as 4chan or Gab or mainstream social 
media platforms like Twitter is now picked up by traditional media 
(Marwick & Lewis, 2017; Wendling, 2018; Philips, 2018) and widely 
diffused in public spaces. Looking at digital media platforms and their 
appropriation by alt-right activists reveals that their influence extends 
far beyond local street demonstrations. However, the degree of impact 
that online content has on the hearts and minds of the population 
remains an empirical question. Do social media and digital platforms 
have any influence beyond the online sphere, and, if so, how much and 
how is it achieved? Here, the concept of performativity — the possibility 
that an artefact or a technology produces an effect in the everyday life of 
those who use it or somehow relate to it — seems relevant. 
According to Paolo Gerbaudo, whose work focuses on the role of 
social media in social movements and collective action, digital platforms 
produce effects in the real world by generating different configurations 
of how people perceive and understand their environment and their 
relation to it, thus bringing novelty or change into being and shaping 
4  There is some conflict here between activism that is sincere, or goal-oriented, versus 
less sincere trolling (for example, being an ‘edgelord’). Although this issue is 
important, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse when alt-right activists 
are goal-oriented and ideologically driven or simply trolling. 
 135Far-Right Digital Vigilantism as Technical Mediation
social movements such as the Arab Spring or the Occupy movement. 
Social media facilitate and enable the organisation of collective actions 
(Gerbaudo, 2012). To capture these performative effects, Gerbaudo 
coined the concept “choreography of assembly”, the process by which 
activists’ use of digital platforms enables “a process of symbolic 
construction of public space which facilitates and guides the physical 
assembling of a highly dispersed and individualised constituency” (ibid., 
p. 5, emphasis added). This symbolic construction acts as a crucial vector 
in shaping a sense of purpose and togetherness among activists and their 
audience. In line with Bennett et al.’s work (2014), this performativity 
affects the hearts and minds of those who are part of the assembly 
or influenced by it. According to Gerbaudo, “what […] has possibly 
brought [digital media platforms] so much attention is their internal or 
local use: their use as means of organization of collective action and […] 
as a means of mobilization in the crucial task of gathering people on 
the streets” (Gerbaudo, 2012, p. 3, emphasis added). Finally, he points 
to the central role of what he refers to as “soft leaders”, or “influential 
Facebook admins and activist tweeps [and YouTubers] who become 
choreographers, involved in setting the scene and constructing an 
emotional space within which collective action can unfold” (Gerbaudo, 
2012, p. 5). Lauren Southern is illustrative of such “soft leaders”. The 
notion of “influencers” also describes such activists, or “people who 
shape public opinion and advertise goods and services through the 
‘conscientious callibration’ of their online personae” (Lewis, 2018, p. 4). 
Lauren Southern is not so much selling goods and services, but as a 
content creator, she rather “adopts the techniques of influencers to build 
[an] audience […] and sell [it] on far-right ideology” (ibid.) and thus be 
considered as a “political influencer” (ibid.).
Understanding the Relation Between Digital Media 
Platforms and Activists: Technical Mediation
Considering the performative effect of digital media offers an 
alternative perspective that falls between a utopian stance, in which 
such technology provides networks of hope (Castells, 2012), and a 
dystopian one, according to which social media allows some people 
to assuage their consciences by taking part in social or political causes 
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online, operating from the comfort of their sofa but without any true 
commitment, a phenomenon known as slacktivism (Kristofferson et al., 
2014; Morozov, 2009a, 2009b ; Gladwell, 2010). Mattoni and Treré (2014) 
warn that scholars should not fetishise digital media or evaluate them 
strictly on the basis of what they make possible — they do not mobilise 
and influence public debate by themselves. Actors, however, use and 
appropriate them precisely for such purposes. What sort of interactions 
occur between technology and activists, between soft leaders and among 
audiences? 
We argue that technology and digital media platforms should be 
considered in their materiality, that is as having 
some property […] that provides users with the capability to perform 
some action. Calling these properties out with the adjective ‘material’ 
seems a ploy to remind the reader that the software-[or digital media 
platform]-in-use does things that cannot be reduced to human intention 
or action (Leonardi, 2010, p. 3).
In contrast to the way in which digital media platforms are understood 
from an instrumentalist perspective, we suggest that they are not 
neutral tools but have a significant effect on the ends to which they are 
put (Bourne, 2012; Feenberg, 1999). This materiality should be taken 
into account in their use by, or interaction with, activists. To better grasp 
these dynamics, we adopt a conceptual framework based on the Actor 
Network Theory  —  ANT (Akrich, 1992; Latour, 1994; 2005; Law & 
Hassard, 1999). ANT’s central notion, technical mediation, entails looking 
at societal vigilantism as a program of action, a series of objectives, 
decisions and intentions by agents in episodes in which digital media 
platforms, far-right populist activists and the audience interplay. 
Bruno Latour grounds the concept of technical mediation on four 
elements. The first is translation, “which does not mean a shift from 
one vocabulary to another […] but the displacement, drift, invention, 
meditation, the creation of a link that did not exist before and that to 
some degree modifies two elements or agents” (Latour, 1994, p. 32). 
The agents involved can be human or nonhuman. However, since it is 
uncommon to refer to nonhumans as agents, ANT uses the term actants 
for both humans and nonhumans — “a borrowing from semiotics that 
describes any entity that acts in a plot until the attribution of a figurative 
or non-figurative role” [e.g. front or back stage], in his example the 
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roles are “‘citizen’ or ‘gun’”(ibid., p. 33). Following Latour, neither far-
right populist activists nor digital media platforms can be considered 
responsible for the meme of the Molotov JPEG. Instead, such symbolic 
constructs are shaped by interaction, or mediation, between the two 
types of actants (at least). Human and nonhuman actants exchange 
properties, characteristics and competences, giving one another new 
possibilities, new goals, new functions (ibid., p. 35) that need to be 
accounted for to understand how the technical mediation is unfolding. 
In this endeavour, one has to account for obstacles that may arise during 
the unfolding and analyse how actants negotiate them. (For example, 
many far-right activists turned to an alternative digital media platform, 
Gab, after Twitter and Facebook strengthened their regulations against 
hate speech.) Introducing the idea of technical mediation makes it 
possible to provide a microanalysis of how far-right activists, digital 
media platforms and audiences interplay in the production and 
diffusion of discriminatory and harmful speech. What is the sequence 
of the mediation and translation processes staging these actants? 
The second meaning of technical mediation is composition, in which 
action is understood not as the exclusive property of humans but rather 
as belonging to an association of entities, or actants. In composition, 
“actants are in the process of exchanging competences, offering one 
another new possibilities, new goals, new functions” (ibid, p. 35). 
The final product of this composition is a blackbox “that makes the 
joint production of actors and artifacts entirely opaque” (ibid., p. 36). 
This is where the analytical challenge takes place: can we open the 
blackbox? Can we provide a more fine-grained analysis that makes 
it possible to better grasp the mediation that occurs between human 
and nonhuman actants? This process is the third meaning of technical 
mediation  —  “reversible blackboxing”  —  and is composed of seven 
mechanisms: disinterest, interest, composition of a new goal, obligatory 
passage point, alignment, blackboxing and convergence. 
Disinterest refers to the first step, where actants are considered in 
parallel. At this point in the mediation process, the two actants evolve 
separately, showing no interest in each other. Enlistment brings a new 
step  —  interest  —  to the technical mediation process and the actants 
connect. Such connection, or assemblage, is related to an exchange of 
properties between the entities and provokes a new goal. The process 
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remains highly iterative and dependent on the nature of the interactions 
between the actants in a network. This step is followed by an obligatory 
passage point that introduces a qualitative novelty whereby the 
assemblage identifies “what counts” as decisive or as knowledgeable 
(Latour, 2005). This translation comes with obstacles and constraints 
that the actants have to overcome in order to align with each other. 
The new assemblage that emerges from the successful overcoming of 
obstacles presents new modes of functioning and capacities. According 
to this perspective, blackboxing is a process of composition, in which 
technology and society are co-emergent, which assembles power 
relations in particular configurations and renders them fixed, invisible 
and logical. Convergence refers to the final product and is important 
in understanding technical mediation. For the topic under discussion 
here, technical mediation in shaping a societal vigilantism program 
and promoting anti-immigration discourse involves an assemblage 
composed of at least Lauren Southern, YouTube and the audience. The 
result is the production of memes as blackboxes  —  or, in the larger 
program of promoting anti-immigration and white nationalist societal 
vigilante discourses, as Molotov JPEGs. 
Finally, the fourth meaning of technical mediation is delegation, when 
meaning is “materialized” into or “engraved” on (Latour, 1994, p. 38) 
matter, which then has the power to influence the actions of individuals.
Methodology
To analyse the societal vigilantism program and the promotion of 
anti-immigration discourse exemplified by the Alps Mission, we 
undertook a case study of one activist — Lauren Southern — and her 
commitment to promoting Génération Identitaire’s Defend Europe 
mission, largely through YouTube. Southern is representative of far-
right soft leaders — or political influencers — in her exploitation of the 
interactive and participatory character of digital media platforms to set 
the scene and bring “a degree of coherence to people’s spontaneous and 
creative participation in the [online] protest movements” (Gerbaudo, 
2012, p. 13). Her leadership consists of proposing “collective images” 
and “forms of actions […] or ‘scripts’” that participants are invited to 
perform (ibid., p. 44). YouTube,
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even more than television, is a particularly unstable object of study, marked 
by dynamic change (both in terms of videos and organization), a diversity 
of content (which moves with a different rhythm to television but likewise 
flows through, and often disappears from, the service), and a similar 
quotidian frequency, or ‘everydayness’ (Burgess & Green, 2018, p. 6). 
For the sake of the analysis, and in order to understand the technical 
mediation, or the interplay between Southern, YouTube and audiences, 
we adopted a sociotechnical approach to the microanalysis of a video 
available on Southern’s YouTube channel and produced while actively 
taking part in the Alps Mission. We selected the video from among 
the 136 videos she had uploaded on her channel5 based on its “raw” 
character, meaning that it was unedited, in process (rather than edited 
afterwards) and live streamed. It therefore provided valuable material 
for the study of the chronology of the technical mediation process, 
and significant empirical material for the analysis of the blackboxing 
involved in Southern’s societal vigilantism. 
We extracted the selected video and converted it into an MP4 file, as 
this format is more convenient for analysis. We then made a complete 
transcription of its content, capturing not only the audio but the 
setting (including the presence of people around the activist, actions 
unfolding around her, interactions with individuals that the viewer 
does not see in the video, etc.), context, live comments and also how 
the message is staged.
The technical mediation to be analysed includes the sender 
(Southern), the technology (digital media platform YouTube) and 
the audience (identified only by the pseudonyms they used when 
posting). These nodes are crucial parts of the choreography of the 
presentation of the Alps Mission as framed in the video produced on 
Southern’s YouTube channel. The video, as a meme, a Molotov JPEG, 
is intended to set fire to public opinion, at least as it is exemplified by 
Southern’s audience, and thus provides a frame, or a symbolic space, 
that “keys” (Goffman, 1974) the public’s interpretation of the event. 
Our objective is to analyse the genealogy of that meme to show how 
it is the outcome of crossing-overs of properties between the actants 
involved in the technical mediation. 
5  https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCla6APLHX6W3FeNLc8PYuvg
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Analysis: Societal Vigilantism as Technical Mediation
In this section, we focus on reversible blackboxing, Latour’s third 
meaning  —  or way of understanding  —  technical mediation, as it 
seems the most promising to help us better understand how a network 
of actants contribute to making digital societal vigilantism visible. We 
analyse each of the seven mechanisms discussed in the earlier exposition 
of Latour’s theory. 
Disinterest: To analyse the actants involved in the mediation process, 
let’s start by providing a precise description of each one. First, Lauren 
Southern. Born in 1995 in Canada, she is a central figure in Canadian far-
right populist activism as well as an Internet personality and influencer. 
At the age of 20, she ran as candidate for the federal Libertarian Party 
in a district in British Columbia, getting 0.9% of the vote. Until 2017 
she worked as a journalist for Rebel Media  —  a copycat version of 
Breitbart6  — founded in 2015 by Ezra Levant, another important figure in 
Canadian far-right populism. She was active as a YouTube vlogger until 
autumn 2018 and is still followed by 685K people.7 She has produced and 
posted 115 videos at the time of writing, whose duration varies between 
two minutes and 90 minutes. Her viewing metrics vary between 38K 
and 2.9M views. The videos consist mainly of interviews with figures 
involved to varied extents in far-right populist activism, or reports on 
events where far-right populism is denounced, or multiculturalism, 
LGBTQ+, or civic rights are promoted. In the latter cases, Southern, 
adopting a provocative or trolling style, interviews activists or militants 
involved with such causes. In a video posted in 2015, she holds a sign 
saying “There is no rape culture in the West” at a SlutWalk demonstration 
6  Breitbart is a populist ultra-conservative news network created in the United States 
in 2007. Its stated editorial position is based on opposition to the establishment, or 
the elites, whether Republicans or Democrats. 
7  In one of her last videos, posted on 14 August 2018, Southern announced that she 
was taking a new direction and has stopped posting on her YouTube channel (at the 
time of writing). She announced that she was not going to post on YouTube for a 
while, since the format she was using “did not get the proper depth of analysis [the 
issues we are dealing with] deserve […] I want to step away from this media rat-
race of ego and narcissism and I just want to tell the truth, that is all that I wanted to 
do since the beginning of all these crazy shenaningans. So, I am absolutely thrilled 
to announce that I won’t just be disappearing of the Internet after taking a step away 
from YouTube. I going to be changing my pace and dedicating all of my time and 
energy to making full-scale and in-depth documentaries […]”. 
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in Vancouver. In another, shot during a demonstration by LGBTQ+ 
activists in March 2016, she argues that there are “only two human 
genders”. In response LGBTQ+ demonstrators empty a container of 
urine on her. On two occasions, Southern was banned from entry into the 
UK and New Zealand based on the alleged risk she presents by stirring 
up ethnic and religious tensions. Her views include antifeminism, 
xenophobia, Islamophobia and anti-multiculturalism (Shaw, 2018). 
In May 2017, Southern was involved in GI’s attempt to stop the NGO 
ship Aquarius from leaving Sicily to search for and rescue migrants off 
the coast of Northern Africa. She and her colleagues were arrested and 
detained by the Italian Coast Guard but justified their actions by stating: 
“If the politicians won’t stop the boasts, we’ll stop the boats” (Claxton, 
2017), referring thus to a vigilante repertoire of actions. In April 2018, 
Southern took part in the Alps Mission. In giving visibility to far-right 
populist discourse and content, Southern undertakes what Neveu 
(2011) refers to as political work in which the human actant designates, 
nominates, provides a language and orders the world.
The second entity, the non-human actant, is YouTube. Launched in 
2005 by Steven Chen, Chad Hurley and Jawed Karim and bought a year 
later by Google, YouTube is a “software for distributing, accessing and 
combining (or ‘publishing’, ‘sharing’ and ‘remixing’) media content on 
the web” (Manovich, 2013, p. 24). Its goal is “to remove the technical 
barriers to the widespread sharing of video online” (Burgess & Green, 
2009, p. 1). One of its primary missions, as stated on its site, is to provide, 
or supply, a channel through which “everyone can make their voice 
heard and discover the world” and its stated goal is to promote four 
fundamental freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom of information, 
freedom of opportunity and freedom of belonging. YouTube hopes 
to provide everyone with an equal opportunity to speak and become 
informed (Gillespie, 2010). According to recent numbers, “over 1.9 
billion logged-in users visit YouTube each month, and every day people 
watch over a billion hours of video and generate billions of views”.8 The 
platform also hopes to make the world more connected and is available 
in a total of 80 different languages (covering 95% of the Internet 
population).9 YouTube’s mission statement fits with rhetoric emphasising 
8  See YouTube for press: https://www.youtube.com/intl/en-GB/yt/about/press/
9  Ibid.
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the Internet’s potential for democratisation and enthusiasm for the 
medium’s most popular characteristics, namely its “User Generated 
Content” (UGC) (Gillespie, 2010) and the “participatory culture” that 
is generally held to be part of the Internet (Jenkins, 2006). According 
to Burgess and Green (2018; 2009) YouTube may be thought of as a 
“patron”, enabling — but also constraining — collective creativity by 
fostering the participation of a large number of actors in the creation and 
broadcasting of contents, while maintaining control of the conditions 
under which “creative content is produced, ordered, and re-presented 
for the interpretation of audiences” (Burgess & Green, 2009, p. 60). The 
content produced on the platform is thus the result of the interplay 
between the platform’s architecture — its affordances — and user tactics 
(Cardon, 2008). 
YouTube is distinct from other digital media platforms (e.g. 
Facebook, Instagram, Twitter; Murthy & Sharma, 2019) in that, in 
contrast to platforms such as Facebook  —  which is based on public, 
or semi-public, profiles as well as the accumulation of friends and the 
expansion of one’s network (boyd & Ellison, 2007; Van Dijck, 2013) — its 
main purpose is providing a platform for broadcasting videos.10 
However, YouTube users, namely broadcasters and the audience, are 
able to interact and communicate on the platform (Murthy & Sharma, 
2019). YouTube is characterised by a series of affordances that make 
it possible to express a reaction to a video. While an earlier version of 
YouTube emphasised sharing “self-made amateur videos” rather than 
“professionally generated content” (Van Dijck, 2013, p. 110), today it 
stands at a crossroads, making available both amateur videos as well as 
more familiar forms of mass media executed by professionals (2009, p. 
60; Van Dijck, 2013). 
YouTube also provides access to the third actant, the audience. As 
Gross argues, “web-based media have made multidirectional, audience-
generated communication a reality, giving citizens the opportunity to 
join the party as producers rather than consumers […] the top-down 
tyranny of the media has been effectively challenged” (2009, p. 67). 
It therefore becomes necessary to take into account not only UGC 
10  Michael Golebiewski and danah boyd specify that YouTube is both a social media 
platform (it allows the possibility of building links between users), as well as a 
search engine, thus indexing content (Golebiewski & boyd, 2019)
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but also the audience: “practices of participation […] the practices of 
audiencehood — quoting, favouriting, commenting, responding, sharing 
and viewing — all leave traces, and therefore they all have effects on the 
common culture of YouTube as it evolves” (Burgess & Green, 2009, p. 57). 
In contrast to the predominant model in broadcasting, the audience can 
participate directly in increasing YouTube’s popularity and the attention 
it generates. Through its Most Viewed, Most Responded, Most Favorited 
and Most Discussed metrics, YouTube makes it possible to create “a 
simplified and atomised model of audience engagement  —  based on 
the raw frequencies of views, comments, response videos, and additions 
to users’ favourites” (ibid., p. 41). Measures of audience involvement 
then serve as the basis for promotion of what is determined to be the 
most popular content, fostering a “feedback loop between the perceived 
uses of and value logics of YouTube and its ‘actual’ uses and meanings” 
(ibid.).
While YouTube as a platform depends on a business model, terms 
of use and legal conditions (such for example as legal restrictions on 
content), its existence is also strongly linked to a large technical network 
that enables users to watch and broadcast videos. The physical and 
immaterial functions of the platform that make it possible to circulate 
professional and amateur contents depend on a series of interdependent 
components. For instance, it requires a device such as a smartphone, 
computer or tablet to watch or broadcast videos. A broadband Internet 
connection is necessary to make the video available and allow it to 
circulate. These different devices are part of a large network of material 
and immaterial processes that not only makes it possible to send and 
view content, but also modifies the composition or the state of the 
actants — human and nonhuman — involved in the process.
Interest: Southern is interested in becoming more visible, or 
promoting and gaining wider visibility for her views. Actant #1 
(Southern) turns to actant #2 (YouTube) in order to reach actant #3 
(the audience). There is no information available about why Southern 
chose YouTube as the way to achieve her goals, but it seems reasonable 
to think that the platform’s affordances played a role in her decision 
and fulfil her requirements. YouTube provides a valuable way to diffuse 
ideas, since the costs related to both production and diffusion of content 
(UGC) are low while the opportunity to reach a wide audience is great. 
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While vlogs are not systematically hosted by YouTube, the platform is 
widely recognised as a way to encourage social participation and is a 
crucial tool for those looking for visibility (Burgess & Green, 2009, p. 
53).
On the second day of the Alps Mission, using a smartphone equipped 
with a camera, Southern used the YouTube app to stream live for sixteen 
minutes and fifteen seconds, providing an update on the situation. 
From the beginning of the livestream, which was of poor quality due 
to a bad network connection, Southern appeared in ‘selfie mode’ and 
let the audience know that she was broadcasting live. She was seen 
outdoors, in close proximity to the demonstrators, with the Alps in the 
background. She varied the shots by moving her mobile phone, showing 
some of the actants who took part in the demonstration. She also filmed 
actants who were part of the “anti-program”. Anti-program here refers 
to any action or event that disrupted the societal vigilantism of the Alps 
Mission or Southern’s livestreaming. These included representatives of 
the mainstream media11 as well as the police. Her live broadcast also 
contained interviews — in the form of informal conversations — with 
other far-right figures. Among these were US activists Brittany Pettibone 
and Martin Sellner, whom she presented as the “mastermind” of the Alps 
Mission. Pettibone and Sellner are well-known identitarian activists and 
YouTubers active in the anti-immigration movement. Pettibone has 115k 
followers and her channel contains 129 videos. Sellner has 85K followers 
and his channel has 341 videos. 
Just seconds after Southern launched her livestream, the audience 
reacted via the YouTube “live comments” function, which is described as 
a “module which lets you engage with the broadcaster and the broader 
YouTube community” (YouTube, 2010). Livestream comments were 
numerous and appeared very quickly, revealing interest in the activists’ 
actions. While there were a few comments that were sceptical about 
the Mission or critical of it, and even insults aimed at Southern, most 
comments were supportive. It was common to see encouragement of the 
cause and the particular action. Some comments included right-wing 
11  It’s not clear why these anti-program individuals were included. Perhaps to allow 
the vigilantes to present themselves as being supported by locals in contrast to local 
attitudes toward the mainstream media.
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symbols. Negative comments largely addressed the bad quality of 
the broadcast, holding the technical device (the nonhuman actant) 
responsible.
Fig. 6.1  Lauren Southern’s livestream interface while she is interviewing Brittany 
Pettibone. Screenshot, 24 January 2019, YouTube. 
Fig. 6.2  Screenshot of Southern’s livestream showing live comments, starting 30 
seconds after the beginning of the video. Screenshot, 24 January 2019, YouTube.
Composition of a new goal: At this stage, the interaction of the main 
actants produces a new actant, actant #4. In technical mediation, a 
new actant is characterised by a goal that differs from that of previous 
actants (Latour, 2007). Neither human nor nonhuman goals are set 
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in advance. Instead, a program of actions unfolds as the result of a 
new mediation  —  translation  —  between, in this case, human and 
nonhuman actants. In her societal vigilantism program, Southern 
specifies her approach to one event — the Alps Mission — where her 
goal is to prevent the entrance of illegal migrants and call attention to 
the wider problems they create for society. The composition of a new 
goal should, however, be considered in relation to what the interactions 
of human and nonhuman actants are as a result. For instance, the 
use of the livestreaming option offered by YouTube enabled the live 
broadcasting, but also came with constraints — the poor quality of the 
image was an obstacle. The tailoring of a new goal was also affected 
by the context  —  for example, Southern had to consider the actions 
going on around her in shaping and diffusing her message / content. If 
she had decided not to livestream but instead to edit the images before 
uploading them to her YouTube channel, the content would probably 
have been different.
The translation that occurs between human and nonhuman actants 
transforms each of the entities through the exchange of properties, or 
crossovers. Such evolution in its turn produces a new state, or step, in the 
technical mediation. Southern becomes a visible personality promoting 
and amplifying an anti-immigrant discourse, while YouTube’s 
algorithms are affected by the presence of actants (influencers or soft 
leaders) such as Southern, posting similar contents promoting anti-
immigrant discourses. The platform’s algorithms are impacted by the 
presence of the video. These algorithms, which are the basis on which 
videos are recommended, play a central role in the management of the 
platform, as stated by YouTube: “Your activity on YouTube, Google and 
Chrome may influence your YouTube search results, recommendations 
on the Home page, in-app notifications, and suggested videos”.12
Given recent revelations by Google employees, it seems clear that 
“YouTube represents one of the largest scale and most sophisticated 
industrial recommendation systems in existence” (Covington, Adams & 
Sargin, 2016, p. 1). Diffusion of YouTube’s content relies on intermediary 
recommendation algorithms that filter as well as classify content in 
order to better align it to users, based on their Internet consumer habits 
(Van Dijck, 2013). In consequence, YouTube recommends the content 
12  https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6342839
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that users access according to a code, which governs their experience of 
the Internet while promoting content selected according to an algorithm. 
Covington et al. (2016) reveal how YouTube uses “deep learning” to 
feed its recommendation algorithms. The system is grounded on two 
neuronal networks: the first deals with “candidate generation” and the 
second with “ranking”. The neuronal networks are fed by diversified 
criteria, such as i) the user’s record of use of the Internet; ii) “collaborative 
filtering”, based on the similarity between users (“expressed in terms of 
coarse features such as IDs of the video watched, search query tokens 
and demographics” and iii) “data impressions” accessed via “a desired 
objective function using a rich set of features describing the video and 
user” (ibid., p. 2). Once these filters have operated, a list of videos, 
sorted by score, are promoted to the user. However, to make a final 
determination of the efficiency of the algorithm, or model, YouTube uses 
live experiments: “In a live experiment, we can measure subtle changes 
in click-through rate, watch time, and many other metrics that measure 
user engagement” (ibid.).
YouTube’s algorithms are capable of making selected contents highly 
visible. However, the recommendation algorithm requires the presence 
and participation of an audience that leaves traces of its activity and 
behaviour online. The audience, by clicking, watching, commenting 
and liking Southern’s video, coupled with the record of its past Internet 
activities, contributes to the choice of the Alps Mission video, as well as 
other videos with similar contents, by the recommendation algorithm. 
The algorithm engages and both assembles and reassembles a specific 
audience by overvaluing and favouring some content over others. In 
Southern’s case, the other channels recommended on her YouTube 
channel (such as Breitbart and Brittany Pettibone’s channels) also promote 
alt-right, far-right or conservative contents. That recommendation 
process is the outcome of an interplay, that is a property of associated 
entities between the user and YouTube’s algorithm. While the user’s 
track records and habits on the Internet modify the code, it allows for 
increasingly fine-tuning the recommendations at the same time.
The interplay between actants transforms each of them, largely 
through the exchange of properties that creates novelty  —  links or 
connections that did not exist before — displacement, or drifts. The new 
actant, #4, can be understood in terms of the following equation: 
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Southern (actant #1) + (YouTube #2 + audience #3) = livestream update 
of the second day of GI’s Defend Europe program, the Alps Mission 
(actant #4).
Obligatory passage point: As the livestreaming continues, new actants 
appear and disappear (and sometimes reappear) in the frame. The 
audience is active throughout the live broadcast and sometimes requires 
Southern’s attention, as she has to read the comments posted by her 
followers and viewers. The mediation, translation and composition 
processes are characterised by friction, resistance and even opposition 
between the actants, each of which is potentially capable of putting an 
end to the livestream. For example, Southern struggles with the bad 
quality of the stream, which makes it difficult for the audience to follow 
the message and increases audience discontent, which is expressed 
numerous times, as in the following screenshot taken directly from 
YouTube.
Fig. 6.3  Audience reacting to the bad streaming of Southern’s video. Screenshot, 
24 January 2019, YouTube.
At points, Southern also struggles with the use of her mobile phone, as 
her hand shakes, possibly revealing anxiety. The idea of an obligatory 
passage point, step 4 in reversible blackboxing, captures the need to 
overcome obstacles and resistances, such as those exemplified by the 
audience’s discontent. Since Southern’s objective is to diffuse her anti-
immigration message as widely as possible, she has to keep the audience 
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involved. The audience becomes part of the translation process and is 
an important actant that Southern has to consider and adapt to in the 
ongoing streaming process, providing a clear example of an exchange of 
properties between two actants. The audience, through the comments 
it posts, makes sense of and is responsive to the message, while 
Southern adjusts her message in response to her audience. YouTube’s 
affordances  —  and the audience’s use of such affordances  —  clearly 
impacted Southern’s program and how she reported on the situation. At 
some points, she moved her phone, positioning it differently in physical 
space while asking if the image was better. At other times she read 
comments and even responded to some of them, addressing the audience 
directly. While many comments expressed support for Southern’s cause, 
this was not the case with all those who posted. Some even criticised the 
lack of interaction with the audience. One user commented: “literally no 
reason to be live if you’re not actually going to talk and just pretend this 
is a pre-recorded YouTube video”.
The outdoor setting in which the livestream occurred presented 
challenges to all actants, human and non-human. For instance, while 
broadcasting Southern also had to remain aware of her environment 
as the situation unfolded and things changed around her, such as 
the unexpected arrival of the police, whose intentions were unclear. 
All actants must successfully negotiate a series of such constraints 
or obstacles — obligatory passage points —  that pave the path to the 
accomplishment of a particular program. 
Alignment: If obstacles are overcome, a new assemblage or collective 
(actant #5), is formed with new modes of functioning and new 
capacities. Once all actants have successfully negotiated the constraints 
in the obligatory passage point, alignment takes place (Latour, 1994). 
The collective formed by Southern-enabled-by-her-smartphone-while-
livestreaming-on-YouTube-and-overcoming-obstacles is now capable of 
providing visibility to the goal, which is better control of the borders 
between France and Italy through the deployment of a barrier. Southern 
also counts on Pettibone and Sellner to offer more details about the 
Alps Mission, particularly the support they received from the local 
population, concrete actions taken to reach the mission’s objectives, 
their experiences of violence from antifascists and the inaction of 
local authorities, including the failure of the police to protect the 
territory. Alignment involves Southern, Pettibone and Sellner, enabled 
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by nonhuman actants such as YouTube and Southern’s smartphone, 
providing an alternative media frame on the Mission to the one 
offered by mainstream media (which is perceived as being too lenient 
toward illegal immigrants) and, according to Pettibone, “will paint 
[the Alps Mission as] something else”. While the message promoted 
by Southern, Pettibone and Sellner seems to be widely shared by the 
audience, who are presented from the start as “identitarian activists” 
and YouTubers, technical problems blur the message for some time. 
Southern needs to make several attempts (such as moving her phone 
in an attempt to get a better connection or requesting sympathy from 
the audience by attributing the bad connection to other actants, such 
as the altitude) to improve the quality of the livestream and to contain 
audience frustration to limit the risk of losing audience members. At 
points, Southern apologises to the audience for the bad quality of the 
livestream, another way to overcome this problem. Despite the obstacles 
and the low resolution of the livestream that forms part of the collective 
(actant #5), the message is delivered, revealing alignment. In the end, 
resistances and obstacles are managed and parameters reach a settled 
state and stability. This brings the process to a new step: blackboxing 
(actant #6).
Blackboxing: In the blackboxing step, all actants in the mediation 
process are integrated. The pieces identified with the previous actants 
are stitched together and the result is not a collection of struggles or a 
shaping process but a finished product — a blackbox. In the present case, 
the product is what the audience sees on Southern’s YouTube channel 
once the livestream becomes a video (a finished product). This video, or 
meme, is material that contributes to shaping an emotional and symbolic 
space, an actant that plays a part in shaping the debate, or discourse, 
about the status of the frontier and illegal immigration. In other words, 
it becomes a “Molotov JPEG” ready to set fire (and intended to do so) 
to public opinion (Hawley, 2017). The extent to which such a meme 
produces convergence in the public or influences its decisions is beyond 
the scope of this chapter. However, once the livestream becomes a video, 
a blackbox, it is put to the test by the audience, which comments on it 
and rates it. Within a nine-month period, Southern’s video had been 
watched 134K times and received 7.6K likes and 384 dislikes as well 
as 1,570 comments. Comments include mere registrations of presence, 
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critiques, insults and trolling as well as approval of Southern and GI’s 
position. The video also develops a ‘life’ of its own beyond YouTube 
through its circulation across other platforms (Facebook, Twitter, 
Google+, etc.) thanks to the share option. 
Convergence: To make a difference, heterogeneous actants (most 
of them the product of assemblages) must come together. In doing 
so they exchange properties, functions and goals, forming a complex 
network — a blackbox — that cannot be easily parsed or deconstructed 
into its constituents (the sum of the actants that compose it). The 
blackbox described in step six is now available to join the larger realm 
of the societal vigilante program directed against immigration that 
includes defence of borders as well as race and identity debates (actant 
#7). It becomes part of Southern’s collection of videos on her YouTube 
channel, but it also has its own life, as shown by its role in our study 
and this chapter. In this sense, Southern has succeeded in meeting her 
primary goal of providing visibility to the Alps Mission. 
Technical mediation allows for change in the substance of message 
and discourse. Southern’s program  —  “to-act-in-order-to-make-the-
Alps-Mission-visible” — was articulated around a specific platform, 
whose use led to production of a message that differs from the one that 
would have been produced if Southern had used another platform. 
Southern’s objective, as realised through YouTube, undergoes a process 
of translation: from the securitisation of the border between Italy and 
France by activists, it becomes the live reporting of the situation by a 
soft leader or influencer (Cotter, 2018; Gerbaudo, 2012). Southern’s 
program is thus delegated to a smartphone (equipped with camera, 
microphone and connection to the Internet) and a platform (YouTube). 
She delegates the action of “seeing” to the cellphone and YouTube, 
producing an additional displacement (Latour, 2007, p. 197). According 
to Latour, this displacement is spatial and temporal and allows 
the spectator to watch  —  and, to some extent, participate through 
the commenting function  —  without leaving his or her seat. The 
displacement is spatial in the sense that the Defend Europe and Alps 
Mission now include a new actant — Southern’s video — broadcast 
and archived on YouTube. The displacement is temporal in that the 
Alps Mission can now appear at any time on YouTube as well as on 
other platforms where it can be shared. A series of objects-institutions 
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perpetuate the visibility of the mission — securing the French-Italian 
border against immigrants — although the action itself is over and its 
protagonist now involved in other activities or actions. In this sense, 
the whole process of technical mediation makes it possible to shape 
a new meme that serves as a brick in the construction of the societal 
vigilante program promoted by GI. The analysis framed by Southern 
and other GI activists (e.g. Pettibone, Sellner), as well as support from 
the audience and the local population have all been “boxed” in the 
Defend Europe Alps Mission video. 
Discussion and Conclusion
Following Gerbaudo’s suggestion that is important to understand how 
digital platforms “contribute to the symbolic construction of public 
space, which facilitates and guides the physical assembling of a highly 
dispersed and individualised constituency” (Gerbaudo, 2012, p. 5), we 
analysed the role of a soft leader in shaping online social vigilantism. 
More specifically, we focused on how the far-right populist activist 
Lauren Southern, YouTube and the audience produce a meme (a 
video) that contributes to shaping an emotional and symbolic space 
characterised by anti-immigrant and identitarian discourses and 
symbols. Using Actor Network Theory (ANT), we showed that the 
shaping and visibility of such symbolic and emotional space is the result 
of a series of mechanisms that characterise technical mediation between 
entities, both human (Southern, the audience) and nonhuman (YouTube, 
algorithms). ANT appears promising as a way to approach the analysis 
of technical mediation once it is recognised that technology has to be 
considered in its materiality —  that a technology-in-use ‘does things’ 
that cannot be reduced to human intention or action only (Leonardi, 
2010). This recognition requires acknowledging that the shaping of 
the emotional and symbolic space in question cannot be analysed and 
understood simply as the results of intention or as an exclusively human 
project. Nonhuman objects also have to be accounted for in the analysis.
Several points should be emphasised with regard to the contributions 
made by the present chapter. To do this, we turn to Latour’s fourth 
meaning of technical mediation, delegation. Latour argues that: 
“techniques modify the matter of our expression, not only its form. 
 153Far-Right Digital Vigilantism as Technical Mediation
Techniques have meaning, but they produce meaning via a special type 
of articulation that crosses the common-sense boundary between signs 
and things” (1994, p. 38). Meaning is “materialized” or “engraved” 
in matter (ibid.) and thus has the power to influence action. Latour’s 
classical example is the speed bump that forces the driver to slow down. 
The speed bump modifies our expression, since the driver’s slowing 
down is now motivated not by a moral rationale (to be careful because 
there may be pedestrians) but rather by an instrumentalist one (I have 
to slow down, otherwise I’ll damage my car). Following Latour 
The engineers’ program, make cars slow down on campus, is now 
inscribed in concrete and, in considering this shift, we quit the relative 
comfort of linguistic metaphor and enter unknown territory. […]  
[W]e remain in meaning but no longer in discourse: yet we do not reside 
among mere objects. Where are we? (ibid., p. 39). 
This question is crucial not only for the study of speed bumps but also for 
understanding the emergence of memes central to shaping the emotional 
and symbolic space and program of societal vigilantism. In Latour’s words, 
the shift is “actorial” (ibid.), which refers to the performative effect of the 
new entity (composed of human and nonhuman actants). The meme is 
not composed only of Lauren Southern, its enunciator, nor is it completely 
Southern’s responsibility: “An object stands in for an actor and creates an 
asymmetry between absent makers and occasional user” (ibid., p. 40). 
The shift is also spatial: the meme’s visibility goes beyond the local space 
of the Alps Mission. Finally, the shift is temporal: the meme is present all 
the time on the web although: “the enunciator of this technical act [Lauren 
Southern in the present case] has disappeared from the scene — while 
someone, something, reliably acts as lieutenant, holding the enunciator’s 
place” (ibid., pp. 39–40). In this sense, delegation expresses an exchange 
of properties between the actants, or entities, involved in the technical 
mediation. The delegation of some roles to nonhumans (digital media 
platforms) means that humans are not in complete control: the nonhuman 
actant does more than express the will of the humans — it affects it. That 
means that while soft leaders play a crucial role in spreading digital 
societal vigilantism, they are only one piece of the puzzle. Other actants 
must be involved in the choreography if the program of actions promoted 
by societal vigilantes is to be sustainable. Translated into a Latourian 
approach, unless disinterest is transformed into enlistment and composition 
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of a new goal, there is no chance that such choreography will transform 
into delegation. 
In the process of delegation and exchange of properties between 
human and nonhuman actants, one should not only consider far-right 
activists, but also YouTube’s algorithm, which contributes to the visibility 
of the societal vigilantism program and discourse in the public domain 
largely through the associations it makes between similar contents (anti-
immigrant, identitarian, etc.) and its role in assembling an audience. This 
audience is composed mainly of individuals whose practices and track 
records on the Internet are characterised by consuming and producing 
videos, discourses and images that share the same anti-immigration and 
identitarian characteristics and is assembled by ‘collaborative filtering’ 
through which, based on the audience’s demonstrated preferences, the 
algorithms recommend additional content. The audience also provides 
fodder for collaborative filtering and contributes to the viability of 
individual videos. The audience thus has an effect on both the discourse 
(e.g. live comments favourable to Southern’s action may make her feel 
supported and lead her to further polarise her discourse) and on YouTube’s 
algorithms. Through its interaction with the video by commenting 
and liking (or disliking), the audience’s actions affect YouTube’s 
recommendation algorithms. If there is no interaction with the video, 
it will sink into limbo, while positive interactions increase its visibility 
on other YouTube channels and, eventually, in the public domain. In this 
sense, developing a relationship between an audience and a particular 
form or content of discourse is delegated to nonhumans — the YouTube 
platform and its algorithms. 
One should not assume that there is a unidirectionality of delegation 
from nonhuman to human, but rather that there is a shared governance 
in the production of memes between human and nonhuman actants. 
More specifically, neither the human nor the nonhuman actants are in 
complete control in the technical mediation and the production of a 
societal vigilantism program and discourse (e.g. in the production of 
memes). They need to be “actioned” and in this case this is done by 
collecting humans’ Internet consumption and track records. Of course, 
YouTube relies largely on its algorithms, but also depends on human 
actants, such as ‘soft leaders’ and YouTube “influencers” (Cotter, 2018), 
an audience. 
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Finally, and provocatively, this chapter shows that the symbolic 
and emotional space “is a space-that-results-from-a-technical-mediation-
between-human-and-nonhuman-actants-that-are-not-isolated-from-each-
other” (Callon, 1991, p. 143). Such space is the result of a complex series 
of inscriptions, or “the result of the translation of one’s interest into 
material form” (ibid.). This process of inscription is cumulative, and 
several layers of inscriptions may exist simultaneously. The symbolic 
and emotional space is thus the result of negotiations and enrolments 
of a network of actants. 
To conclude, the sociotechnical perspective adopted in the present 
chapter offers insight into how anti-immigration discourse and 
harmful societal digital vigilantism proliferate and gain traction 
among audiences. It contrasts with technological determinism 
expressed by the notion of “radicalization by algorithm” (Tufekci, 
2018; Ribeiro et al., 2019) — according to which audiences might be 
at risk after being exposed to far-right content pushed by YouTube’s 
algorithm designed to maximise the company’s profit (Munger & 
Philips, 2019, p. 7). We agree with Munger and Phillips that YouTube 
should be apprehended in its “capacity to create radical alternative 
political canons and interpretative communities to match” (ibid., p. 6). 
YouTube supplies symbolic and emotional content to individuals who 
reject mainstream media for all sorts of reasons, and whose criterion 
of assessment rather rests on emotion, beliefs and desires rather than 
being grounded in a thorough fact-checking process (as traditionally 
executed by mainstream media). In the current debates about post-
truth (McIntyre, 2019), our chapter makes a contribution in showing 
how truth does not only rest on emotions and beliefs — rather than 
facts  —  as documented (ibid.) but also, and more concerningly, on 
infrastructures. These infrastructures enable a series of human actions, 
such as sharing, clicking and commenting, but also non-human 
actants like algorithms and collaborative filtering. The materiality and 
performativity of these actants affects the economy of information in 
turning “fake news” and harmful discourse into political canons that 
are increasingly available, with the risk that they find their match in a 
growing number of ‘interpretative communities’. 
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Empowerment, Social Distrust or 
Co-production of Security: A Case 




As a licensed nurse in the United States, William M. posed online as a 
young woman planning to commit suicide who could explain to others 
how to do so. Using this deception, he formed misleading bonds with 
visitors to suicide chat rooms to persuade them to end their lives in front 
of a webcam (Huey et al., 2012). Pursuing his obsession with suicide, 
William used various screen names, but overlooked the Internet’s 
potential to reveal his real identity. However, some users recognised his 
exploitation of their psychological vulnerability and his betrayal of social 
trust while assisting victims to hang themselves (Anderson, 2010).
Investigations started when a team of women took interest in this 
suicide support. The team featured people who had direct as well as 
second-hand exposure to William’s attempts. (Anderson, 2010). Using 
her digital literacy, one woman discovered that William used multiple 
screen names, and more importantly that social media platforms helped 
him exacerbate suicidal thoughts. Due to their “security demand” 
(Mireanu, 2014, p. iii), the woman collected William’s location and 
IP address, and communicated the affair to the police in her own 
hometown, to the FBI, to the Ottawa Police Service, and then to the 
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Minnesota police (Huey et al., 2012). Despite inadequate legal measures 
against encouraging self-harm online, she continued to participate, as an 
ordinary person, in promoting security and reducing risk factors in her 
surroundings. She engaged in online vigilantism using her digital skills, 
trying to help curb a fatal cybercrime. She revisited police departments 
persistently to prevent William from causing more deaths. During a 
chat, she also urged William to turn on his webcam, and took a picture of 
his face (Porter, 2010; Huey et al., 2012). Her perseverance deterred his 
digital incitement to suicide and helped illustrate the ability of different 
parties to produce — i.e. to illustrate the co-production of — safety. She 
saved the life of a depressed friend of hers by initiating an investigation 
into William’s actions before handing the affair over to the police. 
Meanwhile, in approaching different police departments, she indirectly 
questioned their role. That is, when law enforcement agencies fail to act 
because the law does not empower them to do so, they drive citizens 
to feel a security void that they bridge with collective or individual 
initiatives with or without police consent. While this can be a symptom 
of state failure (Szescilo, 2017), the resultant individual and community 
empowerment strengthens the constructive participation of citizens in 
controlling their environment.
Digital vigilantism does not deal solely with cybercrime, however. 
It also denounces embodied infringements of the law (Wehmhoener, 
2010). When bystanders witness an event they deem offensive, criminal 
or discriminatory, they cascade this feeling through uploadable content. 
This occurred in a rape attempt in Benguerir, near Marrakech in the 
middle of Morocco. In late March 2018, a video went viral online, 
especially on Facebook and YouTube. It featured a boy attempting to 
rape a teenage girl, who was resisting and yelling sharply “don’t you 
have a sister!? Would you want someone to do this to her??” (Khalaf, 
2018). Digital vigilantes doxed  —  or shared personal information 
about — the assaulter immediately, which facilitated his identification. 
The video was originally shot to exhibit the attacker’s masculine power 
and film the rape, but the moral outrage on social media urged the 
police to react. The video and the shared information online, such as 
name, age and neighbourhood helped in the manhunt, while the press 
used the doxing to locate the crime scene, identify the victim and show 
her family’s anguish. Together, these factors led the assailant to receive a 
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ten-year imprisonment term. His friend, who shot the incident, received 
an eight-year sentence. The third boy, who uploaded the video several 
months after the incident, received a two-year jail term for hiding the 
evidence instead of sharing it online or handing it on to the police once 
he obtained it (Babas, 2018). Ubiquitous devices that people buy mainly 
for communication thus hold “potential for civic engagement and 
empowerment through social media” (Chen, 2017, p. 2). The catchphrase 
“don’t you have a sister?” also went viral as a hashtag (Khalaf, 2018) 
to denounce the sexual assault, and it appeared in the titles of songs 
and amateur short movies on YouTube to frame public denunciation of 
sexual harassment, and perhaps to link vigilantism with empowerment. 
As such, technology enables the transfer of frustration online, or the 
digitisation of vigilantism against hostility and animosity in society.
Digital vigilantism refers to the active online participation of some self-
appointed person or group in promoting the rule of law. It is an organic, 
constructive contribution to social order, aided by the transforming role 
of the Internet. Though intentional and programmatic, it is performed 
by actors who do not necessarily “have high levels of [social, economic 
or symbolic] capital” (Mireanu, 2014, p. 9). It incorporates bottom-up 
initiatives, sometimes with the consent or encouragement of the state 
(Chang et al., 2016), to maintain one’s secure environment or to enforce 
the law by exposing wrongdoing online. Vigilantism, consequently, 
redefines engagement for the public good, since citizens engage directly 
with a perceived lack of security, lack of state awareness or inadequate 
state presence.
Digital vigilantism comprises a number of phases. First, social uproar 
is caused by the amorality and objectionable nature of some uploaded 
content. Audiences who feel offended display their attitude via shaming 
or doxing. They create “a mode of informal regulation” or “cyber social 
control” within online communities (Wehmhoener, 2010, p. 11). This 
open trial online often triggers different reactions from the police, the 
press, commentators, friends, family members or colleagues of bullies 
and victims. The crowdsourcing of content and reactions makes each 
group a prosumer1 audience in its own way. They watch the event 
and interact according to their abilities and responsibilities, towards 
1  The term ‘prosumer’ was coined by the American futurist Alvin Toffler in his The 
Third Wave (1980) to denote simultaneous consumption and production 
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the common goal of maintaining social order. In addition, digital 
vigilantism warrants autonomous citizenship. Wehmhoener (2010, p. 
10) even describes it as “a form of autonomous citizenship”, especially 
when the state condones its potential repercussions or “downside 
risks” (Chang et al., 2016, p. 108). With the ubiquity of smart devices 
and social media, ordinary citizens, including illiterate ones, find ways 
to engage socially (Khamis & Vaugh, 2011). The traditionally literate 
and illiterate share online spaces and both can have an impact, due to 
rampant e-interactivity and participation in particular. They collaborate 
and cross-fertilise, though the limits of that collaboration require clearer 
demarcation. Recent scholarship has acknowledged that “literacy 
now encompasses much more than just reading, writing, speaking 
and listening” but also “computer, digital, and media literacy as well” 
(Swan, 2017, p. 10). However, whether basic digital skills transform into 
real-life reading, writing, language accuracy or media interpretation, for 
instance, requires more research.
Frequent vigilantism may indicate distrust in the authorities. Since 
“vigilantism results from unwillingness of the ruling upper class 
to address security needs of poorer populations” (Szescilo, 2017, p. 
149), it occurs less in contexts where the police are trusted, or where 
they automatically guarantee the rule of law. Hoffman (2012) as cited 
in Szescilo (2017, p. 154) contends that “vigilantism does not play 
a significant role in countries where the state provides its security 
institutions with adequate capacities”. When citizens trust the agents 
of the law, vigilantism is less widespread (Scheffers, 2015, p. 12). When 
corruption, “indicia of illegality” and impunity abound, vigilantes react 
with doubt, uncertainty and caution. They may refrain from replacing 
law institutions, lest attention swerves from the criminal action to the 
vigilante reaction. Instead, due to their shrinking trust in the security 
system, vigilantes volunteer individually or collectively for self-defence, 
with or without state encouragement. They contribute their different 
capacities to meet the increasing “demand for supplementary policing 
and security services” (Chang et al., 2016, p. 101).
Vigilantism, though it empowers citizens, may cause repercussions. 
A key downside online is retaliation. Victims, their relatives or 
sympathisers may seek revenge, especially when sentences are too 
lenient for the crimes committed. Citizens may develop a habit of meting 
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out punishment with their own hands, which blurs the meanings of law 
and chaos. Another problem is the infringement upon one’s privacy. 
Anonymous doxing may result in the sharing of information about 
family members or private relationships that do not pertain to the affair 
under scrutiny. Unexpectedly, some remote relatives of perpetrators may 
become victims of cyber-bullying for reasons they may not understand 
well.
Against this backdrop, this chapter delves qualitatively into a case of 
digital vigilantism in Morocco. It explores the social and communicative 
practices of security-seeking citizens. It tackles the empowering impact 
of digitisation and the context of the Arab Spring on the location of 
online vigilantism in the kingdom. The analysis considers a case of 
informal vigilantism; a one-off event that relates to the educational 
system and to classroom violence in particular. The incident exemplifies 
the increasing public awareness of online agency, social justice, the rule 
of law and constructive citizenship, rather than mob justice, in a public 
sphere where civil agency is regaining prominence.
Online Empowerment in the Arab Spring Context
The Internet, as an online public sphere, provides a space for the interplay 
of power dynamics, especially when freedom of speech is suppressed in 
embodied interactions. Citizens use online applications and platforms 
to contest political practices and engage in community wellbeing. They 
exert impact by sharing news and views, uploading content to support 
or denounce given causes, contacting MPs and orchestrating activism. 
Thus, the Internet empowers committed citizens when political practices 
neglect public concerns (Khamis & Vaugh, 2011; Eltantawy & Wiest, 
2011).
The concept of empowerment is seminal to understand social 
movement and change. It refers to both a process and an outcome. 
It is, first, “a process by which people gain control of their lives, 
democratic participation in the lives of their community, and a critical 
understanding of their environment” (Perkins & Zimmerman, 2005, 
p. 570). Empowering processes lead to empowered individuals, 
organisations or communities (Zimmerman, 2000). Psychologically, 
when they are empowered, citizens handle personal problems and 
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opportunities, rather than feeling that circumstances constantly 
weaken them. Beyond individual concerns, empowerment channels the 
decisions and solutions of organisations and communities to improve 
their environment. Citizens collectively crowd-source their perceived 
control (the belief that one can influence the outcomes of a process 
they take part in), their critical awareness (knowing when to engage 
in conflict and when to avoid it) and their effective participation to 
pressure for social and policy change, and to enhance community living 
(Zimmerman, 2000). Access to resources, especially the media, is a 
key empowering factor. With ubiquitous media today, empowerment 
processes grow more decentralised and, probably, more impactful.
When empowerment fails to affect public policies, trust in public 
institutions wanes. For the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, “[t]
rust is an attitude that we have towards people [or institutions] whom 
we hope will be trustworthy, where trustworthiness is a property, not an 
attitude” (McLeod, 2015, n.p.). Thus, trust co-exists with, sometimes 
tiny, doubt. For, if the trusted person or institution will pull through for 
us doubtlessly, then trust is needless (ibid.). However, trust as an 
attitude accumulates from reliable acts that culminate in trustworthiness 
as a property. That is, the state slowly and increasingly becomes 
trustworthy after citizens rely on its services several times, and after it 
does not betray their confidence. Institutional trust is important because 
it demarcates official relations and delimits responsibilities. Civic trust 
in institutions generates social capital, whilst loss of faith in public 
institutions constitutes a crisis in democracy (Cook & Gronke, 2005, p. 
3). Contrariwise, it is difficult to fathom or accept that public institutions 
betray public trust (McLeod, 2015), which usually arouses defiant 
symbolic or material reactions. Therefore, lack of trust, or the open 
expression of distrust, denotes a failure to assume pre-trust or post-trust 
responsibilities. 
Trusting the state becomes hard when it develops a reputation 
for corruption. Pre-Arab-Spring regimes, for example, repressed free 
speech, monopolised public media and disdained representative 
democracy. Consequently, nonconformist voices felt unwelcome.
During the Arab Spring, social media, or “dense informal networks”, 
structured social activism and harnessed mobilisation online (Pérez-
Altable, 2016, p. 19). They have affected social life and the perception of 
social activism (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). For Howard and Parks (2012), 
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social media activism consists of three key elements: infrastructure; 
digital content; and the people who produce and consume that content. 
People are essential for digital vigilantism, possibly more so than 
infrastructure, since content dissemination online results from their 
effort and initiatives to express their individual or collective aspirations, 
concerns or demands. Consequently, for the public, social networks 
enhance activism for already-existing causes. They quickly recognise 
that it is “the flow of attention, not information (which we already have 
too much of), that matters” (Tufekci, 2018) for dissatisfied citizens. 
Despite the state’s mass surveillance, which involved cutting off Internet 
and cellular services and gate-keeping public-service media, protesters 
in different Tahrir  —  or Freedom  —  Squares kept challenging one 
government after another in Arab capitals (ibid.). Social media mainly 
strengthened the public ability to attract attention to the visibility of 
social agency and advocacy.
Furthermore, the 2011 uprisings contested the concept of security. 
Protesters demanded political, economic and social security at large, 
while regimes viewed social unrest as a threat to state safety as a whole. 
In that conflict between strategic narratives over public safety, the 
public has become more outspoken, using the empowerment of social 
media and learning from developments in other Arab Spring countries 
(cross-fertilisation). 
Meeting the practical needs of the uprisings required three roles to 
be fulfilled. The majority of activists flooded Freedom Squares, whilst 
others galvanised marches online and denigrated state interventions 
(Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011; Chen, 2017). A third group formed 
neighbourhood watches, especially in remote areas. They prevented 
burglars from exploiting the chaos, and also state militias from 
exacerbating it for legitimising state power. Neighbourhood vigilantes, 
accordingly, spread under failed or “dead states”, as the Egyptian 
minister of justice put it (Middle East Online, 2013). State violence 
resulted in public distrust and the taking of laws into civilian hands. 
Sometimes, neighbourhood vigilantism led to mob lynching. Videos of 
slain wrongdoers in the Egyptian countryside, for instance, went viral 
to warn potential perpetrators (AsiaNews, 2013). In Tunisia, the idea of 
‘self-protecting civilians’ was short-lived because the regime collapsed 
without squashing protests.
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Due to geopolitical proximity, Moroccan citizens often share 
advocacy strategies with Arab countries. During street protests in 2011, 
slogans demanded the ousting of corruption and despotism instead 
of the ousting of the whole regime. Marchers hoped for a democratic 
transition. The Moroccan regime, however, resorted to an exceptionalist 
narrative (Chalfaouat, 2015; Chahir, 2019). It spread the idea that 
Morocco is unique in North Africa: the Ottoman Empire could not 
conquer Morocco; France took Morocco for a protectorate, not a colony. 
Following the same logic, replicating Arab Spring revolts in Morocco 
was needless since the regime was much less coercive than neighbouring 
ones. The devil lay in the details, however. Though governments 
performed their duties, policies kept regressing. Meanwhile, analyses 
on Facebook articulated frustration with the status quo. The spark of 
the Arab Spring, promoted by ubiquitous smart phones, indicated 
dissatisfaction with the state. To recognise public activism, the state 
amended the constitution in 2011, further empowering citizens with 
participatory democracy measures such as petitions and memoranda. 
Therefore, the impact of the Internet on public conscience enabled 
citizens to reinforce the rule of law. Today, protesters still take to the 
street with political demands. They require the right to jobs, freedom 
of speech, better infrastructure, etc. Visual content from those events 
abounds on social media, as exemplified by the Rif Hirak in 2017 (Lorch 
& Bukhard, 2017) or teachers’ marches in 2018 (Chahir, 2019). Yet, when 
political demands abate, social demands surge. When sit-ins or street 
marches crumble, social activism shifts to denouncing violence between 
the police and citizens, or between teachers and students, for instance. 
Consequently, ordinary citizens use online platforms as communicative 
catalysts to mobilise bottom-up aspirations. They share videos that 
record social deviance, street thievery, harassment, police bribery or the 
exchange of violence. Their active digital vigilantism stresses security to 
make bullies accountable for their crimes.
In short, developments after the Arab Spring display inextricable 
and irreversible ties between the offline and the online. As society 
rushes to cope with technological changes, connected devices 
empower citizens to record daily events and share content with 
audiences in uncontrollable trajectories. This online empowerment 
boosts common citizens’ sense of change-making, and their ability to 
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improve their immediate environment. After the Arab Spring, street 
activism nationally, regionally or locally has not waned, while the 
amount of smartphones, social media accounts and circulating data 
has shot up. Though media empowerment does not guarantee change, 
activism challenges political, economic or social wrongdoing, which 
supports communities. Via digital devices, access to information and 
opinions heightens the questioning the status quo. The following 
section provides a glimpse of the digital landscape in Morocco.
The Digital Reality in Morocco
Communications in Morocco are among the most vibrant in Africa 
for several reasons. The first is demography. Today, around 87% of the 
population are younger than fifty-five. Schoolchildren do not receive 
an adequate education: around 400,000 pupils drop out annually. 
This youth drain aggravates illiteracy rates and impedes employment 
plans. Persistent youth unemployment, soaring corruption levels and 
aspirations for better living conditions push public anger onto social 
media.
Secondly, ownership of connectable devices has increased. In 2017, 
60% of families (20% of the entire population) owned desktops or 
tablets, with a six-percent increase from 2016. In addition, according 
to ANRT2 annual data (2018), 99.8% of Moroccan urban and rural 
families use mobile phones. Around four members of every family 
possess phones, amounting to around 25 million mobile phones, 73% 
of which are smartphones. Eighty-six per cent of the phones are used to 
access the Internet. Their owners prosume and circulate huge amounts 
of information, opinions, attitudes and trends. One aspect of the social 
impact is the diversity of possibilities for connection this enables. 
Ninety-four point seven per cent of Internet users can be found on 
Facebook, Instagram or WhatsApp. Ninety-eight per cent of youngsters 
aged between 15 and 24 (i.e. around 6.5 million), participate on social 
platforms on a daily basis, while Facebook users number around 17.5 
million (NapoleonCat, 2018). Moroccans currently rank fourth in Africa 
and second in the Arab world on Facebook. 
2  National Agency for Regulating Telecommunications.
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Moreover, the digital infrastructure is helpful. Morocco postures 
as a technology hub in Africa, due to its geostrategical location at the 
crossroads of international fibre cables. It participates in a technological 
race to lead North Africa, adopting policies that encourage connectivity 
and ensure surveillance and stability (Chalfaouat, 2015). That is why the 
kingdom ranks eighty-fifth globally in e-governance readiness, offering 
broadband since 2004 and leading Africa with more than 400,000 active 
ADSL lines and a high level of wireless connection (4G). To boost mobile 
broadband connectivity in rural areas, Long Term Evolution services 
were set up in 2015, after upgrading fibre optic networks.
In addition, around 3000 e-news websites cover national and local 
events continuously. In 2015, the Ministry of Communication certified 
204 online news outlets, added to rampant national, regional and local 
uncertified news websites and blogs, which boosts immediate access 
to news and frequent social media interaction. Therefore, the post-
2011 power dynamics capitalise on digital transformations to create a 
perpetual phenomenon of social activism. Activists favour the digital 
sphere, which has resulted in increased vigilantism, sometimes fuelled 
by the equally rising symptoms of social problems.
Digital Vigilantism in Morocco
Co-production (public participation in the production) of security in 
Morocco is not new. Even official institutions and media outlets directly 
or indirectly encourage the co-production of security. For instance, the 
police hang photos of wanted criminals inside police stations and city 
halls, expecting citizens to help. Public radio stations, too, regularly 
broadcast news about fugitives to warn of the danger they pose, and 
seek public help in capturing them.
However, organic vigilantism ensues from citizen initiatives, rather 
than guided participation. In some rural areas, ordinary people conduct 
their own investigations and sentence perpetrators, especially robbers, 
in weekly markets (The Journal, 2015). A crowd might fatally assault a 
culprit so that no one person in the mob would be accused directly. 
Thus, when burglars exploit the reduced police presence in isolated or 
remote areas, the public executes them, acting as an unofficial 
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replacement of the state. Instead of benefiting from the situation, robbers 
often run the risk of becoming its victims. 
Some websites likewise encourage the participation of ordinary 
citizens in reducing corruption, with mixed success. For example, 
Ushahidi, an international group that monitors election transparency, 
launched their Moroccan site in 2011, marsad.ma, but the experiment 
was short-lived. In 2012, it became mamdawrinch.com (“we will not 
bribe”), a platform for anonymous reporting. Mamfakinch.com (“no 
concessions”), a blogging platform for reporting corruption and 
rejecting despotism, waned along with the February 20 Movement and 
folded after official harassment. The platform challenged official stories 
and interpretations of events, and exemplified the interplay between 
state power and social resistance online. It carried weekly coverage of 
“February 20th Movement protests simultaneously taking place 
throughout the country, in addition to international chapter protests in 
Europe and elsewhere” (Errazzouki, 2017, p. 368). It systematically 
offered a Twitter-linked “live feed where individuals participating in the 
demonstrations could include a hashtag in their tweets that would 
automatically stream their tweets on Mamfakinch” (ibid.). After 
building visitors’ trust, Mamfakinch’s work galvanised vigilantism as 
the tweets “tended to include both photos as well as videos and were 
filtered through a marked map hosted on Google Maps” (ibid.). Street 
protesters, who accessed the platform feed directly, benefited from its 
empowering ability to channel their perceived control, critical awareness 
and effective participation. However, the platform’s “brief prominence 
dwindled when the Moroccan state countered its impact” with 
surveillance, malware and accusations of undermining national security 
(ibid., p. 380). Another example, Manchoufouch.com, is a website and 
Android application that records the time and location of sexual 
harassment. Yet, the project’s ability to gain public trust, empower 
harassment victims or galvanise agency remains to be seen.
Online vigilantes prefer anonymity due to their distrust of the legal 
system. Accordingly, organised digital vigilantism is often played down. 
When some journalists investigate corruption, fraud or mismanagement, 
other state-related journalists defame them by framing their efforts 
as disturbing, contradictory or useless. Sometimes, evidence of mass 
surveillance is produced in order to contain disturbing voices and keep 
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freedom of speech within prescribed limits (Errazzouki, 2017). Most 
vigilantism websites have folded, to be replaced with social media 
activism. 
Informal digital vigilantism abounds on social media to denounce 
different types of wrongdoing. Vigilante individuals, organisations, or 
communities monitor official corruption or scandal, such as when the 
police force citizens to give bribes (Sekkouri, 2008), riot police suppress 
citizen behaviour (Chahir, 2019) or a teacher assaults a student. For 
example, in Targuist, a cannabis-farming city, four videos exposed police 
officers collecting bribes from drivers, especially smugglers. These 
videos, which were not uploaded simultaneously, zoomed in on corrupt 
law-enforcement agents facilitating crime. Social and traditional media 
widely covered the scandal, which coincided with a royal visit to the 
region. Consequently, the police officers were arrested or deported 
thanks to the Targuist Sniper or “Targuist Commando” (Sekkouri, 
2008). Vigilantism was thus perceived as a constructive participation in 
reducing corruption, while the authors of the footage evaded official 
tracking and punishment. 
Other vigilantes denounce organised public insecurity. A pertinent 
example is the social uproar against Tcharmil, an urban youth sub-
culture whose adherents wear unconventional clothing and hairdos, 
use their own jargon and carry swords in the streets. They “roll out 
flamboyant clothing and jewellery and fondness for the violent courtesies 
of the street” (El Maarouf & Belghazi, 2018, p. 293). For El Maarouf and 
Belghazi, “Tcharmil captures both an enigmatic and an intricate moment 
of mélange” (2018, p. 292), incarnating the sense of superiority inherent 
in taking over a public space and the boastful intention of unsettling local 
stability. Thinking of themselves as renegades, Mcharmlin3 transform 
the violence they feel and experience into social deviance and fury at the 
unwelcoming, unsatisfactory city. 
Vigilantism, in contrast, shaped the public reaction to this violence. 
Online, anonymous citizens launched a “Zero Grissage” campaign to 
end Tcharmil hostility. Persistent theft and aggression by Mcharmlin 
obliged some inhabitants in Casablanca to elect neighbourhood watches 
against attacks (Lesiteinfo, 2016). Due to frustration with Tcharmil’s 
3  Youngsters who follow Tcharmil as a lifestyle.
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chaos, and amid mounting distrust, people took the law in their own 
hands. They accused the state of inability to maintain public security. 
However, other citizens refrained from forming neighbourhood militias 
against Tcharmil militias (Bladi.info, 2016). To curb the lawlessness, 
“between the 1st of January and the 30th of June, 256 171 persons were 
arrested […] in reaction to the ‘Zero_Grissage’ hashtagged protests on 
social media networks” (El Maarouf & Belghazi, 2018, p. 299). 
Individual vigilantes, the most widespread type of vigilantism, 
highlight one-off incidents. People use phone cameras to record attacks 
by burglars, sexual assaults or problems in medical facilities. In these 
cases, generally, street vigilantes develop an empowering pattern of 
documenting misconduct, sharing the material on social media, creating 
uproar and bringing the wrongdoers to justice. Even when traditional 
media cover the mishap, viewers rush to social platforms because they 
trust them more, since they offer the possibility to access unedited 
content, interact with trustworthy individuals and avoid official 
censorship and bias. 
Analysis of a Digital Vigilantism Case:  
Student Assaults Teacher
Fig. 7.1  Safi Addakirapress. (2017). Shocking / Student assaults his 
teacher in Ouarzazate. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=aC-DjWwDFs8&has_verified=1
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In this case study, an instance of individual vigilantism morphs into a 
community reaction and shows the ways digital visibility galvanises 
social action. This event consists of violence in a school classroom. 
Though it is an example of juvenile delinquency, it is neither organised, 
nor presents a threat to public security. It rather represents an instance 
of a spontaneous, one-off irregularity in which a student, due to details 
that pertain to his own circumstances, defies common norms and 
assaults his teacher inside the classroom. That is why, as a backlash to 
the original act, the digital uproar brings into focus the ways official 
irresponsibility and individual irregularity lead to public insecurity, 
though indirectly, in a complex post-2011 media and activism landscape.
Context: Because it is far from the central region, Ouarzazate rarely 
attracts public attention. The supposedly calm southern city became 
agitated in November 2017, a few weeks after the onset of a difficult 
political and academic period. First, the whole country eagerly witnessed 
the so-called ‘blockage’, a six-month political impasse after legislative 
elections in 2016. Video footage captured over-crowded classrooms due 
to faltering educational planning and incompatibility between 
infrastructure, human resources and the number of pupils. Equally, the 
role of teacher-training centres (aka CPRs) was hotly discussed online. 
For economic and educational reasons, the government had launched a 
plan to reduce the great shortage of staff by delegating the recruitment 
of teachers to regional academies. Teachers, especially in the first year of 
the plan, would join classrooms before receiving training that was not 
necessarily provided by CPRs. While CPR graduates protested the plan, 
university graduates were sent to classrooms without training. Online 
debates spiked when trained teachers were ignored in street protests, 
while the untrained teachers started teaching. The hasty solution of 
sending large numbers of untrained teachers into schools was punctuated 
by police interventions against teacher marches (Chalfaouat, 2017). 
Consequently, debates about legal fragility, financial precarity, 
overcrowded classrooms, lack of pre-service training and frequent 
police crackdowns on teacher protests played out on social media. This 
soured public opinion, creating conditions for the denunciation of 
educational policies and teacher vulnerability in schools.
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Content: The short video starts with a chaotic quarrel inside a classroom. 
Many students are on their feet while one approaches the teacher with 
hostility. The student and the teacher engage in a short fight, before 
other students pull them apart. Many of the students go back to their 
seats. Another group of students keeps watching the violent scene, 
including the one who is shooting the video. Then, the hostile student 
leaves his seat again to attack the teacher who stands sheepishly close 
to his desk near the board. The student mutters that he will not accept 
insults against his mother. He jumps over a number of tables to reach 
the teacher and punches him repeatedly. The teacher, who seems 
unable to defend himself, falls down on the floor in utter humiliation. 
The punching continues for some time. Towards the end, it is not clear 
whether the other students are trying to terminate the fight or helping 
their classmate to assault the teacher.
Social media reaction: Once the video reached Facebook, users were 
outraged. The video circulated virally on a Sunday night, coinciding with 
an important football match. Social media users generally condemned the 
assault, notwithstanding the reasons behind the student’s misbehaviour. 
Blame was levelled immediately at the education authorities for the 
sordid conditions in which teachers worked, even in areas of the country 
that were assumed to be peaceful. Others denounced the exposure of 
teachers to crammed classrooms without the necessary pedagogical 
tools, and accused education authorities of being responsible for 
students’ inadequate upbringing. Teachers in particular felt empowered 
to demand more legal protection from unexpected incidents.
Press coverage: The highest levels of engagement with this event were 
from digital media. Many online outlets identified the high school to 
uncover the hidden sides of the story. They met the student’s classmates, 
whose standpoint was generally neglected in mainstream discussions. 
They revealed that the teacher had mental-health issues that, in normal 
circumstances, would have granted him early retirement. Visitors to 
e-news websites discovered that violent exchanges were common in that 
classroom. The teacher customarily insulted students, who retaliated by 
knocking him down. The only new element was the rampant visibility 
of video footage online. Other pupils accused local education 
administrations of a failure to deal with the problematic situation before 
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the incident: they had moved the teacher to a junior high school to curb 
the problematic outbursts, but brought him back because of a staffing 
shortage.
Other news items and articles delved into the direct reasons for 
the fight. They explained that the teacher insulted the student with 
references to his parents’ poverty. For instance, chouftv.ma, an online 
broadcaster, visited the student’s father in his greengrocery store, at 
which point he revealed that his son had been severely insulted in front 
of his classmates. Media in different cities collected citizens’ opinions on 
the mishap. They generally condemned the assault despite the potential 
causes. They also blamed the student’s parents for his inadequate 
upbringing. Other citizens stressed the ministry’s responsibility for 
the abyss into which the educational system had sunk. Yet, when 
asked about the solution, they generally agreed upon the imperative of 
receiving a good upbringing and being taught the right values at homes 
and schools. Citizens, too, felt empowered to further demonstrate the 
need for security in schools and expressed distrust towards the ministry 
for educational setbacks.
The story also reached local and international broadcast channels. 
The popular public channel, 2M, described the video content as causing 
shock and sorrow. As a manifestation of media convergence, or what 
Chadwick (2013, p. 2) termed as watching “a video of a video of a 
video”, 2M depended on social media debates to criticie the decadent 
value system inside classrooms and the awful attack on the teacher. The 
family of the student, on the contrary, was portrayed as begging for their 
child to be safe, although he had threatened the safety of the teacher. 
The mother of the student said that her son had been bitten and punched 
too, hinting at the absence of a secure environment inside his school, as 
well as in the prison where he was incarcerated at the time. With the 
viral spread of the video, security in educational institutions was 
questioned, with most fingers pointing at state representatives. When 
the school headmaster or the municipal education director (a 
government official) featured on public media, they reiterated that they 
knew about the teacher’s problematic classroom management, and they 
utterly condemned the student’s misbehaviour. However, they refrained 
from admitting responsibility for the circumstances that led to the fight. 
International news outlets in different languages, including Arabic, 
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French and English, discussed the event, based on the uploaded video, 
Facebook tweets and statuses, as well as the opinions of Moroccan 
education experts and commentators.
Workplace reaction: Though the video was released on a Sunday, both 
the regional and local educational authorities issued press releases. This 
unprecedented response appeared to result from the online pressure. 
The authorities condemned the mishap, stressed the teacher’s dignity 
and required a police probe into the issue. Since the teacher did not 
complain after the fight, the ministry of education filed a suit against the 
student. Meanwhile, the teacher and the administration behind his 
problematic situation managed to avoid responsibility and punishment. 
The teacher was neither arrested nor moved to another school, at least 
not before the end of the academic year. In addition, education officials 
contented themselves with issuing press releases that denounced the 
irregularity, praised the importance of the teacher’s dignity and showed 
solidarity with his family and colleagues. On the other hand, three 
teacher unions called for a two-day strike to protest against working 
conditions inside classrooms (Chalfaouat, 2017). The viral video was an 
opportunity for them to require an end to the official discourse that had 
blamed teachers for the woes of the educational system before the 
incident. They also pinpointed the insufficient pedagogical and legal 
support for teachers inside high schools in particular. In a sense, the 
video’s organisational empowerment further encouraged unions to 
defend teachers’ rights, especially since the strike was the first after the 
government had passed a law to punish strikes financially. Due to the 
horror of the video, teachers and unions nationwide felt emboldened to 
challenge the law by going on strike regardless of potential salary cuts. 
They seized the opportunity to mobilise against the distressing situation.
The family’s reaction: Though the video blemished their image as 
parents, the student’s family engaged in media interviews to share their 
own interpretation of the event. The father replied to different online 
outlets and invited some to his greengrocer’s shop. The store, for which 
the student was ridiculed, was a typical venue from which Moroccans 
usually buy produce. Neither the father nor his job seemed degrading 
enough to bring insult or mockery. With that psychological 
empowerment, he could symbolically shift the quarrel in his son’s 
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favour. Despite the excessive shaming online, playing the victim of 
unjust ridicule empowered the father to provide a parallel interpretation 
to the official one, which attracted online sympathy. The student’s 
mother talked to different media outlets too. With her appearance and 
manner of speaking, she was portrayed as worthy of sympathy and as 
comparable to other mothers nationwide. She symbolically rejected any 
indictment of her upbringing for her son’s aggressiveness. They and 
their son apologised for the assault before the court’s final decision, 
according to their lawyer. Their online visibility and constant 
communication with the media caused a considerable change in families’ 
perception of the interaction between social media and law enforcement. 
Their advocacy helped clarify certain neglected points in the story, while 
their apology, as reported by the lawyer online, aimed to gain the 
sympathy of the court jury. Contrariwise, little was heard from the 
family of the assaulted teacher. It is possible they contented themselves 
with the individual and organisational impact of the video.
State officials’ reactions: Officials, especially those from the educational 
system, reacted in several ways. For instance, the president of the 
regional academy issued a press release on Sunday 5 November, and 
talked to the media. He fully denounced the assault, describing it as 
“non-educational”, expressed solidarity with the teacher, his family and 
colleagues, and pledged to prevent the recurrence of such incidents. In 
addition, the municipal education director issued another press release. 
He insisted on maintaining the rule of law and prioritising the teacher’s 
dignity. The delegation also formed a local taskforce to probe the event, 
and sued the student. Led by the municipal director, the taskforce also 
visited the assaulted teacher. When they asked him about the mishap, 
he surprised them by considering it as normal. They shared their 
astonishment with the press, possibly paving the way for what turned 
out to be an unexpectedly lenient sentence against the student. The 
president of the region council also publicised a press release. He asked 
the head of the government and the ministers of justice and education to 
amend the penal code in order to criminalise the assault of teachers. In 
the press release, he apologised to teachers and parents generally for the 
“classroom combat”, and described the assault as “tragic”, “horrendous”, 
“bestial” and “sorrowful” (Tatoo, 2017). He also reproached the 
student’s classmates for their inactivity. Moreover, the police announced 
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that they were detaining the student. The public uproar created 
considerable pressure to imprison the teenager, despite the teacher’s 
prior mistakes. However, the Public Prosecutor in a press conference 
considered the student a mere “reckless pupil” and described his 
detention as an “unfortunate development”. Nonetheless, signs 
abounded from senior officials that the student would be released, since 
he did not necessarily have criminal motives and since the teacher did 
not file any documented complaint even after the video had spread.
Outcome and constructive co-production of security: Because of the 
online and offline debates, the student was brought to court. He was 
sentenced to seventeen days in custody in Ouarzazate, in addition to 
spending two months in a juvenile rehabilitation centre in Marrakech. 
His parents, on the other hand, were fined two symbolic dirhams, one to 
be given to the teacher and one to the municipal delegation.
Since it was so widely viewed, the video’s constructive contribution 
to public security is multi-faceted. To start with, attacking a teacher 
inside a classroom was scorned and condemned severely. Though the 
teacher may have triggered the fight, thousands of comments online 
focused solely on the denigration of the assault and the resulting threat 
to the teacher’s safety in an increasingly hostile educational atmosphere 
nationwide. Teachers, students and parents, as individuals and 
organisations, seized the empowerment of the opportunity to demand 
that schools be made safe from verbal, physical or financial violence, or 
even sexual harassment. They also demanded measures to be taken to 
fight the drug consumption that exacerbates school violence. The moral 
outrage and mode of cyber-social order compelled the student’s family 
to apologise for the mishap online. 
Second, different officials became involved in the issue. The head of 
the government, MPs, ministers and regional and local administrators 
commented on its developments online, or in press releases, 
parliamentary questions, media participations, apologies, etc. They 
might have reckoned on the impact of social distrust online, and agreed 
that the attack was unacceptable. Equally significant was the participation 
of police officers and the Public Prosecutor in the debate. They stressed 
the importance of the rule of law and promised to intervene adequately 
to maintain it. However, no laws were passed or amended to make the 
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social debates and advocacy online an instance of community 
empowerment.
Third, media outlets galvanised the issue in different ways. In the 
absence of raw proof, incomplete and imprecise stories overwhelm 
public discourse. With the viral video, however, the press approached 
different stakeholders, including families, classmates and officials. 
Outlets not only propelled a local event to a national or international 
audience, but also enabled almost all voices and standpoints to receive a 
hearing, which vividly enhances freedom of speech. Nevertheless, as in 
other digital vigilantism events, the press avoided interviewing the 
culprit and the victim in order not to affect the ongoing legal process, to 
protect them against mob justice or potential retaliation and to maintain 
their right to be forgotten. 
Furthermore, the video encouraged different facets of empowerment. 
The public’s power of denunciation, to begin with, was emphasised 
when all influential stakeholders reacted to condemn the assault and 
require the detention of the wrongdoer. Moreover, students were 
empowered to rectify any potential misinformation. They shared the 
video to uncover a problematic situation that would have otherwise 
gone unnoticed. They protested in front of the school when their 
classmate was jailed and they talked to the media to add their own 
details and interpretation of the whole event. Teachers, as individuals 
and unions, equally felt empowered to fuel the uproar online and in 
the streets, since it was an opportunity to inform the public about their 
terrible working conditions. The assault was neither unprecedented nor 
surprising, given its distressing context. Public shaming of the recorded 
attack supported teachers to further criticise educational policies that 
endangered them. Parents were empowered too. Parents increasingly 
send their children to private schools despite the financial hardship 
the decision entails. They silently withdraw from overcrowded public 
schools, whose bad reputation spreads incessantly. The video boosted 
parents’ psychological empowerment, and offered them an opportunity 
to voice the double-edged, unfortunate dilemma of whether to send 
their kids to the problematic public sector or to the costly private one.
Meanwhile, developments around the video highlighted official 
irresponsibility. In a more democratic context, the violent content would 
uncover the lacunae of regional and local education mismanagement, 
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and condemn officials who denied the teacher early retirement. In 
addition, the student’s family blamed the teacher’s illness for their child’s 
offensive reaction, which reduced the prison term. These circumstances 
alarmed officials, including those in remote areas, about the possibility 
for sudden public derision of their malpractice. Without self-regulation 
and professional conduct being ensured, ubiquitous electronic tools can 
unexpectedly mobilise public debate. Officials must then talk in front of 
the cameras tactfully, despite a lack of training or the absence of solid 
justifications for professional incompetence.
Conclusions
To conclude, this chapter answers the research question: how does digital 
vigilantism manifest in Morocco, especially in terms of empowering 
different voices? It discusses the ways common citizens’ access to the 
media as a key resource morphs individual initiatives of sharing footage 
into social outrage online. Community, organisational and, especially, 
individual empowerment persists in consequence. 
As a case in point, the chapter analyses different stakeholders’ 
reactions amidst the frenzy of an instance of school violence. Due to 
digital vigilantism, different individuals and organisations challenged 
or rectified discourses about the incident. From the interactions that 
erupted, several conclusions can be drawn.
First of all, digital vigilantism enhances change in Moroccan society. 
Victims and bystanders realise the importance of recording and sharing 
wrongdoing. Public support online empowers them to endure the 
humiliation of their ordeal. Instead of shying away, they expose their 
affairs online, which generates shaming and denunciation of perpetrators, 
and leads to their arrest. In situations such as the case above, sharing 
wrongdoing may mitigate vulnerability, though not all stakeholders are 
accountable for their contribution to the problem. However, the resulting 
online vibrancy embeds the potential for the rule of law to be reinforced. 
It helps Moroccan citizens to break their silence, since perpetrators are 
either brought to justice or apologise publicly. In short, social events, 
digital connection and vigilantism enable online empowerment, leading 
citizens to appreciate the importance of vigilantism, denunciation and 
doxing. The concurrent empowerment encourages social change and 
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helps social media to improve citizens’ critical awareness and effective 
participation in improving their immediate environment.
Moreover, digital vigilantism stops short at revealing crimes. 
Moroccan citizens do not customarily take revenge after vigilantism. The 
police do not encourage citizens to take responsibility for themselves, as 
stability is key in the strategic narrative of exceptionalism (Fadel, 2016). 
Hence, the police foster a differentiation between vigilantism for a better 
society, and the ability to execute the rule of law. Consequently, citizens’ 
co-production of security is confined to keeping the public sphere 
under control. Today, common citizens function as a neighbourhood 
watch on social media. They report to the public online before the 
police intervene. If the police have already intervened, public pressure 
demands  —  and sometimes leads to  —  stricter sentences. Otherwise, 
vigilantism keeps the pressure online, without embodied intervention 
against wrongdoers.
Furthermore, digital vigilantism requires a responsive government. 
Even though vigilantism facilitates self-help, public contributions to 
the rule of law need encouragement. This may require setting up some 
platform for citizens to co-produce security, and the police to recognise 
doxing during investigations. For more successful vigilantism, the 
platform could link the promotion of civic virtue to the public interest 
and the avoidance of retaliation. Moreover, the police can incorporate the 
ubiquity of online opportunities for citizens by fostering participative 
security as a legitimate contribution to their work. As a result, substantial 
efforts may counter the current increased demands for security, and the 
visible expression of distrust in state efforts.
Finally, the culture of impunity that stems from the flawed judiciary 
and corrupt administration hinders a clear transition from vigilantism to 
changing laws. Vigilantism breaks the silence, enables the co-production 
of security and warns against recidivism. However, annual reports of 
transparency and anti-corruption institutions, such as the High Council 
for Accounts, reveal the ways that impunity hobbles development and 
democracy. Thus, more responsive legal institutions are necessary to 
reap the benefits of vigilantism. The current situation is on the threshold 
of a movement towards more respect for laws. Since vigilantism 
spotlights inadequacies in law enforcement and the repercussions of 
impunity, responsibility rests with legal agents to reduce the impact of 
perceived impunity on the social value of laws and on the seriousness of 
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responses to public demands for a safer environment. Otherwise, when 
such perceived impunity holds citizens back from smooth participation 
in democratising the lives of their community, distrust deepens, leading 
to an irreconcilable crisis in democracy.
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‘This Web Page Should Not 
Exist’: A Case Study of Online 
Shaming in Slovenia1
Mojca M. Plesničar and Pika Šarf 
Introduction
In the autumn of 2015, the Balkan migrant2 route, which led people 
from Greece to central Europe through the Balkans, redirected through 
Slovenia because Hungary closed its borders. This led to a large number 
of migrants entering Slovenia, which spurred heated and often hostile 
debates in the Slovenian public sphere. Many used social media to 
voice their fears and hatred towards migrants, with some comments 
bordering on hate speech and many others crossing that line. (FRA 
Update #1, 2015; FRA Update #2, 2015; Council of Europe, 2018) Since 
increased expressions of intolerance and hatred never resulted in any 
kind of action from the public authorities, several civil-society actors 
started to raise awareness of hate speech by issuing different appeals to 
the public for respect in public debates. 
1  The research underpinning this article was funded by the European Union’s 
Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, under the Marie-Sklodowska-
Curie grant agreement for the “Transmaking” project (no. 734855) and from the 
Slovenian Research Agency for the research project “Automated Justice: Social, 
Ethical and Legal Implications’ (no. J5–9347).
2 As there is no internationally recognised definition of the term migrant, in the 
present article we refer to the terminology of the International Organisation for 
Migration, in which the term is understood as “a person who moves away from his 
or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international 
border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons” (IOM, 2020).
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In a response to the hatred directed at migrants in public posts on 
Facebook, one anonymous participant used the platform offered by 
Tumblr to create a page called “Zlovenija”. The title is a play on words 
that combines the country’s name, Slovenia, with the Slovenian word 
for evil, “zlo”, resulting in the portmanteau “Evil-venia”. Individual 
Facebook posts expressing hate towards migrants were exposed, and 
the names and enlarged (profile) pictures of the posts’ authors were 
published on the page. This all followed the page’s “manifesto” urging 
people to consider the norms of civil communication. Not much 
attention was given to the page by the general public, until some of the 
posts, with their enlarged photos, were printed and posted in random 
public spaces throughout Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia. While they 
remained in digital form, the comments exposed by Zlovenija did not 
have a wider reach due to the so-called Facebook filter bubble effects 
(Bechmann & Nielbo, 2018; Seargeant & Tagg, 2019), especially as they 
were being published in Facebook groups connecting similar minded 
individuals. The same effect was observed with groups promoting 
opposite stances, such as the since-banned group ‘Slovenia protect your 
borders’ (Slovenija zavaruj meje). The change of platform, however, meant 
that the same comments and their authors suddenly became subject to 
public judgment and condemnation for their unacceptable, immoral 
or even illegal nature. This, in turn, stimulated public interest and 
discussion, which took place both on the digital platform of Zlovenija 
as well as in traditional media. The daily newspaper Delo was the first to 
report about the phenomenon in a short opinion piece, which triggered 
false rumours about the reporting journalist actually being the author of 
Zlovenija (as seen below) (Krajčinović, 2015).
Consequently, the initiative that started as a spontaneous response to 
the hatred infecting the country became a powerful tool in the hands of 
civil society in a matter of just two weeks (Interview with Zlovenija, 2018). 
What was at first just an obscure Tumblr page became a pillory with a 
mission to initiate a discussion on the issue of hate speech, remind people 
that the Internet is a public space and that their words have meaning 
and consequences, and hold the mirror up to the society and condemn 
all intolerance and violence (Zlovenija, 2015). The people exposed on 
Zlovenija were, to our knowledge, not subject to repercussions in the 
workspace or family context (such as for example in the Charlottesville 
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case, cf. Milbrandt, this volume). They were, however subject to public 
scrutiny and served as the public face of hatred and intolerance.
Although Zlovenija succeeded in inciting significant conversations 
about the issue of hate speech, with which Slovenia has an uneasy 
relationship as we will discuss later, the method it used was nevertheless 
extreme, and it immediately raised questions about both its legality and 
its legitimacy. The author(s) of the page3 acknowledged this concern 
when they pointed out that:
this page should not exist because it is extreme as it was created as a 
response to the silence of those who should be speaking, those who were 
elected to speak solemnly at a time when the majority loses their minds. 
But they did not. This page should not exist because it bears witness to the 
fact that all other ways of maintaining the basic standards of civilisation 
failed, and we are left with barely holding up the mirror. Here, look at 
(your own) evil (Zlovenija, 2015).4
In this chapter we will examine Zlovenija’s approach and the surrounding 
events by considering different focal points. First, we will analyse the 
original posts that were published on Zlovenija and look for patterns 
and commonalities, as well as the criteria used to select them. We aim 
to provide a close reading of the content that was used and the source 
of further developments. Second, we analyse the debates on Zlovenija 
that followed the original posts and include explanations posted by 
the authors of the original Facebook posts, as well as responses from 
the general public that were published on the page. Third, we take a 
broader look at the response of the wider public online, mainly searching 
through popular online platforms and fora, as well as the reaction of 
the general media, looking through commentaries and news concerning 
Zlovenija. We also consider the question of the (il)legality of Zlovenija’s 
approach, focusing on the (il)legality of 1) the original posts, 2) the 
3  In order to maintain the privacy of the author(s) we refer to them as author(s) 
throughout the chapter, not indicating their gender or how many of them there 
were.
4  “Ta stran ne bi smela obstajati, ker je skrajna, ker je nastala kot odgovor na molk 
tistih, ki bi morali govoriti, tistih, ki so bili izvoljeni za to, da bodo trezno spregovorili 
v času, ko bo večini odpovedal razum. Pa niso. Ta stran ne bi smela obstajati, ker 
priča o tem, da so odpovedali vsi drugi načini ohranjanja osnovnih civilizacijskih 
standardov in nam je preostalo le še nastavljanje zrcala. Izvolite, zazrite se v (lastno) 
zlo”.
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reposting of the posts and 3) the publicising of the posts in a physical 
form by displaying printed versions throughout the streets of Ljubljana. 
Another focal point of public debates was the question of whether 
Zlovenija became just another online ‘shamer’, no better than the original 
wrongdoers it was trying to expose. We supplemented the literature 
and textual analysis with additional information we gathered from the 
author(s) of Zlovenija in an interview we conducted in December 2018. 
We were able to contact the author(s) through the web page and various 
other means and we were able to confirm their authenticity, hence their 
answers give important insights into the operation of the page. Finally, 
we will attempt to understand and critically assess the ideas and the 
methods used by Zlovenija, and the repercussions of its activities.
Zlovenija’s Outline
Zlovenija started in October 2015 as a spontaneous intervention, almost 
as a joke, at a time when Slovenia was facing a wave of hatred directed 
towards migrants, and all formal mechanisms to address the issue of 
hate speech were failing. The author(s) explained that: 
[Slovenian philosopher and media analyst] Boris Vezjak published one 
photograph, in which the quotations were exposed. Then I started to 
post it in a private group and discuss with friends, that we could do 
something like this. I set up the Tumblr page quite quickly and tried to 
make a few posts and I thought that it works and then it was launched. 
[…] We did not think too much about what would happen and what we 
would do with it (Interview with Zlovenija, 2018).5
The idea was simple: the author(s) copied the most brutal, outrageous 
and vile comments they could find and accompanied them with the 
name and picture of the person making these hateful comments, as well 
as a link to the original Facebook post. Tumblr, a visual microblogging 
website, provided a perfect platform to display the faces of hatred to the 
5  “Boris Vezjak je objavil eno sliko, kjer so bili ti citati izpostavljani, potem pa [smo 
začeli to mi] v eni zasebni skupini objavljati in se pogovarjat s prijatelji, da bi lahko 
nekaj takega naredili oziroma smo dost hitro kar naredili Tumblr in sem probal 
par sličic in se mi je zdelo, da zelo funkcionira in potem je to zalaufalo. […] Ni 
bilo kakšnega hudega razmisleka zadaj, kaj se bo zdaj zgodilo, pa kaj se bo s tem 
naredilo”.
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widest audience possible, notably due to the ease with which it enables 
users to crowdsource new content (Oblak Črnič, 2017). 
Even though Zlovenija was actively posting for less than two weeks, 
its concept evolved over that time. The initial idea of posting hateful 
Facebook posts with their author’s name and picture was supplemented 
with the section containing the readers’ letters. The practice of adding 
the link to the original post ceased at some point, which remains one of 
the biggest regrets of the page’s author(s), since Zlovenija started to face 
accusations that the comments were fake and it became impossible to 
prove their authenticity if the original Facebook comment was already 
deleted (Interview with Zlovenija, 2018). Moreover, just a few days before 
Zlovenija was shut down, it provided a new option to the Facebook 
posters to request the removal of a post in case they deleted the original 
Facebook comment and apologised. Like the page itself, the invitation to 
apologise was not very specific or premeditated; it was introduced after 
initial spontaneous apologies to the Tumblr page from the authors of 
some of the posts. The apology had to be submitted via the Tumblr page 
and then it substituted the reposted Facebook post on Zlovenija (ibid.). 
Just as the creation and maintenance of Zlovenija was a spontaneous 
reaction, so too was the decision to shut it down. There are several 
reasons why it stopped actively posting after less than two weeks, but 
the main cause was the sudden emergence of posters depicting the 
Facebook posts exposed on Zlovenija throughout Ljubljana. This was an 
action that was neither anticipated nor performed by the author(s) of 
Zlovenija, but according to the author(s) it was also: 
the most interesting insight of the whole project. As long as Zlovenija 
stayed online, everything was okay, but as soon as the stickers [printed 
versions of Facebook posts] appeared, it escalated to another level and 
it became a better story for the media, as it was a real-life shaming pillar 
(ibid.).6
This unexpected turn of events meant that, on the one hand, the impact 
of Zlovenija went beyond the initial framework, and the real-world 
platform acted as a reminder to the page’s author(s) of how powerful 
6  “To je bil najbolj zanimiv uvid celega projekta. Dokler je bilo to online, je bilo 
vse OK, takoj, ko so se pa te nalepke pojavile, je pa to preskočilo na neko drugo 
stopnjo in postala je veliko boljša medijska zgodba, da je to sedaj sramotilni steber v 
resničnem življenju”.
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and potentially dangerous their actions were; it therefore caused them 
to have a different level of appreciation of their own work (ibid.). On the 
other hand, the pressure on Zlovenija’s author(s) intensified to a much 
greater degree. 
The Facebook posters and their supporters were suddenly more 
motivated to identify the person(s) responsible for both the online 
and the offline campaigns, and calls for collective (legal) action against 
Zlovenija started to emerge. Although the author(s) began the project 
with a certain level of apprehension or caution, this turned to outright 
fear after Zlovenija’s author(s) discovered that people were starting to 
seek help to uncover them on one of the boards on 4chan, an image 
board website known for its anonymity and the lack of rules for posting 
content. If uncovering the author(s) of Zlovenija had previously seemed 
impossible, the author(s) feared that with the help of the international 
community of hackers this became a foreseeable possibility (ibid.). 
Both reasons convinced the author(s) to stop their activities — the 
page on Tumblr is still accessible, but only the manifesto and the apologies 
remain, while the original Facebook posts have been removed.7, 8
The Facebook Posts 
We analysed the 222 posts, which were originally publicly posted 
on Facebook and re-posted by the Tumblr page Zlovenija. We did 
a thematic analysis adhering to Braun & Clarke (2019) concepts of 
reflexive thematic analysis, leaning towards a deductive, latent and 
constructionist approach. Subsequently, we combined the findings from 
our thematic analysis with the insights we gained from the interview 
with the author(s) of Zlovenija.
7  We are indebted to our colleague, Aleš Završnik, who showed great foresight in 
downloading the contents of the page before it was taken down, and was kind 
enough to share all that information, which in turn became the basis of our analysis. 
8  We were, however, able to identify at least one page that imitated the original 
Zlovenija’s idea for much longer. A page entitled ‘Hate Speech’ (Sovraznigovor) used 
Zlovenija’s framework after the hibernation of the page, but took it to Wordpress 
and to this day keeps about 90 posts publicly available. We were unable to identify 
the authors of this page, but given its openly credits Zlovenija for the idea and 
the smaller scale, we believe we can include these posts in the following analysis. 
Moreover, we found at least one artist, Tibor Bolha, who publishes on Tumblr as 
penguindinosaurwar, who took Zlovenija as inspiration and drew the posts by 
hand — we are using some of those depictions to illustrate this chapter and are 
grateful for his permission to do so.
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Fig. 8.1  A bunch of racist ignorant jerks from my country. Illustration by Tibor Bolha 
(2015). All rights reserved. Tumblr, https://penguindinosaurwar.tumblr.
com/post/132146266303/a-bunch-of-racist-ignorant-jerks-from-my-country
This Facebook profile picture depicts the author of the post targeted by 
Zlovenija gently petting a puppy, while the post itself said: “The refugees need 
to be [force] fed just rat poison or closed into a gas chamber…. death to refugees 
liberty to Slovenians [sic]”. The quote is an example of the merging of two of 
our content categories explained below: calls for violence and implicitly referring 
to authoritarian regimes. The Nazi regime is invoked by the reference to gas 
chambers, and the Soviet Communist regime by paraphrasing one of its mottos 
(death to Fascism, liberty to the people).
Fig. 8.2  A bunch of racist ignorant jerks from my country. Illustration by Tibor Bolha 
(2015). All rights reserved. Tumblr, https://penguindinosaurwar.tumblr.
com/post/132146266303/a-bunch-of-racist-ignorant-jerks-from-my-country
This Facebook profile picture depicts a couple kissing. The post, however, reveals 
anger and contempt towards the refugees by saying: “Fuck, the refugees have it 
better than Slovenians [sic] in Slovenia… Now the refugees are all poor and stuff… 
Go the fuck back… And there they give guns to children while guys nicely fuck 
away fucking shitheads”.
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Fig. 8.3  A bunch of racist ignorant jerks from my country. Illustration by Tibor Bolha 
(2015). All rights reserved. Tumblr, https://penguindinosaurwar.tumblr.
com/post/132146266303/a-bunch-of-racist-ignorant-jerks-from-my-country
The Facebook profile picture depicts a dad carrying his smiling child on his 
shoulders. The post itself combines calls for violence with clear undertones of 
alarm and insecurity about the future with regard to the refugees: “Military 
and gas over these terrorists… there is no other solution… or we offer them to 
peacefully return home… or else… in 2024 there will be more of them than locals 
in every country…”
The author(s) of Zlovenija deliberately tried to capture a variety of 
different profiles, young and old, men and women, to show that hatred 
does not have a uniform face (Interview with Zlovenija, 2018). Most 
of the hateful Facebook posts were published either as comments on 
news articles covering the topic of the migrant crisis, which were shared 
on Facebook or in public Facebook groups known for supporting anti-
migrant rhetoric (e.g. “Slovenia protect your borders”, “STOP Migrants 
to Slovenia”, “Slovenia our country”) that had over 31,000 members at 
the peak of the migrant crisis (Bajt, 2015). 
The posts were carefully chosen to show the immense contrast 
between the loving grandparents, newlyweds, proud parents or carefree 
teenagers portrayed in the pictures on the one hand, and the hateful, 
vile and even brutal comments they were posting online. This is also 
the reason the profile picture was not always chosen to accompany the 
comment, but rather the picture that offered the biggest contrast to the 
hate emanating from the comments (Interview with Zlovenija, 2018). 
The typical “Zlovenijan” according to the author(s) of the Tumblr 
page, lives in a rural part of the country, sympathises with right-wing 
political opinions and may be slightly more religious. The hate and fear 
expressed in the original Facebook posts fit well with a typical narrative 
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in which members of the lower-middle class fear that their modest way 
of living will be disturbed by the influx of migrants, and project their 
own insecurities and dissatisfaction with their social status to attack this 
perceived threat (Oblak Črnič, 2017).
A great majority of the hateful comments Zlovenija exposed were 
posted by men (78%) and the author(s) claim a similar if not stronger 
prevalence was noticeable among the comments they chose from 
(Interview with Zlovenija, 2018). This is in line with recent studies on 
how gender determines the content published on social networking 
sites (SNS) such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. Although women 
were found to be predominant SNS users during the past decade, today 
men and women are using SNS at very similar rates. However, the 
divide between the topics they discuss and the language they use is still 
indisputable. A study that examined a million random Facebook status 
updates revealed that, while women are more prone to discuss personal 
subjects with individuals they know, men more often concentrate on 
sports, business, politics and religion (Wang et al., 2013). Moreover, the 
language women use while engaging on Facebook is generally warmer, 
friendlier, more polite and focused on other people, while men are 
usually socially distant and are more likely to use colder, hostile and 
authoritative language (Schwartz et al., 2013; Park et al., 2016).
Post content: Through our analysis, we identified four main themes in the 
Facebook posts: calls for violence, invocations of authoritarian regimes 
and leaders, expressions of fear and the desire for the protection of the 
border, slurs and name-calling of the migrants. Some posts exemplify one 
category, but mostly we can identify multiple themes in any given post. 
Nearly all of the analysed posts share various expressions proposing 
different methods of ‘dealing’ with the migrants crossing the Slovenian 
border, the majority of which involve great violence and would result in 
their death. Shooting or the use of any other type of weapon or domestic 
tool seems to be the most prevalent method, followed by using fire or 
letting migrants freeze to death. “Bullet in the forehead”, “put cyanide 
in their meals”, “let them freeze”, “Kalashnikov the only solution”, 
“burn them with napalm”, “activate a bomb”, are a just a few instances 
of such calls for the execution of the migrants. In less than 5% of all 
comments, calls for the elimination of migrants were accompanied by 
threats to politicians, reporters and humanitarian workers who took part 
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in dealing with the migrant crisis. In approximately 10% of the analysed 
Facebook posts, we found an invocation of authoritarian regimes, either 
calling for the return of authoritarian leaders or promoting the idea of 
re-introducing gas chambers and concentration camps as a solution for 
the migrant crisis. “Hitler Stalin Tito our only salvation!”, “One-way 
ticket to Auschwitz!”, “Gas chambers are a solution”, “Where is Hitler 
when you need him?” are just some of the most illustrative examples. 
Posts expressing fear of migrants were also quite frequent and usually 
included the need for the protection of “our” country and defending the 
border from “them”, either by using (para)military force and police or 
building a fence or a wall. 
The majority of the analysed Facebook posts also used various 
expressions with negative connotation to label migrants, for example 
the words “animals”, “parasites”, “beasts”, “murderers”, “rapists”, 
“trash”, “Muslim pigs”, “rats”, “fuckers”, “Neanderthals”, “shit”, 
appear continuously throughout the page. This is in line with the 
psychological mechanisms of feelings of hate, in which the object of hate 
is reduced to non-human forms, which in turn allows for others to treat 
them inhumanely (either figuratively or in real life) (Milivojevič, 2008).
The authors of the Facebook posts could request removal of their 
name and profile picture from the Tumblr page Zlovenija,9 as soon as 
they deleted the original post from Facebook and briefly explained why 
they had changed their mind. The explanations, which were in most 
cases also apologies for unacceptable behaviour, were published on 
the Tumblr page, where they substituted the original posts and remain 
available online. 
The mechanism of removal was not planned in the initial stages of 
the project, but rather developed as a spontaneous reaction to some 
self-initiated expressions of regret and atonement received through the 
Tumblr page (Interview with Zlovenija, 2018). Although the author(s) 
claimed that a large share of individuals apologised and sought removal 
from the page, in fact only 18 individuals pursued this mechanism (13% 
of all posts), out of which only one individual refused to apologise, even 
9  However, the removal of posts was not enabled for the posts that were re-posted on 
the Wordpress page Sovražnigovor, which shows that although the authors of the 
page copied the format of Zlovenija, they did not follow all the aspects of the idea 
as a whole.
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though he deleted the original Facebook post. One of the reasons why 
the removal of the posts was not pursued more widely might be because 
the page was mostly unknown to the wider public at the time, and was 
closed down within days of gaining widespread attention. Nevertheless, 
the explanations and apologies were a clear sign of Zlovenija’s success 
and an immense reward for the author(s) of the page (ibid.). 
The authors of the hateful Facebook comments who interacted with 
the page provided different arguments to explain their posts. (1) The 
predominant claim was that their posts were a consequence of fear. They 
said that they had posted hateful comments because they were afraid 
for their families, their children and their way of life, which could all be 
disrupted when the migrants entered Slovenia. Moreover, (2) many of 
the commentators argued that they posted their comments in the heat of 
the moment as a result of an instantaneous, reckless decision or wrong 
information provided by the media or, finally, (3) that they only realised 
that their posts crossed the line of hate speech when they were exposed 
by Zlovenija. One comment, for example, included all of the above:
Please delete my picture from the blacklist, since I kind of responded 
hastily with hate speech. There are a lot of posts, some of which are true 
and some are false, which literally make you lose your nerves and you say 
a lot in the heat of the moment. I have 5 children and I am very scared for 
them. Please accept my request [to remove the FB post from Zlovenija].10
The latter argument (not realising hate speech) is not legally convincing. 
One of the main legal principles (lat. “Ignorantia iuris non excusat” 
or “Ignorantia iuris nocet”) stipulates that not knowing the law does 
not exclude the liability of the ignorant individual who violates it. 
Similarly, a rational person is expected to understand that calling for 
the re-introduction of concentration camps, inciting murder, as well as 
using racist and xenophobic language is at least immoral if not illegal 
in a democratic society. However, this argument may be understood 
through the prism of a wide freedom of expression generally enjoyed 
in Slovenia, on the one hand, and a lack of public discussion on the 
topic of hate speech on the other. Both were strengthened by fear and 
10  “Prosim, da izbrišete mojo sliko iz črne top liste, saj sem nekako iz hitrega odziva 
komentirala z sovražnim govorom. Veliko je objav, enih resničnih in enih lažnih, ki 
te dobesedno spravi ob živce in rečeš v efektu marsikaj. Imam 5 otrok in me je zelo 
strah za njih. Prosim, da moji prošnji ugodite”.
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misunderstandings surrounding the migrant crisis, which may have 
given some individuals the courage to post inappropriate content online. 
After Zlovenija put the topic of hate speech at the centre of public 
debates in Slovenia, even Facebook groups that used to incite hatred 
towards migrants started to warn their users not to use language that 
could be recognised as hate speech in order not to be publicly shamed on 
the page (ibid.). Here, it is clear that the intention of the administrators 
of such groups was not to curb the spreading of hate speech online, but 
to protect its users and redirect them to use subtler (but still offensive) 
language. As such, the impact of Zlovenija in mitigating online hate 
speech is evident.
Some of the apologies expressed deep remorse and genuine concern 
as a result of being exposed by Zlovenija. However, reasonable ambiguity 
surrounds the true intent behind the majority of them. The tone of some 
of the apologies leaves no doubt that the only reason for atoning is the 
promise of deleting their post from Zlovenija. Regardless, the rationale 
for introducing the mechanism was to give every exposed individual 
a chance to correct their wrongdoing, and the author(s) of Zlovenija 
never felt moral authority to judge on the sincerity of the apologies and 
substituted the post with an apology whenever someone decided to 
pursue the mechanism of removal (ibid.). 
Media Coverage and the Response of the Wider Public
In the first days after Zlovenija became operational, news about it mostly 
spread through social media sites such as Twitter, but it remained 
largely unnoticed until the posts taken from the Tumblr page appeared 
as posters on random public spaces throughout Ljubljana (ibid.). This 
was not the work of the same author(s) as the online campaign and 
the people responsible remain unidentified to this day. The author(s) 
of Zlovenija find it curious that people did not react while the shaming 
was only happening online, but acknowledged the shaming campaign 
the moment the posts appeared offline: “Although this is ironic, because 
a real-life post will not be seen by 10,000 people, but only by as many 
people as walk by, while a larger group of people will see it online”.11 
11  “Čeprav je to ironično, ker tistega stebra tam ne bo videlo 10.000 ljudi, ampak samo 
toliko, kot jih bo šlo mimo, medtem ko je to na spletu videla večja množica ljudi”.
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(ibid.). However, they seem to have been struck by the publicity brought 
by the posters across Ljubljana and were not prepared to deal with it, 
which ultimately led to the page being shut down. 
It was at this point that the media started reporting about the 
phenomenon, as well as addressing the issue of hate speech surrounding 
the migrant crisis. All five analysed articles refrained from either 
condemning or praising the work of Zlovenija, but raised the question 
of whether or not it was appropriate to put individuals who spread 
hateful comments in an online pillory, in order to highlight the problem 
of hate speech (cf. Milbrandt, this volume). Even the author(s) of the 
page admitted that the method used was drastic, yet also emphasised 
that it should not be evaluated in isolation, but in a broader social 
context (Zlovenija, 2015). The proliferation of online hate speech at 
the peak of the migrant crisis, coupled with the lack of response from 
the authorities, led to what they believed was an intolerable situation. 
In the view of Zlovenija’s author(s), the reaction, therefore, pursued a 
legitimate aim of preventing further escalation of hate directed towards 
the migrants (Interview with Zlovenija, 2018).
As to the wider public, we gather that Zlovenija was met with a 
mixed response. Many members of the public agreed with, and even 
admired the objectives Zlovenija was trying to achieve. On the other 
hand, it was often condemned for being too extreme, and no better than 
the people it was trying to expose. In order to determine the attitude 
of the general public towards the idea of Zlovenija, we first searched 
through popular online platforms and fora, as well as through online 
comments concerning Zlovenija published on Slovenian news websites; 
secondly, we analysed the response published on the page itself 
(“Readers’ letters”). 
Throughout the migrant crisis, the online media in Slovenia faced 
an immense increase in the number of published comments. The 
National Radio Television Web Portal MMC reported that the number of 
comments published for one news article related to migration exceeded 
the number of comments they usually receive daily for all news (FRA 
Update #2, 2015). Due to the unmanageable number of comments that 
needed to be deleted because they either qualified as, or bordered on 
hate speech, the working process of the most frequently visited news 
websites in Slovenia (www.24ur.com) was seriously impaired. This led 
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to them initially limiting online commenting to only one migration-
related news article per day, and later disabling commenting altogether 
(Oštir, 2015). The majority of news websites followed this example and 
limited or disabled online comments on the news relating to migrants, 
including all articles related to Zlovenija. 
Comments referring to Zlovenija can be nevertheless found on 
a variety of news websites, as well as online platforms and fora; they 
are usually hidden among thousands of posts relating to the migrant 
crisis in general (some examples include “Zlovenija  —  careful with 
your opinions”, “Now I am really afraid”, “Refugee crisis in Slovenia 
2015”, “Refugee crisis in Slovenia in 2016”). Even the topics that were 
originally created to comment on the phenomenon of Zlovenija in most 
cases quickly became preoccupied with other issues, and provided 
another platform to express negative and hateful comments. 
The analysis of the comments addressing Zlovenija revealed three 
prevailing themes that can be found in almost any debate surrounding 
it. Firstly, the fear that repeatedly appeared in the apologies posted on 
Zlovenija was also one of the main topics discussed in the online fora. 
However, as well as expressions of the fear of the migrants and the 
Islamisation of Slovenia and Europe as a whole, many users expressed 
concern about a society in which certain individuals freely express 
their wish to use gas chambers and burn people alive, and yearn for the 
return of Hitler or Stalin. 
Second, since the author(s) of Zlovenija remain anonymous to 
this day, almost every discussion about Zlovenija eventually turned 
into accusations, speculation and a guessing game over who created 
the Tumblr page. Journalists and bloggers who reported about the 
phenomenon before it gained widespread attention were frequently 
accused of being Zlovenija’s authors. The rumours led to the public 
exposure of a journalist working for the Slovenian newspaper Delo, even 
though she expressed her doubts about the methods Zlovenija used. 
Some users of social media even went a step further and encouraged 
the “Zlovenijans” to take action and sue the journalist. An eye-catching 
Facebook post, which was reposted numerous times and includes a 
picture of the journalist accused of being the author of Zlovenija, reads:
Nina Kranjčinović, a journalist of Delo and the leader of the page 
Zlovenija. She executed an actual attack on patriotic Slovenians, who 
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care what is happening with Slovenia. I advise anyone that has been 
used to incite hatred by the owners and establishers of this web page and 
whose pictures were published on this extremist web page without their 
permission to join and file a collective action.12 
The last theme, hinted at in the quote above as well, was the discussion 
about Zlovenija’s legal repercussions. However, even the discourse on the 
topic of legality was extremely polarised: on the one hand the question 
of the legality of the original posts was raised and often accompanied by 
discussions about the (in)ability of the Slovenian criminal justice system 
to deal with hate speech. On the other hand, many voiced their concern 
that the page violated the Facebook authors’ rights to privacy, data 
protection laws and copyright protection. Moreover, as some examples 
of shaming have shown, being put to the pillory may have devastating 
consequences for the exposed individuals in their everyday lives, and 
could result in losing their jobs and family disintegration, coupled with 
severe emotional distress due to social isolation (Ronson, 2015; Scheff & 
Schorr, 2017). 
The analysis of the 88 letters that were published on Zlovenija 
reveals a similar divide between the supporters and opponents of 
Zlovenija’s method of holding the mirror up to society: 52% of the 
readers support the idea behind it (46 letters), while 44% of the letters 
express a negative opinion about Zlovenija (39 letters); among them 
15% (12 letters) think that Zlovenija is no better than the original 
shamers it was trying to expose. Extreme polarisation is, in general, a 
key component of hateful comments on Slovenian online news sites, 
as shown by the study of the characteristics and strategies of online 
hate speech conducted by Erjavec & Poler Kovačič (2012). However, 
not all of the readers’ letters were suitable to be published on the 
Tumblr page due to their inappropriate content, which seems to have 
been a continuation of the same hateful rhetoric that surrounded the 
original Facebook posts, but directed instead towards the author(s) of 
Zlovenija (Interview with Zlovenija, 2018). 
12  “Nina Krajčinović, novinarka Dela in voditeljica strani ZLOvenija. Izvršila je dejanski 
napad na domoljubne Slovence katerim ni vseeno kaj se dogaja s Slovenijo. Svetujem 
vsem, ki so jih lastniki in snovalci te spletne strani uporabili za podpihovanje 
sovraštva in njihove slike brez dovoljenja objavili na svoji ekstremistični spletni 
strani, da se zberejo in vložijo skupinsko tožbo”.
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Legal Repercussions
One of the most prevalent themes of the comments referring to Zlovenija 
was its legality, in particular, whether reposting personal information 
along with profile pictures violated the authors’ right to privacy as well 
as infringed intellectual property law. Moreover, questions of legality 
surrounded the very existence of Zlovenija, i.e. the original Facebook 
posts, mostly focusing on the issue of whether they constitute hate 
speech worthy of formal criminal prosecution or not. In the following 
section, we first examine the legality of Zlovenija, and then turn to the 
question of the lawfulness of the hateful Facebook posts and the (lack 
of) prosecution of hate speech in Slovenian courts.
Right to privacy: When assessing the violation of the right to privacy, we 
need to highlight that all posts published by Zlovenija were taken from 
publicly available (“open”) profiles on Facebook. Facebook provides 
different privacy settings, ranging from completely public profiles with 
all content opened to everybody, including people without a Facebook 
profile, to completely closed (“private”) profiles where content can 
only be seen by friends or an even more restricted group, with a variety 
of options in between. Under Facebook’s Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities, when publishing content or information using the 
Public setting “you are allowing everyone, including people off of Facebook, 
to access and use that information, and to associate it with you (i.e., your name 
and profile picture)”. (Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, 
2018, emphasis added.) The courts in the US have continuously held that 
one cannot reasonably expect privacy with respect to the information 
revealed on public social media profiles.13 (Ping Chang, 2019) In Romano 
v. Steelcase the court noted that: 
when plaintiff created her Facebook and MySpace accounts, she consented 
to the fact that her personal information would be shared with others, 
notwithstanding her privacy settings. Indeed, that is the very nature 
and purpose of these social networking sites, else they would cease to 
exist. Since plaintiff knew that her information may become publicly 
available, she cannot now claim that she had a reasonable expectation 
13  See for example People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505(Crim. Ct. 2012); Moreno v. 
Hanford Sentinel, Inc. (Cal. App. 2009).
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of privacy. As recently set forth by commentators regarding privacy and 
social networking sites: given the millions of users, “in this environment, 
privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in 
some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking” (Romano v. 
Steelcase Inc., 2010).
The European Court of Human Rights, on the other hand, has 
repeatedly acknowledged the importance of online anonymity, which 
is a significant factor when assessing whether an individual enjoyed a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, due to the specific nature of online 
activity in which users may choose to remain unidentifiable (Delfi AS 
v. Estonia, 2015). In a case concerning the disclosure of personal data 
from the Internet Service Provider based on a dynamic IP address, the 
Court rejected the (American) reasoning that by knowingly exposing 
his online activity to the public, the applicant waived his expectation of 
privacy. On the contrary, when arguments in favour of finding a violation 
of Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, the Court 
reiterated the importance of the aforementioned online anonymity and 
continued: 
that the fact that he did not hide his dynamic IP address, assuming that 
it is possible to do so, cannot be decisive in the assessment of whether 
his expectation of privacy was reasonable from an objective standpoint 
(Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018).
It is questionable whether the Court would take the same standpoint 
when assessing a reasonable expectation of the privacy of the publicly 
available SNS profiles, since choosing to reveal content to the public 
clearly shows that the individual did not want to remain anonymous 
online.
A recent case (Egill Einarsson v. Iceland, 2018) sheds light on how 
the Court might weigh the right to privacy in cases when individuals 
publish content on open SNS profiles in the future. When assessing 
whether the national courts struck the right balance between the right to 
privacy and freedom of expression, the Court attached some importance 
to the fact that the content was published on an open Instagram profile 
and was therefore accessible not only to the plaintiff’s followers but to 
more than 100,000,000 Instagram users. Referring to its case law, the 
Court stated that: 
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in the light of its accessibility and its capacity to store and communicate 
vast amounts of information, the Internet plays an important role in 
enhancing the public’s access to news and facilitating the dissemination 
of information in general. At the same time, the risk of harm posed 
by content and communications on the Internet to the exercise and 
enjoyment of human rights and freedoms, particularly the right to respect 
for private life, is certainly higher than that posed by the press (ibid.)
Based on this reasoning, it is highly plausible that the Court would not 
find a violation of the right to private life protected in Article 8 of the 
ECHR if the content was published on an open SNS profile.
IP infringement: Facebook’s Terms of Service stipulate that every 
individual is the owner of the content he or she creates and shares on 
Facebook (Facebook Terms of Service, 2018). Firstly, an individual is only 
a holder of the copyright of the content that he himself created. Only 
appearing on a photo or a video does not grant you copyright in that 
photo or video, since the owner of copyright is the author who created 
the work (Copyright and Related Rights Act, 1995). Secondly, not all 
of the content posted on Facebook could be protected by intellectual 
property rights. Certain work is only recognised as copyright work, i.e. 
work protected by copyright, if it meets certain conditions: copyright 
work is (1) an individual intellectual creation, (2) in the domain of 
literature, science and art, (3) which is expressed in any mode (ibid.). 
In order for a work to be protected by copyright, it must involve at least 
a minimum amount of creativity. Names, titles, phrases or slogans are 
usually not protected under copyright, therefore a personal name used 
on Facebook does not enjoy copyright protection. 
On the other hand, photos and videos posted on Facebook could, 
in general, be subject to copyright. However, amateur photographs, 
including a great majority of Facebook pictures, do not reach a required 
level of creativity to be considered a personal intellectual creation and 
are therefore not protected by copyright (Trampuž, Oman & Zupančič, 
1997). In any event, the assessment of whether a photograph is copyright 
work or not has to be made on a case-by-case basis, and the possibility 
that some of the profile pictures reposted on Zlovenija infringed 
copyright cannot be excluded.
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Prosecution of hate speech under Slovenian law: Hate speech lacks a 
universal definition and is not recognised as a uniform legal construct, 
neither in international law, nor in the majority of domestic legal 
systems (McGonagle, 2013). Nevertheless, the Constitution of the 
Republic of Slovenia prohibits any incitement to national, racial, 
religious or other discrimination, and the inflaming of national, racial, 
religious or other hatred and intolerance, as well as incitement of 
violence and war (Constitution of Republic of Slovenia, 1991). 
Particularly serious forms of hate speech, although per se not a criminal 
offence, are also prohibited under criminal law as a criminal offence of 
Public Incitement to Hatred, Violence or Intolerance under Article 297 
of the Slovenian Criminal Code (Criminal Code, 2008). However, the 
case law of Slovenian criminal courts on the issue of hate speech is 
very limited. The conditions that need to be fulfilled for an act to be 
considered criminal pursuant to Article 297 of the Criminal Code are 
very narrowly defined. The prosecution of hate speech is further 
complicated by a legal opinion issued by the Public Prosecutor’s Office 
of the Republic of Slovenia, in which an interpretation of Article 297 
was adopted that is not only substantially different than the plain text 
of that provision, but also factually and legally incorrect (Završnik & 
Zrimšek, 2017).
It seems that, in a conflict between equality, which includes the 
right to be protected from discrimination and eliminating hateful, 
racist, xenophobic speech on the one hand, and protecting the freedom 
of speech and expression on the other, legislature and practice in 
Slovenia opt for the latter. This might be explained by the experience of 
the ex-Yugoslavian regime in which criminal law was often (ab)used 
as a powerful censorship tool. Pursuant to Article 133 of the Criminal 
Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which prohibited 
hostile propaganda, individuals could be prosecuted for verbal 
offences against the state, resulting in limited or even entirely thwarted 
freedom of speech (Bajt, 2017). As a consequence, freedom of speech 
has enjoyed almost unlimited protection since the independence of 
Slovenia, sometimes to the detriment of other human rights. These 
include equality and protection from discrimination, as well as a very 
narrow understanding of hate speech in Slovenian criminal legislation 
and practice. 
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Conclusion: Zlovenija — the Good, the Bad or  
the Necessary?
There is little dispute as to whether Zlovenija’s methods were 
troublesome. The author(s) of Zlovenija themselves claim that it “should 
not exist”, acknowledging the issues with the page’s methods, as well as 
the problematic nature of engaging its targets in one big sweep. 
On the one hand, the reflections of Zlovenija’s author(s) on how 
events unfolded indicate spontaneity, as well as the resentment that 
spurred their actions — this can be observed with regard to how the page 
was created, how its content developed and changed in response to the 
public response and in the way it went dormant. On the other hand, the 
author(s)’ answers indicate nuanced considerations and self-reflection, 
especially with regard to the page’s imagined and actual impact. While 
we easily associate the first two characteristics, i.e. spontaneity and 
resentment, with vigilantism, the other half is harder to reconcile with 
the common understanding of the concept.14 
In particular, Zlovenija’s attitude towards their “victims” seems more 
considerate than expected. Shaming typically entails the perceived 
transgressor becoming the “transgressor-victim” (Cheung, 2014), which 
may or may not be an intended consequence of the shamers (Trottier, 
2018). In the case of Zlovenija this aspect was given a considerate 
amount of thought by the author(s). This emerges from our interview 
with the author(s) and is corroborated by Zlovenija’s conduct in 2015. 
The author(s) expressed some initial concerns about using people’s 
names and faces and the potential consequences their exposure could 
bear, but ultimately decided the cause was worth the risk. Moreover, 
once apologies started to come in, the author(s) were moved and 
immediately proceeded to delete the posts. But most importantly, two 
aspects of the interview with the author(s) stood out: 1) how Zlovenija 
may negatively affect the life of exposed individuals, who may be reckless 
and inappropriate, but are nevertheless ordinary human beings, and 2) 
(self-)questioning about who should have the authority and power to 
change people’s lives. The author(s) stated, that:
14  It bears noting that scholarly interpretations have no qualms in interpreting it as 
such (Johnston, 1996).
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at some point you start to think about it and you realize  —  these are 
people with jobs, families, friends. All of them will be harassed. In a 
way, this is cyber bullying. […] If he loses his job at least he will learn 
something, but on the other hand why am I as a person entitled to make 
this call?15
The author(s) further contemplated both the legitimacy and the legality 
of their actions. All these considerations played an important role when 
deciding to end Zlovenija’s activities and ultimately led to its hibernation 
(Interview with Zlovenija, 2018). 
In this regard, Zlovenija deviates from other examples of naming and 
shaming that aimed to hold individuals accountable for their illegal or 
immoral actions. Public shaming, and especially online shaming, may 
have unpredictable, uncontrollable and disproportionate consequences, 
which can have a lifelong impact on the target. In one of the most 
extreme cases, for example, a woman’s life was turned into wreckage 
after her tweet saying: “Going to Africa. Hope I don’t get AIDS. 
Just kidding. I’m white!” went viral and spurred heated responses 
online. Numerous similar cases of minor online transgressions led to 
unintended and often disproportionate outcomes by destroying lives 
and reputation in the name of righteousness (Ronson, 2015). It seems, 
however, that none of those ‘vigilantes’ shared the concerns voiced 
by Zlovenija’s author(s), or even felt them. Such was the case after 
the white supremacist rally in Charlottesville in 2017, when several 
Twitter accounts shared the pictures of its participants calling out 
their followers to identify them (Milbrandt, this volume; Penza, 2018). 
Several individuals were recognised and, as a consequence, lost their 
jobs, were disavowed by their families, and even received death threats. 
The main difference, however, is that these consequences were sought 
by the authors of the account. However, the participants of the rally 
were not the only ones facing negative consequences, as numerous 
unfounded accusations based on false identification have previously 
been made by Internet vigilantes (Milbrandt, this volume; Phillips & Yi, 
2018). One such notorious example was in the aftermath of the Boston 
15  “Na neki točki začneš razmišljat, to so vsi ljudje, ki imajo družine, prijatelje, službe, 
vsi bodo zdaj šikanirani, na nek način je to kibernetsko nadlegovanje. […] Če sedaj 
izgubi službo, se bo vsaj nekaj naučil, ampak po drugi strani, zakaj sem jaz kot 
(civilna) oseba zdaj to povzročil?”
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Marathon bombing, when Reddit and Twitter users immediately started 
to crowdsource information to identify the suspected bomber whose 
picture was released by the FBI and shared on social media sites. The 
action ended in falsely attributing responsibility for the bombing to a 
missing university student (Starbird et al., 2014).
On the contrary, the intention of Zlovenija’s author(s) was not 
to expose individuals in order to help the authorities with their 
identification or prosecution, nor to ensure that they experienced any 
other negative consequence, albeit some were inherent in the practice. 
Their stated goal was to encourage a discussion on hate speech and to 
point out unacceptable forms of communication. Any consequences 
for these individuals were seen as merely negative side effects, while 
apologies or rationalisations from these individuals were welcomed 
and fostered. In the distinction between exclusionary and reintegrative 
shaming (Braithwaite, 1989), Zlovenija’s approach leans towards the 
latter. Depending on how we define victims of intolerance and hate 
speech, what Zlovenija did may be interpreted as bringing together 
the perpetrators (FB posters) and the community in which they have 
committed their offences — against individual victims (migrants) and 
against the community itself. Moreover, it seems that in some instances 
when seemingly sincere apologies were issued by the perpetrators, the 
page might have been successful in achieving some sort of reintegration.
Another important step in the development of the campaign was 
the decision to end it. As explained earlier, this was largely due to a 
realisation that the author(s) of Zlovenija seem to have had after the 
posts on their Tumblr page were printed and posted around the city 
of Ljubljana. This was, according to the author(s) of Zlovenija, an 
unwanted and unexpected outcome of the online shaming. Although 
it put Zlovenija and hate speech in the centre of the public debate, and 
therefore played an important role in achieving Zlovenija’s goals, this 
course of events was never planned or expected by the author(s) of the 
online campaign. In fact, while admitting that online campaigns may 
have a wider outreach and tangible consequences, the author(s) seem to 
only have realised the full extent of what they were doing when seeing 
posters in a non-digital environment (Interview with Zlovenija, 2018).16 
16  A Brazilian campaign, “Virtual Racism, Real Consequences”, used a similar strategy 
as Zlovenija as it copied racist Facebook and Twitter comments from public profiles. 
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These actions by Zlovenija’s author(s) seem to distinguish their 
campaign from similar campaigns or actions, described in this volume. 
The somewhat reintegrative nature of Zlovenija, discussed above, and 
the consideration of potential unwanted consequences give the action a 
slightly different flavour. 
It seems clear that the initiators of social interventions should show 
reasonable diligence when planning a campaign that will have a social 
impact. This means they should consider and weigh the negative 
consequences of their actions. However, what happens after that is a 
value judgment: should they be held accountable if they fail to prevent 
predictable harm, as manufacturers are similarly liable for the safety of 
their product, or owners are responsible for the damage caused by a 
dangerous object? Accountability in these cases arises from the danger 
such product or activity presents to the individuals or a society. If you 
play with fire, should you be prepared to get burned?
Zlovenija held up a mirror to society in order to highlight the issue of 
hate speech in the public sphere. When it started to attract the attention 
of the press and incited a debate about hate speech, it fulfilled the main 
aim of its author(s), who felt it would be the best for Zlovenija’s legacy 
to end the project while it was still at its peak. (Interview with Zlovenija, 
2018). With every passing day, the debate surrounding Zlovenija 
moved away from the topics it was trying to highlight, shifting from 
the discussion about the limits of free speech in a democratic society 
towards questioning the method Zlovenija used to pursue its goal and 
often claiming that Zlovenija was no better than those it was trying to 
expose. 
Yet even legal frameworks take into consideration, to some extent, 
the intent that guides an individual’s actions in both criminal and 
civil areas. If we evaluate Zlovenija as a social phenomenon through 
the same prism by analyzing only the purpose and goals it was trying 
to achieve, the difference between Zlovenija and hate speech becomes 
more obvious. The stated aim of the campaign, that is, to warn against 
and demonstrate the extent of hate speech, can hardly be deemed 
unjustifiable.
However, the comments were not gathered and exposed online, but published 
on billboards near the homes of the racist commentators with the specific aim of 
alarming the perpetrators (Chang, 2015; Weber 2015). 
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However, the goal may not be completely isolated from the method, 
since the two are inherently intertwined, and it was the method that 
Zlovenija used to pursue its goals that made the whole project so extreme 
and therefore problematic. It boils down to the fundamental question of 
means and ends: should society tolerate any approach in the fight against 
hate speech, or any other illegal or socially undesirable behaviour, as 
long as it is legally permissible, or can we imagine circumstances in 
which the ends can no longer justify the means? Would we also sanction 
an online wall of shame that would expose obese people in order to 
promote a healthy lifestyle? While the aim may still be laudable, the 
method feels even more troubling in such a setting.
Zlovenija as a virtual wall of shame was an exceptional reaction to 
exceptional online behaviour provoked by exceptional circumstances. It 
was the result of an extraordinary set of circumstances, and is distinctive 
in how it illustrated social tensions that culminated in citizen-to-citizen 
exchanges in pursuit of justice. However, in a functional democratic 
society in which the government is fulfilling its basic duties, there 
should be no need for it to occur in the first place.
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‘Make them famous’:  





“If you recognize any of the Nazis marching…send me their names/
profiles and I’ll make them famous” (@YesYoureRacist). These words 
helped to propel an effective — if somewhat controversial — social media 
campaign in August 2017, when members of the public were sought to 
help identify participants who were filmed and photographed during 
a widely publicised and violent white supremacist rally that transpired 
in the streets of Charlottesville, USA. Following their identification, 
otherwise anonymous rally participants were broadly exposed (‘outed’) 
within their broader communities and across their social networks. 
This opened them up to adverse effects that extended beyond the 
symbolic realm of the digital-media-sphere. Operating as both informal 
punishment and public pedagogy, this grassroots campaign of “digital 
vigilantism” (Trottier, 2017) carried a tacit warning to possible future 
participants at similar public events: appear at your peril.
This chapter explores the socio-moral complexities of digital 
vigilantism (DV) through an interpretive and visual sociological case 
study of this campaign. Broadly, DV may be defined as “a process where 
1  I would like to thank Daniel Trottier for all that he has done to make this timely 
collection possible. I would also like to thank Doug Harper for offering his visual 
sociological eye to earlier iterations of this chapter. Much appreciated!
© Tara Milbrandt, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0200.09
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citizens are collectively offended by other citizen activity, and coordinate 
retaliation on mobile devices and social platforms” (Trottier, 2017, p. 
55). While they are not equivalent, one possible and often prominent 
component of DV is “doxing”, which involves the excavation and online 
circulation of otherwise personal information about subjects, released 
non-consensually by a third party. This tactic is generally deployed 
to publicly shame or otherwise harm identified subjects by virtue of 
such intractable exposure.2 In the case at hand, DV work was primarily 
focused upon a type of “deanonymizing doxing” (Douglas, 2016). 
Doxing practices are morally controversial due to the disproportionate 
harms they can open people up to (e.g. harassment, threats, violence), 
their privacy-violating dimensions and the affront they may represent to 
the “sacredness” of the modern person (Joas, 2013). However, the public 
nature of the events that materialised in Charlottesville in August 2017, 
and their perceived significance  —  as marking a dangerous moment 
in contemporary US history — created fertile conditions for what one 
commentator called a “shame pass” (Teitel, 2017, para. 4) to apply. In 
the prolific public discourse these events generated, some commentators 
questioned whether or not it was reasonable for a participant in such a 
high-profile event to expect to remain anonymous afterwards, anyway, 
and so, could “outing” rally-goers even be considered a violation?
This chapter begins with some contextualising of the original 
event — the Charlottesville rally — to highlight the broader constellation 
of circumstances that empowered the social media call and response 
to identify and expose participants, far and wide. Following this, I 
formulate the creative, rhetorical and moral dimensions of this social 
media campaign, focusing on the nature of its call to action, and 
analyzing specific demonstrations of its putative success. Approaching 
DV as a complex “member’s method” for creating and maintaining a 
sense of order from below (cf Garfinkel, 1967), I analyze the complex 
interplay of images and words found in prominent social media postings, 
foregrounding the tacitly shared understandings that energised 
this campaign, and which rendered its call to action meaningful. 
2  Doxing, or as it is sometimes spelled “doxxing”, originated in hacking culture and 
was made globally famous by the Internet group “Anonymous” (see Coleman, 
2015). For an in-depth conceptual elaboration on doxing, and its variants, see 
Douglas, 2016; this volume). 
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Throughout, I attend to the imagined audience of strangers that was 
given presence through the Twitter account “YesYoureRacist”: dispersed 
allies united by a shared definition of urgency, and willing to suspend 
moral reservations over its DV tactics by participating in, or otherwise 
supporting, a campaign to make Charlottesville rally-goers ‘famous’. 
Finally, I formulate what this social media campaign arguably achieved 
and what, specifically, it contributed to the collective conversation and 
aftermath of Charlottesville 2017. Drawing inferences from a doomed 
anniversary rally that occurred one year later, I speculate on its broader 
societal implications.
Above all, I argue that it helped to crystallise a broadly felt and 
unified refusal of the terrain that was being sought by organisers, 
participants and supporters of the Charlottesville rallies, namely, to 
legitimate the articulation of violent white supremacy in contemporary 
American public life as but one kind of ‘expression’ amongst others. 
Utilising the tools of digital media, it worked to deny the possibility that 
participants — present and future — could attend a rally associated with 
such sought-after legitimation anonymously, and thus without risk or 
consequence to their future selves. This went beyond the condemnation 
of a disturbing event. By getting personal, this DV campaign introduced 
a dangerous type of “fatefulness” into rally participation, by creating 
conditions in which later exposure amounted to a loss of control for 
the pictured participant (Goffman, 1967). This included reputational 
harm and exclusion from full social participation. In doing so, it helped 
to constitute opposition to what the rally represented on deeply socio-
moral grounds, irreducible to legalistic definitions of protected forms 
of speech and assembly. Positive participation in the rally could not be 
represented as one’s mere alignment with one controversial ‘side’ or 
position amongst others, within a pluralistic social landscape. Rather, it 
amounted to becoming morally tainted through one’s association with a 
deplorable and destructive force against a pluralistic social world.
Throughout the study, I highlight the mixed nature of visibility 
(cf. Brighenti, 2007). I emphasise what this case reveals about its 
simultaneously emboldening and dis-empowering possibilities in 
a digital-media-infused public culture, where expressive conduct 
undertaken in one setting and time may come back to haunt actors 
later and elsewhere, especially when representations are placed before 
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different and unanticipated audiences. As a heuristic strategy to 
understand the significance of DV within today’s digital-media-infused 
landscape, I ask the reader to consider this question: what would have 
been different about Charlottesville 2017 without the social media campaign 
aimed at identifying and outing participants before a broader public? 
The materials I draw from are widely available in the public sphere: 
social media postings, news media reports, public comments, audio-
video materials found on the Internet in the form of posted footage, 
and a short news documentary. In keeping with my primary analytic 
interests, and out of an ethical commitment to not reproducing the 
phenomenon under investigation — whether in the form of unwanted 
or sought-after notoriety on the part of participants previously unheard 
of — I have opted to anonymise these materials in my re-presentation 
of them.3
A Potent Constellation of Circumstances: 
Contextualising a Social Media Campaign
To understand the social media campaign aimed at ‘outing’ 
Charlottesville rally participants, specifically how it worked, what it did, 
and what it reveals about DV and the complexities of public visibility 
in contemporary society, it is important to understand the exceptional 
circumstances in which it took shape, gained traction and became — for 
the most part — defined as morally acceptable, and even virtuous citizen 
activity.
A Contentious Rally: Charlottesville, 2017
On 12 August 2017 a “Unite the Right” rally was held in Charlottesville, 
USA in the city’s recently re-named Emancipation Park.4 Hundreds of 
3  This does not include individuals who were already high-profile and/or 
recognisable public figures prior to the events being considered.
4  The park’s name has been a source of significant recent controversy. In under two 
years it moved from being called “Robert E. Lee Park” after Confederate general 
Robert E. Lee (until May 2017), to “Emancipation Park”, standing for a social 
ideal (June 2017-July 2018). In July 2018 it was re-named again, this time with the 
conspicuously politically neutral name of “Market Street Park”, which is its current 
name (at the time of writing). 
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participants converged at a pre-rally march the night before on the 
University of Virginia grounds. This was catalyzed by a controversial 
municipal decision (3:2) to remove Confederate monuments from 
two city parks, and in particular a statue of Robert E. Lee, who was a 
Confederate States Army soldier and commander (between 1862–1865) 
during the American Civil War. This statue, like Lee’s legacy, is a site of 
significant ongoing controversy.5 Its immanent removal was the stated 
impetus for the rally in Charlottesville, whose organisers equated the 
removal to a problematic rewriting of history.
While the social issue of how to address historical monuments is 
complex, it is important to be clear that the version of American history 
being defended here was tied indisputably to groups and sentiments 
associated with violent white supremacy, including anti-Semitism, and 
advocates for a white ethnostate.6 The August events followed smaller 
rallies held that same summer. One in May was organised by a high-
profile white supremacist speaker in the US, who offered a Nazi-style 
salute and shout of “Hail Trump, hail our people, hail our victory” 
during a speech following the US election result announcement of 
Donald Trump’s presidency in 2016 (Global News, 2016). The second, 
in July, was organised by a branch of the Ku Klux Klan called the called 
the Loyal White Knights. 
Not coincidentally, a poster promoting the August rally (Fig. 9.1) 
contained symbolism reminiscent of fascist propaganda films such as 
Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will (1935), along with a listing of the 
names of several known (in the US) and “proud white nationalists” 
(MSNBC News, 2017b). A mythical and militaristically ordered image 
5  After the violence in Charlottesville in August 2017, the family descendants of 
Robert E. Lee, as well as Jefferson Davis and Stonewall Jackson, called for the 
Confederate statues to be removed from the park, suggesting that they would be 
more appropriately exhibited in a museum. For further background and detail on 
the controversy over Confederate monuments in Charlottesville, see “Blue Ribbon 
Commission on Race, Memorials, and Public Spaces Report to Charlottesville 
City Council”, December 19, 2016. This committee was formed in 2016 and was 
tasked with addressing recent controversies pertaining to historic monuments in 
Charlottesville, Virginia. 
6  Regardless of the complex factors (economic, cultural, biographical) that might 
have ‘motivated’ different people to attend and participate in such an event, there is 
an indisputable violation of modern social justice ideals at work. Such groups and 
sentiments are premised on a racist hierarchy that presumes essential differences in 
value and ‘rightful’ social position amongst different categories of people.
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of a victorious future is implied, with soldiers standing guard, ready to 
sacrifice themselves for a glorious cause; there is a “hailing” (Althusser, 
1970) of the imagined participant who is willing to play a part in such 
an endeavor, who may be emotionally stirred by an idea of restoring 
‘greatness’. In light of the above, the presence of overtly racist and anti-
Semitic symbolism during the rally would have come as no surprise to 
attendees in August, thereby invalidating the possibility for anyone to 
later claim ignorance or innocence. 
Fig. 9.1  Unknown creator, “Unite the Right” Charlottesville rally poster, August 
2017, published under fair use. 
An Inter-Tribal Assembly of the “Far-Right” 
The stated intention of the August 2017 rally was “to unify the white 
nationalist movement” across the US, according to one prominent 
organiser.7 Also dubbed an event in support of “freedom of speech”, it 
7  This organiser, Damigo, is founder of “Identity Evropa”, which is an American 
neo-Nazi and white-supremacist organisation founded in March 2016, which was 
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drew together approximately five hundred supporters, many of whom 
were affiliated with different groups and organisations, including 
members of various white-nationalist and white-supremacist 
groups — including chapters of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), neo-
Confederates, neo-Nazis and members of organised militia groups.8 
Participants came together as a single ‘we’ in shared physical spaces, 
marching and moving through these spaces, shouting and chanting 
slogans in unison. 
Fig. 9.2  CNN Screengrab, Charlottesville “torch” march, August 12, 2017, CNN News, 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/12/us/white-nationalists-tiki-torch-march-
trnd/index.html
The sights and sounds of participants openly and enthusiastically 
engaging with globally condemned symbols associated with some 
of modern humanity’s most deplorable events circulated widely in 
the streets of Charlottesville, as seen in the prolific mainstream news 
reports and videos posted online by media workers, photographers, 
spectators and participants. Many attendees were seen giving Nazi 
salutes, and heard chanting phrases such as “white lives matter”, 
“white power”, “you will not replace us”, “Jews will not replace us” 
and Nazi-associated slogans, such as “blood and soil” (CNN, 11 August 
2017). Several participants held KKK paraphernalia, Confederate 
flags and objects featuring potent symbols of global injustice such as 
swastikas (see Olesen, 2016). Many carried torches, producing visually 
dramatic effects in global media representations of the gathering 
(Fig. 9.2). Joined with such slogans and signage, the use of flaming 
rebranded three years later as “American Identity Movement”.
8  See “Unite the Right Rally”, on Wikipedia.org for a useful, descriptive overview of 
the rally. See also “2017: The Year in Hate and Extremism”, by Heidi Beirich and Susy 
Buchanan, Southern Poverty Law Center, Spring 2018 Issue, https://www.splcenter.
org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2018/2017-year-hate-and-extremism
222 Introducing Vigilant Audiences
torches was visually potent, as it is a well-known symbol of anti-black 
intimidation used by the KKK in the US post-Civil war period, and 
of anti-Semitic intimidation in Nazi Germany in the 1930s and 1940s 
(Bond, 2017). While positive engagement with such sights and signs 
may violate global ideals associated with a diverse and viable modern 
society  —  including human dignity, equality and inclusion  —  their 
public display and articulation in the US are constitutionally protected 
as “expressive” activity.
“Extreme” and “violent” manifestations of “white nationalism” have 
become a significant and “growing concern around the world” in recent 
years, not just in the US (Carranco & Milton, 2019, para. 8). Supporters of 
far-right, anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant groups, and those advocating 
for a white ethno-state, have been self-consciously working to move 
away from the cultural and political margins, infiltrating mainstream 
institutions in parts of Europe, as well as within the US and Canada. 
A key finding by a Swedish researcher who infiltrated the alt-right 
movement in Europe for a year, and marched with white supremacists 
in Charlottesville in 2017, is that participants in such groups are seeking 
ultimately to “change the culture” by “making their ideas mainstream”. 
Working to shift the limits of acceptable speech further and further 
to the political right, this includes a sought-after ability to freely give 
expression to “their racist ideas in the public square” (Hermansson, 
quoted in Illing, 2017, para. 9).
In the language of French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1995[1912]), 
the Charlottesville rally can be considered an inter-tribal assembly of 
the far-right in America. It was symbolically connected with similar 
collective formations across the broader Western world at this time, 
especially in parts of Europe.9 In his classic study of religion, Durkheim 
emphasised the significance of “reunions, assemblies and meetings” 
for members of groups to “uphold and reaffirm… the collective 
sentiments and the collective ideas which makes [their] unity and 
personality”. Such concentrated events can be potent occasions of 
9  These include Europe’s Generation Identity, Scandanavia’s Nordic Resistance 
Movement, Canada’s Aryan Guard, and the UK-based neo-Nazi group Combat 18, as 
well as the increasingly influential far-right, anti-immigrant and populist political 
parties such as Greece’s Golden Dawn, Hungary’s Jobbik, Germany’s AfD and Italy’s 
Lega Norda (now called Lega), to name but a selection.
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moral remaking; through being “closely united to one another”, group 
members “reaffirm in common their common sentiments” (Durkheim, 
1995[1912], pp. 474–5). Qualitatively unlike online spaces, events 
involving physical co-presence are uniquely powerful as they provide 
concrete occasions for participants to shore up shared beliefs and 
sentiments through enacted social practices, such as marching, 
cheering and chanting together (Rawls, 2001). Icons and symbols that 
express group sentiments are thereby “evoked and revitalized” (Inglis, 
2017, p. 308). If this is what made the Charlottesville events exciting 
for the organisers, attendees and supporters of “uniting the right”, for 
the concerned moral majority, it was what made them frightening.
Counter-Rally
The events in Charlottesville drew forth a broad range of groups and 
individuals from civil society who passionately opposed virtually 
everything that the “Unite the Right” assemblages represented. In 
audio-visual footage, anti-racist counter-protestors can be heard 
shouting down the voices of “Unite the Righters” with slogans such as, 
“…No Nazis, no KKK, no fascist USA…”. The significant counter-rally 
that the Charlottesville assembly inspired was composed of members 
of diverse groups from local residents and businesses; students and 
faculty; members of faith-based, labour and socialist groups; civil 
rights organisations; and members of anti-racist and anti-fascist social 
movements, some of whom support the use of direct action, most 
notably under the banners of Black Lives Matter (BLM) and Antifa. 
This counter-rally represented a different vision of society, associated 
with modern social justice ideals and animated by a shared need to 
gather, demonstrate, struggle for, and in diverse ways, enact shared 
opposition to what “Unite the Right” represented here. It was in 
general alignment with these ideals, the belief that what was on display 
should be afforded no legitimate place in contemporary society, and the 
perception that this occurrence signified a moment of real and present 
danger in the US, that the social media call to “make [rally participants] 
famous” took shape and gained traction.
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State of Emergency: Danger and Violence
Following several physically violent exchanges and incidents involving 
white-supremacy-affiliated rallygoers and anti-racist counter-protesters, 
on the morning of 12 August a state of emergency was declared. The 
assembly was defined as unlawful, and the State Governor announced 
that without additional powers, public safety could not be safeguarded. 
Most tragically, four hours after the social media call to “make them 
famous” was issued, a man associated with one of the white supremacist 
groups drove his car into a crowd of counter-protestors, killing civil-
rights activist Heather Heyer and seriously injuring several others. In 
addition to the violence on the streets, numerous accounts and 
documentary representations from that day suggested that law 
enforcement was not effectively protecting people, especially members 
of targeted groups, from threat and violence. This included a disturbing 
video that circulated online showing an African American man being 
savagely beaten by six white men, as well as urgent calls for police 
protection, left unaddressed, by Jewish members inside a synagogue 
threatened with violence outside.10 Reflecting the tumultuous nature of 
the entire event, two state police officers also died in a helicopter crash 
while monitoring the streets below. There was much fear, violence and 
carnage, as early opponents to the rally had predicted.
VICE News Documentary: Potent Symbolism, Public 
Visibility, Dangerous Legitimacy
Dramatic images from the rally, publicised extensively around the 
digital-media-connected world, circulated on the 24/7 news cycle. A 
particularly influential representation took the form of a twenty-minute 
documentary called Charlottesville: Race and Terror, made on the scene 
by VICE News. It aired the next night, generating over 50 million views 
across multiple viewing platforms. The film was itself treated as a 
news story within international media, “lay[ing] bare [the] horror of 
neo-Nazis in America” (Gabbatt, 2017). Three prominent themes can 
be distilled from this documentary, which form an important cultural 
10  The man was charged with assaulting a white supremacist, but was later acquitted 
(Shapira, 2018).
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backdrop for understanding the significance of the events and most 
importantly, for present purposes, to understand the nature of the social 
media response and DV campaign they elicited.
Fig. 9.3  VICE News screengrab, August 21, 2017, https://www.vice.com/en_ca/
article/qvzn8p/vice-news-tonight-full-episode-charlottesville-race-and-
terror and The Guardian News screengrab, August 16, 2017, https://www.
theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/16/charlottesville-neo-nazis-vice-news-hbo
One striking feature was how brazenly participants and organisers 
interviewed by Elle Reeve of VICE News expressed racist and specifically 
white supremacist sentiments that are normally prohibited — at least 
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informally — from public expression in American public life. Anti-black 
and anti-Semitic statements were made repeatedly, with confidence, and 
without shame. For example, one participant explained, “We’re showing 
this class of anti-white vermin that this is our country” (VICE News, 
2017). Some of the participants spoke openly about their willingness to 
use violence, if deemed “necessary”, particularly the high-profile alt-
right activist Christopher Cantwell, who revealed a cache of guns to the 
reporter.
A second striking theme was the emphasis on being public; showing 
America that they were not an “Internet meme” but were, rather, “a big 
real presence that can organise in physical space” (Reeve, in VICE News, 
2017). Vocal participants articulated the belief that these rallies marked 
a turning point for the far right, making reference to anticipated future 
events and guided by a hierarchical vision that this is “our” country 
(and so, not “theirs”).
A third theme was participants’ focus on being law-abiding citizens 
whose expressive activities were protected by the US First Amendment. 
Speakers noted their proper use of bureaucratic procedures, e.g. in 
obtaining a legal march permit in advance. Participants framed the rally 
as formally legitimate, i.e. compliant within the current legal-rational 
order (Weber, 1978). A couple of participants from Quebec, who were 
later “outed” as recruiters on an anti-racist website based in Canada, 
mocked the Canadian legal-moral context, stating that in Canada you 
can “get arrested for hurting somebody’s feelings” (VICE News, 2017).11
As condensed in this news documentary, the rally was performatively 
announcing, to America and beyond, that what can be seen and heard 
on the streets of Charlottesville has a legitimate and growing place in 
contemporary society.12 It sought to constitute the cultural legitimacy of 
such expression, by giving it manifestation in the camera-filled public 
realm of co-present persons and to the gaze of local, national and global 
11  See Curtis et al. (2018). “Alt-right in Montreal: How Charlottesville exposed the 
key players in the local white nationalist movement”, in Montreal Gazette, 14 May 
2018, https://montrealgazette.com/news/local-news/alt-right-in-montreal-how-
charlottesville-exposed-the-key-players-in-the-local-white-nationalist-movement
12  The Canadian contingent implied that what took place was part of a trans-national 
social movement, not something only relevant or meaningful to residents of 
Charlottesville, Virginians or Americans who feel that they have something to lose 
by the removal of Lee’s statue from the park.
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news media. It was performative, in that it sought to “realize” what it 
was claiming already existed (Butler, 2015, pp. 28–29); its “successful” 
enactment implied the possibility of future re-enactment (Blitefield, 
2006). 
The perceived significance of the rally was effectively summed up 
in an article written by Matt Thompson and published in The Atlantic 
on day two of the Charlottesville events. Drawing attention to the 
conspicuous absence of participant concealment, the journalist likened 
the rally to a “pride march” for violent white supremacy: 
[T]he images we saw in Charlottesville today and yesterday […] draw 
their menace not from what is there — mostly, young white men in polos 
and T-shirts goofily brandishing tiki torches — but from what isn’t: the 
masks, the hoods, the secrecy that could at least imply a sort of shame […] 
We used to whisper these thoughts, the new white supremacists suggest. But 
now we can say them out loud. The ‘Unite the Right’ rally wasn’t intended 
to be a Klan rally at all. It was a pride march […] The shameless return 
of white supremacy into America’s public spaces seems to be happening 
by degrees, and quickly… (Thompson, 2017, para. 4–5, emphasis in 
original). 
Highlighting the strikingly blatant nature of what could be seen, the 
concerned reader is left with the frighteningly unanswerable question: 
what is next…? The ensuing DV campaign can be understood in response 
to this concern, as a concerted attempt to deny the participants the cover 
of remaining anonymous in the days that followed.
Moral Equivalence as Implied Affinity:  
A Presidential Response 
Now infamously, US President Trump did not initially denounce white 
supremacists by name. In his first public statements on 13 August, 
Trump condemned what he called “this egregious display of hatred, 
bigotry and violence on many sides; [brief pause], on many sides” 
(CNN, 2017). He also noted on 15 August that “you had people, that 
were very fine people, on both sides.”(CNBC News, 2017, emphasis 
added). Critics — including members of the Republican Party — widely 
condemned Trump for implying moral equivalence, which was widely 
taken to imply his ideological affinity with white supremacy. Prominent 
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members of the ‘alt-right’, including former KKK leader David Duke, 
certainly interpreted it that way, identifying Trump as an heroic ally in a 
much-reported-upon Tweet: “Thank you President Trump for your 
honesty & courage to tell the truth about #Charlottesville & condemn 
the leftist terrorists in BLM/Antifa” (Duke, cited in Price, 2017).
The ominous spectacle of violent white nationalism and white 
supremacy in twenty-first-century public culture was given an additional 
layer of urgency by a populist President’s refusal to name or condemn 
it as such. Offering a stark contrast, in a country grappling with similar 
formations including the rise of the far-right AfD political party, and 
speaking to the global significance of the events in Charlottesville, 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel offered this comment, “It is racist, 
far-right violence, and clear, forceful action must be taken against 
it, regardless of where in the world it happens” (Merkel, quoted in 
Wildman, 2017, para. 1).
“Make Them Famous”: Understanding a Campaign of  
Digital Vigilantism
As and after the events transpired in Charlottesville, multiple online 
sites and feeds were created and/or used to identify and subsequently 
expose otherwise anonymous rally participants as such, to people 
within their home communities and institutional affiliations. The 
popular Twitter account “@YesYoureRacist” (YYR), which I primarily 
focus on, was the highest profile and most coordinated example of this. 
Its creator called upon others — online allies, far and wide, members of 
the public who shared concern and outrage for what was occurring in 
Charlottesville’s public realm — to help him “make them [rally 
participants] famous”. Some celebrities used their status to supplement 
and amplify such efforts, including American actress Jennifer Lawrence, 
who posted this note on her Facebook profile, addressed to her sixteen-
million-plus Facebook followers, above four images from the rally: 
“These are the faces of hate. Look closely and post anyone you find. You 
can’t hide with the Internet you pathetic cowards!” (Lawrence, quoted 
in Wiest, 2017, para. 4). As this comment implies, the Internet creates 
new conditions for otherwise anonymous individuals to become 
“unmasked” when they participate in socially maligned events in the 
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public sphere, as long as there are willing and able collaborators, and 
platforms accessible for such work.
YYR was created in 2012 by a young anti-racist activist from North 
Carolina. Essentially, it is an online space in which participants ‘call 
out’ instances of everyday racism, mostly occurring within the United 
States, including offensive statements made by President Trump and 
his supporters, by celebrities and public figures, as well as ordinary 
people who claim to be ‘not racist, but…’. Screenshots of later deleted 
social media posts are often re-posted, along with brief ripostes. Rooted 
in a type of digital accountability, where people’s fleeting words and 
deeds “live on” in ways that cannot be un-said or un-done, such a space 
creates a type of “mediated solidarity” (Dant, 2012, p. 50–1) within a 
structurally unequal and highly fractured society. Here, manifestations 
of racism and white supremacy  —  whether obvious or subtle  —  are 
identified, reproduced and denounced by a vigilant association of like-
minded others who are similarly keeping watch, however geographically 
dispersed they may be.
Fig. 9.4  Logan Smith, YesYoureRacist Twitter screengrab, August 12, 2017, 
https://twitter.com/YesYoureRacist?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwca
mp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor
Building on this existing feed, and in response to its founder’s call-
to-action, YYR gained over 300,000 followers the weekend after the 
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Charlottesville rally, reaching close to 350,000 by 15 August 2017. 
Throughout the summer and into late autumn of 2017 YYR garnered 
392,000 followers, morphing for a concentrated period of time into 
a space primarily focused on DV activities related specifically to 
identifying and exposing Charlottesville rally-goers.
Although neither the activist behind this campaign nor YYR 
supporters utilise such terminology, conceptually, this social media 
campaign fits several criteria for “digital vigilantism”, as developed 
by media scholar and sociologist Daniel Trottier. Galvanising members 
of the digitally connected public to participate in the denunciation 
of rally participants, it worked as a form of “weaponized visibility” 
by creating  —  or threatening to create  —  forms of visibility through 
the posting of digital materials. Its public manifestations and effects 
were “unwanted”, “intense” and “enduring” (Trottier, 2017, p. 55) for 
subjects. In response to deeply felt offence over what was occurring in 
Charlottesville, and using the threat of infamy, digital media activists 
disrupted any expectation of anonymity or temporal boundedness that 
may have been presumed by rally-goers. Physical and digital spaces 
were creatively connected through these efforts to identify and expose 
the rally’s attendees, and presumed temporal boundaries were broken. 
The social consequences of past activities during a tumultuous weekend 
spilled into the future for correctly identified participants. New kinds 
of risks and possibilities were thereby introduced into their lives, 
outside of the temporal, spatial and social boundaries of the original 
events. While the use of such tactics may appear exceptional at first 
glance, they mirror practices of online communication that have become 
commonplace amongst social media users around the world. As Trottier 
puts it, “an increase in online sharing of personal information  —  as 
evidenced from the growth of services like Facebook, Twitter and 
Instagram — contributes to DV, as they provide both a platform and a 
set of practices that render DV meaningful and practical” (ibid., p. 61). 
Such practices contribute to a blurring of the border between private 
and public domains, and also between spectating audience member and 
citizen-activist.
Let us next explore this campaign and its consequences in more 
empirical detail. How was it put forth and taken up? What were the 
members of its intended audience, recipients who were sympathetic to 
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the call to “make [rally-goers] famous”, presumed to know and assume 
about the social world (cf. Schutz, 1953), as applied to the example at 
hand? How was subject identification given moral justification, and how 
was “success” being tacitly defined through this DV campaign? What 
was actually accomplished and what, overall, has this DV campaign 
contributed to the Charlottesville story and beyond? While it has 
become common to skim over posted content in our speedy and reactive 
digital-media-saturated culture, in order to generate critical insight into 
the subtle workings of contemporary culture, it is important to slow 
down in our interpretive work of socially impactful texts and images, to 
understand how things mean (Rose, 2016). 
A Digital Call to Action and its Anticipated Audience
Fig. 9.5  Logan Smith, YesYoureRacist Twitter screengrab, “Social media call to 
action”, August 12, 2017 and MSNBC News screengrab, “naming and 
shaming”, August 15, 2017, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/
logan-smith-activist-behind-yesyoureracist-outs-charlottesville-white-
nationalists-twitter-n792936
“If you recognize any of the Nazis marching in #Charlottesville, send me 
their names/profiles and I’ll make them famous #GoodNightAltRight 9:43 
AM–Aug 12, 2017” (@YesYoureRacist). This digital media call to action 
was made on day two of the “Unite the Right” rallies in Charlottesville, 
which indicated an emergent  —  not pre-planned  —  understanding 
that the marchers ‘should’ be publicly identified. Four photos were 
assembled beneath these words, which depicted mostly clean-cut 
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young white men — framed as “Nazis marching” — carrying bamboo 
torches while congregating during a night-time demonstration against 
the backdrop of a prominent university building. A socially complex 
argument is made through this compilation of words and images, which 
we shall consider in some detail. 
Words: The textual call is addressed to a general “you”. “If you 
recognize any of the Nazis marching in #Charlottesville…” (Fig. 9.5). 
Members of its intended audience are presumed to understand that 
“Nazis marching” refers to persons associated with violent racism, 
extreme, and potentially fascistic beliefs and practices, including but 
not limited to anti-Semitism. They are also assumed to be social-media 
literate, for instance, to know that images from the rally can be found 
that other people have posted online, which depict still-anonymous 
participants (#Charlottesville and #GoodNightAltRight). This open call 
invites any connected reader to take (digital) action by engaging in such 
identification work, to move from a passively concerned member of the 
public to one who is actively engaged in “Internet sleuthing”.13 
A digital division of labour is established, with the curator at the 
other end, promising to utilise the platform and his cultural resources to 
make once-identified subjects “famous”. The receptive audience member 
(the “you”) is presumed to know and assume that such infamy will be 
consequential for the pictured rally-goer in a negative way and that this is 
a good thing. The question of what it will mean to subject rally participants 
to negative infamy within an expansive social sphere, unable to conceal 
such participation after the dust settles in Charlottesville, and what 
could be “good” about such public visibility, is left implicit. Whereas 
in countries such as Germany, where the display of Nazi symbolism is 
legally prohibited as hate speech, and such exposure can lead to formal 
charges, in the current American context the consequences of such DV 
tactics lie primarily within the socio-moral sphere.
Images: The four assembled images reinforce the textual message at the 
same time as the words help to explain the significance of what can be 
seen there. The words and the images are thus mutually reinforcing. 
13  For two recent studies that explore facets of “Internet sleuthing” see Myles et al. 
(2017) and Yardley et al. (2016).
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Appearing as otherwise ordinary college students, the pictured 
participants depart from stereotypical images of a neo-Nazi, such as the 
armed men interviewed for the VICE news documentary, at the same 
time as they are described as “Nazis marching”. Their conventional, 
clean-cut and more or less middle-class appearance is reinforced against 
the backdrop of a socially respectable institution —  the University of 
Virginia. Participants appear casually oblivious to being photographed; 
nobody is masking his face or appears reticent about his visibility here. 
In the prominent image, the torch-bearing men appear as if they are 
moving towards their social media audience, whose receptive members 
are being explicitly called upon to take action. 
Responding to a Social Media Call to ‘Name and Shame’
Dozens of images of primarily white male participants were posted 
onto YYR, with words implying that the pictured subjects needed 
to be identified, that doing so was morally justified and that readers 
should re-tweet (RT) such images (Fig. 9.6). Images typically focused 
on individual participants. This had the effect of stripping each of the 
anonymising cover of the crowd. If, in the crowded streets and parks, 
like-minded others offered kinship and strength in numbers, this 
protective cover was dissolved in the individualising spaces that were 
created online. Organisationally, these compilations resembled police 
‘wanted’ posters. Often appearing in mid-chant, evidence of the social 
‘crime’ was contained in the image: the pictured subjects could be seen 
as self-incriminating, as willing and enthusiastic agents, through their 
visible participation in a maligned event and implied association with 
symbolic expressions of violence, hatred and racism.14 
What happens between the posted image and the positive 
identification is left opaque. The invisible work of doing Internet 
sleuthing  —  here, of connecting faces in pictures with names of 
verifiable people — creates an asymmetrical relation of visibility. Such 
work, revealed by its effects, seems both magical and inevitable. Once a 
picture is posted, it seems as if it is an omniscient Internet that is doing 
14  Such visualising tactics are comparable to how Michel Foucault (1977) described 
and formulated the “art of punishing” in modern schools, factories and prisons 
through disciplinary processes of individuation.
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such work, and that it is merely a matter of time before anonymous faces 
are rendered identifiable. 
Next let us formulate what ‘success’ meant in this context by exploring 
some prominent examples of positive identification. Success in this DV 
context involved two dimensions: correct identification and evidence of 
offline effects, i.e. practical intervention into the lives of others. 
Fig. 9.6 YesYoureRacist Twitter screengrab, “RT to identify”, August 12, 2017.
The Meanings of Successful Identification 
A former employee: The first posted instance of successful identification 
involved a young man from California, who reportedly lost his job as a 
result of being correctly identified as a Charlottesville rally participant. 
Framed for its audience as an update, and demonstrating the efficacy of 
the social media campaign and Internet sleuthing work that was 
invisibly taking place, the post noted that the now exposed individual 
“no longer has a job” (Fig. 9.7). 
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Fig. 9.7 YesYoureRacist Twitter screengrab, “Update”, August 13, 2017.
Sociologically, it is important to consider what is presumed to be self-
evidently positive about such a development. A clue can be found in the 
former employer’s note that was included in the social media post, next 
to a photograph from the rally with an identifiable man — presumably 
the former employee — holding a torch and positioned in the center. 
After expressing its thanks for “bringing this to our attention”, an 
apology is offered for a “delayed response”. By noting it was “inundated 
with inquiries” regarding its (now former) employee’s attendance at 
the rally, the business makes known to the reader that this “incident” is 
considered significant by a multitude of unseen members of the public. 
It is stated that, “We feel it is imperative to let you know that [he] is no 
longer employed [here]”(Fig. 7).
A sense of perceived urgency and civic duty is suggested in this 
communication; the business is hereby publicising to the wider world 
that they no longer have a formal association with the man seen in 
the picture. The note is more than factual information; it carries moral 
overtones that imply responsibility on the part of this organisation (a 
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local business) to a broader public, to announce that its contractual 
relationship with the man who attended the rally has been terminated. 
Signs also appeared in the shop window, and inserts were placed in 
menus at all three of its Berkeley, California locations. “Effective Saturday 
12th August [name of man] no longer works [here]. The actions of those 
in Charlottesville are not supported by [name of business]” (Pershan, 
2017). In making such announcements, the former employer helps to 
amplify the public shaming effects for the now exposed individual by 
naming him and creating further exposure of the perceived significance 
of his rally participation.
As this example demonstrates, the type of visibility that is produced 
by DV carries with it the capacity to intervene into a subject’s life in 
materially consequential ways. In this case, correct identification and 
exposure within the subject’s local environment affects his social status 
and “life chances” (Weber 1978; Giddens 1973, pp. 130–1), namely 
the ability to maintain employment following the significant publicity 
received by his (now former) employer concerning his off-work 
activities, which led to his obligatory resignation. 
Fig. 9.8  Unicorn Riot, posted to YesYoureRacist Twitter screengrab, “Some of 
them responded violently”, August 13, 2017.
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A son is publicly “disowned”: Different versions of public dis-association 
can be found in other examples, including the case of a young man 
who was publicly “disowned” by his family of origin after having been 
correctly identified on YYR as a vocal rally participant. He appears in a 
short video that was taken during the rally, and embedded into a YYR 
post, where he is sarcastically named as a “charming Nazi” (Fig. 9.8). 
In this video he can be heard making statements about so-called “white 
genocide” while looking into a stranger’s camera. While he appears 
naively indifferent to being captured on film in this moment, an unseen 
person knocks the camera out the photographer’s grasp, suggesting 
hostility between the presence of some participants wishing not to be 
“caught” on film and those who are digitally documenting what is 
taking place in the streets. 
Fig. 9.9  Inforum, “Public letter”, August 14, 2017, https://www.inforum.com/
opinion/letters/4311880-letter-family-denounces-teffts-racist-rhetoric-
and-actions 
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Two days after this identification, his father published a “heartbreaking” 
letter to the editor, addressed both to his son and to a wider audience, 
in a local community newspaper (Suerth, 2017, para. 1). The father 
disavows his son, until he “renounce[s] his hateful beliefs”, and states 
his wish to “loudly repudiate my son’s vile, hateful and racist rhetoric 
and actions”([name of father], quoted in Twin Cities Pioneer Press, 2017). 
In this letter, the father identifies his son as “an avowed white 
nationalist”, and connects what is happening (“now”) with the 
“silence of good people that allowed the Nazis to flourish the first time 
around”(Fig. 9.9). As in the case of the former employer, the articulation 
of moral responsibility within the context of a broader socio-political 
world is made evident. It may be surmised that the man’s father, and 
family at large, experienced — or feared experiencing — blame (possibly 
threats) for conduct and statements made by the young man bearing their 
(family) name, as they made a point of articulating in public statements 
that he “didn’t grow up with [hateful beliefs]”. “Why must we be guilty 
by association?”, the father asks (rhetorically) in this letter.15 This public 
letter was widely reported upon as part of the story of Charlottesville, 
offering an emotionally poignant side of its digital shaming aftermath. 
It is not merely that the young man was symbolically disowned by his 
family but that this was done so publicly.
“Angry torch guy”: The most prominent example of successful 
identification was of so-called “angry torch guy”, a young man whose 
image appeared in the first call to action and has since become iconic of 
the rally and its digital-shaming aftermath. Mouth agape, the man in 
the center appears to be in mid-shout. He looks intoxicated by the scene 
around him, a night-time gathering filled with other white men holding 
flaming torches. Such an image connotes fascist rallies and dangerous 
mob behavior, where fanatical and naive followers stand ready to act as 
parts of a larger group, stirred by a charismatic speaker (Fig. 10).16 
15  In news media interviews, members of the young man’s extended family have said 
that some of them have been “targeted by death threats” over the actions of their 
identified family member (Suerth, 2017, para. 15).
16  The photographer behind this now famous image shared this view. In an interview 
about it, Samuel Corum, of Anadula Agency in Turkey, described the “energy in his 
face”, surmising that when we saw the man yelling, his interpretation was that “He 
had a purpose and his face showed it”. (McAndrew, 2017b).
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Fig. 9.10  YesYoureRacist Twitter screengrab, “This angry young man”, 
August 12, 2017.
Following the man’s correct identification and public exposure as the 
person behind the picture, calls were made for Nevada University, 
where he is a student, to expel him. Over ten thousand people signed an 
online petition (through Change.org), and calls were made to “flood” 
the university student office with phone calls demanding the student’s 
expulsion. In addition to the worldwide circulation of this image, his 
identification elicited significant controversy and debate on his home 
campus. The image, paired with his name, was widely circulated across 
social media by fellow students, including a note drawing attention to 
his membership in a campus fraternity, and the statement “DO NOT 
LET HIM GO UNSHAMED” (Toppo, 2018, para. 8). His campus 
fraternity revoked his membership, stating that the Charlottesville rally 
was “disturbing, disheartening and contrary to our values” (ibid.). He 
subsequently quit his part-time job, explaining during a radio interview 
that he did not wish to “pick at the scab of Charlottesville”. The potency 
of association and implication of “moral taint” (Rosati, 2008) was made 
visible in other ways. For example, images found online from his social 
media posts appeared to connect him to a US Republican Senator Dean 
Heller; this created an additional linkage between the current US 
government and sentiments that were given expression during the 
Charlottesville rally. The cycle of attempted dis-association continued; 
in a Twitter response the Senator attempted to distance himself from 
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this, stating “I don’t know this person & condemn the outrageous 
racism, hatred and violence. It’s unacceptable & shameful. No room for 
it in this country” (Heller, on Twitter, 12 August 2017).
The President of the public university responded in a statement 
“denouncing all forms of bigotry and racism” stating that these “have no 
place in a free and equal society”. It was also emphasised that, “peaceful 
assembly and exchange of ideas is part of the bedrock of any free society” 
(Johnson, in Toppo, 2018). The man behind the picture was not expelled, 
as doing so would have infringed upon his First Amendment right to 
expression, since “…you can’t discipline someone for looking angry…” 
(para. 17).17 While he was not formally punished, the attention and 
public scrutiny that ensued from the DV campaign certainly gave him 
unwanted notoriety (“fame”). In public interviews he has stated that 
his life, as a result of being correctly identified as the person behind the 
picture, is now “spiraling out of control” (McAndrew, 2017a, para. 1). 
Talking to media in interviews, he has expressed concern that he 
may be unable to secure employment upon graduation, in light of 
his unexpected global infamy. He also defended his participation at 
Charlottesville, describing himself as proud of his white European 
heritage, and referring to his trip to Virginia as a moment in which he 
“dabbled in alt.right ideology” (Toppo, 2018). Regarding the iconic 
photo he explains that, “I got caught in the heat of the moment”, but 
insists he is “not the angry young man” seen in the photo, i.e. that he is 
not reducible to the image of this moment. 
As is typical in cases of online shaming (cf. Ronson, 2015), attempts 
at visibility management backfired and drew significant ridicule and 
consternation on social media. This example highlights how, once 
identified, the participant lives with a type of public scrutiny. Following 
an attempt to explain and defend his presence at Charlottesville, on a 
subsequent YYR post a comparison was drawn between the image of 
“Angry Torch Guy” and the iconic photo showing Hazel Bryan, who 
became a poster-girl for anti-black racism during a delicate moment 
17  Minimally, the university president’s statement symbolised a perceived responsibility 
to denounce “all forms of bigotry and racism” in light of the revelation that one of 
its students had attended the Charlottesville rally; this opened its administration up 
to significant criticism regarding the implications of the continued membership of a 
“white supremacist” at this educational institution. 
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during the US Civil Rights era, after being seen and photographed 
shouting down African American student Elizabeth Eckford.18 Like 
the image captured with Bryan shouting at Eckford — a split second in 
time — the now fateful photo of “Angry Torch Guy” has come to function 
as both an artifact of collective memory and site for public-sphere 
engagement (Lucaites & Hariman, 2001). While both subjects — Bryan 
in 1957 and the rally participant of 2017 — have become subject to infamy 
and negative iconicity due to a single, captured photo in which they 
come to represent a larger social issue and historical moment, the digital 
difference is that in addition to being “unwanted” and “enduring” 
(Trottier 2017, p. 55), there is a scrutinising intensity for the identified 
subject today. This difference illustrates the potency of a 24/7 news cycle, 
paired with the pervasiveness of social media in public culture today.
Moral Taint and the Power of Association 
As these examples dramatise, and the social media campaign of 
identifying and outing rally participants in Charlottesville helped to 
establish, to participate in such an event at this time was to endanger 
one’s reputation, existing social ties, institutional affiliations and life 
chances. An important — if under-recognised — dimension here is that 
others become (potentially) tainted through their connection with the 
participating individual by virtue of an implicit vicarious responsibility 
(Rosati, 2008). It is against this subtle backdrop that the campaign to 
make participants “famous” worked. Even the Tiki brand, whose 
bamboo torches were prominent during the rally, sought to distance 
itself symbolically from further association with the Charlottesville 
events. Using the platform Facebook, the company issued the following 
statement: “We do not support their message or the use of our products 
in this way […] Our products are designed to enhance backyard 
gatherings and to help family and friends connect with each other…” 
(“Tiki” brand public statement, in Ortutay, 2017). Along similar lines, 
18  Eckford was one of nine African American girls arriving for her first day of school 
at Central High in Arkansas, and was shouted at by an angry white mob of 
segregationists, which included young Bryan, and was ultimately prevented entry 
into the school by the National Guard. For further background see “Little Rock Nine”, 
https://www.history.com/topics/black-history/central-high-school-integration
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and as but one of many examples of online platforms banning the 
participation of white supremacist groups and individuals, the popular 
online dating app OkCupid permanently banned Christopher 
Cantwell — the committed participant who appeared prominently in 
the Vice video, stating that “There is no room for hate in a place where 
you’re looking for love” (OkCupid posting, cited in Bonos, 2017). 
Such expressions of “moral taint” and formal dis-association challenge 
the image of society as a mere aggregate of rights-bearing individuals. 
While on the surface, this DV campaign may appear individualistic 
in its orientation and politics, its efficacy clearly depended on the 
collaboration of others — individuals and organisations — who shared 
the basic judgment that animated the campaign, namely, that violent 
white supremacy must be unequivocally denounced and afforded no 
legitimate place in contemporary society. To participants, present and 
future, and to the broader social world, its moral lesson is that while 
a person might be ‘free’ as an individual to attend what they wish, to 
say what they like and to associate with whom they please within the 
formal bounds of law, no one is free from being held to account for this 
in terms of its broader social meaning and significance. A high-profile 
DV campaign, such as the case under consideration, contributes to a 
general re-thinking of what it means to openly participate in any socially 
controversial public event. 
A Case of Mis-identification
There was at least one high profile case of outright mis-identification 
causing harm. A University of Arkansas professor was mistakenly 
identified as having been one of the rally participants, based on his 
physical resemblance to one of the rally participants who was seen and 
photographed wearing an Arkansas Engineering t-shirt. As was widely 
reported, the man wrongfully identified “was flooded with vulgar 
messages on social media and accused of racism, and his home address 
was posted on social networks” (Victor, 2017). Offering insight into the 
effects of doxing in relation to the Charlottesville events, on National 
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Public Radio (NPR) he reported that he and his family contacted police 
and left their home for the weekend out of fear of misplaced aggression.
Additionally, a de-contextualised photo of an American YouTube 
personality wearing a swastika on his armband, that came from a 
“prank” video he had made during a Trump rally which he had posted 
months prior to the Charlottesville events, was given circulation on 
the same Twitter thread. While it was removed, with apology for the 
“confusion” its posting generated, it had negative consequences for the 
person it featured, who was pressured to respond to backlash over the 
error.
Such incidents were used as the basis for many media commentators 
and members of the public to question or criticise the DV campaign 
altogether, and highlight its intrinsic risks and dangers. While the 
activist who first issued the call to make rally participants “famous” 
sought to rectify instances of mistaken identification, some drew upon 
such incidents to argue that such campaigns are indefensible forms 
of “mistake-prone mob vigilantism” (Gass, 2017), inhabit a “swampy 
low ground” on the Internet (Ellis, 2017) and contribute in socially 
negative ways to a surveillance society. In effect such criticisms render 
distinctions of intention irrelevant. According to such criticism, the end 
cannot justify this means. Following the incident with the University 
of Arkansas professor, and taking a stand against doxing, irrespective 
of political motivation, the crowdfunding platform Patreon suspended 
the activist’s account (YYR) on the grounds that it was in violation 
of “Patreon Community Guidelines”. Patreon’s decision serves as an 
important reminder that DV activism always and necessarily depends 
upon the continued accessibility of public or social media platforms, 
and that use can be revoked at any time. This raises important questions 
about how platform decisions about content moderation are made, and 
how such curation shapes public discourse (see Gillespie 2018).19 
19  While this subject exceeds the scope of this study, I will note that into 2019, social 
media platforms such as Facebook and Instagram have begun publicly to ban 
the accounts of known white supremacist groups and speakers, defined in its 
community guidelines as dangerous individuals, even if their speech does not 
formally break a law.
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Virtuous Denunciation
Arguing that their denunciation was virtuous, and demonstrating the 
ongoing negotiation and interpretive work involved in legitimating 
their methods, media activists occasionally posted notes on the feed, 
indicating that people should “keep up the good work” in the ongoing 
effort to identify and expose participants to their broader communities. 
In response to occasional criticism that was expressed in some of 
the posted comments concerning the ethics of naming names, it was 
periodically pointed out that rally participants could not reasonably 
have expected to remain anonymous, and that the significance of the 
events demanded such a response.
The unlikely voices of some prominent writers and activists who had 
previously and influentially cautioned against “online shaming” and 
“call out culture” were given a voice in different news media articles, 
following posted comments about the events. Two such examples are 
British journalist Jon Ronson, author of So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed 
(2015) and Toronto community organiser and poet Asam Ahmad, 
whose influential article published in Briarpatch in 2015 criticised “call-
out” culture among progressive activists, pointing to what he called its 
“mild totalitarian undercurrents” (Ahmad, 2015, para. 4).20 As Ronson 
posted, in Twitter comments that were further circulated in various 
news media articles, “[The Charlottesville white supremacists] were 
undisguised in a massively contentious rally surrounded by the media… 
There’s a big difference between being a white power activist [or] white 
supremacist and being, say, [name redacted]” (Ronson, cited in Blum, 
2017; Chappell, 2017; Pringle, 2017).21 Along similar lines, Ahmad 
asserted that “Every single white supremacist deserves to be publicly 
20  Also addressed to left-leaning readers, in late August of 2017, Ahmed published 
a follow up piece in Briarpatch titled “When Calling Out Makes Sense”, https://
briarpatchmagazine.com/articles/view/when-calling-out-makes-sense
21  The case referenced here is often cited as an iconic example of the excesses of social 
media shaming and ‘trial by Twitter.’ The target became a trending social media story 
after sending an offensive, racist comment (‘tweet’) on Twitter prior to boarding a 
plane. As she slept on the flight, her comment was reposted tens of thousands of 
times, where it generated significant denunciation around the digitally connected 
world, including a hashtag asking if she had landed. By the time she exited the 
plane, she had become the recipient of significant online vitriol, including threats of 
violence. She was fired from her job as a communication director the next day.
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shamed and face the consequences of their actions” (Ahmad, cited in 
Gass, 2017). In light of the exceptional nature of the events to which 
they were responding, readers familiar with, and sympathetic to such 
criticisms about the excesses of online shaming were hereby offered a 
tacit pass to “shame away”.
Fig. 9.11  YesYoureRacist Twitter screengrab, “Whether you like it or not, it’s time 
to pick a side”, August 12, 2017.
Additionally, postings often reinforced a sense of the present as an urgent 
time for moral clarity and judgment, sometimes quite self-consciously, 
especially following the death of the counter-protestor, and injuries to 
others, when they were violently struck by a car driven by a rally-goer. 
“Nazis are marching without fear. Counter-protestors are getting mowed 
down in the street” (Fig. 9.11). Addressed to an audience presumed to 
be concerned by what can be seen in the two images — marchers holding 
flags bearing swastikas and the moment a car “mows down” counter-
protesters  —  the reader is called upon to pass judgement on what is 
occurring. Here the symbol of violence (a flag bearing a swastika) and 
the actualisation of violence (a car driving through bodies of people) 
are joined together in meaning. “Whether you like it or not, it’s time to 
pick a side” (ibid.). Later referred to as “the photo from Charlottesville 
that will define this moment in American history” (Rosenberg, 2017), 
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the second image subsequently won a Pulitzer Prize for “Breaking News 
Photography”.22 Haunted by symbols of what should be in the past, the 
present was interpreted as a potentially defining moment of American 
history-in-the-making, and characterised as a time in which there is no 
spectator position. The audience member who was presumed to be both 
ambivalent about DV tactics, and morally attuned to political dangers 
on the horizon, is asked the implicit question: which side are you on?
News Media as Reportage and Collaboration
From the beginning, news media articles and interviews with the 
activist behind the original call to action helped to amplify and 
widen the audience scope of the DV campaign, by reporting on it as 
newsworthy and recirculating images and examples from it. While 
my primary focus has been on digital media audience activism in this 
case, and the co-ordinating work of ordinary citizens in response to this 
call, it is important to emphasise that by reporting on this campaign 
as part of the story of Charlottesville 2017, news media reportage and 
popular commentary — on air, in print and online — very actively, 
if inadvertently, contributed to both its publicity and efficacy, even 
when it was expressly critical of the methods of doxing and shaming 
(for an example of this, see Ellis, 2017). Regardless of the discursive 
context in which they were placed, by recirculating images and names 
of ‘outed’ rally participants from social media postings, with very few 
exceptions, and by reporting on this campaign as something interesting 
and controversial, news media contributed to the infamy of the pictured 
and identified participants. While not unique to this case, news media 
actors functioned as important co-collaborators in the creation of digital 
naming and shaming effects (see Hess & Waller, 2014, pp. 103–4).
In most of the prolific news stories found online, on television and in 
print, different opinions from various experts and commentators who 
were asked to ‘weigh in’ on the DV campaign were included, from media 
scholars and civil libertarians, to anti-violence educators and public 
22  Ryan Kelly of The Daily Progress was the photographer behind this image, called 
‘Charlottesville Car Attack’, which later won a Pulitzer Prize for “Breaking News 
Photography”. 
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intellectuals. Serving as proxy for the ambivalence that was present 
within the wider public concerning the ‘outing’ of rally participants, 
on-air news commentators occasionally voiced their own reservations 
concerning DV tactics. For example, following an interview with the 
activist behind the prominent social media call, in which he was asked 
to explain what he was “trying to accomplish”, two MSNBC newscasters 
are heard briefly struggling over its ethical implications. One mused on 
what she considered the absurdity of anybody expecting “privacy” after 
having participated in such a public event:
to those who participated in the rally over the weekend who’ve been 
complaining for the last twenty-four hours that they don’t deserve to 
have their names and faces out there, I say, you’ve got to be kidding me, 
you were a part of this.
In the next moment she adds, “But it is dangerous business, right? People 
have families, and extended families. Now that we live in this world of 
social media [shakes her head], I don’t know. This is a very complicated 
issue”. “It is”, reiterated her on-air co-worker (MSNBC News, 2017a). 
Moral ambivalence over the use of such tactics was often made part and 
parcel to the story. By framing it in this way, and not merely reporting 
upon its factual elements, news media thus contributed to making 
the DV campaign topical, inviting the audience to weigh in on it as a 
complicated socio-moral issue of the times. 
Those who argued that the DV campaign was morally justified, 
in spite of its risks and limitations, typically drew attention to the 
exceptional nature of the events to which the ‘call’ to name and shame 
were addressed, exacerbated by the inadequacy of the US President’s 
response. A columnist for the Toronto Star summed this position up 
as follows, “In light of the horrific events in Charlottesville, VA., this 
weekend, I firmly believe that a shame-pass is in order….It’s nothing 
but necessary in a nation whose leader refuses to condemn voices of 
hate…” Speaking to its relevance beyond the borders of the US, she 
went on to urge her audience of newspaper readers to “shame away”, 
arguing that to have participated in the Charlottesville rallies could not 
be dismissed as a “lapse in judgment” as it is to participate in something 
that is “a direct threat to the way of life of every decent person on this 
earth” (Teital, 2017, para. 4-5). As this example reveals, the line between 
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commentating on the campaign and actively contributing to it was 
exceedingly thin.
Clearly, the effectiveness of ‘naming and shaming’ becomes 
intensified through the news media reportage and the commentary it 
elicits, whether the emphasis is more critical, supportive or mixed. 
Beyond the specificities of the case at hand, this highlights the importance 
of reflexivity in all manner of reportage and commentary; since public 
shaming and other related dimensions of DV initiatives depend upon 
significant collaboration to be effective, it becomes increasingly difficult, 
if not impossible, not to be implicated in some manner and thus it is 
important to take this into account in any such re-presentation.23
Aftermath, One Year Later
One year later, under heavy police presence, a coalition of individuals 
associated with the far-right in America organised a rally in Washington 
after being denied a permit for such an event in Charlottesville. Framed 
by its organisers as a second “Unite the Right” event, this would-be 
anniversary event  —  doomed before it began  —  brought together a 
couple of dozen supporters. In addition to the heavy police presence 
in Washington, a state of emergency was declared in Virginia by the 
state Governor in advance of the Charlottesville anniversary. In notable 
contrast with the five hundred or so persons who had congregated 
the previous August, formally permitted to do so, and buoyed by 
the belief that this moment represented a positive “turning point” in 
their movement, the sparse assembly of participants was massively 
outnumbered by thousands of counter-demonstrators. In a country 
with a population exceeding 327 million people, from the vantage point 
23  Of course, this also includes scholarly writing. In the case of this study, and in 
keeping with the ethical protocols put forth by the editors of this collection and 
agreed upon by contributors, I have sought to maintain the anonymity of rally 
participants who were not public figures prior to the Charlottesville events. At the 
same time, I must recognise the limitations of this approach, since the ample news 
stories that have circulated about previously unknown, and subsequently identified 
individuals have typically included their names alongside their images. Minimally, 
by not embedding names of such participants into the writing of this chapter, 
Internet searches of such names will not pull up this particular text. 
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of uniting the right, this event was nothing short of a spectacular and 
demoralising failure. 
Mirroring the tactics used during the previous year, local activists 
engaged in pre-emptive naming and shaming tactics, aimed at 
discouraging participation, by publicising names of known organisers 
in advance. As reported in the New York Times
activists posted personal information of organizers online, and 
encouraged people to alert employers of their affiliations, put up fliers 
outing them in their neighbourhoods, and uncovered their “ties to more 
‘respectable’ right-wing organizations that help them hide their true 
intentions (Fausset et al., 2018).
Connections were made in news reports between this conspicuously 
sparse turnout and the previous year’s outing “by both online activists 
and mainstream media outlets” (Fausset et al., 2018, para. 3). Organiser 
Jason Kessler attributed the small numbers to an “atmosphere of 
intimidation” (ibid., para. 4). In a sense, as both the organiser’s 
remarks and the news reports implied, the social media activists had 
taken the enjoyment out of the event for participants. Specifically, the 
consequences of the ‘outing’ tactics the previous year seemed to have 
successfully diminished participants’ capacity to feel powerful and 
effervescent one year later, while physically surrounded by like-minded 
others in the public realm. 
It would be unwise to infer from this conspicuously meagre 
anniversary rally that the white supremacist movement is withering in 
the US, that the 2017 social media campaign was alone responsible for 
what happened the next year, or that any complex social formation can 
be diminished through such means alone. As critical race scholars and 
anti-racist educators importantly highlight, it is relatively easy to 
condemn overt manifestations of racism, while its invisible institutional 
structures remain intact (see Paradkar, 2017). Since this time, there has 
been much concerned discussion about the overall rise of the alt-right, 
and violent manifestations of explicitly racist, white supremacist, anti-
immigrant, anti-Black, anti-Semitic and anti-Islamic sentiments in 
numerous countries around the world, at the cultural and formal 
political level. At the cultural level, the successful failure of the 2018 
“Charlottesville anniversary” rally, however, suggests some efficacy on 
the part of the vigilant social media campaign, in dissuading all but the 
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fully committed participant from taking the gamble of marching in the 
streets, facing the cameras, and living with the kind of infamy that was 
generated following Charlottesville 2017. In so doing, it helped to 
accentuate the urgency of the moment, a time in which actors and 
groups bearing symbols and expressions of violent white nationalism 
and white supremacy are seeking legitimate presence in the mainstream. 
The hope is that this will also contribute to making a difference at the 
formal political level, in delegitimating political actors who seek or draw 
support from groups or individuals associated with such manifestations.
Discussion and Conclusion: Solidifying Meaning, 
Refusing Moral Equivalency, Getting Personal
Let us revisit the question posed at the outset: what would have been 
different about Charlottesville 2017 without the social media campaign 
aimed at outing participants as such? In other words, what did this 
campaign produce and achieve, and what are some of its significant 
social implications?
The DV campaign helped to crystallise the meaning of what kind 
of event the “Unite the Right” rally was within the broader public 
culture: an ominously exceptional, socially dangerous and potentially 
historically significant moment within contemporary US society. 
It contributed to a united refusal within civil society to normalise and 
thereby legitimate the expression of violent white nationalism and white 
supremacy, legitimation that was being sought by rally organisers, vocal 
participants and event supporters who assembled in Charlottesville 
in August 2017 under the banner “Unite the Right”. Thus, it can be 
understood as an attempt to socially refuse the public manifestation of 
violent white supremacy in twenty-first-century public life as but one 
controversial orientation amongst others, a refusal maintained even 
when symbolising this expression through signage and space is granted 
constitutional protection. “Nazis marching”, argued YYR, can be 
afforded no socially comfortable place within the contemporary public 
landscape. The current laws in the US may permit such manifestations 
in the name of the First Amendment  —  freedom of expression  —  as 
well as the right to assemble, if done lawfully; however, this campaign 
performatively argued that the violation such manifestations represent 
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to individuals, groups and the society at large, demands their immediate 
and targeted denunciation.24
If we understand DV as rooted in conduct that some consider 
‘offensive’, it must be noted that the kind of offense at stake in this case 
goes beyond interactional conflict or norm violation. Affective support for 
this social media campaign, even if it was tinged with some reservation 
concerning tactics, revealed a shared sense that what was seen and heard 
in Charlottesville was socially criminal even if it was formally permitted. 
It violated strongly held sentiments “deeply written” into the collective 
consciousness, to use the language of Durkheim; its manifestations 
threaten and harm individuals — especially those who are members of 
particular minority groups, fomenting destructive forces within society. 
In this sense they threaten everybody’s well-being. 
The DV campaign, including the ambivalence it evoked, helped to 
create conditions to articulate a clear rejection of the trappings of moral 
equivalency, on the grounds that it is a moral outrage to consider violent 
manifestations of racism and anti-racist responses to such manifestations 
as mere differences in content. As suggested earlier, the first response 
by President Trump, in which he referred to “violence on many sides” 
and “very fine people” on both sides, could have only intensified the 
felt necessity of such a refusal for the moral majority of concerned and 
outraged spectators to the events that transpired in Charlottesville. In 
this respect, the DV campaign also posed a challenge to those who were 
critical of its method, as this, too, might inadvertently reproduce such a 
political (‘neutral’) position.
The refusal to legitimate the terrain of violent white nationalism and 
white supremacy was largely achieved by making participation in such 
events particular, personal, risky and potentially fateful for the previously 
unknown and presumed anonymous participant. This was the unique 
aspect that the DV campaign added to Charlottesville 2017, and as I 
have argued here, its power lay primarily in the socio-moral domain. 
Whereas the vigorous public opposition, including the counter-rallies, 
was largely articulated in relation to social justice principles, the targeting 
24  Indeed, it can also be said that one of those same principles, namely ‘freedom of 
expression’, is also in part what empowered the DV campaign to engage in its tactics 
of naming and outing participants as it did. 
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of individuals and the naming of names, encouraged and coordinated 
through contemporary tools of social media, created the conditions for a 
type of accountability and consequence for the otherwise unremarkable 
individual rally participant. The DV campaign took things beyond the 
level of general condemnation of a disturbing and reprehensible event, 
by making anyone’s positive association with and during such an event 
live on in ways that were socially consequential. 
The prolific circulation of particular instances of correct identification 
and exposure, we can surmise, constituted a public pedagogy of sorts, 
whose primary lesson to anyone who participates in such an event, 
now and into the foreseeable future, is to expect significant visibility 
and not to imagine that it will be possible to remain anonymous after 
the dust has settled. Participation at any level  —  organiser, speaker, 
marcher, bearer of sign, holder of torch, chanter of slogan — was thereby 
constituted as socially risky and even dangerous for the individual, 
in that it promised to make such participation matter afterwards and 
outside of the original event. In Goffman’s sense, “fatefulness” refers 
to “the mark of the threshold between retaining some control over the 
consequences of one’s actions and their going out of control” (Goffman, 
1967, p. 27). This is precisely what the “angry torch man” alluded to 
when he referred to his post-identification life as now “spiralling out 
of control”. This is the unique, potent and indeed morally controversial 
aspect that the DV campaign, led by YYR, ‘added’ to the Charlottesville 
events and their aftermath.
For the individual, says this campaign, there can be nothing casual 
about participation in a rally tainted by the threat or actuality of violent 
white supremacy. The possibility of dabbling or casually playing at 
being a ‘weekend white supremacist’, without facing worldly 
consequences in the days after, was powerfully challenged. We can 
speculate that such a lesson would be most effective for the participant 
for whom attendance was likened to a type of thrill-seeking or weekend 
adventure, and less so for the ideologically “true believer” (cf. Hoffer, 
1951), since the former — if not the latter — is more likely to have 
affiliations with those to whom such participation would be considered 
repugnant, and which his (or her) subsequently exposed participation 
may jeopardise. The most powerful, if also invisible, force that enabled 
this DV campaign to have the effects that it did was the unspoken moral 
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force of a shared vision of a world in which racially motivated hatred 
and violence must be made to have no legitimate place.
Campaigns of digital vigilantism can, of course, be inspired and 
undertaken from a variety of possible interests  —  political, socio-
cultural, personal and otherwise. Making a case for the importance of 
detailed and socially contextualised scholarly investigation into such 
manifestations and their consequences within a complex and pluralistic 
social world, the example we have explored here offers insight into how 
such methods can be mobilised on behalf of social-justice interests. 
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Doxing as Audience Vigilantism 
against Hate Speech
David M. Douglas
Doxing, the public release of personally identifiable information, is both a 
means of harassment and intimidation, and a tool for activism. Releasing 
personal information about individuals whose actions or stated beliefs 
harm others, or undermine social cohesion, removes the anonymity or 
obscurity that may foster these forms of antisocial behaviour. However, 
doxing may also be used to target those whose actions or beliefs pose no 
risk to others, or who merely do not follow social norms. In societies that 
value individualism (such as Western liberal democracies), anonymity 
and obscurity are important means of protecting individuality from the 
pressures of conformity and popular opinion, and allow us to develop 
ourselves and experiment with ways of living. Depriving someone of 
the protections anonymity and obscurity grant them should not be 
taken lightly. For doxing to effectively support activist goals, it must 
expose wrongdoing that the broader population (the activist’s audience) 
will accept as a legitimate concern. Otherwise, activists risk creating 
sympathy for their target and ostracising themselves from the audience 
they wish to persuade.
Other chapters in this volume by Mojca M. Plesničar and Pika Šarf, 
and Tara Milbrandt analyse specific instances in which doxing was used 
by activists to shame those who use hate speech on social media, or 
who were present at a white supremacist rally, respectively. This chapter 
supplements these discussions by presenting a moral justification for 
doxing as audience vigilantism in response to hate speech. It draws 
on Daniel Trottier’s (2017) account of digital vigilantism and Emma 
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Jane’s (2017) analysis of feminist “digilantism” in response to Internet 
harassment and sexist hate speech. I argue that doxing that deanonymises 
a proponent of hate speech is an appropriate means of combating hate 
speech if it is intended to begin a process of deradicalisation. 
Identifying sources and promoters of hate speech via doxing serves 
several purposes. Firstly, it increases the risk of engaging in hate speech 
by removing the speaker’s anonymity and increasing their vulnerability 
to legal sanctions and social ostracism. Secondly, it draws attention to 
threatening behaviour that might otherwise be ignored. Finally, it may 
serve as a response by the vilified group, or their supporters, that they 
do not trust the authorities to adequately respond to acts of hate speech 
against them. Doxing may also be employed to delegitimise public 
officials who are either themselves anonymous sources of hate speech, 
or who support it, since promoting hate speech is incompatible with the 
duty of service to all citizens that public service requires.
This defence of doxing has a number of limitations. As it is a 
response to the tension between tolerance and freedom of speech, it is 
intended to apply to liberal democracies that value both. It also does 
not justify releasing any sort of personally identifiable information 
(that is, information about someone that can uniquely distinguish 
them from other people) about practitioners of hate speech. It uses 
an earlier analysis of doxing (Douglas, 2016) that distinguishes 
between doxing that is intended to remove someone from obscurity 
or anonymity (deanonymising doxing), doxing that make it easier to 
physically locate someone (targeting doxing) and doxing that reveals 
personal information that undermines the identified person’s credibility 
(delegitimising doxing). Targeted doxing should also be avoided as 
the response risks going beyond what Kelly D. Hine calls “socially 
tolerable bounds” (1998, p. 1253) in her defence of vigilantism. In this 
case, targeted doxing creates the opportunity for vigilantes to physically 
intimidate or harm the identified individual. Outside of the potential 
harm caused to the targeted individual, this may undermine broader 
support for acts against hate speech.
I also acknowledge that unlike the cases of sexist hate speech Jane 
describes (in which the audience responds to specific messages by named 
individuals who do not disguise their identity), there is a significant risk 
of false positives, in which innocent individuals are erroneously identified 
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as sources or promoters of hate speech. The negative consequences of 
mistaken identification mean that those who have erroneously identified 
an innocent person must take responsibility for correcting this error if this 
form of deanonymisation is to be permissible.
I will support this argument with short descriptions and discussions 
of two examples where doxing has been used to either identify 
proponents of hate speech, or where it is used by hate speech proponents 
to intimidate activists working against them. I also use the examples 
of sharing racist speech found on Facebook on the Zlovenija Tumblr 
page and identifying the participants of the “Unite the Right” rally that 
are described in other chapters by Plesničar and Šarf, and Milbrandt, 
respectively. Given the important of hate speech to my defence of this 
form of audience vigilantism, that is where I will begin my discussion.
Hate Speech
Raphael Cohen-Almagor (2015, p. 148) defines hate speech as “bias-
motivated, hostile, malicious speech aimed at a person or a group of 
people because of some of their actual or perceived innate characteristics”. 
It may also be described as group libel or group defamation (Waldron, 
2012, p. 39). More generally, Jeremy Waldron (ibid., p. 4) describes hate 
speech as something undermining the public good that individuals 
in a society, from diverse backgrounds and belonging to different 
groups, will be able to live their lives without facing “hostility, violence, 
discrimination, or exclusion by others”. It undermines the dignity 
of those singled out by hate speech by attacking their status as equal 
members of the community (ibid., p. 5). On a more visceral level, it 
provokes memories of historical oppression that continue to resonate 
with those whose identities have been marked as inferior in the past, 
and who still face discrimination today. In Charles R. Lawrence III’s 
powerful words:
There is a great difference between the offensiveness of words that you 
would rather not hear  —  because they are labeled dirty, impolite, or 
personally demeaning — and the injury inflicted by words that remind 
the world that you are fair game for physical attack, evoke in you all of 
the millions of cultural lessons regarding your inferiority that you have so 
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painstakingly repressed, and imprint upon you a badge of servitude and 
subservience for all the world to see. (1990, p. 461, emphasis in original)1
The continued existence of implicit and explicit biases against minorities 
(including hate speech itself) suggests that even well-intentioned states 
fail to practically reflect their stated commitments to political and social 
equality. Waldron (2012, p. 31) is right in saying that “the position of 
minority groups as equal members of a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, or 
religiously pluralistic society is not something that anyone can take for 
granted”. The targets of hate speech may also believe that the state (or 
those implementing and enforcing the state’s laws) will not take their 
concerns seriously (Schwencke, 2017).
The legal tolerance for hate speech differs between societies, even 
among those recognising the importance of freedom of expression 
(Sumner, 2003, pp. 144–45). The United States places a strong emphasis 
on the importance of freedom of expression, and so permits hate speech 
that would be illegal in other liberal democracies (Cohen-Almagor, 
2015, p. 205; Mill, 2018). Even in liberal democracies that criminalise 
hate speech (such as Australia and the UK), the extent of the limitations 
they impose on freedom of expression is contested (Mill, 2018).
The targets of hate speech and those who regard it as a serious 
threat to social cohesion often resort to private measures (including 
vigilantism) to counter the expressions of hate they face. Such actions 
are self-defence by the targeted group, and serve two purposes: silencing 
the hate speech itself (the retributive purpose), and signalling to the 
broader community that such speech is unacceptable (the expressive 
purpose). Popular support for the vigilante’s actions depends on the 
vigilante’s justifications for why suppressing this instance of hate speech 
is more important than tolerating the speaker’s right to express it.
Digital Vigilantism (DV) and ‘Digilantism’
Trottier describes digital vigilantism (DV) as a response to a transgression 
that “seek[s] to render a targeted individual (or category of individual) 
visible through information sharing practices such as assembling and 
1  I originally came across this quote in Hate Crimes in Cyberspace by Danielle Keats 
Citron (2014, p. 17).
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publishing their personal details” (2017, p. 57). It is made possible by 
computer-mediated communication systems that facilitate informal 
groups in coordinating actions in response to transgressions, and 
dispersing once satisfied that their goal is achieved (ibid.).
Jane’s concept of “digilantism” overlaps with Trottier’s account 
of DV, and further shows how these activities differ from traditional 
vigilantism. Jane defines digilantism as “politically motivated (or 
punitively politically motivated) practices outside of the state that are 
designed to punish or bring others to account, in response to a perceived 
or actual dearth of institutional remedies” (2017, p. 3). This description 
goes beyond the traditional account of vigilantism described by Les 
Johnston (1996) by incorporating responses that might otherwise be 
classified as “activism” (Jane, 2017, pp. 3–4). Violence or threatened 
physical violence usually appear to be a necessary part of vigilantism 
(Dumsday, 2009; Hine, 1998, pp. 1248–9). Without physical violence (or 
the threat of it), vigilantism may appear to be just particularly robust 
activism. Nonetheless, the connection between vigilantism and violence 
may be maintained by broadening the concept of violence as “avoidable 
insults to basic human needs” (Gatlung 1990, p. 292). While Johan 
Gatlung uses this definition to underpin his conceptions of structural 
and cultural violence (which describe the processes of exploitation 
and the symbols and language that justify both direct physical violence 
and exploitation, respectively), this definition may be used to describe 
vigilantism as violence (either direct, physical violence, or the structural 
or cultural violence traditionally thought of as “non-violent”) in response 
to direct, structural or cultural violence by the targets of such violence. 
Hine (1998, p. 1222) mentions citizens confronting and harassing drug 
dealers to force them to leave their community, and residents threatening 
to launch civil law suits against property owners to compel them to evict 
criminals, as examples of non-violent vigilantism. Such “non-violent” 
vigilantism should not be criminalised, Hine (ibid., p. 1252) argues, 
as the tendency to over-punish transgressors using physical violence 
makes vigilantism costly to society, rather than vigilantism itself. This 
allows Hine’s concept of vigilantism without physical violence to fall 
within the scope of DV and digilantism.
A major form of DV is “weaponising” visibility through “naming 
and shaming” transgressive individuals or groups (Trottier, 2017, p. 
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56). Those targeted by DV are removed from obscurity by the public 
exposure of a transgression (or alleged transgression).2 The power of 
such shaming comes from both the audience witnessing it, and the 
identified individual’s knowledge that there is such an audience, 
who may themselves participate in further shaming them. In DV and 
digilantism, these are mediated audiences: they witness transgressions 
through computer-mediated communication systems, such as 
social media platforms. Furthermore, the audience can increase the 
visibility of the transgression by sharing and commenting on it on 
social media. As such, the vigilante audience need not be limited to 
the same geographical area or country as the targeted transgressor. 
Transgressions visible and provocative enough to provoke widespread 
disgust may face a global vigilante audience. Controversial, poor-taste 
or merely misunderstood social media posts are examples of such 
transgressions.
Doxing
Doxing is the deliberate release of personally identifiable information 
in a form that is easily accessible to others, usually with the aim of 
intimidating the identified person (Hawley, 2019, p. 201; Douglas, 
2016, p. 199). Joan Donovan (2017) rightly notes that doxing offers “a 
powerful leveller for those who seek social justice when they know 
criminal justice is far out of reach”. Using doxing to draw attention to 
wrongdoers is a form of private justice that comes under the umbrella 
of DV (Trottier, 2017, p. 56).
The information released by doxing are forms of identity knowledge 
about specific individuals. Elsewhere I distinguish between three types 
of doxing: deanonymising, targeting and delegitimising (Douglas, 
2016, pp. 203–6). These types differ in what information is revealed 
about someone and the motive for doing so. Deanonymisation reveals 
information that connects an individual’s anonymous or pseudonymous 
identity to their regular identity. Targeting reveals information about an 
individual that allows them to be physically located, such as their home 
address or workplace. Delegitimising reveals potentially embarrassing or 
2  Daniel Solove vividly calls this the “digital scarlet letter” (2007, p. 76).
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humiliating information about an individual. Each kind of doxing takes 
something from the identified person: anonymity (deanonymisation), 
obscurity (targeting) or credibility (delegitimisation) (ibid., p. 204). 
Recognising the different types of doxing is important to determine 
whether there is a plausible moral argument for releasing personal 
information.
Seeking anonymity is not necessarily a sign of wrongdoing. Gary 
T. Marx (1999) lists fifteen common rationales for anonymity (or 
pseudonymity) that are socially desirable. The purpose of seeking 
anonymity must be considered if deanonymisation is to be justifiable. 
There are clear cases for justifying deanonymisation when anonymity 
is adopted to avoid accountability for wrongdoing, and when a 
pseudonym is used to mislead others (for example, by using an alias to 
associate themselves with a particular group for some benefit). In these 
cases, doxing is a form of whistleblowing.
Deanonymisation only requires revealing information that 
establishes a connection between a pseudonym or actions performed 
anonymously, and some form of identity knowledge of an individual. 
One form of identity knowledge is an individual’s locatability, which 
includes both their physical location and the means through which they 
can be contacted (ibid., p. 100). Revealing locatability information about 
an individual increases their vulnerability to harassment (if contact 
information is disclosed) and physical harm (if location information is 
disclosed).
If deanonymising and targeting doxing answer the ‘who’ and 
‘where’ questions about an identity (ibid., p. 101), delegitimising 
doxing reveals ‘why’ this particular individual is of interest. It purports 
to reveal a transgression by the identified individual for which they 
deserve (in the view of those doxing them) to be publicly shamed. 
These transgressions may be breaches of social norms, immoral 
activities, deceptive or harmful behaviour, or anything else that may 
undermine the individual’s reputation or publicly humiliate them. The 
transgression is from the perspective of those performing the doxing: 
the identified individual or the wider community may not recognise 
it as particularly troubling, threatening, controversial or transgressive 
at all.
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Doxing in Response to Hate Speech
I consider four examples where doxing is used to either identify 
members of groups that promote hate speech, or members of groups 
that protest hate speech. These examples are: Anonymous’ #OpKKK 
campaign to reveal the identities of Ku Klux Klan members; the display 
of racist speech found on Facebook, posted with the author’s identity 
on the Zlovenija Tumblr page; the identification of individuals pictured 
taking part in the 2017 “Unite the Right” rally at Charlottesville, Virginia 
in the US; and attempts by right-wing groups to identify participants 
in Antifa protests. In each case, individuals or groups attempt to 
uncover and disclose identity knowledge (such as the common or legal 
names) of individuals. In the case of #OpKKK, the hacktivist collective 
Anonymous sought to reveal the membership of the Ku Klux Klan 
so that they could not conceal their racist beliefs and activities. In the 
Zlovenija example, the anonymous activists were naming individuals 
who expressed hate speech on social media. In the case of identifying 
participants in the “Unite the Right” rally, individuals sought to remove 
the obscurity of those who promoted hate speech in a public space. The 
final case, attempts by right-wing groups to identify members of Antifa 
groups, differs from the others in that doxing is being used against those 
who protest against hate speech. It serves as a contrast with the other 
cases in order to establish that the context within which doxing is used 
is significant for whether a group may use it to defend itself.
Anonymous and #OpKKK
The Ku Klux Klan (KKK) are an American white supremacist group that 
has existed in various forms since around 1866 (Law, 2009, p. 128). While 
its activity and membership has waxed and waned since the group’s 
emergence, its long history of violence and the distinctive costumes 
that conceal its members’ identities have made the KKK particularly 
notorious in the United States. It currently exists as a collection of 
localised groups that share the name, rituals and the white supremacist 
ideology of the original group (Southern Poverty Law Center, n.d.).
The impetus for #OpKKK was the distribution of leaflets by a KKK 
chapter threatening to use “deadly force” against those protesting the 
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police shooting of Mike Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, on August 9, 
2014 (Gilbert, 2014). Activists identifying themselves with Anonymous 
hacked two Twitter accounts connected to the KKK, and claimed to have 
gathered information about their members through their access to these 
accounts (Woolf & Stafford, 2015). Around this time, news reports from 
left-wing web sites stated that several US senators and mayors were 
on Anonymous’ list of KKK members (Anonymous OpKKK, 2015). A 
Twitter account associated with Anonymous distanced itself from these 
reports (ibid.). A list of around 350 names was eventually released by 
those involved in #OpKKK (Anonymous, 2015). Some of those listed had 
already publicly stated their membership of the KKK (Woolf, 2015). The 
document listing the names of alleged KKK members contains a preface 
describing the activists’ methods of data collection and a thoughtful 
account of their reasons for releasing this data (Anonymous, 2015).
Zlovenija
As Plesničar and Šarf describe in their chapter, Zlovenija was a Tumblr 
page where the anonymous author(s) posted screen captures of racist 
speech that related to migration to Slovenia. Examples of hate speech 
were removed if the speaker apologised. The anonymous authors of 
Zlovenija removed the examples of racist speech after posters displaying 
the posts featured on the site began to appear on the streets in Ljubljana 
and due to concerns about organised attempts to deanonymise the 
author(s).
Identifying “Unite the Right” Rally Participants
The August 2017 “Unite the Right” white-nationalist rally in 
Charlottesville, Virginia and the digital vigilantism that occurred in 
response are described in detail by Tara Milbrandt in another chapter 
of this book. For the purpose of this chapter, I will focus on two aspects 
of the doxing that happened to rally participants: whether the response 
was motivated by an acceptable goal, and the instances of mistaken 
identification that occurred.
This example differs from #OpKKK as the targets are limited to a 
particular group: those present at the Charlottesville rally in support 
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of white nationalism. The identified individuals also made no attempt 
to conceal their identities at the rally. The @YesYoureRacist Twitter 
account also only listed the names of the identified individuals, making 
it deanonymising doxing (as they were removed from obscurity). It was 
also delegitimising doxing as it portrayed the identified individuals 
as white nationalists. It was not targeting doxing, as no locatability 
knowledge was revealed by the account.
Identifying Antifa Protesters
Anti-fascists (or Antifa) seek to disrupt the ability of fascist and far-
right groups to organise and communicate their views to the public 
(Bray, 2017, pp. xiv–xv). Doxing perpetrators of hate speech (those 
creating or spreading hostile, biased and malicious works targeted at 
specific groups of people) is a controversial method of combating the 
support and propagation of such speech. For example, doxing is one 
tactic adopted by Antifa groups to silence members of fascist and far-
right groups (ibid., pp. 86–87), although not all Antifa groups accept it 
as a legitimate tactic (Bartlett, 2015, p. 67). Similarly, fascist and far-right 
groups themselves use doxing to intimidate critics (such as journalists) 
(Wilson, 2018) and to expose Antifa members (Bartlett, 2015, p. 68). 
Unlike the previous examples, this case covers instances where 
doxing is used against those who vigorously oppose hate speech and 
the right-wing groups who are at least sympathetic to it. This example 
is important for establishing that the activist’s cause in doxing others 
is important for determining whether it can be defended as socially 
useful vigilantism. In other words, whether doxing opponents is self-
defence for the activists themselves, or self-defence for both the activists 
themselves and the broader community. 
Doxing as Audience Vigilantism
Doxing as a tool for audience vigilantism has three stages: uncovering 
personally identifiable information, releasing and announcing that 
information, and the audience acting on that information. For simplicity, 
I will call these the discovery, release and response stages of doxing as 
audience vigilantism. The discovery stage may be performed in secret 
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by activists, while the release and response stages require audiences 
who serve as the potential vigilantes who will act against the identified 
individual. How the information is disseminated and presented in 
the release stage affects the potential audience, the likelihood that the 
audience will respond and how that audience will harass or shame the 
identified individual.
The discovery stage is performed by the activist, who has identified 
a transgressor (or potential transgressor). The activist uses whatever 
information is available to them to search for further identity knowledge 
about the transgressor. The activist may seek assistance in identifying 
an individual by releasing whatever information they have and asking 
others for further information. In this case, the discovery stage merges 
with the release and response stages.
The release stage has two components: the publication of identity 
knowledge about the targeted individual(s), and publicising the release 
of this information. Gaining publicity for the information release is 
necessary to create an audience who may act on it. Social media can 
serve a role, as it does for the discovery stage: in addition to providing 
evidence of the target’s transgressions, it also offers an avenue for 
publicising the release of identity knowledge. In the #OpKKK example, 
the release stage was Anonymous’ posting of information onto Pastebin 
(Anonymous, 2012) and announcing this on Twitter. In the Zlovenija 
example, the release stage was the posting of the racist speech and the 
identity of the speaker on the Zlovenija page. In the “Unite the Right” 
example, this stage was the posting of pictures of rally participants on 
the @YesYoureRacist Twitter account, which served as both publishing 
and publicising the release of this identity knowledge.
The response stage is the actual vigilante action the audience 
performs. It is the activist’s goal in discovering and releasing information 
about the target. The audience may respond by further publicising the 
transgression and the transgressor’s identity, or by using the identity 
knowledge to contact the transgressor. The first response seeks to shame 
the identified individual, while the second harasses or threatens them 
(or worse). The second type of response is traditional vigilantism, as it 
includes the threat of violence (Johnston, 1996). DV and digilantism only 
necessarily involves increasing the target’s visibility, and so may include 
acts where only the first response occurs, or where both the first and 
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the second occur. Ethical evaluations of vigilantism (such as Dumsday 
(2009)) may therefore be applied to cases that involve both the first 
and second response. As the literature on traditional vigilantism may 
be directly applied to the second type of response, my discussion will 
focus on the first type, where shame is used to punish the transgressor.
In both types of response, the audience’s active involvement takes the 
response beyond the activist’s control. The appearance of posters around 
Ljubljana containing posts from the Zlovenija page is an example of how 
the audience’s response can differ from what the activist anticipates. As 
Jane (2017, pp. 5–6) rightly notes, digilantism (and social media activity 
generally) are characterised by “[c]haos, speed, unpredictability, strong 
affect, and spur-of-the-moment decisions”. This unpredictability and 
lack of control makes audience vigilantism risky to initiate, and serves 
as a prima facie moral objection against it as the response is likely to be 
disproportionate to the transgression.
The #OpKKK example demonstrates the care necessary in performing 
the discovery and releases stages of doxing as DV, and the external 
factors that can compromise its effectiveness. The legitimate #OpKKK 
list described in broad terms how they collected the listed data. The 
decentralised and anarchic nature of Anonymous creates difficulties 
for the audience in clearly distinguishing between the ‘legitimate’ 
Anonymous #OpKKK list and the independent list. The apparent 
source of the first list did not claim to belong to Anonymous or to be 
connected with #OpKKK (Woolf & Stafford, 2015). This nuance and 
the confusion caused by the false initial reports of politicians appearing 
on the list reduced the impact that the release might otherwise have 
had. While Anonymous’ unique character made it particularly difficult 
for the audience to identify ‘official’ Anonymous information releases 
from others, this problem exists for any activist group. An effective and 
responsible DV campaign therefore needs to present a clear identity to 
avoid confusion within the audience it seeks to inform and motivate.
Jane (2017) notes that Hine’s account offers two criteria for 
vigilantism that should not carry criminal liability. These criteria also 
suggest how we might begin to morally evaluate DV. These criteria are 
that the vigilante’s actions are based “on an accurate perception of social 
need”, and that the act is within “socially tolerable bounds” (Hine, 1998, 
p. 1952). These criteria suggest some constraints on the possible motives 
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and actions that might be defended as morally permissible DV. The first, 
an accurately perceived social need, limits the permissible causes that 
may motivate DV. These causes must be reasonable in the sense that they 
can be justified to those with other perspectives within their community 
(Stanley, 2015, p. 108). This rules out conspiracy theories and extremist 
political, racial or religious causes, as they cannot be described and 
defended using premises and evidence that are in principle justifiable to 
all. Following Hine, I will call this the legitimate social need criterion. This 
restriction on extremes also carries over to the second criterion, which is 
that the digital vigilante acts must not cause physical harm to persons, 
and the disruption caused must be temporary and limited to those 
responsible for the concern identified in the first criterion. Permissible 
DV cannot be indiscriminate, and must respond to injustices that are, in 
principle, recognisable to those unaffected by it. Again following Hine, I 
will call this the socially tolerable bounds criterion for DV.
The emphasis these criteria place on DV to be understandable and, 
in principle, acceptable to the broader community highlights how 
DV (and doxing as DV in particular) is audience vigilantism. DV’s 
effectiveness in addressing the social concerns that motivate it depends 
on how well it presents its cause to the audience. Without audience 
support, this form of vigilantism cannot achieve its intended purpose. 
Extreme methods and political causes risk alienating audiences and 
creating sympathy and community support for the targets of DV. 
Activists who utilise audience vigilantism therefore have an interest in 
keeping their actions within limits to encourage and maintain popular 
support for their goals.
Shaming as Audience Vigilantism
Audience vigilantism replaces the physical violence of traditional 
vigilantism with the shaming of individual(s) who have transgressed 
against the community. Jacob Rowbottom (2013, p. 1) lists three 
goals for “naming and shaming” individuals: informal punishment, 
informing the public about their conduct and expressing disapproval 
for that conduct.
The use of shame as a legal punishment for wrongdoing offers 
a useful starting point for considering it as a vigilante punishment. 
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Shame punishments express that the punished is a certain sort of person 
(Nussbaum, 2004, p. 230). Shame punishments for hate speech, for 
example, express that the punished individual is a bigot with a hatred 
of a certain group of people. The person is made visible as someone of 
poor character, and so shame punishments risk permanently staining 
the identity of those they punish (ibid., p. 231). In contrast, guilt 
punishments express only that the punished has performed a wrongful 
act (ibid., p. 230). Nussbaum (ibid., p. 207) describes guilt as “a type 
of self-punishing anger, reacting to the perception that one has done a 
wrong or a harm”. Guilt punishments condemn the act, while shame 
punishments condemn the person.3
This connection between shame and guilt suggests how shame 
punishments might be employed without necessarily alienating the 
transgressor from respectable society. Brooks (2008, p. 330) argues 
that shame punishments can be justified if used to inspire guilt within 
the wrongdoer. This moves the purpose of shaming from humiliation 
to reintegration: the individual’s stigmatisation is temporary until they 
themselves recognise the wrongness of their actions. Reintegrative 
shaming follows the transgressor’s shaming with efforts to return them 
to respectable society through limiting the time they are shamed, offering 
forgiveness for their actions and recognising that the transgression 
should not define the person’s identity (Braithwaite, 1989, pp. 100–1). 
The purpose is to move from condemning transgressors themselves 
(they are being shamed by others for wrongdoing) to condemning their 
actions (they themselves feel guilt for wrongdoing, and this guilt can 
motivate them to change their behaviour). It should encourage them to 
change their behaviour and attitudes, and encourage their community 
to forgive their transgression, rather than permanently alienate them 
from it.
While these discussions of shame punishments within a legal 
system suggest that shaming may be justified as a punishment, its use 
by vigilantes introduces problems that make it more difficult to justify. 
Solove (2007, pp. 94–98) lists several concerns about Internet shaming: 
its permanence, its disproportionality, the lack of due process and its 
3  Zlovenija is an example of this distinction. As the authors removed the post if the 
person who made the racist comment apologised, they inspired guilt in the speaker 
without permanently shaming them.
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abuse for bullying and personal disputes. The permanence of Internet 
shaming (due to the accessibility of the shaming material via search 
engines, and the possibility that others have copied and redistributed 
it even if the original poster removes it) makes returning to obscurity 
(effectively reintegrating into society) difficult after being shamed. This 
is one of the motivations of the “right to be forgotten” (Jones, 2016, pp. 
9–15).
The widespread accessibility of the humiliating material also makes 
Internet shaming particularly harmful. It lacks the definite end of 
reintegrative shaming, and the transgression may continue to define 
that person in their interactions with others. The widespread integration 
of the Internet into daily life makes it difficult to distance oneself from it 
to avoid encountering harassment (Franks, 2012, p. 682).
The risks associated with shame punishments imposed by vigilantes 
make them difficult to defend without considering their context. For 
those unable to seek legal action against legitimate threats to themselves 
and their communities, and who lack other effective alternatives to 
defend themselves against aggression, shaming punishments may be 
justified provided that they are used carefully. The shaming of hate-
speech proponents should be directed towards encouraging them to 
reconsider their views and reintegrate into the broader community. 
Excessive shaming and public humiliation risk being counter-productive, 
as social support (and the loss of it) is an important factor in holding 
and rejecting radical beliefs (Koehler, 2017, p. 17). The concept of 
reintegrative shaming also suggests how shaming by a vigilante 
audience might be kept within “socially tolerable bounds”. Defending 
themselves against hate speech also serves as an ‘accurately perceived 
social need’ for minority groups.
#OpKKK certainly fulfils the legitimate social need criterion for DV: 
the KKK exists, it has a history of violence and the fact that some 
members are comfortable enough to publicly claim to be members 
suggests that legal responses to the hate speech it promotes are 
insufficient. Publicising the membership of the KKK draws attention to 
the threat the organisation poses to others within US society. What of 
the socially tolerable bounds criterion? Ideally, those identified as KKK 
members would go through a process of reintegrative shaming, which 
may involve publicly renouncing their membership and assisting law 
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enforcement agencies with information about criminal activity 
performed by the organisation. This, of course, carries personal risk for 
such individuals, but it serves as a clear public signal of guilt about their 
former harmful transgressions. The community would also be obliged 
to protect those who have renounced their transgressions from reprisals. 
The former transgressor and the community are then reconciled through 
their newfound mutual assistance: the community through reforming 
someone whose views and actions were harmful to others and obtaining 
useful information to prevent further hate crimes and hate speech, and 
the transgressor through protection against reprisals and gaining a 
more balanced and nuanced perspective on the society in which they 
live.
The Zlovenija page was motivated by a concern about the racism 
within public discussions of migrants arriving in Slovenia. It had a 
legitimate social need as a formal attempt to combat the hate speech 
found on social media. It also arguably meets the tolerable social bounds 
criterion. While an argument can be made that including a direct link 
to the speaker’s Facebook post increased the risk of targeting doxing 
occurring (since it increased the ease with which location information 
about the individual could be found if it is included in the person’s 
profile), the Zlovenija authors acted responsibly by removing the 
identity information they posted once they became concerned that they 
were losing control over how this information was being used. Their 
removal of posts after the speaker apologised also demonstrates the 
authors’ responsibility in seeking to limit the shaming of those they 
identified. 
The violence and hate speech at the “Unite the Right” rally provide 
clear evidence that there is a legitimate social need to defend the 
community against white nationalism. The apparent reluctance of law 
enforcement to intervene and keep protesters and counter-protesters 
apart (Thompson, 2017), and the presence of citizen militias whose 
sympathies were unclear (Gunter & Hughes, 2018) might also be used 
to argue that the legal means of protecting the community are insufficient 
and that audience vigilantism is necessary.
These limitations assist in meeting the tolerable social bounds 
criterion. However, revealing any form of identity knowledge makes it 
easier to find locatability information about an individual, so the fact 
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that @YesYoureRacist did not itself reveal locatability information does 
not mean that those identified could not be targeted (Ellis, 2017). The 
relative anonymity of participating in a large public protest might also 
encourage individuals to express views they might otherwise conceal. 
Presence in a crowd creates the possibility of deindividuation occurring, 
which might drive individuals to extreme acts that they would otherwise 
avoid (Douglas, 2010).
These objections may be addressed by emphasising the importance 
that the shaming of audience vigilantism must be reintegrative. As in 
the previous example of named-and-shamed KKK members, those 
identified as white nationalists should be assisted in coming to recognise 
the prejudices that drive their views and to renounce their earlier racist 
beliefs. As with reintegrating former KKK members, it will be difficult 
for many to readmit those who previously supported racist views back 
into their community. Nonetheless, such acceptance, after those who 
have been shamed feel genuine guilt for their actions, is necessary to 
reduce the risk of ostracism, which would further alienate and radicalise 
those with racist and prejudicial views.
The example of doxing Antifa activists is crucial to establish the 
importance of the legitimate social need criterion. If the activist’s cause 
is irrelevant to this evaluation, any moral permissibility granted to 
the doxing of far-right activists would also hold for doxing Antifa and 
other social justice activists. Both Antifa and far-right groups attempt 
to suppress opposing political speech, and both perceive themselves 
as defending their communities. However, the legitimacy of their 
perceptions of their community and the threats they are reacting against 
differ significantly.
Far-right or ‘alt-right’ groups that attempt to suppress subversive 
expression believe they are defending their community against cultural, 
moral and/or social corruption. However, their flawed or self-serving 
understandings of culture and race undermine their conception of 
‘community’. The concept of ‘whiteness’ motivating many far-right and 
alt-right activists incorporates (at least elements of) white supremacy, 
the ideology that ‘white people’ are in some way intrinsically superior 
to other peoples, and this superiority justifies these people having 
unearned privileges and power in society (Beirich & Potok, 2011). The 
doxing of anti-fascist and other social justice activists by far-right and 
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alt-right activists is the use of audience vigilantism to silence challenges 
to white privilege. To meet the legitimate social need criterion, far-right 
and alt-right activists would need other groups in society to accept the 
legitimacy of white privilege (and that others must therefore accept 
their intrinsic inferiority). Any society that claims to accept political and 
social equality (such as liberal democracies) must reject such claims. 
Fascists and far-right extremists therefore lack the legitimate social need 
criterion for audience vigilantism.
Conclusion
Vigilantism of any form will always be morally controversial. 
Nonetheless, for those who have legitimate concerns about the ability 
of law enforcement to protect themselves and their communities from 
harm, vigilantism may be a defensible option. Digital vigilantism, in the 
form of doxing those who threaten harm to communities, is a viable 
option if it incorporates reintegrative shaming. Without the possibility 
that those who are exposed by digital vigilantism can be reintegrated 
into their communities, DV risks further alienating them and reinforcing 
their extreme views.
Not all justifications for doxing transgressors are equally legitimate. 
Hate speech, however, certainly is a legitimate concern. Where the law 
prohibits hate speech, its victims should seek legal avenues against it. If 
the law is silent about serious expressions of hate, those who face them 
may have a legitimate reason to turn to the use of audience vigilantism 
(including doxing) to defend themselves, provided that this serves as 
the start of an effort to reintegrate proponents of hate speech into a 
tolerant society that respects others.
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Citizens as Aides or Adversaries? 
Police Responses to Digital 
Vigilantism
Rianne Dekker and Albert Meijer
Introduction1
On social media, citizens are engaging in tasks that traditionally fall 
within the authority of law enforcement agencies (LEAs). Examples 
include web-sleuthing collectives solving criminal cases or searching 
for missing persons (Yardley et al., 2016), specialised networks of 
paedophile-hunters (Campbell, 2016; Nhan et al., 2017), hacktivist 
groups revealing cybersecurity breaches or hacking back (E Silva, 2018; 
Schmidle, 2018) and online neighbourhood-watch schemes (Lub, 2018). 
Social media has opened up new sources of information about crime to 
citizens, and it facilitates participation in crime fighting. This includes 
public denunciation of unwanted behaviour, digital forensics, open 
source intelligence and crowdsourcing. Cultural norms on social media 
incite such new forms of civic engagement with public security: social 
media is non-hierarchical and users have traditionally approached it 
as a communitarian space governed by libertarian values (Nhan et al., 
2017, p. 345).
Online acts of criminal investigation, crime prevention and the 
denunciation of crime and deviance by citizens, have been gathered 
1  The research leading to this chapter has received funding from the European 
Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program, under Grant Agreement 
no 700281. 
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under the labels ‘do-it-yourself (DIY) policing’ and ‘digital vigilantism’ 
(or ‘digilantism’). Both concepts refer to citizens performing activities 
that fall within the discretion of LEAs. At the same time, there is a 
notable difference between these concepts: DIY policing or digital 
civilian policing emphasises that it is motivated by a desire to assist law 
enforcement, for example by analysing available information to identify 
evidence and suspects (Nhan et al., 2017, p. 347). Usually, DIY police 
participants collect information on actual or potential crimes and relay 
this information to law enforcement (Huey et al., 2012, p. 85). In some 
cases, this is volunteered and in others it occurs in response to official 
calls for assistance with police work. In contrast, the concept of digital 
vigilantism stresses the active bypassing of law enforcement and using 
the public nature of social media for retaliation (Trottier, 2017). Digital 
vigilantism also includes pursuit and denunciation of a broader set of 
offences that are immoral rather than illegal. It is characterised by a 
general perception that law enforcement and the criminal justice system 
are falling short and different methods of criminal investigation and 
justice are required (Johnston, 1996; Schuberth, 2013). One could say 
that the concept of DIY policing highlights the desirable side of 
participative practices (citizens wanting to contribute to law enforcement 
efforts), whereas digital vigilantism highlights its negative side (citizens 
taking public security matters into their own hands).
The concepts of DIY policing and digital vigilantism reflect a 
normative discussion about the role of citizens in policing, as well as 
different perceptions the police may hold towards this relatively new type 
of co-production of public security (cf. Brandsen & Pestoff, 2006). Public 
security is traditionally governed by the state holding the monopoly on 
the legitimate use of physical force in a central and hierarchical way, 
making co-production in this domain disputed. Police responses to 
different acts of online engagement with public security highlight where 
normative boundaries between DIY policing and digital vigilantism are 
drawn. The law enforcement perspective, however, is often missing in 
research into online engagement with public security. In what cases do 
the police consider citizens engaged in policing with the support of Web 
2.0 as aides or as adversaries? Based on qualitative analysis of round-
table discussions among representatives of European law enforcement 
agencies (LEAs) and other public organisations active in the domain of 
public security — including local governments, ministries and national 
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and supranational networks and agencies — this chapter addresses the 
research question: How do law enforcement authorities decide whether 
digital contributions of citizens to public security are acceptable? 
It is relevant to study law enforcement’s stance on the issue because 
we have seen examples of DIY policing and digital vigilantism in 
many different countries and even across borders. This study focuses 
on the perspectives of European law enforcement agencies and 
reflects upon the generalisability of their views to other police forces 
worldwide. Furthermore, public debate on the desirability of online 
citizen engagement with public security is growing. As authorities in 
the domain of public security, LEAs are in a position to informally and 
formally encourage or discourage various acts of online engagement 
with public security. According to Huey et al. (2012, p. 95) “continued 
efforts should be made to understand further police attitudes towards 
these groups and how more fruitful co-operative relations could be 
developed”.
By studying the perceptions of LEAs we also contribute to a 
theoretical understanding of which new patterns of co-production 
between law enforcement agencies and (collectives of) citizens are 
developing in an information age. Public administration literature 
claims that social media is strengthening co-production (Linders, 2012; 
Meijer, 2012). This chapter develops a typology to come to a more fine-
grained understanding of the manifold forms of online co-production 
of public security, and discusses several ways to guide desirable and 
undesirable practices.
Online Co-Production of Public Security
Over the past decades, governments have moved from providing 
public services themselves to increasingly involving civil-society actors 
and citizens in the provision of public services. Public administration 
studies of co-production describe examples in healthcare, social 
welfare, community services and other public domains (Brandsen 
& Pestoff, 2006; Voorberg et al., 2015). Co-production has also made 
its way into the domain of public security, with strategies of plural 
policing and community policing. The concept of plural policing relates 
to how responsibilities for policing and security services extend from 
sovereign states to private companies, transnational arrangements and 
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citizens (Loader, 2000; O’Neill & Fyfe, 2017). Community policing 
has emerged as a police operating paradigm of close collaboration 
with citizens to maintain public security. Community policing entails 
informing and engaging citizens as experts within their local context, 
and being responsive to their information and requests (Mastrofski 
et al., 1995; Skogan & Williamson, 2008). In these policing strategies, 
non-state actors and citizens are not only ‘clients’ of the police, but also 
active contributors to the production of public security (Percy, 1978). 
Consequently, modern sovereign states no longer have a monopoly on 
the use of legitimate force within given spatial boundaries.
The platforms of Web 2.0 are strengthening collaboration with citizens 
in various public domains, including public security (Linders, 2012). 
They facilitate sharing and discussion of user-generated content within 
communities of interest (Haythornthwaite, 2005, p. 140) and enables a 
direct connection with government (Frissen et al., 2008). Meijer (2012, 
p. 1158) outlines how new media are an important facilitator for new 
forms of co-production, because the costs of connecting to citizens have 
been reduced drastically and the new technologies create opportunities 
to interact 24/7. The Citizen’s Net (Burgernet) application (app) — one 
of the cases in this study — enables the Dutch police to send out a digital 
message to call upon the help of citizens within a specific geographical 
area. It enables citizens to participate in solving local crime or missing-
persons cases in the ‘golden hour’ directly after the incident. Citizens 
can respond with their information and receive a message when the 
situation is solved and their information is no longer requested. Such 
instantaneous, rich and synchronous forms of interaction between 
citizens and government can hardly be created without the networked 
infrastructure provided by social media.
Linders (2012) proposes a typology of co-production supported by 
social media in which collaboration between government and citizens 
can take different forms. He distinguishes “government as a platform”, 
“citizen sourcing” and “do-it-yourself government” (ibid., p. 447). In 
government as a platform, the initiative for co-production lies with 
government, reaching out to citizens for specific forms of input. The 
“Citizen’s Net” (Burgernet) app from the Dutch police would be an 
example of this (cf. Meijer, 2012; 2015). In citizen sourcing, the initiative 
for co-production lies with citizens. The public helps government 
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to be more responsive and effective, for example, by reporting local 
disturbances to the police. Government holds the primary responsibility 
for action, but citizens influence the direction and outcomes, improve 
the government’s situational awareness, and may even help to 
execute government services on a day-to-day basis. Already, in these 
government-led types of digitally supported co-production, we see the 
risk of citizens infringing upon each other’s privacy, and the risk of 
citizens taking vigilante actions. Participation is sometimes motivated 
by entertainment and a notion of gaming, besides or instead of a motive 
of civic responsibility (Meijer, 2012, p. 1168): “Intervening in police work 
turns into a real life game in which everybody can participate. Get a 
text message, look out of your window, and catch the thief”. Excitement 
about participation in police work can become problematic when it turns 
into a competition between citizens, and this might encourage unethical 
or even illegal behaviour in order to solve crime.
These risks become even greater when online co-production is not 
initiated by, or does not occur in close collaboration with government. 
Do-it-yourself policing and digital vigilantism would fall into the 
category of ‘do-it-yourself government’. Social media has opened 
up opportunities for this type of citizen-to-citizen co-production of 
public security. This poses larger risks to government than online 
forms of co-production that are initiated and closely coordinated by 
government (Linders, 2012). While possibly being very effective and 
low-cost for government, communities of interest engaged with this 
form of co-production may step out of line. How is this ‘line’ defined 
by government actors in the domain of public security? And how does 
this distinction generate different police responses that are intended to 
fit online co-production within their standards of fruitful cooperation? 
These questions, which are still unanswered in public administration 
literature, will be addressed in this chapter.
Method
Data on attitudes and responses towards online co-production of 
public security were collected in round-table discussions amongst 
public security practitioners. Six European practitioner workshops 
on various topics related to DIY policing and digital vigilantism were 
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organised over the course of 2017 and 2018 in the context of the Horizon 
2020 project Medi@4Sec (www.media4sec.eu). The topics of these 
workshops were: DIY Policing, Riots & Mass Gatherings; the Dark 
Web; Everyday Policing; Trolling; and Innovative Market Solutions. A 
variety of practitioners from European LEAs and other organisations 
active in the domain of public security were invited, based on their 
experience with the workshop themes. This included representatives 
of local and national police forces, police colleges and police networks, 
but also representatives from local, regional and national governments, 
NGOs, private companies and research institutes (Table 11.1). 
Practitioners came from various Northern, Southern, Central and 
Eastern European countries, but representatives from countries that 
were more actively engaging with social media — such as the UK and 
the Netherlands — were overrepresented (Figure 11.1). The numbers 
of workshop participants ranged between 30–40 for each workshop, 
creating a total of 215 workshop participants. This total includes 
approximately 30 participants who attended multiple workshops, so the 
total of unique participants is around 150.
The round-table discussions were led according to the World Café 
format. This format entails collaborative group dialogues wherein 
knowledge is gathered and shared amongst practitioners. It stimulates 
thinking about current and ideal practices by creating an informal sphere 
of discussion (Stewart, 2005; Fouché & Light, 2011). The goal of the 
round-table discussions in the World Café format was to formulate 
recommendations and action points for public security actors. 
Discussions at each table included between four and six practitioners and 
took 30 to 45 minutes per round table, before participants moved on to 
a second round table with a different composition of practitioners. Each 
practitioner participated in two round-table discussions per workshop. 
Two ‘table hosts’ from the project consortium moderated the discussions 
and took notes. After a short round of introduction, the main questions 
leading the debate in each of the workshops were: In what ways have 
you/has your organisation encountered this phenomenon? What are 
current practices? How could these be improved into ideal practices? 
The round-table discussions took place under Chatham House rules, 
creating an open discussion. Table hosts summarised the discussion 
on paper and publicly presented the main outcomes to the workshop 
participants to collect final questions and feedback.
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Fig. 11.1  Countries represented by workshop participants (Total N=215)  
*Three private-sector delegates represented organisations from the 
United States.
For the research aims of this chapter, anonymised summaries of the 
round-table discussions were qualitatively coded. This entailed a 
process of open coding in dialogue with the focus of the research 
question. We coded (1) various forms of online citizen co-production 
of public security that are distinguished by law enforcement authorities; 
(2) the response they received; and (3) whether they are deemed 
acceptable or unacceptable and why. This explorative analysis provides 
an image of which acts of online co-production of public security are 
considered to be helpful or disruptive by law enforcement authorities 
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in Europe, and how they are therefore met with different responses. It 
reveals how police professionals discursively construct citizens as aides 
or adversaries. 
A limitation of our method is that the workshops and round tables 
each focused on a distinctive topic, such as ‘DIY Policing’ and ‘Everyday 
policing’ (with a more positive connotation) or ‘trolling’ (with a 
negative connotation). This influenced the tone of the discussion, but 
still left space for different interpretations and opinions — as the data 
show. Because the round-table discussions took place under Chatham 
House rules, our analysis was based on anonymised summaries of the 
discussions and we were unable to link statements to specific actors, 
nor could we distinguish whether statements were broadly supported 
by different actors. The summaries represent the majority views and 
the data are presented as general opinions. This means that we refrain 
from making statements on the prevalence of views and only use 
direct quotes when these were very strongly voiced and stressed in the 
summary reports.
Results
Online co-production of public security is responded to in various 
ways by practitioners, highlighting different attitudes towards different 
forms of engagement. The sections below outline which acts of online 
engagement are considered helpful and which are considered disruptive 
by LEAs and other public security actors. Based on analysis of practitioner 
dialogues, we interpret where these discursive boundaries are drawn by 
focusing on specific policing tasks and images of the citizens involved.
Accepted Forms of Online Co-Production of  
Public Security
Online acts of denouncing crime are generally evaluated positively 
by public security practitioners. Sometimes denunciation happens 
implicitly when criminal acts are shamed or mocked, and sometimes 
this is done directly when citizens discipline the behaviour of others on 
social media. This type of online engagement is generally considered as 
a helpful form of crime prevention. Public security actors expect it to 
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create enhanced awareness of the rule of law and to reinforce societal 
norms of accepted behaviour and deviance. Discussions during the 
trolling and DIY policing workshops highlighted that this form of 
engagement in crime prevention is seen as a positive contribution to 
police efforts.
More institutionalised forms of participation in crime prevention are 
also welcomed. For example, when citizens are sharing police warnings 
through social media — as discussed in the Everyday Policing workshop. 
This is expected to raise citizens’ overall awareness of public security 
risks and to enable them to deal with minor issues amongst themselves 
before they escalate to a level requiring police intervention. This more 
formal and government-led form of engagement and collaboration in 
crime prevention is expected to enhance citizens’ trust in the police as 
a modern, professional and open organisation, and to reinforce good 
relations between police and the public. The Innovative Market Solutions 
workshop indicates that several European police forces are using, 
acquiring or developing online tools or apps to encourage participation 
in crime prevention.
Other acts of online policing, besides engagement with crime 
prevention, are seen as more risky, but are generally valued when 
they resemble offline forms of collaboration with police. Two aspects 
mentioned during the DIY policing workshop are key in distinguishing 
these types of acts as helpful: first, collaborating with the police by, 
for example, bringing tips on cases, evidence or suspects to the police. 
Citizens doing this are seen as aides when they share the objectives of 
public security actors and are collaborating within their professional 
standards. A second aspect based on which practitioners distinguish this 
behaviour as acceptable is when online co-production focuses on cases 
directly affecting citizens’ own neighbourhoods or communities. When 
citizens are former or potential victims and have a legitimate concern 
for their personal safety, public security practitioners are understanding 
of their engagement and involvement. Both aspects reflect the ideal of 
community policing.
Online co-production in activities that go beyond this operating 
philosophy of community policing are approached more reluctantly. 
Online open source investigations by the Bellingcat collective and by 
citizens after the Boston Marathon bombings were referenced during 
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the DIY policing workshop as prominent examples of this. Their actions 
were considered as risky, since they led to premature accusations and 
interference with ongoing operations. However, several practitioners 
in the DIY Policing, Riots and Mass Gatherings and Everyday Policing 
workshops noted that citizens engaging in these types of online 
co-production of safety were also sometimes aiding police work. 
They can act as additional ‘eyes and ears’ of the police when they are 
investigating large amounts of evidence using their own expertise 
and professionalism (cf. Nhan et al., 2017). Collectives engaged in 
investigating crimes and public disorder are seen as having a broad 
range of skills, which can provide interesting new leads. Also, citizens 
policing the social spaces of Web 2.0 —  for example in tracing illegal 
activity on the Dark Web — are considered helpful. Many public security 
practitioners see their organisations as under-resourced, which prevents 
them from having a meaningful presence online (Dark web workshop; 
cf. Huey et al., 2012). Online engagement with crime and deviance 
beyond citizens’ own locality is approached with caution, but some 
practitioners note that it is only logical that social media are pushing the 
boundaries of the locally-based model of community policing towards 
matters outside of citizens’ own communities and towards the online 
space (DIY Policing workshop).
Unacceptable Forms of Online Co-Production of  
Public Security
Forms of online co-production that go beyond collaboration with LEAs 
within the citizens’ local context are generally deemed disruptive. 
Public security actors in the DIY Trolling workshops expressed two 
main concerns: these forms of online co-production can be harmful to 
other citizens and society and they can be harmful to the efforts of law 
enforcement.
Harm to Citizens and Society
Three arguments were presented about why online co-production can 
be harmful to citizens and society: Firstly, online co-production is seen 
as harmful to other citizens and society when premature accusations that 
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other citizens are criminal offenders are voiced online. Online collaboration 
can give way to rampant speculation, including the mislabelling of 
innocent actions as suspicious activities and the misidentification of 
innocent individuals as legitimate suspects (cf. Nhan et al., 2017, p. 
353). This may happen, for example, in online neighbourhood-watch 
groups (DIY Policing workshop). Online manhunts are most harmful 
when they concern innocent suspects, but even when speculations in 
the end turn out to be correct, some public security practitioners see 
this as harmful to the suspect and prosecution of the case. Using online 
naming and shaming as a means of reprisal brings unnecessary harm to 
the suspect, and it is not usually possible for the suspect to be forgotten 
by having all online material deleted after sentencing is completed 
(cf. Kohm, 2009; Mayer-Schönberger, 2009). DIY Policing and Trolling 
workshop participants noted that the public shaming of suspects can 
lower the sentencing in court. Here, practitioners distinguish acts of 
naming and shaming as a way of crime prevention and retaliation. It is 
only accepted when its main purpose is warning others not to engage in 
or not to become a victim of this kind of behaviour.
Secondly, it was argued that online engagement with public security 
may focus only on effectiveness and not on process values. It was mentioned 
in the DIY Policing workshop that individuals and collectives who are 
engaged with public security mainly strive for effectiveness, and that 
this is the only measure on which they grade their success. They aim for 
quick and high numbers of apprehensions. However, they do not adhere 
to other public values that enable due process in criminal investigations 
(cf. Jørgensen & Bozeman, 2007; De Graaf & Meijer, 2019). The values that 
were mentioned as lacking include the protection of data and privacy, 
necessity and proportionality, non-discrimination and accountability 
for one’s actions. Decisions about who to punish and how to do this 
are not transparent, accountable or democratically legitimate in such 
cases. In this respect, the authority of online crime fighters is highly 
questionable, even when their targets are quite obviously engaged in 
criminal behaviour (cf. Rizza et al., 2012). Also, citizens’ measurement 
of effectiveness was critically discussed in the DIY Policing workshop. 
It was stated that digital vigilante groups often target ‘low-hanging 
fruits’ that are easily caught but are also causing relatively little harm. 
Apprehending more professional offenders requires more elaborate 
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investigation, which takes time, and apprehension rates might thus 
be lower. However, when measured in years of sentencing instead of 
numbers of apprehensions, police cases can be seen as more successful.
Another related concern of public security practitioners is when 
individuals or groups engage in unprofessional practices of criminal 
investigation and punishment (DIY Policing workshop; cf. Huey et al. 
2012). Acts that are clearly labelled in the DIY Policing and Trolling 
workshops as ‘vigilante’ include entrapment, for example by acting as 
a decoy to uncover paedophiles, infiltrating websites and organisations, 
illegitimate ways of collecting evidence (for example the use of drone 
images) and doxing (Trolling workshop). The latter entails acts of 
harvesting and publishing private information about a particular 
individual online (cf. Trottier, 2017). This is seen as not only harmful 
to suspects, but possibly also to the digital vigilantes themselves when 
they are dealing with dangerous suspects. They can become a victim of 
criminals who feel threatened by digital vigilantes.
Harm to Police Operations
Practitioners also identified several dangers to police work of online 
co-production of public security. Again, three arguments were provided. 
First, practitioners on a local and national level voiced a very practical 
concern that an abundance of online engagement can overburden 
police with information and demands for intervention (Everyday Policing 
workshop). These demands might not always be met in case of petty 
incidents, because the police have to prioritise due to limited resources 
(cf. Nhan et al., 2017). When the police become more easily approachable 
through its social media presence or specialised apps, practitioners 
expect that the threshold to seek the help of law enforcement will 
become lower (DIY Policing workshop). Particularly, practitioners fear 
a growing number of requests related to offenses in cyberspace such 
as trolling, cyber-bullying and online shaming. However, much of this 
is not illegal and is dealt with most easily by moderation implemented 
by social media platforms, or solved by citizens amongst themselves 
(Trolling workshop). The presence on social media of police and police 
apps raises the expectation that all notifications will be dealt with. If 
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this expectation is unfulfilled, that might undermine trust in police and 
encourage vigilante acts.
Practitioners are also concerned that online engagement with crime 
may jeopardise ongoing police investigations and criminal prosecution of cases. 
Citizens can, for example, resort to unlawful acts to collect evidence, 
tamper with evidence or publish information online that is kept 
classified in a police investigation (DIY Policing workshop). Public anti-
authoritarianism — which is typical to some online platforms — coupled 
with a personal sense of right and wrong, often conflicts with legal 
standards and complicates police efforts. In response, we learned 
during the Innovative Market Solutions workshop that LEAs are using 
data mining and analysis tools to keep track of online engagement with 
ongoing police investigations (cf. Žitnik et al., 2018). This helps identify 
information that might distort the investigation, such as incorrect 
information that causes panic or leads to harmful actions. Information 
from online sources may also bring new leads for the investigation. 
Some practitioners, however, note that online publics only rarely bring 
new information to the table and often cause more harm than benefit 
(DIY Policing workshop; cf. Huey et al., 2012). According to these 
practitioners, the expertise and successes of digital vigilante groups 
are exaggerated by the groups themselves and in news reports of their 
activities.
Relatedly, there is a concern that online co-production of public 
security undermines police authority. When stories of successful 
apprehensions are uncritically shared and picked up by news media, 
and when there is no accountability or transparency about the actions 
that did not lead to success, public security practitioners are concerned 
that this may undermine trust in the police and eventually police 
authority and legitimacy (DIY Policing workshop). An example that 
was discussed during the DIY workshop was that of online paedophile-
hunter groups. In an increasing number of grooming trials, evidence 
from these groups is used. The groups are actively listing successful 
apprehensions and convictions on their websites.2 When the police are 
seen as ineffective and inefficient, citizens may increasingly resort to 
taking matters into their own hands — with the risk that their 
2  See for example www.darkjustice.co.uk.
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unprofessionalism has negative consequences, as well as the lack of due 
process to other citizens and society outline above.
Discussion: Online Citizens as Aides and Adversaries
Our analysis of discussions amongst European practitioners about 
online co-production in public security reveals that discursive 
boundaries of helpful and harmful acts of are not only drawn based 
on involvement in specific police tasks, such as crime prevention vs. 
investigation and prosecution. Discursive boundaries are primarily 
drawn based on the resemblance with the existing operating paradigm 
of community policing (Mastrofski et al., 1995; Skogan & Williamson, 
2008). While there are many differences between countries in adopting 
this policing paradigm, among Northern and Western European 
countries it has become relatively popular. Countries that are more 
democratically consolidated tend to have stronger relative preferences 
towards community-oriented policing over zero-tolerance styles (Lum, 
2009). Distinctions between DIY policing and digital vigilantism by 
public security practitioners in these countries are based on this model.
Citizens are considered as aides to police efforts when they engage 
with cases relating to their local context and when they closely 
collaborate with law enforcement. When online engagement goes 
beyond this familiar model of co-production, citizens are more likely to 
be considered adversaries. This concerns involvement in cases outside 
of citizens’ own local contexts and when they do not collaborate with 
law enforcement, or when they do so only at a later stage in order to be 
able to claim their own successes. These groups are seeking a broader 
audience in order to publicly denounce and retaliate against crime, 
instead of wanting to solve issues locally within the criminal justice 
system. From the perspective of public security actors, this is what 
distinguishes harmful digital vigilantism from helpful DIY policing.
Based on these two distinguishing features of DIY policing and digital 
vigilantism, we can develop a more fine-grained typology of online 
co-production in the domain of public security, including examples of 
behaviours that were brought up in the discussions (Table 11.2). 
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Table 11.2: Typology of online civic engagement in public security
Cases within citizen’s 
local context





Discussing tips on 
suspects or missing 
persons based on evidence 
posted by police on social 
media
Investigating evidence 
from social media sources 
on rioters, hooligans or 
terrorists and bringing this 
to the police





independently from local 
police, bringing offenders 
to justice themselves
Online entrapment of 
offenders and bringing 
these cases to the police 
only afterwards, hacking 
or phishing and doxing 
suspects without bringing 
these cases to the police
Public security organisations in various European countries are at 
different stages of maturity in responding to these various types of 
online co-production. This depends on the technological resources of 
the police force, the political context of the country and the local police 
culture. Presumably, the differences with countries beyond the EU are 
even larger. Police forces with less financial and technological resources, 
within authoritarian political systems and with a repressive police 
culture will engage less in co-production of public security with online 
citizens. Representatives from European LEAs who participated in our 
workshop share a similar ideal of better engaging with DIY policing and 
more strongly denouncing digital vigilantism.
Two ideal typical forms of DIY policing and digital vigilantism are 
highlighted in the upper-left and lower-right boxes of Table 11.2. There 
is consensus that local, collaborative forms of engagement with public 
security, such as sharing and discussing tips on suspects or missing 
persons based on evidence posted by police on social media, should 
be better facilitated and encouraged. Some police forces are already 
doing so by hosting various social media channels on which calls to 
action are posted, or having specialised apps to ask for collaboration 
in local cases. Examples are Amber Alert and the Dutch ‘Citizen’s Net’ 
app (cf. Meijer, 2012; 2015). More common are police forces that only 
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host one centralised social media account, which is used to disseminate 
information to the public and not to interact with the public. This type 
of social media adoption reinforces a traditional and hierarchical model 
of the police as knowledge broker (Nhan et al., 2017, p. 344).
There is also relative consensus that ideal typical forms of digital 
vigilantism — as highlighted in the lower-right box of Table 11.2 — should 
be more strongly denounced by LEAs. Even though, in some cases, the 
specific expertise and resources of online publics are valued, the police 
consider the independence with which these groups are working and 
claiming successes as harmful to society and to police authority. Public 
security actors fear that only the positive successes of these individuals 
and collectives are celebrated, while the many compromises that are 
made with regard to public values other than effectiveness, such as the 
privacy of suspects, are too easily ignored. While harmful acts towards 
others, such as trolling and doxing, may be unethical but not illegal, 
some public security actors wish to pursue current regulations more 
strictly, or to expand them. Other public security actors wish to publicly 
counter the successes of digital vigilantes by providing information on 
negative side-effects and offering a counter-narrative.
Literature on digital vigilantism suggests that these forms of 
guidance would have limited effects. Since social media spaces are 
governed by libertarian and sometimes anti-authoritarian values, 
online publics will not always self-identify as vigilante or be willing to 
follow the procedures of law enforcement. Also, because social media 
spans national borders, citizens engaging in DIY policing will belong 
to multiple jurisdictions that may have different guidelines. As stated 
earlier, countries with more authoritarian governance systems are not 
likely to have a tradition of community policing or to employ a positive 
stance towards the online engagement of citizens in police work. In 
these cases, police attitudes towards citizens prevent them from taking 
online co-production seriously. There is a police subculture of distrust, 
in which citizens are stereotyped either as “know nothings”, “suspicious 
persons” or “assholes” (Manning & Van Maanen, 1978, pp. 223–4). This 
mutual distrust might be reinforced by the anonymity of social media 
(Walker et al., 2006) and will complicate attempted collaboration in 
online spaces.
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The two forms of online civic engagement that were debated more 
intensively are found in the upper-right and lower-left boxes of Table 
11.2. Public security actors see some merit in both, but are also concerned 
with their negative effects. When collaborative engagement occurs 
outside citizens’ local contexts, their level of expertise was debated. Are 
they able to bring new leads to the table that the police investigation 
would not have uncovered? Some practitioners pointed towards strained 
police resources and the “wisdom of the crowds” (cf. Surowiecki, 
2004) that online citizens can contribute to the investigation. Besides 
this crowdsourcing of intelligence, others value the specific expertise 
of some citizens in more specialised investigations, such as cybercrime. 
The motives of citizens to help in cases outside of their own communities 
are questioned, however. Why would citizens offer their time and skills 
to collaborate with law enforcement when they have no direct fear for 
their own safety, or for that of others within their community? Some 
practitioners fear that the desire to match or outsmart law enforcement 
will lead these citizens to take bold measures, and to lose sight of public 
values that are equally as important as effectiveness. 
Meijer (2012) describes how online co-production in the domain of 
public security can indeed be motivated by entertainment, or even have 
an element of ‘gaming’ to it. However, in this digital age, engagement 
with criminal cases outside of one’s local context can also be motivated 
by local concerns and a sense of civic responsibility. In her seminal 
book The Death of Distance (1997) Cairncross claims that the revolution 
in telecommunications technologies makes geographical distance less 
significant. Studies on the effects of Web 2.0 also note how social media 
makes geographical borders less relevant. However, other borders 
remain present: for example, language barriers preventing people from 
communicating with each other, and social borders distinguishing cases 
which feel familiar enough to engage with. Due to the media-rich and 
personal nature of social media communication, citizens can feel closely 
engaged with cases from which they are geographically far removed. 
This may motivate them to contribute digitally to policing efforts.
In the case of online engagement with local cases without 
collaboration with the police, citizens’ own methods of seeking justice 
are problematised most. Engagement with local issues of public security 
is valued. However, it is exactly because matters are close to home, that 
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public security actors fear it is tempting for citizens to take matters into 
their own hands. For example, neighbourhood watch groups may use 
their online platforms to encourage people to bring suspects to justice 
themselves. When collaboration with the police is not sought, or is sought 
only at a late stage, practitioners fear that methods of investigation and 
punishment are unlawful, unprofessional and cause harm to suspects, 
to other citizens, and to social cohesion in local communities. European 
police forces are developing apps to facilitate engagement in prevention 
and investigation, according to law enforcement standards. For example, 
the police in Nice (France) piloted the app C-Now (previously Reporty) 
in which citizens can take videos of incidents and crime and live-share 
this information, including geolocation, with emergency operators. The 
Dutch police is developing apps to engage citizens in finding missing 
persons (Samen zoeken) and securing evidence after a crime (Sherlock).
Conclusions 
Online forms of co-production of public security are here to stay, but 
the rules of this ‘game’ have yet to be established. DIY policing and 
digital vigilantism can be considered as examples of “do-it-yourself 
government” (cf. Linders, 2012). These forms of online co-production are 
initiated by citizens, take place relatively independently of government 
law enforcement, and are therefore most ambiguous. As authoritative 
actors within the domain of public security, law enforcement agencies 
and other public organisations involved with public security play 
an important role in establishing the boundaries between acceptable 
and unacceptable forms of online engagement. In their responses to 
different forms of online civic engagement, they discursively set these 
boundaries. This chapter has therefore addressed the question of how 
law enforcement authorities define the boundaries of which digital 
contributions of citizens to public security are acceptable, and which 
unacceptable.
An analysis of round-table discussions between European public 
security practitioners, during six workshops, highlights that discursive 
boundaries of accepted forms of online co-production are drawn based 
on the existing philosophy of ‘community policing’. In this policing-
operation paradigm, engagement is characterised by close collaboration 
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with law enforcement and involvement in cases concerning citizens’ 
local communities. Acts of online engagement with matters of public 
security that fall outside of this definition — either on one or on both 
conditions — are met with more skepticism and reluctance. They are 
considered to bring risks of harm to others in society, as well as to police 
work and police authority.
Broad definitions of DIY policing and digital vigilantism generate 
only limited understanding of the different responses of LEAs towards 
online civic engagement. Developing a more fine-grained distinction 
and typology based on these two key features of community policing is 
helpful to understanding normative boundaries drawn by authorities, 
and probably also by less authoritative actors towards this phenomenon. 
As authorities in the domain of public security, LEAs and local, national 
and international public security organisations are in a position to 
formally and informally define the boundaries of accepted acts of DIY 
policing, which will probably also permeate to less authoritative actors 
and citizens (cf. Schneider, 2014).
Our research details shared perceptions of LEAs in Europe regarding 
online engagement of citizens in security practices. It provides 
important insights in what is seen as acceptable and unacceptable 
behaviour on the Internet. Unfortunately, based on the anonymous 
character of the round-table discussions and reporting, we were not 
able to distinguish differences in opinion between LEAs in different 
European countries or between actors working for different types of 
public security organisations. This raises a set of new questions. Further 
research should focus on investigating the similarities and differences 
between countries with different political contexts and police cultures. 
Comparative research enables us to understand how national security 
cultures translate into police engagement with online co-production of 
public security. In addition, we need to investigate the actual responses 
of the police to find out whether their actions indeed fit the matrix 
that we developed based on their statements. Are they indeed more 
supportive of local practices and practices in close collaboration with 
law enforcement?
The research maps current views but also raises questions about the 
future. Police notions of what is a ‘local context’ and ‘close 
collaboration’ — the two key dimensions in our model — may start to 
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shift and change. Local context used to be defined in a geographical 
sense, but this is shifting with the death of distance and it may require a 
new meaning in the “space of flows” (Castells, 1999, p. 294). Citizens 
might feel close affinity with others in different localities, which 
motivates them to engage with their public security issues. Furthermore, 
close collaboration was previously defined as following police orders: 
government-as-a-platform forms of co-production. Now, this may 
become a more horizontal collaboration. These shifts will define what 
LEAs see as acceptable and unacceptable forms of online citizen 
engagement and what they label as DIY policing and digital vigilantism.
For some European law-enforcement authorities, it has been difficult 
to diverge from their traditional authoritative role as knowledge brokers, 
and instead to actively engage with social media to guide the online 
activities of citizens. They generally feel that there is little that they can 
do to stop new forms of online engagement with public security and it 
is also not in their best interest to do so. Therefore, we observed a shared 
desire amongst the group of public security practitioners to provide 
more guidance in online civic engagement with policing. By stonewalling 
or denouncing all types of online citizen engagement, LEAs would miss 
out on an opportunity to acknowledge legitimate concerns for public 
security, with the risk that citizens might lose trust in the police, causing 
the erosion of police legitimacy (cf. Crump 2011; Meijer & Thaens 2013; 
Warren et al. 2014; Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer 2015). They feel that 
judgements on these co-production initiatives should not be left only to 
online collectives themselves, or to the public courts of news media and 
public opinion.
Several options to provide more guidance, including regulations, 
training, moderation and apps were proposed. They are mostly 
proposed within the traditional domains of community policing such 
as crime prevention, tracing missing persons and addressing local 
nuisance, disorder and petty crimes. In more specialised disciplines and 
larger cases such as white-collar crime, sexual assault and murder cases, 
online civic engagement is generally deemed less suitable and guidance 
was not proposed in order not to inadvertently encourage involvement. 
Public security actors wish to direct online publics to key areas of 
investigation and help focus their efforts. Furthermore, police guidance 
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would help to ensure transparency in evidence collection and study, and 
it is expected to steer citizens towards more professional norms.
Many acts of digital vigilantism cannot be forbidden as being 
unlawful, but are simply unethical. In the case of unlawful acts, it is 
doubtful whether public security actors will achieve the desired goal 
of guiding digital vigilantes towards DIY policing characterised by 
close collaboration with law enforcement and involvement in only local 
matters. Digital vigilantes might not self-identify as such, and even if 
they do, their vigilante acts might be an active choice based on anti-
authoritarianism and distrust in government law enforcement. At the 
same time, providing more guidance to those engaged in DIY policing 
may come at a price. It can create an implicit incentive for citizens 
to get (more) involved in matters of public security, although this 
has not been the primary goal: public security actors only wished to 
guide existing involvement, as an overabundance of tips and requests 
is already a concern. Coordinating DIY policing activities may also 
create new liabilities for the police when acts by citizens that have been 
coordinated by the police cause harm after all (cf. Huey et al., 2012). 
Lastly, facilitating online involvement in public security can stimulate an 
atmosphere of social control and mutual distrust amongst citizens (cf. 
Schreurs et al., 2018). Existing social, cultural and political divides in 
society might become more prominent. These matters should be taken 
into account by public security actors when providing more guidance to 
DIY policing.
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More Eyes on Crime?: The 
Rhetoric of Mediated Mugshots
Sarah Young
In September 2017, a man in North Carolina, USA was arrested for a 
probation violation. While the arrest was standard, the man’s booking 
photo was not — his mugshot featured him, arm raised with a smile on 
his face, eating a bologna sandwich, prompting the photo to go ‘viral’ 
(Elsesser, 2017). 
Introduction
While it may not be typical for an arrestee to be photographed eating a 
sandwich, the booking photo described above illustrates a growing 
trend in the United States — the participatory online mugshot. While 
the publication of online mugshots may be more popular in America 
than elsewhere (Collier, 2014), these photos have been known to go 
viral and trend world-wide. Combining traditional uses of the mugshot 
for information management and classification purposes (Finn, 2009) 
with participatory digital technologies, online mugshots provide a 
space where the public can elevate the exposure of arrestees by making 
the images viral, as in the example of the North Carolina man above, 
who now and forever has the dubious association of having the bologna-
sandwich mugshot. Proponents argue that increased mugshot visibility 
aids department transparency and provides more information for the 
community (Murray, 2015), but is justice and “more eyes on crime” the 
rhetoric that is extolled in online galleries? I argue no, especially in one 
prominent example of Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office’s former 
Mugshot of the Day (MotD) program from Arizona, USA.
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In 2011, controversial Joe “Sheriff Joe” Arpaio, the self-proclaimed 
“America’s toughest sheriff” (BBC News, 2017), launched the MotD 
program through the MCSO’s webpage. While Sheriff Joe’s base 
supporters and audience may predominately be in the desert southwest 
of the United States, where voters kept Arpaio in power as County Sheriff 
from 1993 to 2016 and whose “brand of politics made him the most 
popular politician in Arizona” (Kiefer, 2016), Arpaio and his policies 
have received world-wide notoriety. In the heyday of his popularity, 
Arpaio boasted of having two hundred TV interviews per month and 
thousands of articles written about him from all over the world (Santos, 
2012) in places like England (BBC News, 2017) or Australia (Duffy, 
2018). Some of his more famous American supporters and advocates of 
his justice policies range from actor Steven Seagal (Ohlheiser, 2014) to 
President Donald Trump (Hirschfeld Davis & Haberman, 2017).
Run from 2011 to 2016, the Mugshot of the Day! site allowed the 
public, under the guise of a voting game, to view all the jail bookings 
for the last three days to elevate the visibility of their mugshot of choice 
to the leaderboard. The top eight mugshots were featured daily on the 
site’s main page, and the most popular shot of the day was featured 
at the top of the homepage and labelled, “Mugshot of the Day!” This 
program was justified by Sheriff Joe reportedly saying, “More eyes on 
arrestees may result in more leads to criminal investigators” (Hermann, 
2011).
While Arpaio had also used other extreme measures for attention 
and publicity to show his ‘tough’ stance on crime, such as when he 
created the US’ first female chain gang (Santos, 2012), required inmates 
to wear striped outfits issued with pink underwear, housed inmates in 
tents in the desert heat and fed inmates mouldy bologna (Kiefer, 2016), 
what is specific about this program is that MCSO was not just asking 
the public to be vigilante viewers of crime infotainment, and to watch 
the inmates from a distance, as in a quirky news report on Arpaio’s Tent 
City. Instead, he changed the participatory nature of the audience and 
created a space where the public could stay distant while also becoming 
up close and personal with those arrested.
By looking at the MCSO’s MotD program, I argue that through the 
exigency of entertainment on participatory platforms, online mugshots 
temporarily coalesced a group of digital vigilantes into being, in order 
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to weaponise visibility. This claim is not only an argument that the 
initial intention of the MotD (entertainment) does not disqualify it as 
a DV activity (due to the unwanted, intense and enduring visibility it 
produces), but it also contributes to evolving definitions of how one 
participates in vigilantism in a digital world, and who can do so. To 
support this argument, I will use the MSCO site in four ways: 1) argue 
that online mugshot consumers can be digital vigilantes, 2) argue that 
entertainment provides this link, 3) discuss the implications of these 
conclusions and 4) discuss what this means for other online mugshot 
platforms in a larger context.
The MCSO’s MotD Program Creates Digital Vigilantes
Firstly, I will explain how those who interact with online mugshots, 
especially in the case of MCSO can be considered digital vigilantes. I 
argue they can be considered this because 1) online mugshots on the 
MCSO site call into being a group of people that temporarily coalesces 
2) through participatory platforms to 3) shame and weaponise visibility 
against a target.
Individuals temporarily coalesce: According to Charland, one becomes 
a member of a collective through interaction with its discourse. 
Identification then is a rhetorical move. One is not always born into 
associations with others  —  one can choose to heed the call. There is 
not necessarily a subject that “would exist prior to and apart from the 
speech to be judged”, instead the discourse can call a subject into being 
(1987, p. 133). This is true for digital vigilantes as well. Digital vigilantes 
heed a call for participation and find themselves in the call for action. As 
Trottier discusses, these individuals do not have to have prior association 
and are often “unaffiliated with a formal organisation” (2017, p. 57).
Particularly for MCSO, one became a member of the voting collective 
because they found themselves in the call to vote for the mugshot. To 
vote on one’s favourite mugshot of the day, the user did not have to 
register or otherwise be involved with the Sheriff’s Office or affiliated 
with any other organisation. One was able to look at the photos, click on 
their favourite image and tap the “vote” button next to the photo. Once 
they had voted and their selection was logged by the site, though, they 
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became a member of the collective in that their vote joined with the 
other votes to work together to elevate the visibility of the photo.
Online mugshots utilise digital platforms to name and shame: Second, 
in digital vigilantism, the ability both to join the group and to carry 
out the actions of a digital vigilante are granted through digital, 
participatory platforms. Jenkins et al. describe participatory culture as a 
“mix of top-down and bottom-up forces” that alter the traditional roles 
of producer and consumer (2013, p. 11), and a participatory platform 
utilises the mix of top-down and bottom-up affordances that allow those 
at the “top” to provide the space for interaction, but engage the public 
to produce their own conversation. This follows Trottier’s comment that 
“DV is a product of digital media platforms and user-generated cultural 
practices” (2017, p. 57).
In the case of MCSO, the members of the voting collective were only 
able to coalesce, and these members only able to vote, because they 
could heed the call for membership online on a participatory platform. 
Voters did not meet in a public square or in a physical location to 
target particular individuals; voters could just turn on their computers, 
navigate to the MCSO’s site and select their favourite mugshot with a 
click of the mouse.
Mugshot consumers weaponise visibility: One can coalesce for 
membership and use participatory platforms without being a digital 
vigilante though, so an important piece of the argument is that digital 
vigilantes can inflict some type of punishment on their targets. As 
Trottier (2017) describes, DV is a process where the coalesced groups 
“respond through coordinated retaliation” (2017, p. 56), implying that 
some type of harm results in the process.
One punishment is shame. Shame works by showing others how 
someone has violated an accepted social norm (Karp, 1998), and while a 
person might feel fear when they are physically threatened, they might 
“feel shame when the social self is threatened” (ibid., p. 279). Shame 
causes feelings of embarrassment because a person believes someone 
has a low opinion of them, and this can range from close friends even 
to strangers (ibid., p. 280). As Rosedale concludes, the mugshot creates 
“a shame-filled expression captured by the photograph” (2014, p. 791). 
So, when someone’s mugshot is visible to the public, this can result in 
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shame even if the person photographed does not even know who will 
be looking at the photo.
One way that groups can use shame to harm targets is through 
weaponised visibility. According to Trottier, weaponised visibility makes 
“explicit use of targets’ personal information by rendering them visible 
to public scrutiny” (2017, p. 65). The more visible a target is, the more 
others can find out about their actions. This visibility can range from 
the name-and-shame tactic in which a target’s personal information is 
revealed, to drawing out child predators through shows like To Catch A 
Predator, in which volunteers pose as underage children to bait potential 
sex offenders (Smallridge et al., 2016), to, as I argue, voting on online 
mugshots. Even though in the case of MCSO these mugshots were 
uploaded first by a state entity, the public can turn these photos into 
weapons of visibility by drawing even more scrutiny to the images.
Trottier (2017) outlines that there are three characteristics of 
weaponised visibility. It is unwanted, intense and enduring. Each of 
these facets creates a type of visibility that can bring shame and harm 
to a target. MCSO’s mugshots present the opportunity for a group’s 
members to capitalise on all three of these characteristics to weaponise 
visibility when voting on their favourite image.
First, when visibility is weaponised, it is unwanted and “the target 
is typically not soliciting publicity” (ibid., p. 55). For the voting public 
on the MCSO site, the group could use visibility to harm their target 
because mugshots inherently represent an unwanted condition. Typically, 
a mugshot is a negative reminder of something bad, and the photos 
dehumanise the photographed (Lashmar, 2013). Rosedale also adds that 
the mugshot “includes an individual’s expression at an embarrassing 
moment. At the time the photograph is taken, the individual has been 
‘deprived of most liberties’” (2014, p. 791). So, when interacting with 
any type of mugshot, the public was already engaging in making more 
visible an unwanted artefact.
The unwanted nature of MCSO’s MotD program is especially 
apparent looking at one of the major cases testing the legalities of 
online mugshots. In this suit, the plaintiff unsuccessfully1 sued the 
county because he argued MCSO took his property, or more specifically, 
1  It is interesting to note that in dismissing the case, the courts referenced the 1904 
case of Shaffer v. United States, which concluded that mugshots can be used as law 
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his “image, name, and fingerprints” without his permission and 
posted both his image, arrest details and personal information on 
their site, thus violating his Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable seizures, Fifth Amendment right to private property, 
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment 
and Ninth Amendment right to life, liberty and happiness (Campbell, 
2013). One of the main complaints in the suit was that the mugshot was 
featured publicly, and that users could interact with it and re-publish it 
on other sites. As listed in the suit regarding MCSO and other entities 
reposting his photo, “many of these websites, including the County’s, 
permitted site visitors to vote on a ‘mugshot of the day’, and some even 
permitted viewers to make comments about images posted on the sites”. 
Clearly, for the plaintiff, visibility was unwanted.
Second, visibility, when weaponised, is intense: “content like text, 
photos and videos can circulate to millions of users within a few days” 
(Trottier, 2017, p. 55). When voters engaged with the mugshots on the 
MotD site and elevated photos to the main page, they could increase the 
intensity of the photo’s circulation. No longer relegated to interior pages, 
once the photos had received enough votes, the images would move 
and be prominently featured on the site’s main page. Then, whenever a 
visitor clicked on the homepage, the user was greeted with one of eight 
photos. The magnitude of the intensity of the exposure is illustrated by 
the number of visitors to the MSCO site, and during the time period 
when the MotD program was running, then-Sheriff Arpaio boasted that 
this controversial program had a million hits a day and was “one of the 
most visible law enforcement sites on the Internet” (Maricopa County 
Sheriff’s Office, 2015a).
Third, weaponised visibility is enduring because it can be a top search 
result or it can morph into its own cultural reference (Trottier, 2017, 
p. 55). For groups of voters on the MCSO site, voting on a particular 
photo could make the image more enduring. Once the photo had been 
elevated to the main page, it remained there for the rest of the day 
and, as mentioned, it would be the first images seen by site visitors. 
Although in the case of MCSO the images were removed after three 
days, thereby limiting the lasting characteristic of endurance for 
enforcement sees fit because “it would be [a] matter of regret to have its use unduly 
restricted upon any fanciful theory or constitutional privilege” (Campbell, 2013). 
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voters on the MCSO’s page, voters could still affect the endurance of 
the images. The most visible mugshots were often downloaded or 
screenshotted, and featured as content on other news or blogging sites 
(Stern, 2016) such as the Phoenix New Times, who weekly reviewed their 
own “Mugshots of the Week” based on MCSO’s photos (Hendley, 2015) 
and whose content is still online today. These images were also reposted 
in places such as tabloid news outlets, who picked up celebrities such as 
WNBA star Brittney Griner (TMZ, 2015) and private blogs like Maricopa 
County Mugshots (Maricopa County Mugshots, n.d.) which showcased 
screenshots of offenders.
Overall, then, voters on the MotD program were able to join together 
to further shame particular targets, thereby weaponising visibility and 
acting as digital vigilantes. Before continuing, though, it is of note that, 
by nature of posting the mugshots online for a contest, MCSO was in a 
way participating in their own weaponisation of visibility against those 
who had been arrested, thereby strengthening the connection between 
the state, the public and digital vigilantism. Without these images have 
being posted, there would not be the chance to vote for the photos in the 
first place. Even further, MCSO was releasing booking date, full name, 
booking number, gender, birthdate, height, weight, hair and eye colour, 
race and arrest reason (Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, 2015b), which 
further doxed the arrestees and created the possibility of new justice 
initiatives such as the silencing of protest and dissent (this point will be 
discussed later in the chapter.)
The Exigency of Entertainment 
The previous section detailed how the MCSO’s MotD program illustrated 
the similarities between the digital vigilantes and voters on the site. The 
following section will detail one significant difference: the exigency of 
the audience participation. I argue that both the call for participation 
on the “Mugshot of the Day!” page, together with a sample of the site’s 
‘winners’, supports that entertainment, rather than detection of criminals 
or retribution, evoked participation on the site. This not only challenges 
Sheriff Joe’s supposed reason for creating the program but also adds 
314 Introducing Vigilant Audiences
complexity to the idea of the ‘vigilant audience’ who is traditionally 
conceptualised to coalesce for justice-seeking reasons.
Objects and Views Analysis
To make this argument, it is important to understand how the page 
looked when users would land on the Office’s page. Were users greeted 
with rhetoric for identifying criminals for the sake of keeping the streets 
safer? Were they greeted with calls for retaliation to harm those 
photographed? I argue neither, users were greeted with the exigency of 
entertainment.
Methods: To analyse the page, I used a content and views analysis as 
described by Hart-Davidson et al. (2007), which builds on the work of 
Rockley & Kostur (2003) and their ideas of content auditing. For the 
analysis, the “content” portion “is a straightforward list of the content 
types available on the site” (ibid., 17). The “views” portion “is a different 
view of content that complements what can be a rather static, product-
focused inventory of text types” (ibid.), and instead, views are “a 
collection of content objects presented to the user in a coherent visual 
format” (ibid.). In a content and views analysis, a researcher examines 
a website to see how web content is managed and how content serves 
strategic goals. This was an effective strategy for this analysis because it 
offered a way to see what content MCSO allowed, how they let users 
navigate the space and if the content of the MotD page matched the 
supposed strategic goals of the office, which was to have more eyes on 
arrestees. Only the MotD page was used for the analysis because this 
was the relevant page that facilitated the interaction. For this analysis, 
while Hart-Davidson et al. stuck to genres in their study with content 
types like “news and announcements” and “policy statements”, this 
was smaller and focused on one page rather than the site, so I included 
more specific details of content like “photo of Sheriff Joe”.
Results: For content, there were several standard items on the page that 
ran across the whole site, such as the header element with the photo of 
Sheriff Joe, department name and image of Sheriff’s badge, and there was 
also the footer element, with the contact information, privacy statement 
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and copyright information. The bulk of the content unique to the page 
was the photos of the mugshots and the different ways to search for the 
photo of your choice. The punctuation of the exclamation mark on the 
phrase “Mugshot of the Day!” was a particularly enthusiastic addition 
to the site.
To view content on and off the page, there was little variation 
available. Users could use a menu to navigate around the site to other 
locations like “About MCSO” or “Victim Services”. Users could also use 
links to peruse specific offenses, and users could search the mugshots by 
first name, last name or booking number. Users could also click on 
“Contact Us” and “Privacy Statement”. It is of note that below these 
photos was the disclaimer, “Mugshots reflect the bookings within the 
last 3 days. Individuals booked prior to that time will not be displayed. 
PRE-TRIAL INMATES ARE INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY!” 
(Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, Mugshots, 2015, emphasis in 
original). Table 12.1 provides a snapshot of the results.
Table 12.1: Results of the Content and Views Analysis for the MotD Page
Content Views
• Photo of Sheriff Joe
• Name of Department and 
tagline
• Image of Sheriff’s badge
• Name of other website pages
• Mugshot of the Day! image
• Categories of crimes
• Seven “Mugshot Leader 
Board” images
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Discussion: Although Sheriff Arpaio had claimed his mugshot program 
was about how “[m]ore eyes on arrestees may result in more leads to 
criminal investigators” (Hermann, 2011), this was not necessarily what 
was being communicated or displayed on the webpage. Offense-taking 
and punishment were not presented as the reason to vote. Instead, 
participants were greeted by the exigency of entertainment. According 
to a visual analysis of this page, the site was designed to facilitate 
the easy process of scanning, searching and voting for one’s favorite 
mugshot. Nowhere on this page was there a call to elevate the image of 
those you recognise from other crimes or details directing onlooker to 
report tips to the agency. There was a “Contact Us” link, but it was listed 
in the footer of the page and was an element that ran across the bottom 
of every page rather than an appeal for the public to identify particular 
individuals.
Overall, then, the page was focused more on entertainment and 
letting the audience easily navigate the site to vote, rather than to 
enable them to assist with law enforcement duties. Thus, I argue that 
entertainment was the impetus for voter’s participation. To further back 
up this claim, I also looked at a sample of the mugshots that were being 
selected as the mugshot of the day.
Qualitative Content Analysis
A look at the photos presents an opportunity to see who the voters 
picked to name and shame. This would help identify the outward 
manifestations of the rhetoric of the site. With a call for entertainment, 
who were voters selecting?
Methods: To do this, I selected a random selection of images, and I chose 
a selection of 285 photos from the summer of 2015. To look at these 
photos, I conducted a visual, qualitative content analysis. According to 
Rose, content analysis for images involves “counting the frequency of 
certain visual elements in a clearly defined sample of images” (2007, 
p. 61), and then looking at these frequencies to make meaning. Each 
image was also categorised into only one category. By looking at these 
mugshots, a pattern emerged that participants were doing more than 
just keeping an eye out for criminals — I argue they were, for the most 
part, specifically targeting individuals for their appearance.
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Elo and Kyngas outline that the general goal of content analysis is 
to get a “condensed and broad description of the phenomenon, and 
the outcome of the analysis is concepts or categories describing the 
phenomenon” (2007, p. 108). For a greater level of confidence in the 
data, I also worked with a second coder to achieve intercoder reliability, 
as recommended by Geisler and Swarts (2019). Multiple coders were 
essential because as Krippendorff (1980), Geisler and Swarts (2019), 
and Rose (2007) underscore, qualitative content analysis is useful when 
it is both replicable and reliable. To be replicable and thus more reliable, 
more than one person should be able to conduct the same study and get 
similar results. According to Rose, similar results can be achieved with 
good coding description with codes “defined as fully as possible” (2007, 
p. 68). With well-defined categories, each coder could match their code 
to the description of the classification.
With a second coder, I was able to achieve 270 agreements, which is 
approximately 95% of simple intercoder agreement, or in other words, 
the “measure of the extent to which coders assign the same codes to 
the same set of data” (Geisler & Swarts, 2019, p. 155). In this study, the 
5% discrepancy arose most times when an image had more than one 
category trait, for example a subject had both an out-of-the-ordinary 
facial expression, but also body tattoos, and coders debated as to 
which code was more prominent. I was also able to get a 0.920 Kappa 
agreement as calculated by GraphPad (2014) which was rated as a “very 
good” strength of agreement.
Results: According to Schreier, “With qualitative content analysis, the 
coding frame itself can be the main result” (2014, p. 180), and after 
following the steps of analysis, Table 12.2 details the eleven categories 
emerged. 
Table 12.2: Category Results for MotD Leaderboard
Element/Coder Coder 1 Coder 2
Attractive Female 182 184
Disheveled Female 8 8
Disheveled Male 6 4
Facial Expression 13 12
Hairstyle 11 12
Injury 9 6
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Name 4 4
Other visual 21 23
Pose 8 5
Prominent Tattoo 10 11
Unknown 13 16
Total 285 285
As shown in Table 12.2, nearly all the mugshots in this period fit into ten 
identifiable categories with only one “unknown” category that does not 
appear to correlate to visual characteristics. Looking at the data, the most 
frequently occurring category was images labelled “attractive female” 
by both coders. The remaining images were split between the ten other 
categories. To describe the other categories in alphabetical order: firstly, 
there were “dishevelled” female and male categories that featured 
individuals whose appearance might suggest a transient lifestyle. The 
“facial expression” category featured images where the arrestee wore 
an unusual expression, such as a wide smile or someone visibly crying. 
Those in the “hairstyle” category had hair that stood out as the main 
identifying feature, such as bright purple hair or hair styled straight 
up in the air, and the “injury” category featured individuals who had 
identifiably fresh injuries or bandages covering their face. The “name” 
category was an exception for the results in that the voting tended to 
be aimed at the arrestee’s name rather than their image; for instance, a 
male arrestee had a name that sounded like a sexual euphemism and a 
man with the same first, middle and last name appeared in this group. 
The “other” category featured those with something identifiable about 
the image that would make the photo stand out, such as an eye patch 
or face mask, but the difference was more of a one-off than an emerging 
pattern. Although this was the second-highest-scoring category, it 
was still significantly less frequent than the top category. The “pose” 
category featured individuals whose bodies were doing something 
out of the ordinary, such as a woman whose hands were placed under 
her chin reminiscent of a 1990’s-era professional glamour portrait, and 
the “prominent tattoo” category featured individuals who had visible 
face and upper-body tattoos (ones that could be seen in a mugshot 
profile). Finally, there was an “unknown” category that featured those 
individuals who were voted onto the leader board, but nothing stood 
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out visually. These could have been individuals who had been featured 
in the news for exceptional crimes, but as this study looked only at the 
visual elements, nothing stood out in their appearance.
Discussion: While the exact reason someone voted cannot be determined, 
due to the anonymous nature of the voting process, the information 
above can at least provide evidence of a visual pattern. In conjunction 
with the content and views analysis of the site, and by looking at the 
results on the leader board, the emergent cluster of visual characteristics 
provides evidence that voters were not just elevating the criminals that 
post the greatest threats to the community. For instance, several of the 
“leading” offenders were arrested for lower-level issues like failure to 
pay fines or fees. Instead, the majority of those featured were attractive 
females, followed by the dishevelled, injured, tattooed, and unusually 
hairstyled. As local Phoenix reporter Ray Stern (2016, n.p.) anecdotally 
noted about the site, “Typically, the winners were the jail’s best-looking 
female inmates, though occasionally a man would win if he had the 
right facial tattoos or bizarre appearance”.
This overwhelming majority of “winning” attractive females is also 
another important exploration unto itself in matters of gender, race 
and class, but for this chapter’s argument, these results fit in with work 
done on engaging in voyeurism as entertainment. The mugshots exist as 
screen bodies, and in a patriarchal world, as Wise comments, “[w]omen 
on screen are then the object of the voyeuristic gaze — they are seen as 
objects of pleasure, often as objects of desire” (2016, p. 16). Voters have 
singled out younger, attractive females to target with visibility in the 
name of entertainment, with the voters in control and those featured in 
the photos forced to sit passively by as others elevate and manipulate 
their digital exposure.
Oddly enough though, too, this is not the first time Sheriff Joe has 
facilitated the increased visibility of arrested females. In July 2000, 
Arpaio started “Jail Cam” that streamed footage from inside the jail 
“where interested viewers world-wide could watch around the clock 
coverage of arrestees entering the jail in handcuffs, the booking process 
and life within the holding cells” (Lynch, 2004, p. 255). This became 
especially problematic in 2001 when as Lynch reports, “the camera inside 
the women’s holding cell became ‘misaligned’ and began broadcasting 
a view of the women’s toilet area” and claims were that “these images 
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ended up being linked to several Internet pornography sites” (ibid., p. 
258).
Implications of the Claims
After reviewing the literature about vigilantism and comparing this 
to the MCSO’s MotD program, as well as examining the leader board, 
my main conclusion emerges: through the exigency of entertainment 
on participatory platforms, online mugshots can temporarily coalesce a 
group of digital vigilantes that weaponise visibility.
With this conclusion, two main implications also emerge that need 
to be discussed. Firstly, entertainment can serve as the exigency for 
individuals to engage in digital vigilantism, and secondly, there can be a 
relationship between the state and the public when engaging in digital 
vigilantism.
Entertainment as exigency for acts of digital vigilantism: To begin this 
discussion, I argue that entertainment can serve as exigency for digital 
vigilantism. This has implications for 1) mugshots as well as 2) digital 
vigilantism and the audience.
Firstly, this claim has implications for mugshots, because those who 
view mugshots have not typically been considered vigilantes. Starting in 
the 1800s, as the use of mugshots grew in popularity, they began to serve 
more constructed, supplementary spaces of entrainment. In order to 
build support for emerging law enforcement groups, some departments, 
such as the New York City police, began to post mugshots in their offices. 
Called “rogue’s galleries” where spectators could visit the lobby of the 
department and view displays of the photos, the spaces allowed 
onlookers to return the gaze of the images (Hall, 2009). They were 
“understood as a popular form of amusement and as an invitation to 
practice the art of detection as a personal safety strategy” (ibid., p. 65), 
and tourists flocked to these galleries (Gunning, 1995). Images of 
outlaws spread in time to wanted posters, bulletins, most-wanted lists 
published by the media such as the FBI’s ten-most-wanted list, then to 
television programs such as America’s Most Wanted. Audiences could 
consume the images as a pastime, whether seeking to identify criminals 
or enjoy a voyeuristic look into another’s life. In their leisure time, a 
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viewer could inspect, consume, judge, speculate and mingle with the 
images, all while keeping distance.
The early mugshot viewer was theorised, then, as more of a spectator 
rather than a participant in interaction with the photo. Interaction was 
limited to more passive defiance. Hall (2009, p. 8) uses Caldwell’s (1995) 
work and calls the historical mugshot consumer a “vigilante viewer” 
or one that stands up to the images and the fear they can produce, in 
order to return the gaze and gain satisfaction that their life is more 
productive than the photographed. As Hall notes, they did not want 
“a live encounter with the outlaw” and instead were more interested to 
“see ‘what a real outlaw looks like’” (2009, p. 7). They would also rather 
have relinquished control of catching and punishing the outlaw to the 
authorities, often cheerleading law enforcement to do so.
In a change of paradigm, though, the participatory platform 
transforms what was called the ‘vigilante viewer’ into a more active 
participant: the ‘digital vigilante’. Whereas vigilante viewers were 
relegated to being passive participants, viewing the photos at a distance, 
those who interact with mugshots online can actually harm the 
individual featured by elevating the images and weaponising visibility. 
Although the mugshot-consuming digital vigilante might still not want 
the live encounter, they can now at least engage with the platform and 
punish the target, whether they know it or even view the target as a 
‘target’.
Secondly, this conclusion also has implications for digital vigilantism 
and what it means to be an audience. As discussed, DV’s “point of 
departure is moral outrage or a general sense of offence taking” (Trottier, 
2017, p. 57), but in another paradigm shift, entertainment does not fit that 
description. DV as entertainment doesn’t fully fit with the motivations 
of outrage or offense. Instead of seeking retaliation or punishment, 
participation is invited by MCSO seemingly for entertainment 
purposes (even if the pleasure derived from participation comes from 
schadenfreude or the voyeuristic ability to objectify the accused.) 
This interpretation also emphasises the power structure of mugshots 
and the one-sidedness of the entertainment. Although Makinen and 
Koskela comment that surveillance as entertainment “is increasingly 
understood in terms of hedonism, pleasure and amusement” (2014, p. 
189), especially in the context of mugshots, this pleasure is most likely 
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absent from those featured in the mugshots, and instead experienced 
by those among the audience who are ‘punching down’, a term Linton 
discusses in her chapter in this volume. Overall, though, even though 
entertainment may seem more light-hearted than more aggressive 
forms of doxing or ‘naming and shaming’, it still produces similar 
results — a watching but participatory audience and a group of those 
being watched, with the latter assemblage being filled with shame 
resulting from the weaponisation of visibility.
It may be easier to argue, then, that those who participate in the 
MCSO’s MotD program are just not digital vigilantes, because the call 
to unite them is more about entertainment and less about retaliation 
for perceived wrongs. However, I also argue that just because the 
group might not be called into existence by the allure of retribution, 
this does not mean that the consequences are different. Those voting 
on the mugshots are still able to weaponise visibility, even if it is under 
the guise of entertainment rather than an attempt to right perceived 
wrongs. Even if entertainment, not retribution, motivated the call for 
engagement, the fact that users elevated the visibility of individuals still 
resulted in consequences for the individual being elevated.
While it may be controversial to make this claim, the idea of 
intention in digital vigilantism at least warrants debate, which 
hopefully spurs discussions about the types and degrees of digital 
vigilantism, or stimulates a debate about terminology that would cover 
the phenomenology of using entertainment as the exigence of the 
weaponisation of visibility. It also effectually causes one to be alert for 
other cases in which entertainment provides the exigency for digital 
vigilantism, such as the work of Driessen and Linton in other chapters 
of this book.
The state/public/private partnership: My second implication is that if 
MCSO created groups of digital vigilantes through their participatory 
platforms under the guise of entertainment, then this means the state 
and the public do have some connections with digital vigilantism. 
This claim also has implications because vigilantism has traditionally 
separated the state and public. As Johnston has argued, vigilantism is 
carried out by “autonomous citizens” (1996, p. 232) expressly without 
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state authority or support.2 However, my conclusion supports Trottier’s 
comments that “[w]hile states may not willingly support vigilantism, 
recent trends in policing are indicative of nodal governance between 
government, law enforcement, private industry and the general public” 
(2017, p. 64). This point also calls for more research and debate as to the 
degree that these entities could and should be connected.
It is also important to add that for the MCSO and other mugshot-
posting agencies, not only does the state provide the space and 
participatory platform for the public to engage with mugshots, but it 
also contributes to a triangular relationship between the state, the public 
and private industry that results in unwanted, intense and enduring 
visibility.
While some municipalities require open access to their public 
records, and other jurisdictions allow for the release of information only 
through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests (Birchall, 2016; 
Martin, 2014; Rosedale, 2014; Shephard, 2014), when state agencies like 
MCSO post the photos onto their official sites, anyone can screen-scrape 
mugshots. Unless posting agencies write their own software to stop 
screen-scraping, as the Charleston, SC sheriff’s office has done (Duffin & 
Fountain, 2018), others can use these photos for their own ends (Rostron, 
2013).
A search of online mugshots reveals how unwanted this is because, in 
addition to the aforementioned lawsuit discussed above, outside of the 
MCSO illustration, there are many other examples of lawsuits where 
those featured on these mugshots pages sued the publisher (Hartzog 
& Selinger, 2015; Martin, 2014; Rosedale, 2014; Rostron, 2013) or where 
those photographed attend “expungement clinics” to learn how to get 
mugshots and associated arrest information taken offline (Lageson, 
2016, p. 26). As stated previously, mugshots are inherently an unwanted 
reminder of a past indiscretion.
The intensity of this relationship is also increased by the triangular 
relationship. The number of reposts can be in the thousands, and as 
2  I would argue that Johnston himself could revisit his own argument to see how 
the resistance or skepticism against law enforcement is, in itself, a motivating 
factor in vigilante actions, thus establishing at least some rhetorical exigency and 
relationship between the state and the public.
324 Introducing Vigilant Audiences
Kravets (2011, n.p.) reports, one website owner hosting four million 
mugshots “‘screen-scrapes’ mugshots at a rate of 1500 per day”. These 
images can travel to other sites, too, and for any given site, mugshots are 
often just downloaded from one site to another (Vasigh, 2013).
These corporate sites also increase the intensity of online mugshots 
by allowing for easier searching. Because commercial site providers 
want to promote their sites, so that they can appear among the top 
results in any number of locations and searches, they use search-engine 
optimisation, tag photos in certain ways or pay to appear among the 
top results of a Google search (Lageson, 2014; Rostron, 2013; Vasigh, 
2013). Also, as Vasigh (2013) brings out, there is a difference between 
mugshots that are available through routine Google searches versus 
those that take more targeted effort to uncover through specific 
departmental jurisdictions. One may not know the arresting agency and 
specific details of an offense to give to law enforcement agencies, but 
someone “may find an arrestee’s mug shot accidently when he or she is 
not seeking to obtain it but is merely searching online” (ibid., p. 289). 
Summing up this intensity, Lageson notes:
[Y]our coworker, first date, or the parents of your kid’s new friend at 
school can all stumble on this information, as a simple arrest — one that 
might not even lead to charges — appears online, accompanied by a 
booking photo. This photo and arrest record might be re-posted to a 
Facebook page, a community blog, on a newspaper police blotter. These 
data are also purchased in bulk by private companies, whose sites are 
often paid top results in a Google search (2014, p. 24).
The state / public / private relationship is also enduring. Because online 
mugshots can be posted by any number of hosts, the photos can 
seemingly multiply on many sites with few ways to stop the reproduction. 
This is another notable difference to law enforcement sites. As Vasigh 
(2013, p. 286) notes, “Most sheriff’s offices usually delete mug shots of 
individuals who are not convicted”, but this is not necessarily true of 
other web publishers. Some commercial websites place the burden on 
the individual and require the mugshotted person to notify them that 
they were not convicted, before the photo will be removed. Often the 
sites also charge for removing the photos, and fees could be any 
amount — for instance, the site Blabbermouth.kc.com tried to charge 
$199.99 to remove a mugshot (Rostron, 2013) and the site Unpublisharrest.
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com was charging $399 (incidentally, both came under the scrutiny of 
law enforcement themselves for these practices, but this is not always 
the case.) This is especially problematic because, as one individual 
interviewed at an expungement clinic stated, “We are here today to try 
to clear our record. Let’s just imagine that I am successful. There is like 
3,000 services out there” (2016, p. 26). So even if one could afford a $400 
fee once, there could be seemingly no end to the number of fees one 
would have to pay. While some states ban charging fees for removal 
(Vasigh, 2013), other states do not, and the practice still proliferates.
Overall, then, not only do the state and the public have a relationship 
in relation to online mugshots, there is a third connection with private 
industries who also use these photos to name and shame in their own 
ways (which also warrants more examination).
Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter, I’ve argued that through the exigency of 
entertainment on participatory platforms, online mugshots temporarily 
coalesce a group of digital vigilantes to weaponise visibility. While I used 
the example of MCSO’s MotD program to illustrate this, the conclusions 
also reveal the need for more research in three areas.
Firstly, while other sites are not necessarily built on “Mugshot 
of the Day!” voting platforms, being able to post reactions such as 
Facebook’s like, love, haha, wow, sad and angry emojis allows mugshot 
consumers the ability to increase the visibility of the photographs on 
other platforms. Visibility has also allowed mugshots on platforms like 
Facebook to go culturally viral too, with a significant amount of exposure. 
More recently, there was “Neck Guy”, who became a meme due to the 
circulation on Facebook of his unusually thick neck in his mugshot 
(Caldwell, 2018), and one of the most notable, visible mugshots was 
the example of 2014’s “hot mugshot guy” or “hot felon”, Jeremy Meeks, 
who was singled out for his model-like appearance. Meeks’ mugshot 
posted by the Stockton Police Department on their Facebook page had 
over 56,000 likes and 16,400 comments in the first 48 hours of posting, 
with a repost of the photo by a news station garnering 301,000 likes 
and 65,000 comments in another twenty hours (Caldwell, 2017). User 
interaction was so strong that the photo also became a meme, spurring 
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the hashtag #FelonCrushFriday, and Google identified “Jeremy Meeks” 
as the top trending search on 20 June 2014.
Secondly, the conclusions also indicate the need for additional 
research about who is targeted when dealing with images and the justice 
system. For MCSO, the department developed a contest around images 
in which the public could participate, and at least in half the cases, the 
public chose to highlight attractive female bodies. The other votes also 
targeted those who looked out of the ordinary. This is a point worthy of 
future attention for studies of gender, justice and culture.
Finally, this also invites more discussion of who can be doxed, who 
can do the doxing and what motivates the doxing. It might seem more 
acceptable for the state to share mugshots for safety reasons, but when 
the same information is shared by state or private entities for purposes 
of entertainment, the rhetorical situation and justifications seemingly 
change, too. These photos can even become larger tools for public 
suppression, as is particularly evident in recent examples involving 
hate groups. Caroline Sinders and Joan Donovan (2018) note that in 
August 2018, the Berkeley, CA police department tweeted mugshots of 
counter-protestors at a far-right gathering. This, in essence, served as 
a silencing device for protests because it added an additional layer of 
consequence for those arrested, as “[b]y placing the arrested in public 
view, these far-right groups are able to target and harass those awaiting 
trial” (ibid., n.p.) and intimidate future protesters. With power in the 
hands of the state to place the personal information of others onto 
participatory platforms, it is increasingly important to interrogate the 
power structures and power diffusions that call for and allow citizens 
both to carry out and to be a victim of naming and shaming.
While it may be difficult to pinpoint exactly why someone chose to 
vote for a particular person, it was helpful to analyze both the calls for 
voting as well as the images that received the most votes, in order at 
least to provide a snapshot of how the call for participation was framed 
and what the resulting participation looked like. Overall, the research 
into these photos ultimately leads me to conclude that through the 
exigency of entertainment on participatory platforms, online mugshots 
temporarily coalesce a group of digital vigilantes to weaponise visibility. 
Thus, the state can play a part in digital vigilantism, ultimately 
contributing to ever-evolving definitions of vigilantism in a digital 
world.
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This ground-breaking collec� on of essays examines the scope and consequences of 
digital vigilan� sm — a phenomenon emerging on a global scale, which sees digital 
audiences using social pla� orms to shape social and poli� cal life. Longstanding 
forms of moral scru� ny and jus� ce seeking are disseminated through our 
contemporary media landscape, and researchers are increasingly recognising the 
signifi cance of societal impacts eff ected by digital media.
The authors engage with a range of cross-disciplinary perspec� ves in order to 
explore the ac� ons of a vigilant digital audience — denuncia� on, shaming, doxing 
— and to consider the role of the press and other public fi gures in suppor� ng 
or contes� ng these ac� vi� es. In turn, the volume illuminates several tensions 
underlying these jus� ce seeking ac� vi� es — from their capacity to reproduce 
categorical forms of discrimina� on, to the diverse mo� va� ons of the wider 
audiences who par� cipate in vigilant denuncia� ons.
This � mely volume presents though� ul case studies drawn both from high-profi le 
Anglo-American contexts, and from developments in regions that have received 
less coverage in English-language scholarship. It is dis� nc� ve in its focus on the 
contested boundary between policing and entertainment, and on the various 
contexts in which the desire to seek retribu� on converges with the desire to 
consume entertainment.
As with all Open Book publica� ons, this en� re book is available to read for free on 
the publisher’s website. Printed and digital edi� ons, together with supplementary 
digital material, can also be found at www.openbookpublishers.com
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